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Abstract		
	Since	 Freud’s	 ‘Mourning	 and	Melancholia’	was	 published	 in	 1917,	many	 theorists	 have	expanded	upon	as	well	as	critiqued	his	work	in	order	to	think	through	questions	of	grief	and	subjectivity.	In	this	thesis	I	argue	that	such	questions	are	generally	framed	in	relation	to	 the	 human,	 and	 suggest	 that	 our	 contemporary	 moment	 is	 increasingly	 producing	literary	 texts	 that	 are	 particularly	 concerned	 with	 imagining	 the	 relationship	 between	loss	and	the	nonhuman.	Following	David	Eng	and	David	Kazanjian	(2002),	I	use	‘loss’	as	a	theoretical	 term	 that	 ‘names	 what	 is	 apprehended	 by	 discourses	 and	 practices	 of	mourning,	melancholia,	nostalgia,	sadness,	trauma	and	depression’,	and	I	argue	that	this	term	 is	 able	 to	usefully	 open	up	 such	discourses	 and	practices	beyond	anthropocentric	narratives.		This	 thesis	 is	organised	 into	 two	sections.	Each	 focuses	on	a	particular	 instance	of	 loss,	the	first	being	‘Mourning	and	Melancholia’	and	the	second	‘Trauma.’	In	the	first	section,	I	begin	with	an	extended	reading	of	Peter	Carey’s	2012	novel	The	Chemistry	of	Tears.	Here	I	examine	 Carey’s	 text	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 ‘critical	 agency’	 Freud	 identifies	 as	 one	 of	melancholia’s	 symptoms,	 exploring	 the	 ways	 this	 manifests	 in	 the	 novel	 as	 a	 form	 of	‘unworking’	 that	 reorients	 the	 protagonists’	 relationships	 to	 humans,	 nonhumans,	 and	‘things.’	 In	 the	 two	 remaining	 chapters	 of	 this	 section,	 I	 firstly	 examine	 de-extinction	projects	 in	relation	to	recent	 theoretical	work	that	 identifies	melancholic	attachment	as	the	basis	of	subject	formation,	and	then	undertake	a	reading	of	Chloe	Hooper’s	A	Child’s	
Book	of	True	Crime	(2002)	that	explores	the	text’s	portrayal	of	children	and	extinction	in	the	light	of	recent	work	on	queer	negativity.			In	 the	 second	 section	 I	 undertake	 a	 set	 of	 three	 linked	 readings	 that	 explore	 the	relationship	between	trauma	theory	and	 interpretation.	All	 three	of	 the	 literary	 texts	 in	this	section	feature	ghostly	animals	as	guiding	elements	of	the	plot,	and	my	interest	here	is	 in	 exploring	 how	 hospitable	 their	 authors	 are	 to	 these	 uncanny	 subjects.	 I	 briefly	examine	Evie	Wyld’s	novel	All	the	Birds,	Singing	(2014)	as	a	depiction	of	PTSD,	then	move	on	 to	 read	Suzanne	Berne’s	The	Dogs	of	Littlefield	(2014)	alongside	critical	work	 that	 is	concerned	 with	 the	 concept	 of	 immunity.	 Finally,	 I	 undertake	 an	 extended	 reading	 of	Fiona	McFarlane’s	novel	The	Night	Guest	(2014).	Here,	 I	 trace	 the	 relationship	between	‘inside’	and	‘outside’	as	it	manifests	in	both	trauma	and	hospitality	theory,	suggesting	that	McFarlane’s	text	offers	an	important	disruption	of	this	binary.				 	
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Introduction	
	
Monstrous	Metaphors:	
	Theorising	the	Nonhuman	in	Loss	Narratives	
		 Belief	is	half	of	all	healing.	Belief	in	the	cure,	belief	in	the	future	that	awaits.	
−A	Monster	Calls	(2016)	
	 If	it’s	in	a	word,	or	it’s	in	a	look,	you	can’t	get	rid	of	the	Babadook.	−The	Babadook	(2014)		
	
Letting	go			 Conor	O’Malley	 is	 twelve	years	old	and	he	keeps	having	 the	 same	nightmare.	He	 is	 leaning	over	 the	edge	of	a	cliff,	holding	 tightly	on	to	his	mother’s	hand	to	stop	her	 from	falling.	He	has	 this	nightmare	because	 in	waking	life	his	mother	is	very	ill:	she	is	dying.	One	night	the	yew	tree	that	stands	 in	 the	 cemetery	 behind	 his	 house	 starts	 to	 uproot	 itself	 from	 the	ground;	 its	 branches	 twist	 into	 the	 shape	 of	 limbs	 and	 it	 grows	 tall	 and	monstrous,	 then	walks	 slowly	 and	 heavily	 towards	 his	window,	 shaking	the	ground.		‘I	have	come	to	get	you,	Conor	O’Malley,’	it	says.	The	monster	has	a	proposal	 for	Conor;	 it	will	 tell	him	 three	stories,	over	 three	nights,	and	 then	 Conor	 will	 have	 to	 tell	 a	 story	 in	 return:	 the	 story	 of	 his	nightmare.	When	it	comes	time	for	Conor	to	do	this	he	refuses	because	the	nightmare	 he	 keeps	 having,	 where	 he	 can	 hold	 on	 no	 longer	 and	 his	mother	 falls,	has	a	 terrible	 truth	at	 its	heart.	The	monster	knows	 this,	of	course;	 it	has	always	known.	 ‘Speak	 the	 truth,’	 it	 roars,	 ‘it	will	 kill	 you	 if	you	do	not!’	So	Conor	reveals	the	true	story	of	his	nightmare:	he	wants	it	all	 to	be	finished.	 ‘I	 let	her	fall,’	he	tells	the	creature.	 ‘I	 let	her	die.’	Conor	has	been	brave,	the	monster	says,	and	together	they	travel	for	the	last	time	
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to	the	hospital	where	his	mother	is	dying.	This	story,	the	creature	explains,	‘ends	with	 a	 boy	holding	on	 tight	 to	his	mother,	 and	by	doing	 so	he	 can	finally	let	her	go.’		
Hanging	on	
		 Amelia’s	husband	was	killed	 in	a	 car	 crash.	He	was	driving	her	 to	the	hospital	to	give	birth	and	the	baby	that	was	born	that	day	is	now	seven	years	 old.	 His	 name	 is	 Samuel,	 and	 he	 sees	monsters	 everywhere.	 He	 is	difficult	and	needy	and	Amelia	struggles	 to	 look	after	him	because	she	 is	still	paralysed	by	grief.	When	Samuel	finds	a	pop-up	picture	book	about	a	monster	called	 ‘the	Babadook’,	he	becomes	certain	 that	 it	 is	 in	 the	house	and	wants	to	hurt	them	both.	Amelia	tries	to	destroy	the	book.	She	hides	it,	rips	it	up,	and	sets	it	alight,	but	it	keeps	coming	back	somehow,	just	as	the	story	says	it	will.	‘If	it’s	in	a	word,	or	it’s	in	a	look,	you	can’t	get	rid	of	the	Babadook.’	 Soon	 she	 starts	 hearing	 the	 monster	 in	 the	 house	 at	 night,	whispering	and	knocking	on	doors.	She	follows	it	down	to	the	cellar	where	she	 keeps	 all	 of	 her	 husband’s	 belongings	 and	 finds	 it	 there,	 dressed	 as	him.	Then,	somehow,	the	monster	is	inside	Amelia	and	she	is	filled	with	its	anger	 and	 its	 violence.	 It	makes	 her	 kill	 her	 little	white	 dog	 and	 then	 it	turns	 its	 rage	 towards	 her	 son,	 although	 she	 tries	 her	 best	 to	 fight	 it.	 ‘I	haven’t	been	good	since	your	dad	died’,	she	tells	Samuel.	 ‘I’m	sick,	Sam.	I	need	help.’	He	is	determined	to	protect	her	from	monsters	at	all	costs.	He	ties	her	up	in	the	cellar	and	there	is	an	exorcism;	she	vomits	the	Babadook	out	 in	a	 flood	of	black	bile.	After	 this	 their	 lives	are	a	 little	 calmer.	They	gather	up	worms	together	 in	the	garden	and	Amelia	 takes	them	down	to	the	 cellar	where	 the	Babadook	 lives,	where	Samuel	 is	not	 allowed	 to	 go.	She	feeds	it	every	day.		 	***		
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	 The	sketches	above	present	the	plots	of	two	recent	films,	A	Monster	
Calls	(2016),	and	The	Babadook	(2014).1	Although	they	belong	to	different	genres	–	A	Monster	Calls	is	a	film	for	children,2	and	The	Babadook	a	horror	–	 they	 share	 a	 striking	 similarity	 in	 that	 they	 both	 tell	 stories	 about	 the	way	grief	comes	to	inhabit	and	change	family	relationships.	This	is	where	the	 similarities	 end,	 however,	 because	 the	ways	 that	 both	 films	 imagine	the	 effects	 of	 this	 grief	 are	 vastly	 different.	A	Monster	 Calls	 tells	 a	 story	about	 letting	go	and	moving	on	from	grief,	with	this	process	of	 letting	go	presented	as	an	imperative	that	will	prove	fatal	 if	 ignored.	The	Babadook	takes	 as	 its	 theme	 the	 effects	 of	 such	 a	 failure	 to	 let	 go,	 with	 Amelia’s	inability	to	move	on	after	her	husband’s	death	resulting	in	the	arrival	of	a	monstrous	presence	that	even	as	the	film	closes	remains	dormant.	In	this	sense,	despite	 their	differences	 in	approach,	 the	 films	can	be	understood	as	sending	a	particular	moral	message	in	that	they	both	position	the	idea	of	 ‘hanging	 on’	 to	 grief	 as	 damaging.	 In	 A	Monster	 Calls	 this	 damage	 is	positioned	at	the	level	of	the	grieving	subject	themselves	because	Conor’s	failure	to	‘speak	the	truth’	and	acknowledge	that	he	needs	(and	wants)	to	let	 go	 of	 his	 mother	 will,	 the	monster	 says,	 kill	 him.	 Conversely,	 in	 The	
Babadook,	 the	 risks	of	Amelia’s	 longstanding	 relation	 to	her	 grief	 extend	outwards	to	endanger	not	only	her	but	also	her	child.			 In	telling	these	stories	about	holding	onto	and	letting	go	of	grief,	A	
Monster	Calls	 and	The	Babadook	 set	 up	 an	 opposition	 that	 replicates	 the	distinction	 made	 by	 Sigmund	 Freud	 a	 hundred	 years	 earlier	 in	 his	influential	 essay	 ‘Mourning	 and	 Melancholia.’	 Here	 Freud	 theorises	responses	 to	 grief	 in	 psychoanalytic	 terms	 by	 contrasting	 ‘the	 normal	affect	 of	 mourning’	 to	 its	 pathological	 opposite,	 melancholia. 3 	The	mourner,	 in	 Freud’s	 terms,	 undergoes	 a	process	 of	 detachment	 from	 the																																																									1	J.A.Bayona,	A	Monster	Calls	(IFC	Films,	2016);	Jennifer	Kent,	The	Babadook	(Screen	Australia,	2014).	2	The	film	is	adapted	for	screen	by	Patrick	Ness	from	his	book	of	the	same	name.	3	Sigmund	Freud,	‘Mourning	and	Melancholia’,	in	The	Standard	Edition	of	the	Complete	Psychological	
Works	of	Sigmund	Freud.	Volume	XIV	(1914-1916),	On	the	History	of	the	Psycho-Analytic	Movement,	
Papers	on	Metapsychology	and	Other	Works	(London:	Vintage,	2001),	p.	243.	
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lost	 love	object	 instigated	by	 ‘reality-testing’	 that	 identifies	 this	object	as	no	longer	being	in	existence	(p.	244).	A	Monster	Calls	stages	this	process	by	the	monster	repeatedly	emphasising	the	importance	of	Conor	speaking	the	‘truth’	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 his	 nightmare.	 This	 ‘reality-test’	 allows	 Conor	 to	recognise	the	imminent	loss	of	his	mother	and	to	begin	to	detach	from	her,	an	action	expressed	literally	in	the	film	through	the	powerful	visual	image	of	him	letting	go	of	her	hand.			 By	 contrast,	 this	 process	 of	 detachment,	 after	 which	 ‘the	 ego	becomes	free	and	uninhibited	again,’	fails	to	work	properly	in	melancholia.	Instead,	 the	melancholic	refuses	detachment	by	 forming	an	 identification	with	 the	 lost	 love	 object	 and	 incorporating	 it	 into	 their	 ego.	 In	 doing	 so	they	make	the	 lost	object	a	part	of	 themselves	and	merge	with	 it,	so	that	previously	held	attitudes	toward	that	object	can	now	be	shifted	back	onto	their	own	person.	Because,	as	Freud	explains,	 ‘the	 loss	of	a	 love-object	 is	an	excellent	opportunity	for	the	ambivalence	in	love-relationships	to	make	itself	 effective	 and	 come	 into	 the	 open’,	 and	 because	 he	 sees	 one	 of	 the	possible	preconditions	for	a	melancholic	response	as	the	grieving	subject’s	already	 unusually	 ambivalent	 relationship	 to	 what	 has	 been	 lost,	 the	orientation	 to	 the	object	 that	becomes	shifted	back	onto	 the	 self	 is	often	one	 characterised	 by	 feelings	 of	 ‘being	 slighted,	 neglected,	 or	disappointed.’	The	result	of	this	is	that	the	melancholic	exhibits	‘a	lowering	of	 the	 self-regarding	 feelings	 to	 a	 degree	 that	 finds	 utterance	 in	 self-reproaches	 and	 self-revilings’	 (pp.	 250-251).	 In	 The	 Babadook	 the	appearance	of	 the	monster	 is	 associated	with	Amelia’s	 late	husband	 and	her	continuing	attachment	to	him,	a	connection	made	clear	by	the	monster	choosing	 the	cellar	where	Amelia	keeps	all	her	husband’s	possessions	as	its	den.		The	cellar	in	the	film	suggests	the	space	of	Amelia’s	ego	into	which	the	 lost	 love	 object	 (her	 husband)	 has	 been	 incorporated,	 and	 her	identification	with	the	monster	by	means	of	its	possession	of	her	allows	all	the	 ambivalent	 and	 destructive	 energies	 associated	 with	 melancholia	 to	emerge	and	 turn	back	upon	her	and	Samuel.	Ultimately	 in	The	Babadook	the	moment	of	reality-testing	does	not	result	in	Amelia’s	detachment	from	
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her	 husband.	 Although	 she	 exorcises	 The	 Babadook	 by	 claiming	 it	 is	‘trespassing	 in	 her	 home’	 –	 a	 phrase	 that	 suggests	 the	 ejection	 of	 the	incorporated	object	from	the	ego	–	as	the	film	closes	the	monster	remains	dormant	in	the	cellar	and	her	feeding	of	it	shows	she	is	invested	in	keeping	it	alive.		 In	 its	 simplest	 terms	 this	 distinction	 between	 mourning	 and	melancholia	manifests	 in	 these	 narratives	 as	 a	means	 of	 identifying	 and	opposing	healthy	and	pathological	responses	to	loss,	and	of	making	visible	the	 negative	 consequences	 of	 the	 latter.	 In	 this	 sense	 they	 provide	examples	of	the	antagonistic	relationship	between	‘hanging	on’	and	‘letting	go’	 that	 this	 thesis	 will	 argue	 is	 still	 identifiable	 in	 contemporary	representations	 of	 loss.	 As	 looking	 at	 the	 reviews	 of	 both	 films	 makes	clear,	however,	something	strange	happens	when	people	watch	(and	then	write	 about)	 these	 two	 stories	 of	 loss;	 strange	 because	 although	 the	presence	of	a	monster	is	vital	to	each	tale,	responses	to	the	film	seem	to	be	intent	 on	 making	 these	 monsters	 disappear.	 The	 Empire	 review	 of	 A	
Monster	Calls,	 for	example,	suggests	that	the	titular	monster	 is	 in	fact	not	‘the	 Neeson-voiced	 creature’	 but	 rather	 ‘grief	 itself.’ 4 	Similarly,	 the	
Independent	praises	the	film	for	not	being	 ‘scared	to	let	the	monster	out’,	with	 the	true	meaning	of	monster	here	being	 ‘the	boy’s	rage	and	guilt	as	well	as	his	grief.’5	Reviews	of	The	Babadook	are	even	firmer	on	this	point,	with	Pop	Matters	 claiming	 the	 reason	 it	 is	 so	 frightening	 is	because	 ‘it	 is	not	 a	 movie	 about	 a	 monster’,	 but	 about	 ‘a	 mother.’6	Vulture’s	 reviewer	even	goes	so	far	as	to	defend	the	film	against	the	idea	that	its	metaphor	is	
																																																								4	Dan	Jolin,	‘A	Monster	Calls’,	Empire,	2017	<https://www.empireonline.com/movies/monster-calls/review/>	[accessed	11	October	2017].	5	Geoffrey	McNab,	‘Review:	A	Monster	Calls	Isn’t	Afraid	to	Let	the	Monster	out’,	The	Independent,	2016	<http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/films/reviews/a-monster-calls-review-film-liam-neeson-tree-felicity-jones-a7500131.html>	[accessed	11	October	2017].	6	‘“The	Babadook”	Isn’t	a	Horror	Movie	About	a	Monster,	But	a	Mother’,	PopMatters	<http://www.popmatters.com/review/192938-the-babadook/>	[accessed	11	October	2017].	
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‘too	 close	 to	 the	 surface,	 and	 the	 film	 too	 obviously	 a	 parable	 of	motherhood’	by	explaining	that	he	‘didn’t	mind	that	“obviousness.”’7		 The	problem	that	arises	here,	then,	is	that	the	nonhuman	vanishes	from	the	narrative;	or	perhaps	more	accurately,	is	pushed	out	of	the	frame.		Rather	than	suggesting	that	because	this	occurs	such	interpretations	of	the	films	 are	 incorrect	 in	 some	 way	 (certainly,	 both	 The	 Babadook	 and	 A	
Monster	 Calls	 invite	 this	 kind	 of	 analysis)	 I	 am	 interested	 instead	 in	 a	question	that	would	be	phrased	more	positively.	What	would	a	review	of	these	 films	 look	 like	 that	 took	 these	 monsters	 seriously?	 How	 might	 a	response	 be	 formulated	 that	 approached	 the	 questions	 of	 loss	 raised	 by	both	texts	without	feeling	the	need	to	erase	their	nonhuman	presences?		 It	 is	 here	 that	my	 thesis	 intervenes.	 In	 the	 chapters	 that	 follow	 I	examine	 how	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 nonhuman	 enters	 narratives	 about	 loss,	particularly	focusing	on	tracing	the	ways	that	this	figure	interacts	with	the	hanging	on/letting	go	opposition	that	I	see	as	still	key	to	the	way	that	loss	is	 formulated	 in	 contemporary	 texts.	 As	 such,	 my	 thesis	 aims	 to	 take	nonhuman	presences	 seriously	when	 they	appear	 in	narratives	of	 loss,	 a	task	I	take	up	in	two	particular	ways.	Firstly,	 I	examine	how	space	might	be	 opened	 up	 for	 the	 nonhuman	 in	 contemporary	 texts	 by	 drawing	attention	to	its	presence	in	these	narratives	and	prioritising	its	meaning	in	the	 readings	 that	 I	 undertake.	 Secondly,	 I	 address	 the	 question	 of	 how,	once	this	space	is	opened	up,	it	might	be	kept	open.	As	such,	I	look	closely	at	 the	 ways	 contemporary	 texts	 might	 be	 hospitable	 to	 nonhuman	presences	without	seeking	to	erase	them	or	reduce	their	meaning.	When	using	the	term	‘nonhuman’	here,	I	include	in	that	definition	all	‘bodies’	that	would	usually	be	understood	as	distinct	from	the	human.	In	doing	so	I	do	not	 exclude	 ‘things’	 or	 ‘objects’	 that	 are	 conventionally	 categorised	 as	nonliving	 (or	 nonsentient)	 such	 as	 machines,	 chemicals,	 and	 buildings,																																																									7	‘Australian	Horror	Movie	The	Babadook	Is	In	the	Running	For	My	Favorite	Movie	Of	the	Year’,	
Vulture,	2014	<http://www.vulture.com/2014/11/movie-review-the-babadook.html>	[accessed	12	October	2017].	
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whilst	also	using	the	word	nonhuman	to	refer	to	presences	that	might	be	more	easily	understood	as	embodied,	like	animals	(or	monsters).	In	using	this	 umbrella	 term	 I	 do	 not	 mean	 to	 flatten	 the	 important	 distinctions	between	 these	 different	 bodies,	 and	 each	 chapter	 in	 this	 thesis	 seeks	 to	evaluate	 the	 particular	 nonhuman	 presence	 that	 it	 focuses	 on	 in	 all	 its	proper	complexity.	However,	it	is	useful	to	me	here	(and	at	other	times	in	my	thesis)	as	shorthand	for	the	kinds	of	bodies	that	stand	in	opposition	to	the	humanist	subject.		 In	the	remainder	of	 this	 introduction,	 then,	 I	 first	 identify	some	of	the	 contemporary	work	 that	 has	 been	done	 on	 loss,	 specifically	 theories	that	 have	 addressed	 the	 concepts	 of	 mourning	 and	 melancholia.	 I	 then	turn	 to	 look	 at	 work	 done	 by	 scholars	 whose	 primary	 interest	 is	 the	theorisation	 of	 the	 nonhuman	 –	 most	 significantly	 the	 fields	 of	 animal	studies,	 new	 materialism,	 and	 environmental	 humanities	 −	 in	 order	 to	explore	some	of	the	ways	that	this	body	of	work	has	figured	the	nonhuman	in	 relation	 to	 loss.	 Finally,	 I	 lay	 out	 some	of	 the	 scholarly	work	 that	 has	most	 influenced	 my	 thinking	 in	 order	 to	 explain	 my	 approach	 to	 the	questions	of	this	thesis	in	more	detail,	finishing	with	a	brief	description	of	the	themes	that	will	be	addressed	in	each	chapter.		 ***			 Although	the	concept	of	melancholia	has	a	long	history,	this	thesis	uses	Freud’s	1917	essay	‘Mourning	and	Melancholia’	as	its	starting	point.	This	 is	because	Freud’s	essay	can	be	understood	as	 initiating	 the	conflict	between	normal	 and	pathological	ways	 of	mourning	 understood	here	 as	part	 of	 the	 hanging	 on/letting	 go	 formulation	 that	 inhabits	 theories	 of	loss.8	As	such,	in	this	thesis	I	tend	to	use	the	word	‘grief’	or	‘grieving’	as	a	
																																																								8	One	of	the	most	influential	studies	of	the	evolution	of	melancholia	as	a	concept	is	Saturn	and	
Melancholy:	studies	in	the	history	of	natural	philosophy,	religion	and	art	by	Raymond	Klibansky	(London:	Nelson,	1964)	
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more	 neutral	 term	 to	 indicate	 an	 instance	 of	 loss,	 with	 ‘mourning’	 and	‘melancholia’	used	specifically	in	their	Freudian	psychoanalytic	sense.			 Whilst	 Freud’s	 essay	 can	 certainly	 be	 understood	 as	 instantiating	this	 opposition,	 he	 himself	 came	 to	 doubt	 that	 an	 ultimate	 separation	 of	the	 two	 terms	was	possible.	 In	his	 later	work	 this	 led	him	 to	 reconsider	one	of	 the	central	claims	of	 ‘Mourning	and	Melancholia’;	namely	 that	 the	identification	of	ego	with	abandoned	object	was	a	pathological	response	to	loss.	 	Instead	he	came	to	understand	this	process	as	not	only	‘typical’	but	also	 a	 vital	 component	 of	 subject	 formation,	with	 the	 ego	made	 up	 of	 ‘a	precipitate	 of	 abandoned	object-cathexes.’9	Walter	Benjamin	 and	 Jacques	Derrida	have	also	sought	 to	complicate	 these	terms	and	undermine	their	oppositional	 logic,10	Benjamin	 in	The	Origin	of	German	Tragic	Drama	 and	Derrida	as	part	of	a	substantial	body	of	work	on	mourning,	most	notably	in	
Memoires	for	Paul	de	Man.11However,	as	an	analysis	of	the	two	films	above	shows,	the	oppositional	logic	of	healthy/pathological	mourning	persists	in	cultural	 forms	 that	 deal	with	 loss,	 as	well	 as	 in	 the	 political	 sphere.12	In	this	 sense	 melancholia	 and	 mourning	 still	 operate,	 as	 Sara	 Ahmed	 has	argued,	as	diagnostic	categories.13	
																																																								9	Sigmund	Freud,	Sigmund	Freud,	and	others,	The	Ego	and	the	Id.	Translated	by	Joan	Riviere.	Revised	
and	Newly	Edited	by	James	Strachey.	(London:	Hogarth	Press,	1962),	p.	18.	10	For	an	analysis	of	this	in	Benjamin’s	work	see	Ilit	Ferber,	‘Melancholy	Philosophy:	Freud	and	Benjamin’,	E-rea,	4.1	(2006)	and	in	Derrida’s	see	Sam	Durrant,	Postcolonial	Narrative	and	the	Work	
of	Mourning.	(Albany:	State	University	of	New	York	Press,	2004),	pp.	23-51.	11	Walter	Benjamin	and	John	Osborne,	The	Origin	of	German	Tragic	Drama	(London ;	New	York:	Verso,	1998);	Jacques	Derrida,	Memoires	for	Paul	de	Man,	trans.	by	Cecile	Lindsay,	Rev.ed	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	1989).	12	We	might	think	here	of	the	former	British	Prime	Minister	David	Cameron’s	differing	attitudes	to	historical	episodes	of	violence.	Cameron	gave	a	speech	in	2014	where	he	emphasized	the	importance	of	ensuring	‘the	the	memory	and	lessons	of	the	Holocaust	live	on	for	generations	to	come.’	This	is	in	contrast	to	comments	made	on	a	2015	trip	to	Jamaica	where	he	said	that	the	country	should	‘move	on’	from	the	painful	legacy	of	slavery.	(Rowena	Mason,	‘Jamaica	Should	“Move	on	from	Painful	Legacy	of	Slavery”,	Says	Cameron’,	The	Guardian,	30	September	2015		[accessed	13	October	2017].;	PA,	‘“We	Must	Never	Forget	The	Holocaust”’,	HuffPost	UK,	[accessed	13	October	2017].)	13	Sara	Ahmed,	The	Promise	of	Happiness	(Durham	[NC]:	Duke	University	Press,	2010),	p.	139.	
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	 In	 recent	 decades	 there	 has	 also	 been	 an	 emphasis	 in	 humanities	disciplines	 on	 retaining	 this	 opposition	 by	 theorising	 melancholia	 as	 an	ethical	response	to	loss.	Such	approaches	have	increasingly	come	to	think	of	melancholia	 in	 political	 terms	 and	 particularly	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 subject	formation,	an	argument	made	most	 familiar	by	 Judith	Butler	with	regard	to	the	disavowal	of	queer	experience.14	In	the	introduction	to	their	edited	collection	 of	 essays	 on	 loss,	 David	 L.	 Eng	 and	 David	 Kazanjian	 similarly	suggest	 that	 the	 themes	 of	 the	 included	 work	 illustrate	 the	 fact	 that	‘melancholia	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 this	 century	 has	 emerged	 as	 a	 crucial	touchstone	for	social	and	subjective	formations.’15	For	Eng	and	Kazanjian	melancholia	 provides	 a	 particularly	 ethical	 means	 of	 engaging	 with	questions	 of	 memory	 and	 history	 in	 the	 contemporary	 moment.	 Their	argument	that	‘mourning	abandons	lost	objects	by	laying	their	histories	to	rest,’	whilst	‘melancholia’s	continued	and	open	relation	to	the	past	finally	allows	 us	 to	 gain	 new	 perspectives	 on	 and	 new	 understandings	 of	 lost	objects,’	reverses	the	orthodox	narrative	of	mourning	and	melancholia	by	aligning	mourning	with,	 if	 not	 pathology,	 certainly	 a	 kind	 of	 immorality	(Loss,	p.	4).	Catriona	Mortimer-Sandilands	makes	a	similar	argument	when	she	 suggests	 that	 melancholia	 is	 ‘a	 potentially	 politicized’	 way	 of	preserving	and	subscribing	value	to	a	lost	object	‘in	the	midst	of	a	culture	that	fails	to	recognize	its	significance’,	a	notion	Sara	Ahmed	also	addresses	in	relation	to	what	she	argues	is	British	society’s	failure	to	engage	with	its	racist	history	(The	Promise	of	Happiness,	p.	121-159).16		 Eng	 and	 his	 colleague	 Shinhee	 Han	 also	 number	 among	 the	theorists	 who	 have	 found	 the	 concept	 of	 melancholic	 identification	 (the	ego’s	 incorporation	 of	 and	mergence	with	 its	 lost	 love	 object)	 useful	 for																																																									14	Judith	Butler,	The	Psychic	Life	of	Power :	Theories	in	Subjection	(Stanford,	Calif.:	Stanford	University	Press,	1997).	15	David	L.	Eng	and	David	Kazanjian,	Loss :	The	Politics	of	Mourning	(Berkeley ;	London:	University	of	California	Press,	2003),	p.	23.	16	Catriona	Mortimer-Sandilands,	‘Melancholy	Natures,	Queer	Ecologies’,	in	Queer	Ecologies:	Sex,	
NAture,	Politics,	Desire	(Bloomington:	Indiana	University	Press,	2010),	pp.	331–58	(p.	333).	
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exploring	issues	of	identity	in	social,	political,	and	cultural	terms.		They	see	the	 melancholic	 model	 as	 particularly	 applicable	 to	 an	 analysis	 of	 race	(specifically	the	experience	of	Asian	Americans),	suggesting	that	it	can	be	understood	 as	 ‘underpinning	 our	 everyday	 conflicts	 and	 struggles	 with	experiences	of	 immigration,	assimilation,	and	racialization.’17	Anne	Cheng	has	also	found	melancholia	valuable	as	a	means	of	theorising	the	operation	of	 racialization	 in	 the	 USA,	 where	 she	 sees	 (white)	 national	 identity	 as	taking	shape	by	incorporating	the	abandoned	object	of	the	racial	‘other.’18	Douglas	 Crimp	 and	 Ann	 Cvetkovich	 similarly	 find	 a	 melancholic	framework	 helpful	 for	 thinking	 through	 questions	 about	 queerness,	identity,	and	grief	in	relation	to	the	on-going	legacies	of	the	AIDS	crisis.	19	Whilst	 recognising	 the	usefulness	of	melancholic	 thinking	 for	analyses	of	subjectivity,	 these	 theorists	 tend	 to	 be	 more	 sceptical	 about	 its	 ethical	dimension.	 Ranjana	 Khanna	 and	 Paul	 Gilroy	 in	 particular	 have	 drawn	attention	 to	 the	 ways	 that	 melancholia	 often	 functions	 as	 a	 colonial	cultural	 formation,	 Khanna	 by	 situating	 psychoanalysis	 in	 its	 historical	context	 as	 a	 ‘colonial	 discipline’,	 and	 Gilroy	 by	 coining	 the	 term	‘postimperial	 melancholia’	 to	 refer	 to	 British	 national	 attitudes	 to	 the	violent	legacies	of	empire.20		 A	 related	 but	 separate	 strand	 of	 inquiry	 focusing	 on	 the	 political	and	 ethical	 implications	 of	 theorising	 loss,	 best	 represented	 by	 Judith	Butler’s	work	in	her	books	Precarious	Life	and	Frames	of	War,	 focuses	on	exploring	how	certain	lives	come	to	be	figured	as	‘grievable’	whilst	others																																																									17	David	L.	Eng	and	Shinhee	Han,	‘A	Dialogue	on	Racial	Melancholia’,	in	Loss:	The	Politics	of	
Mourning,	ed.	by	David	L.	Eng	and	David	Kazanjian	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	2003),	p.	344.	18	Anne	Anlin	Cheng,	‘The	Melancholy	of	Race’,	The	Kenyon	Review,	19.1	(1997),	49–61.	19	See	their	contributions	to	Eng	and	Kazanjian’s	volume	Loss	(2003)	as	well	as	their	own	monographs:	Douglas	Crimp,	Melancholia	and	Moralism:	Essays	on	AIDS	and	Queer	Politics	(Cambridge,	Mass:	MIT	Press,	2002);	Ann	Cvetkovich,	An	Archive	of	Feelings :	Trauma,	Sexuality,	and	
Lesbian	Public	Cultures	(Durham,	NC:	Duke	University	Press,	2003).	20	Ranjana	Khanna,	Dark	Continents :	Psychoanalysis	and	Colonialism	(Durham,	N.C. ;	London:	Duke	University	Press,	2003);	Paul	Gilroy,	Postcolonial	Melancholia,	The	Wellek	Lectures	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2005).	
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do	not.	For	Butler	 this	question	emerges	most	urgently	out	of	 the	rise	 in	global	violence	post-9/11,	and	 leads	her	 to	posit	 the	affective	experience	of	loss	as	a	powerful	means	of	imagining	new	kinds	of	community	in	these	difficult	times.	The	fact	that	‘all	of	us	have	lost	somebody’	suggests,	Butler	argues,	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 ‘appeal	 to	 a	 “we”	 united	 by	 shared	vulnerability	 to	 this	 condition	 (Precarious	 Life,	 p.	 22).	 A	 community	gathered	 together	 under	 the	 sign	 of	 loss	 would	 thus	 be	 well	 placed	 to	refuse	to	accept	 ‘the	differential	distribution	of	grievability	on	which	war	depends’	(Frames	of	War,	p.xix).	This	imagined	community,	however,	does	not	 extend	 outwards	 in	 her	 work	 to	 include,	 for	 example,	 animals.	Although	Butler	states	 that	she	 is	 interested	 in	asking	 ‘whose	 lives	count	as	lives’	by	way	of	exploring	who	gets	to	be	called	human,	she	focuses	on	this	 question	 by	 limiting	 herself	 to	 exploring	 the	 ethical	 potential	 of	broken	 attachments	 only	 as	 they	 occur	 between	 subjects	 she	 already	assumes	 to	 be	 human.	 ‘Perhaps	 it	 should	 come	 as	 no	 surprise	 that	 I	propose	to	start,	and	end,	with	the	question	of	the	human,’	she	writes,	‘as	if	there	were	any	other	way	for	us	to	start	or	end!’	(Precarious	Life,	p.	20)		 I	 certainly	would	not	want	 to	 suggest	 here	 that	 such	 an	omission	invalidates	Butler’s	project,	which	I	find	compelling.	Rather,	it	is	useful	to	note	that	the	theoretical	move	she	makes	here	–	emphasising	the	inclusive	or	 expansive	 potential	 of	 loss,	whilst	 at	 the	 same	 time	 remaining	within	what	can	be	understood	as	the	orthodox	limits	of	that	concept	–	is	one	that	often	characterises	contemporary	scholarship	on	this	issue.	Melancholia	in	particular	 is	 often	 imagined	 as	 having	 what	 Eng	 and	 Kazanjian	 call	 ‘an	extended	 capacity	 for	 representation’	 due	 to	 its	 ‘flexibility	 as	 a	 signifier’	(pp.	4-5),	a	claim	that	comes	out	of	Freud’s	dual	assertions	 in	 ‘Mourning	and	Melancholia’	 that	mourning	and	melancholia	may	occur	as	 reactions	not	only	to	the	loss	of	a	loved	person,	but	also	to	that	of	‘some	abstraction	[…]	 such	 as	 one’s	 country,	 liberty,	 an	 ideal,	 and	 so	 on’	 as	 well	 as	 his	suggestion	that	in	melancholia	the	lost	object	is	hard	to	pin	down,	so	that	‘one	 cannot	 see	 clearly	what	 it	 is	 that	has	been	 lost’	 (pp.	243,	245).	 It	 is	striking	 then,	 that	 the	 idea	 that	 melancholia	 offers	 a	 ‘capaciousness	 of	
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meaning’	 in	 relation	 to	 loss	 is	 not	 really	 pushed	 to	 its	 full	 potential,	whereby	 the	 attachments	 and	 forms	 of	 subjectivity	 engendered	 by	experiences	of	 loss	might	be	 seen	as	 extending	beyond	 the	human,	or	 at	least	beyond	human	agency	and	interest.	To	think	further	about	how	the	nonhuman	might	come	to	be	included	in	such	formulations,	it	is	useful	to	turn	 now	 to	 the	 scholarly	 field	 that	 has	 perhaps	 most	 consistently	prioritised	 the	 decentring	 of	 the	 human–	 animal	 studies	 –	 in	 order	 to	briefly	examine	how	this	scholarship	has	moved	beyond	anthropocentrism	in	its	theoretical	discussions	of	loss.			 Susan	 McHugh	 describes	 animal	 studies	 as	 ‘an	 interdisciplinary	field	of	 inquiry	 that	 coalesces	 around	questions	of	 agency	 and	 the	 social	and	 […]	 insists	 that	 readings	 of	 animal	 representations	 inform	 and	 are	informed	 by	 axiological	 and	 other	 “unnatural”	 histories.’	 The	 sub-	discipline	 of	 literary	 animal	 studies,	 she	 argues,	 has	 to	 reckon	 with	 the	ways	that	literary	criticism	has	traditionally	operated	around	the	figure	of	the	animal,	and	if	considered	at	all,	‘representations	of	animals	have	been	seen	first	and	foremost	as	dissembling	humans,	as	at	best	metaphorically	speaking.’	Literary	animal	studies,	then,	in	line	with	the	project	of	animal	studies	 as	 a	 whole,	 pays	 attention	 to	 ‘animal	 traces’	 as	 they	 appear	 in	narratives.21Responses	to	loss	in	this	field	(specifically	in	the	disciplines	of	literature	 and	philosophy	which	 are	my	 focus	here)	have	predominantly	reflected	the	aims	of	Butler’s	work	in	Precarious	Life	and	Frames	of	War	in	that	 they	 focus	 on	 expanding	 the	 sphere	 of	 the	 grievable	 to	 include	 the	animal,	largely	by	theorising	how	forms	of	community	gathered	under	the	sign	 of	 loss	 might	 be	 structured	 by	 a	 recognition	 of	 human-animal	attachments.	 Cary	Wolfe,	 for	 example,	 suggests	 that	 Butler’s	 scholarship	‘runs	 aground	 on	 the	 question	 of	 nonhuman	 animals’	 in	 its	 failure	 to	include	 them	 in	 the	 definition	 of	 persons	 that	 she	 uses	 to	 theorise	interdependency,	 an	 omission	 he	 finds	 in	 need	 of	 address,	 not	 least																																																									21	‘One	or	Several	Literary	Animal	Studies?	-	Susan	McHugh	|	H-Animal	|	H-Net’	<https://networks.h-net.org/node/16560/pages/32231/one-or-several-literary-animal-studies-susan-mchugh>	[accessed	14	October	2017].	n.p..	
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because	‘clearly,	some	nonhuman	animals	have	their	own	social	relations	of	 interdependency,	 and	 still	 others	 live	 in	 relations	 of	 interdependency	with	human	beings’.22	Alternative	models	for	such	kinds	of	community	are	set	out	 in	 the	work	of	Ralph	R.	Acampora,	Cora	Diamond,	and	Anat	Pick,	who	suggest	that	humans	might	be	moved	to	treat	animals	more	ethically	by	 recognising	 their	 shared	 corporeality	 as	 bodies	 exposed	 not	 only	 to	loss,	 but	 also	 to	 death.23	This	 approach	 is	 also	 echoed	 in	 the	 newly	emergent	 field	 of	 the	 environmental	 humanities,	where	 scholars	 such	 as	Donna	 Haraway	 and	 Thom	 van	 Dooren	 have	 focused	 on	 the	 idea	 of	‘multispecies	 community’	 as	 offering	 an	 opening	 onto	 more	 ethical	thought	 in	a	time	of	rising	 levels	of	nonhuman	extinction.24	Van	Dooren’s	approach	 in	 particular	 also	 involves	 drawing	 attention	 to	 the	 way	 that	nonhuman	 animals	 have	 their	 own	 mourning	 practices,	 a	 fact	 that	anthropological	studies	of	animal	grief	like	those	of	Barbara	J.	King,	Jeffrey	Masson,	and	Susan	McCarthy	have	also	attended	to.25		 ***			 My	thesis	aims	to	find	ways	to	think	about	nonhuman	presences	in	narratives	of	loss	by	bringing	contemporary	scholarship	on	this	topic	into	conversation	 with	 work	 that	 has	 sought	 to	 theorise	 the	 nonhuman.	 In	doing	so,	my	focus	is	not	primarily	on	analysing	how	the	nonhuman	might	
																																																								22	Cary	Wolfe,	Before	the	Law :	Humans	and	Other	Animals	in	a	Biopolitical	Frame	(Chicago ;	London:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2013),	pp.	18–19.	23	Ralph	R.	Acampora,	Corporal	Compassion :	Animal	Ethics	and	Philosophy	of	Body	(Pittsburgh,	PA:	University	of	Pittsburgh	Press,	2006);	Stanley	Cavell	and	others,	Philosophy	and	Animal	Life	(New	York ;	Chichester:	Columbia	University	Press,	2008);	Anat	Pick,	Creaturely	Poetics :	Animality	and	
Vulnerability	in	Literature	and	Film	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2011).	24	Donna	Jeanne	Haraway,	Staying	with	the	Trouble:	Making	Kin	in	the	Chthulucene,	Experimental	Futures:	Technological	Lives,	Scientific	Arts,	Anthropological	Voices	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2016);	Thom	Van	Dooren,	Flight	Ways :	Life	and	Loss	at	the	Edge	of	Extinction	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2014),	p.	5.	25	Barbara	J.	King,	How	Animals	Grieve	(Chicago:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2013);	Jeffrey	Masson	and	Susan	McCarthy,	When	Elephants	Weep :	The	Emotional	Lives	of	Animals,	New	edition.	(London:	Vintage,	1996).	
	 14	
come	to	be	understood	as	a	lost	object	(although	at	times	I	do	consider	it		in	this	way)	or	folded	into	communities	of	loss,	but	rather	on	attending	to	nonhuman	textual	presences	as	an	interpretative	problem.	As	such,	I	aim	to	 explore	 how	 certain	 texts	 either	 enable	 or	 foreclose	 the	 possibility	 of	taking	nonhumans	seriously	in	narratives	of	loss,	and	also	try	to	seek	out	forms	of	analysis	that	push	back	against	the	tendency	to	erase	nonhuman	bodies	which	often	characterises	such	stories.	This	is	an	important	task,	I	argue,	 at	 a	 time	 when	 our	 contemporary	 moment	 is	 increasingly	producing	 texts	 that	 are	 particularly	 concerned	 with	 imagining	 the	relationship	between	loss	and	the	nonhuman.		 In	bringing	questions	of	interpretation	to	bear	on	the	figure	of	the	nonhuman	as	it	appears	in	loss	narratives,	I	do	not	assume	interpretation	to	 be	 a	 neutral	 term.	 As	 Robert	 McKay	 has	 noted	 in	 relation	 to	 textual	animal	 bodies,	 by	 interpreting	 a	 text	 ‘one	 must	 always	 consume	 and	silence	 the	 animal	 that	 it	 is	 the	 text’s	 apparent	 point	 to	 present.’	26	In	trying	 to	make	 space	 for	 nonhuman	bodies	 in	my	 analysis,	 then,	 I	 try	 to	maintain	a	critical	relationship	to	the	kinds	of	interpretative	modes	that	I	suggest	are	able	 to	accommodate	 the	nonhuman,	most	 specifically	 in	 the	second	section	of	this	thesis	where	I	address	debates	about	interpretation	in	 the	 field	of	 trauma	 theory.	 	This	 is	particularly	 important	because	 the	texts	that	I	choose	to	analyse	here	all	exhibit	an	ambivalent	relationship	to	the	nonhuman,	and	as	such	part	of	my	task	in	this	thesis	involves	drawing	attention	 to	 these	 often	 liminal	 presences	 in	 order	 to	 examine	 the	ways	they	 shape	how	 loss	 is	 imagined	 in	 each	 text,	whilst	 also	 trying	 to	 avoid	flattening	their	meaning.	Equally,	I	also	aim	to	keep	open	the	potential	and	varied	meanings	of	‘loss’.	In	doing	so,	I	follow	Eng	and	Kazanjian	by	seeing	‘loss’	 as	 naming	 ‘what	 is	 apprehended	 by	 discourses	 and	 practices	 of	mourning,	melancholia,	nostalgia,	sadness,	trauma,	and	depression’	(p.	2).	I	 find	 this	 particularly	 useful	 as	 a	 term	because	 I	 see	 it	 as	moving	 away	from	more	specific	practices	of	naming	that	have	been	developed	with	the																																																									26	Robert	McKay,	‘BSE,	Hysteria,	and	the	Representation	of	Animal	Death:	Deborah	Levy’s	Diary	of	a	Steak’,	in	Killing	Animals,	by	The	Animal	Studies	Group	(Urbana:	University	of	Illinois	Press),	p.	166.	
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human	in	mind	(Freud’s	mourning	and	melancholia	being	a	prime	example	of	 this).	 As	 such,	 I	 see	 it	 as	 a	 generous	 term	 able	 to	 envelop	 nonhuman	relationships	 to	 loss	 as	 well	 as	 to	 recognise	 the	 inevitable	 intersections	between	the	specific	strands	of	experience	that	Eng	and	Kazanjian	identify	here.			 This	 thesis	 draws	on	 scholarly	work	 that	 follows	 the	 challenge	 to	the	linguistically	conceived	subject	set	out	by	poststructuralism	in	further	calling	 into	question	humanist	 ideas	of	 sovereign	 subjectivity.	 	 In	animal	studies,	 for	 example,	 this	 has	 included	 intellectual	 projects	 like	 Jacques	Derrida’s	 that	 have	 sought	 to	 thicken	 and	 complicate	 the	 designation	‘animal’	 and	 challenge	 the	ways	 it	 is	 introduced	as	a	 limit	 to	 the	human.	Derrida	 instead	 advocates	 for	 a	more	heterogenous	kind	of	 thought	 that	would	‘envisage	the	existence	of	“living	creatures,”	whose	plurality	cannot	be	 assembled	 within	 the	 single	 figure	 of	 an	 animality	 that	 is	 simply	opposed	 to	 humanity,’27	and	 Matthew	 Calarco	 takes	 this	 project	 even	further	when	he	argues	that	 ‘the	human-animal	distinction	can	no	longer	and	ought	no	longer	to	be	maintained’.28	Jane	Bennett	has	taken	a	similar	stance	in	arguing	for	a	focus	on	the	shared	materiality	of	humans,	animals,	objects,	and	things	as	a	means	of	ecological	thinking	that	would	minimize	‘the	difference	between	subjects	and	objects’	 in	order	to	attribute	agency	to	the	nonhuman	in	the	form	of	what	she	calls	‘thing-power’.29			 Yet,	 whilst	Wolfe	 justifies	 the	 need	 to	 rework	 the	 human/animal	distinction	 by	 noting	 its	 implication	 in	 oppressive	 structures	 that	 have	used	 it	 as	 a	 ‘discursive	 resource’	 in	 order	 to	 lopsidedly	 ascribe	 value	 to	different	lives,	I	do	not	follow	him	or	others	in	aligning	my	work	with	the	field	 of	 ‘posthumanism.’	 This	 is	 because,	 as	 Zakiyyah	 Iman	 Jackson	 has																																																									27	Jacques	Derrida	and	Marie-Louise	Mallet,	The	Animal	That	Therefore	I	Am	(New	York:	Fordham	University	Press,	2008),	p.	47.	28	Matthew	Calarco,	Zoographies :	The	Question	of	the	Animal	from	Heidegger	to	Derrida	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2008),	p.	3.	29	Jane	Bennett,	Vibrant	Matter :	A	Political	Ecology	of	Things	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2010),	p.	13.	
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noted,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 ask	 ‘what	 and	 crucially	whose	conception	 of	humanity	are	we	moving	beyond?’	For	Jackson,	calls	to	move	beyond	the	human	 often	 ‘reintroduce	 the	 Eurocentric	 transcendentalism	 this	movement	 purports	 to	 disrupt,	 particularly	with	 regard	 to	 the	 historical	and	ongoing	distributive	ordering	of	race.’30	Alexander	G.	Weheliye	makes	the	same	point	 in	his	brilliant	discussion	of	the	gaps	 in	Michel	Foucault’s	and	 Giorgio	 Agamben’s	 theories	 of	 ‘biopolitics’	 and	 ‘bare	 life’	 from	 the	perspective	 of	 black	 studies.	 He	 argues	 that	 questions	 of	 race,	 and	specifically	what	he	calls	 ‘racializing	assemblages,’	should	be	at	 the	heart	of	 debates	 about	 human	 subjectivity	 and	 valued	 life,	 with	 racialization	understood	 ‘not	 as	 a	 biological	 or	 cultural	 descriptor	 but	 as	 a	conglomerate	of	socio-political	relations	that	discipline	humanity	into	full	humans,	 not-quite-humans,	 and	 nonhumans.’31	My	work	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	not	about	dissolving	human/nonhuman	difference,	then,	in	the	sense	that	I	have	described	above,	but	rather	takes	as	its	central	concern	more	general	questions	about	 the	refiguration	of	subjectivity	 through	 loss,	a	problem	I	engage	 with	 specifically	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 colonialism	 and	 its	 legacies	 in	Chapters	One	and	Six.	 In	 this	sense,	 I	 think	of	my	project	as	operating	 in	the	way	Erica	Fudge	suggests	historical	engagements	with	the	figure	of	the	animal	 should	 do	 when	 they	 refuse	 a	 humanist	 approach.	 ‘By	 refusing	humanism,	 and,	 implicitly	 anthropocentrism,’	 she	 writes,	 ‘we	 place	ourselves	next	to	the	animals,	rather	than	as	the	users	of	the	animals.’32	In	line	 with	 this	 idea,	 my	 theorization	 of	 the	 nonhuman	 proceeds	 by	examining	 the	ways	 that	nonhuman	presences	can	be	examined	 ‘next	 to’	those	of	humans	in	narratives	of	loss.																																																									30	Zakiyyah	Iman	Jackson,	‘Outer	Worlds:	The	Persistence	of	Race	in	Movement	“Beyond	the	Human”’,	GLQ:	A	Journal	of	Lesbian	and	Gay	Studies,	21.2–3	(2015),	215–18	(p.	215).		Wolfe	does	just	this	when	he	states	that	‘it	is	understandable	of	course,	that	traditionally	marginalized	peoples	would	be	skeptical	about	calls	by	academic	intellectuals	to	surrender	the	humanist	model	of	subjectivity,	with	all	its	privileges,	just	at	the	moment	when	they	are	poised	to	“graduate”	into	it.’	(Animal	Rites,	p.	7).	31	Alexander	G.	Weheliye,	Habeas	Viscus :	Racializing	Assemblages,	Biopolitics,	and	Black	Feminist	
Theories	of	the	Human	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2014),	p.	4.	32	Erica	Fudge,	‘A	Left-Handed	Blow:	Writing	the	History	of	Animals’,	in	Representing	Animals,	ed.	by	Nigel	Rothfels	(Bloomington:	Indiana	University	Press,	2002),	pp.	3–18	(p.	15).	
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	 I	 have	 also	 found	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘affect’	 exceptionally	 useful	 in	undertaking	 this	 critical	 investigation,	 primarily	 because	 in	 thinking	 of	loss	 as	 an	 affect	 I	 see	 it	 as	 able	 to	 trouble	 cognition	 in	ways	 that	 allow	encounters	 between	 human	 and	 nonhuman	 bodies	 to	 exceed	 or	 inhibit	interpretation.	In	their	introduction	to	The	Affect	Theory	Reader,	Gregory	J.	Seigworth	and	Melissa	Gregg	describe	affect	as	arising	‘in	the	midst	of	in-
between-ness:	in	the	capacities	to	act	and	be	acted	on’,	a	formulation	I	find	particularly	 valuable	 for	my	work	here	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 allows	 for	 an	analysis	 of	 encounter	 and	 relationality	 that	 is	 not	premised	on	 the	prior	fixing	of	subjectivity.33	As	such,	to	think	of	experiences	of	loss	in	terms	of	affect	is	already	to	be	in	a	relation	to	loss	that	is	expansive	enough	to	allow	space	for	the	nonhuman.		A	foregrounding	of	affect	works	to	redress	some	of	 the	 more	 rigid	 intellectual	 structures	 of	 psychoanalytic	 thought,	 (my	approach	to	which	I	will	end	with	here).		 Critical	 approaches	 that	 use	 psychoanalysis	 now	 commonly	recognise	 it	 as,	 in	 Linda	Ruth	Williams’	words,	 ‘interdependent	with	 the	cultural	 forms	 it	 is	 often	 said	 simply	 to	 inform.’34	In	 this	 thesis	 I	 treat	psychoanalytic	work	on	mourning,	melancholia,	and	trauma	as	 textual	 in	this	way.	That	is,	I	read	these	diagnostic	categories	as	cultural	formations,	and	an	analysis	of	their	workings	extends	across	all	of	the	chapters	in	this	thesis.	 I	 also	 see	 this	 critical	 approach	 to	 psychoanalysis	 as	 necessary	because,	 as	 Stephen	 Frosh	 points	 out,	 it	 has	 ‘ambitions	 to	 be	 a	 ‘general’	theory’’,	with	this	drive	toward	universal	validity	giving	it	something	of	a	‘’colonising’	tendency.’35	It	is	this	propensity,	I	would	suggest,	that	ties	the	conclusions	and	structures	of	psychoanalysis	so	closely	to	the	Eurocentric	humanism	 in	 which	 it	 has	 its	 historical	 roots,	 and	 which	 also	 make	 its																																																									33	Melissa	Gregg,	The	Affect	Theory	Reader	(Durham,	NC ;	London:	Duke	University	Press,	2010),	p.	1.	34	Linda	Ruth	Williams,	Critical	Desire :	Psychoanalysis	and	the	Literary	Subject	(London ;	New	York:	E.	Arnold,	1995),	p.	1.	35	Stephen	Frosh,	Psychoanalysis	Outside	the	Clinic :	Interventions	in	Psychosocial	Studies	(Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2010),	p.	17.	
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theories	of	loss	overdue	for	an	analysis	that	would	acknowledge	the	place	of	the	disavowed	nonhuman	in	this	thought.		 ***		 This	thesis	is	organised	into	two	sections,	divided	thematically	and	also	 by	 the	 particular	 instances	 of	 loss	 that	 they	 address.	 Both	 of	 these	sections	 take	 as	 their	 broad	 theme	 a	 troubled	 site	 in	 contemporary	thought	that	I	see	as	having	relevance	to	the	questions	of	subjectivity	and	relationality	that	necessarily	grow	out	of	an	analysis	of	loss.	In	Section	One	this	 theme	 is	 global	 ecological	 crisis,	with	 a	 specific	 focus	 on	 extinction,	and	 in	 Section	Two	 it	 is	 the	discourse	 around	borders	 that	has	 emerged	most	 strongly	 post-9/11.	 These	 themes	 function	 as	 a	 means	 of	 loosely	grouping	the	texts	in	each	section	together	with	regard	to	their	global	and	political	 context,	 and	 are	 addressed	 only	 indirectly	 in	 the	 work	 that	follows.	Instead,	the	more	important	organisational	principle	of	these	two	sections	is	the	particular	formation	of	loss	that	each	addresses,	conceived	as	 presenting	 an	 example	 of	 the	 hanging	 on/letting	 go	 opposition	 that	 I	have	 suggested	 characterises	 loss	 narratives.	 Section	 One	 focuses	 on	mourning	and	melancholia,	and	Section	Two	on	trauma,	with	Section	One	exploring	 the	 nonhuman	 attachments	 that	 are	 opened	 up	 in	 narratives	that	engage	with	mourning	and	melancholia,	 and	Section	Two	 looking	at	the	 ways	 that	 such	 attachments	 might	 be	 maintained	 in	 a	 set	 of	 linked	readings	 that	 investigates	 the	 relationship	 between	 trauma	 theory,	interpretation,	and	hospitality.		 Chapters	 One,	 Two,	 and	 Three	 focus	 on	 theorising	 some	 of	 the	different	 ways	 that	 melancholic	 attachment	 might	 come	 to	 involve	 the	nonhuman.	 In	 Chapter	 One	 I	 read	 Peter	 Carey’s	 novel	 The	 Chemistry	 of	
Tears	(2013)	 as	 an	 example	of	melancholic	 ‘critical	 agency’,	 bringing	 the	text	 into	dialogue	with	new	materialist	work	that	seeks	to	extend	agency	to	 nonhuman	 objects	 and	 ‘things.’	 In	 Chapter	 Two,	 the	 only	 chapter	 in	which	I	do	not	look	at	a	literary	text,	I	analyse	de-extinction	projects	as	a	
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melancholic	 cultural	 formation,	 examining	how	Freud’s	 later	 insight	 that	melancholic	attachments	form	the	basis	of	subjectivity	might	be	extended	to	include	the	nonhuman.	Concluding	this	section,	Chapter	Three	turns	to	theories	of	queer	negativity	that	reject	futurity	in	order	to	investigate	the	ways	 that	 human	 children	 and	 endangered/extinct	 animals	 come	 to	 be	figured	 as	 precarious	 subjects	 in	 two	 novels,	 The	 Hunter	 by	 Julia	 Leigh	(2001),	and	A	Child’s	Book	of	True	Crime	by	Chloe	Hooper	(2002).			 In	Chapter	Four	I	 turn	to	an	analysis	of	 trauma	theory	 in	order	to	explore	 how	 attachments	 to	 the	 nonhuman,	 once	 opened	 up,	 might	 be	continued.	 This	 chapter	 sets	 out	 the	 project	 of	 the	 second	 section	 of	my	thesis,	which	is	to	conduct	a	set	of	three	linked	readings	that	examine	how	hospitable	 contemporary	 trauma	 texts	 are	 to	 nonhuman	 presences;	specifically	 spectral	 animals.	 In	 order	 to	 set	 out	 the	 critical	 context	 for	these	readings,	Chapter	Four	gives	a	theoretical	overview	of	interpretative	debates	in	trauma	theory,	demonstrating	how	these	can	be	understood	to	replicate	 the	 hanging	 on/letting	 go	 conflict	 that	 characterises	 mourning	and	melancholia	in	the	ways	that	they	oppose	working-through	to	aporia.	This	chapter	ends	with	a	brief	 reading	of	Evie	Wyld’s	novel	All	the	Birds,	
Singing	(2014)	as	a	depiction	of	PTSD.	Chapter	Five	engages	with	Roberto	Esposito’s	work	on	immunity	in	order	to	read	Suzanne	Berne’s	novel	The	
Dogs	 of	 Littlefield	 (2014)	 as	 a	 trauma	 narrative	 that	 ironically	 figures	working-through	 as	 a	means	 of	 reinforcing	 bounded	 subjects.	 Finally,	 in	Chapter	Six	I	conduct	an	extended	reading	of	Fiona	McFarlane’s	The	Night	
Guest	 (2014),	which	 I	 suggest	 is	 able	 to	 remain	hospitable	 to	nonhuman	presences	 due	 to	 its	 refusal	 to	 either	 work	 through	 or	 negate	 their	meaning.		 	
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Chapter	One	
	
‘Any	who	sees	the	truth	will	be	called	mad’:	
Melancholic	Critical	Agency	in	The	Chemistry	of	
Tears	
	
	
Introduction	
	Let	 us	 dwell	 for	 a	 moment	 on	 the	 view	 which	 the	 melancholic’s	disorder	affords	of	the	constitution	of	the	human	ego.	We	see	how	in	him	one	 part	 of	 the	 ego	 sets	 itself	 over	 against	 the	 other,	 judges	 it	critically,	and,	as	it	were,	takes	it	as	its	object.	Our	suspicion	that	the	critical	agency	which	 is	here	split	off	 from	the	ego	might	also	show	its	independence	in	other	circumstances	will	be	confirmed	by	every	future	 observation.	We	 shall	 really	 find	 grounds	 for	 distinguishing	this	 agency	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 ego.	 What	 we	 are	 here	 becoming	acquainted	with	is	the	agency	commonly	called	‘conscience’;	we	shall	count	 it,	 along	 with	 the	 censorship	 of	 consciousness	 and	 reality-testing,	among	the	major	institutions	of	the	ego	[…]	.		Freud,	Mourning	and	Melancholia,	(1917	[1915])			This	chapter	examines	Peter	Carey’s	exploration	of	grief,	The	Chemistry	of	
Tears	 (2010),	 in	 the	 context	 of	 melancholic	 ‘critical	 agency’.	 I	 bring	together	theoretical	perspectives	on	mourning	and	melancholia	alongside	some	 thoughts	 from	 the	 relatively	 recent	 area	 of	 theory	 known	 as	 ‘new	materialism’,	a	branch	of	criticism	that	seeks	to	displace	the	centrality	of	the	 human	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	 different	 kinds	 of	 agency	 that	 may	 be	 at	work	 in	 ‘things’.	 I	 argue	 that	 bringing	 some	 contemporary	 critical	
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interpretations	 of	 mourning	 and	 melancholia	 into	 dialogue	 with	 new	materialism	invites	reflection	on	the	ways	that	grief	might	extend	beyond	and	disrupt	the	realm	of	the	human.	Specifically,	I	argue	that	Carey’s	novel	situates	 melancholic	 critical	 agency	 (which	 Freud	 saw	 as	 a	 kind	 of	conscience)	as	reorienting	vision	in	order	to	open	up	perspectives	on	how	ideas	 of	 subjectivity	 might	 be	 distributed	 or	 withheld,	 so	 that	 grieving	subjects	might	be	able	to	imagine	and	enact	new	ethical	relationships	with	humans,	nonhumans,	or	even	‘things’.			 Carey’s	novel	follows	the	horologist	Catherine	Gehrig	as	she	grieves	the	sudden	death	of	her	 lover,	Matthew.	At	 the	same	 time,	 she	works	on	restoring	 a	 nineteenth	 century	 swan	 automaton	 modelled	 after	 Jacques	Vaucanson’s	 1739	 duck	 automata.	 In	 the	 process	 of	 the	 restoration	 her	twenty-first	 century	world	 is	merged	with	 the	nineteenth	century	one	of	the	 automaton’s	 commissioner,	 Sir	 Henry	 Brandling,	 whose	 diaries	 are	included	 with	 the	 machine.	 The	 text	 conducts	 an	 extended	 examination	and	 critique	 of	 what	 might	 be	 called	 the	 boundaries	 of	 life;	 that	 is,	 the	ways	in	which	different	bodies	come	to	be	understood	as	variously	living,	nonliving,	 dead	 or	 somewhere	 in	 between,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 ways	 these	bodies	 or	 ‘things’	 might	 be	 understood	 to	 exhibit	 agency,	 drawing	 on	scientific	and	cultural	anxieties	about	the	animate	and	inanimate	that	can	be	traced	from	the	creation	of	Vaucanson’s	duck	automata	to	the	present	day.	 In	 asking	 these	 questions	 against	 a	 backdrop	 of	 grief,	 the	 text	demonstrates	how	ideas	about	‘who’	or	‘what’	counts	as	a	subject	are	also	irrevocably	 tied	 to	 the	ways	 that	 certain	bodies	become	grievable	whilst	others	do	not.	As	such,	my	reading	of	this	text	brings	together	theories	of	mourning	 and	melancholia	 alongside	new	materialist	work	 that	 seeks	 to	understand	 the	 networks	 of	 relationships	 that	 work	 to	 produce	 certain	subjects	as	more	animate,	or	lifely,	than	others.							
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I.	 Critical	Agency		 For	Freud,	the	evidence	that	a	melancholic	reaction	to	loss	saw	the	birth	 of	 a	 ‘critical	 agency’	 within	 the	 psyche	 was	 to	 be	 found	 in	 the	tendency	 to	 self-beratement	 he	 posited	 as	 characteristic	 of	melancholia.	The	 melancholic,	 Freud	 wrote	 in	 1917	 in	 Mourning	 and	 Melancholia,	‘represents	his	ego	to	us	as	worthless,	 incapable	of	any	achievement	and	morally	despicable;	he	reproaches	himself,	vilifies	himself,	and	expects	to	be	 cast	 out	 and	 punished.’36	These	 reproaches	 against	 the	 self,	 Freud	theorised,	 occurred	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 melancholic’s	 identification	 with	their	 lost	 love	 object,	 toward	 which	 they	 had	 previously	 held	 an	ambivalent	 relation.	As	 such,	 feelings	of	hatred	or	 rage	aimed	at	 the	 lost	object	became	necessarily	turned	against	the	melancholic’s	own	ego,	now	identified	with	that	object.	In	order	for	this	to	happen,	Freud	surmised,	it	was	necessary	for	the	ego	to	go	through	a	process	of	splitting,	so	that	one	part	of	it	(the	‘critical	agency’)	became	able	to	set	itself	against	and	judge	the	other.	He	identified	this	critical	part	as	one	of	the	major	institutions	of	the	ego:	conscience.			Writing	 a	 few	 years	 later,	 in	Group	Psychology	and	 the	Analysis	of	
the	Ego,	 Freud	 referred	 again	 to	 this	melancholic	 splitting,	 whereby	 the	ego	 becomes	 ‘divided,	 fallen	 into	 two	 pieces,	 one	 of	which	 rages	 against	the	 second.’37	This	 first	 piece	 of	 ego,	 full	 of	 rage,	 he	 described	 as	 ‘not	unknown	 to	 us’	 and	 comprising	 ‘the	 conscience,	 a	 critical	 faculty	within	the	 ego,	which	even	 in	normal	 times	 takes	up	a	 critical	 attitude	 towards	the	ego,	though	never	so	relentlessly	and	unjustifiably’	(pp.	68-9).	He	goes	on	 to	 associate	 this	 critical	 faculty	 of	 conscience	with	 the	 concept	 of	 the	ego	ideal	that	he	had	first	written	about	in	his	1914	paper	On	Narcissism,	understood	 as	 both	 an	 individual	 and	 social	 ideal	 of	 perfection	 against	which	the	ego	must	be	constantly	measured.	Conscience,	he	had	suggested,	might	 be	 the	 psychic	 agency	 doing	 that	 measuring,	 and	 in	 Group																																																									36	Sigmund	Freud,	‘Mourning	and	Melancholia’,	p.	246.	37	Sigmund	Freud,	Group	Psychology	and	the	Analysis	of	the	Ego,	The	International	Psycho-Analytical	Library ;	no.6	(London:	Hogarth	Press :	Institute	of	Psycho-analysis,	1922),	p.	68.	
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Psychology	he	formalised	this	idea	through	the	topographical	image	of	the	split	ego,	with	the	ego	ideal	the	first	 ‘piece’	of	ego,	set	against	the	second	piece	‘which	contains	the	lost	object’	(p.68).	Finally	 in	 1923	 in	The	Ego	 and	 the	 Id	 Freud	 revisited	 his	 work	 on	mourning	and	melancholia	once	more.	 	 In	 this	 later	paper,	he	associated	the	 ego	 ideal	 with	 a	 new	 term:	 the	 super-ego.	 Whilst	 Freud	 still	understood	the	super-ego	to	be	an	agency	of	conscience,	in	this	new	paper	he	associated	this	agency	with	a	kind	of	domination	over	the	ego,	one	that	reinforced	 its	 adherence	 to	 social	 norms	 in	 the	 former	 manner	 of	 the	person’s	parents.		As	a	child	grows	up,	the	role	of	father	is	carried	on	by	teachers	and	others	 in	 authority;	 their	 injunctions	 and	 prohibitions	 remain	powerful	in	the	ego	ideal	and	continue,	in	the	form	of	conscience,	to	exercise	the	moral	censorship.	The	tension	between	the	demands	of	the	conscience	and	the	actual	performances	of	the	ego	is	experienced	as	a	sense	of	guilt.38		It	 is	 apparent,	 then,	 that	 whilst	 always	 remaining	 a	 psychic	 institution	associated	 with	 morality	 or	 ethics,	 the	 concept	 of	 melancholic	 ‘critical	agency’	 as	 Freud	 understood	 it	 transformed	 over	 time.	 In	Mourning	and	
Melancholia	he	linked	this	critical	agency	to	the	undoing	of	social	norms	in	the	 sense	 that	 it	 manifested	 in	 erratic	 behaviour	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	melancholic	 person,	 whose	 insistence	 on	 publicly	 voicing	 their	 sense	 of	moral	failure	was	described	by	Freud	as	an	‘insistent	communicativeness	which	 finds	 satisfaction	 in	 self-exposure.’	 In	his	opinion,	 the	workings	of	this	 critical	 agency	 were	 evidence	 that	 the	 person’s	 conscience	 had	become	 ‘diseased’	(p.247).	However,	when	this	concept	of	critical	agency	evolved	first	into	that	of	the	ego	ideal,	and	then	later	the	super-ego,	it	took	on	more	 of	 a	 normative	 function.	 Freud	 now	 understood	 it	 as	 a	 crucial																																																									38	Sigmund	Freud,	‘The	Ego	and	the	Id’,	in	The	Standard	Edition	of	the	Complete	Psychological	Works	
of	Sigmund	Freud.	Volume	XIX	(1923-1925)	The	Ego	and	the	Id	and	Other	Works	(London:	Vintage,	2001),	pp.	1–66	(p.	37).	
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component	of	 the	ego,	deployed,	 it	seems,	 in	 the	service	of	social	control	by	 psychically	 enforcing	 the	 ‘injunctions	 and	 prohibitions’	 instituted	 by	authority	figures.		Yet	recently	both	Ranjana	Khanna	and	 Judith	Butler	have	sought	 to	rehabilitate	 what	 might	 be	 considered	 the	 more	 radical	 aspects	 of	melancholic	critical	agency	as	envisaged	by	Freud.	Khanna	is	quite	explicit	about	how	such	a	project	of	rehabilitation	stands	in	relation	to	the	history	of	the	concept	in	Freud’s	work.	If	 Freud	 would	 eventually	 transfer	 the	 critical	 agency	 found	 in	melancholia	 into	 the	normalizing	 function	of	 the	 superego,	 I	would	salvage	 it,	 putting	 the	 melancholic’s	 manic	 critical	 agency	 into	 the	unworking	of	conformity,	and	into	the	critique	of	the	status	quo.39	Whilst	for	Khanna	this	critical	agency	retains	its	association	with	morality,	the	ethical	project	 to	which	 it	 contributes	 is	 the	disruption	of	 repressive	authoritarian	structures,	rather	than	the	reification	of	them.	Her	argument	is	made	 in	 the	 context	of	her	own	discipline,	postcolonial	 studies,	where	she	 argues	 for	 colonial	 melancholia	 as	 a	 critical	 reading	 practice	 that	makes	visible	 ‘the	psychical	strife	of	colonial	and	postcolonial	modernity’	(p.x).	Furthermore,	Khanna	rejects	the	view	of	melancholia	as	a	‘disabling	affect’,	arguing	instead	that	its	critical	agency	provides	‘an	ethico-political	gesture	toward	the	future.’40	The	radical	potential	of	critical	agency,	which	she	 theorises	as	a	 remainder	unassimilable	 to	 the	normalizing	project	of	the	super-ego,	means	that	 it	seeks	to	undo	rather	than	perpetuate	 ‘social	mechanisms	of	control’	(‘Post-Palliative’,	npn).	Similarly,	 in	her	recent	work	Butler	has	argued	 for	understanding	the	rage	that	the	critical	agency	turns	back	against	the	self	as	signalling	a	dissatisfaction	with	and	push-back	against	certain	 forms	of	social	power,	so	that	‘we	might	well	ask	whether	the	situation	in	which	the	ego	is,	as	it																																																									39	Khanna,	Dark	Continents,	p.	23.	40	Ranjana	Khanna,	‘Post-Palliative:	Coloniality’s	Affective	Dissonance’,	Postcolonial	Text,	2.1	(2005),	n.p..	<http://www.postcolonial.org/index.php/pct/article/view/385>	[accessed	10	May	2017].	
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were,	berated	by	the	ideal	is	not	the	inversion	of	a	prior	situation	in	which	the	 ego	would,	 if	 it	 could,	 have	 berated	 the	 ideal’	 (Psychic	Life	of	Power,	p.185).	 Specifically,	 Butler	 sees	 the	 violent	 actions	 of	 the	 critical	 agency	upon	 the	 ego	 as	 related	 to	 the	 hidden	 origin	 of	 loss	 in	melancholia,	 the	‘object-loss	withdrawn	from	consciousness’	to	which	Freud	attributed	the	melancholic	 response	 (Mourning	 and	 Melancholia,	 p.245).	 For	 Butler,	however,	 the	 opacity	 of	 loss	 in	 melancholia	 (and	 the	 violent	 reaction	 it	engenders	in	the	conscience)	is	produced	not	by	individual	pathology	but	rather	 by	 a	 societal	 distribution	 and	management	 of	 the	 grievable;	what	she	calls	 the	 ‘social	 foreclosure	of	grief’.	She	draws	attention	to	the	ways	that	‘forms	of	social	power	emerge	that	regulate	what	losses	will	and	will	not	 be	 grieved’,	 and	 suggests	 that	 lost	 objects	 that	 beget	 a	 melancholic	response	may	have	been	situated	as	ungrievable	in	this	way	(p.183).		In	this	chapter	I	will	follow	both	Khanna	and	Butler	in	exploring	the	ways	that	melancholic	critical	agency	might	be	understood	as	potentially	subversive.	 In	 doing	 so	 I	 take	 a	 particular	 insight	 from	 each	 of	 these	theorists.	Firstly,	I	am	interested	in	the	‘unworking	of	conformity’	Khanna	suggests	 appears	 as	 a	 function	 of	 this	 critical	 agency,	 and	 specifically	 in	this	word	 ‘unworking.’	 I	 apply	 this	 in	 the	 chapter	 that	 follows	by	paying	attention	 to	 the	 ways	 that	 Carey’s	 novel	 presents	 a	 critical	 melancholic	gaze	 as	 focused	on	 taking	 things	 apart	 in	 order	 to	 expose	 the	historical-relational	processes	that	have	brought	them	into	being.	As	such,	 I	situate	the	melancholic	 in	 this	 text	 as	maintaining	 a	 questioning	 relationship	 to	losses	 that	might	 be	 hidden	 or	 disavowed.	 In	 order	 to	make	 this	 case,	 I	focus	on	explicating	the	ways	in	which	such	an	‘unworking’	process	can	be	seen	at	work	in	The	Chemistry	of	Tears.	I	do	this	firstly	in	relation	to	time,	drawing	 on	 theoretical	 material	 that	 proposes	 a	 connection	 between	melancholia	 and	 asynchronicity,	 and	 secondly	more	 literally	with	 regard	to	the	sense	in	which	Carey’s	use	of	 ‘steampunk’	tropes	focuses	attention	on	the	visible	workings	of	mechanical	objects.	Following	 on	 from	 this,	 I	 take	 Butler’s	 insight	 that	 the	 violent	actions	of	the	critical	agency	may	gesture	toward	socially	prohibited	losses	
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in	order	to	examine	the	ways	that	Carey’s	text	asks	questions	about	which	losses	become	grievable,	 at	what	 times,	 and	 for	whom.	Whereas	Butler’s	analysis	 focuses	 on	 the	 human,	 and	 in	 particular	 on	 the	 relationship	between	melancholia,	gender,	and	sexuality,	I	expand	this	enquiry	here	in	order	to	think	through	the	ways	that	grievability	extends	beyond	a	reified	idea	of	 the	human	and	 is	 related	 to	questions	about	 ‘who’	or	 ‘what’	 gets	granted	 subjectivity	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 In	 doing	 so,	 I	 engage	 with	 the	theoretical	field	of	new	materialism	in	order	to	draw	out	some	of	the	ways	in	 which	 nonhuman	 bodies,	 objects,	 and	 things	might	 be	 understood	 as	exhibiting	 the	 same	 kind	 of	 ‘material	 vitality’	 as	 humans	 (Bennett).	 My	ultimate	 aim	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 theorise	 this	 new	 materialist	 work	alongside	the	 ‘unworking’	of	vision	that	I	argue	is	brought	about	through	the	action	of	critical	melancholic	agency.	I	do	this	in	order	to	suggest	that	a	recognition	 of	 human/nonhuman	 mutual	 enmeshment	 should	 remain	attentive	 to	 the	 oppressive	 structures	 that	 have	 historically	 allowed	certain	bodies	to	emerge	as	lifely	whilst	leaving	others	exposed	to	death.		II.	 ‘Normal’	Mourning		 As	 will	 have	 become	 apparent,	 the	 analysis	 of	 The	 Chemistry	 of	
Tears	 that	 I	 present	 here	 is	 reliant	 on	 upholding	 and	 working	 with	 a	distinction	between	mourning	and	melancholia	that	 is	perhaps	no	 longer	relevant.	 In	The	Psychic	Life	of	Power,	 the	 same	 text	 in	which	 she	 posits	melancholia	 as	 a	 symptom	 of	 the	 stratification	 of	 grievable	 life,	 Butler	argues	 persuasively	 for	 the	 ultimate	 inseparability	 of	 the	 two	 terms,	claiming	 ‘there	 is	no	 final	 separation	of	mourning	 from	melancholia’	 and	Freud’s	attempts	 to	distinguish	 them	are	 ‘challenged	not	only	 in	his	own	essay	by	that	name,	but	explicitly	in	The	Ego	and	the	Id’	(p.193).	For	Butler,	Freud	 ultimately	 came	 to	 understand	 a	 melancholic	 reaction	 to	 loss	 as	constitutive	of	subjectivity,	rather	than	pathological,	acknowledging	in	The	
Ego	and	the	Id	that	identification	with	a	lost	object	was	in	fact	a	‘common	and	typical’	reaction	to	loss.		
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Butler’s	 analysis,	 however,	 follows	 Freud’s	 own	 in	 focusing	 on	processes	of	mourning	and	melancholia	as	they	occur	psychically;	that	is,	as	 they	 operate	 internally	 within	 the	 ego.	 Therefore,	 although	 Butler	 is	interested	 in	 the	 social	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 she	 sees	 melancholic	 loss	 as	reflecting	 and	 drawing	 attention	 to	 social	 restrictions	 that	 govern	 the	grievable,	 her	 focus	 is	 on	 the	ways	 in	which	 these	 foreclosures,	 and	 the	melancholic	reactions	they	engender,	establish	and	maintain	subjectivity.	As	 such,	melancholia	 and	mourning	 are	 able	 to	 converge	 in	 her	 analysis	because	she	works	 from	the	 inside	out.	By	 this	 I	mean	 that	although	she	sees	 the	melancholic	action	of	 identification	with	 the	 lost	object,	 and	 the	disavowed	rage	this	causes,	as	symptomatic	of	the	kinds	of	social	injustice	that	 sees	 some	 lives	 valued	 differently	 to	 others,	 she	 still	 assumes	 that	melancholia	 (and	mourning)	 are	 relatively	 stable	 concepts.	 As	 such,	 she	understands	a	melancholic	reaction	to	loss	as	inhabiting	a	kind	of	psychic	reality	whereby	changes	to	the	ego	occur	within	the	subject	as	a	result	of	their	 identification	 with	 the	 lost	 object,	 with	 these	 changes	 then	 being	expressed	outwardly	in	the	form	of	visible	behaviours	that	are	reflective	of	the	 topographical	 changes	 that	 have	 occurred	 internally.	 This	 is	 in	contrast,	 for	 example,	 to	 the	 work	 of	 Sara	 Ahmed,	 who	 understands	melancholia	as	a	diagnostic	tool	imposed	onto	a	grieving	subject	(from	the	outside	in)	rather	than	as	expressive	of	any	real	psychic	changes	occurring	within	that	subject.	The	 distinction	 between	 good	 and	 bad	 ways	 of	 dealing	 with	 loss	survives	 at	 the	 level	 of	 cultural	 diagnosis.	 The	 melancholic	 may	appear	as	a	figure	insofar	as	we	recognize	the	melancholic	as	the	one	who	“holds	onto”	an	object	that	has	been	lost,	who	does	not	let	go,	or	get	over	loss	by	getting	over	it	(Promise	of	Happiness,	p.139).	In	contrast	to	Butler,	then,	Ahmed	suggests	that	melancholia	is	only	able	to	appear	as	such	when	it	is	contrasted	to	mourning.	Her	work	focuses	on	the	affective	communities	that	are	‘produced	by	sharing	objects	of	loss’,	which	also	 means	 ‘letting	 objects	 go	 in	 the	 right	 way’	 (p.141).	 This	 work	 of	collective	 mourning,	 or	 collective	 letting-go,	 produces	 melancholics	 as	
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‘affect	 aliens’	who	have	 failed	 to	move	 on	 from	 loss	 in	 this	way.	 For	my	purposes	here,	the	important	thing	that	Ahmed’s	work	makes	clear	is	that	it	matters	less	how	mourning	and	melancholia	might	be	distinguished	(or	not)	 at	 a	 psychic	 level	 (i.e.	 in	 the	 way	 that	 Butler	 and	 Freud	 theorise)	because	ultimately	a	diagnosis	of	mourning	or	melancholia	–	or	‘normal’	or	‘pathological’	–	is	made	socially.	Therefore	even	if	the	process	as	it	would	be	 understood	 psychoanalytically	 unfolds	 in	 the	 same	 way	 within	 the	psyche	 (identification	 with	 an	 object,	 incorporation	 of	 that	 object),	diagnoses	 of	mourning	 or	melancholia	 are	 decided	 externally	 depending	on	the	way	that	the	behaviours	of	the	grieving	person	are	received	in	the	world.	Although	Carey	never	uses	the	psychoanalytic	terms	‘mourning’	or	‘melancholia’	 in	 his	 text,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 he	 is	 interested	 in	 the	 cultural	diagnoses	 of	 loss	 that	 Ahmed	 suggest	 ultimately	 maintain	 a	 separation	between	these	two	states.	In	order	for	melancholia	and	its	critical	agency	to	 emerge	 as	 not	 only	 ethically	 productive	 but	 also	 radical	 in	 its	orientation	 to	 loss,	 Carey	 juxtaposes	 it	 against	 a	 ‘normal’	 model	 of	mourning,	 imposed	 from	 the	 outside	 in	 and	 presented	 as	 socially	appropriate	 in	 just	 the	 terms	 that	 Ahmed	 describes.	 He	 shows	 this	primarily	 through	 the	 complex	 and	 changeable	 relationship	between	 the	protagonist	 of	 the	 novel,	 Catherine	 Gehrig,	 and	 her	 manager	 and	 friend	Eric	Croft.	Catherine	 is	 a	 horologist	 working	 at	 the	 Swinburne	 Museum,	 a	fictional	institution	that	closely	resembles	the	Victoria	&	Albert.	The	novel	begins	 in	London,	2010,	and	we	meet	her	as	she	 finds	out	 that	Matthew,	her	lover	of	thirteen	years,	has	died	suddenly	after	suffering	a	heart	attack	on	 the	 tube.	Their	relationship	has	always	been	a	secret	one.	Matthew	 is	married,	 and	as	he	also	works	at	 the	Swinburne	Museum	Catherine	 isn’t	able	to	discuss	her	grief	with	anyone	that	knew	him.	It	is	apparent	that	she	has	 few	 friends,	 her	 affair	with	Matthew	having	 been	 the	main,	 perhaps	only	 relationship	 in	 her	 life.	 The	 one	 person	 who	 apparently	 has	 been	(unbeknownst	 to	 Catherine)	 aware	 of	 the	 affair	 is	 Eric	 Croft,	 the	 head	curator	of	the	horology	department,	who	immediately	assigns	her	to	a	new	
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project	in	the	museum’s	private	Annexe	which	involves	the	restoration	of	a	ninteteenth	century	swan	automaton	modelled	on	 Jacques	Vaucanson’s	grain-eating	duck.	When	Catherine	begins	reading	a	set	of	notebooks	that	are	 included	 with	 this	 machinery,	 she	 becomes	 involved	 in	 the	 story	 of	their	 author,	 Sir	 Henry	 Brandling,	 the	 commissioner	 of	 the	 automaton,	which	he	intends	to	be	a	cure	for	his	critically	ill	young	son.	Catherine’s	 assignment	 to	 this	 new	 project	 is	 explicitly	 situated	 by	Eric	as	a	curative	measure:	“’I	thought	you	might	like	to	know	that	there	is	a	future.	Perhaps	you	should	peek	at	the	object	that	will	be	waiting	for	you	when	 you	 finally	 come	 back	 to	 work.”’41	Her	 labour	 will	 be	 a	 form	 of	working-through,	 a	 process	 of	 libidinal	 detachment	 from	 Matthew	 and	reattachment	to	her	new	love	object:	the	swan	automaton	and	its	fabulous	story.	 She	 will	 be	 a	 mourner,	 not	 a	 melancholic.	 Catherine	 is	 initially	resistant	 to	 and	 bewildered	 by	 the	 task	 she	 has	 been	 given,	with	 all	 the	connotations	of	fixing,	healing,	patching	up	and	repairing	which	so	overtly	mimic	 a	 process	 of	 mourning	 work	 that	 she	 feels	 estranged	 from	 and	opposed	to.	Her	eventual	agreement	to	the	project	(which	is	also	a	partial	acceptance	 of	 the	 imperative	 to	 mourn	 ‘normally’)	 is	 brought	 about	predominantly	 because	 of	 social	 pressure	 from	 Eric.	 When	 she	 initially	refuses	his	offer	to	work	on	the	swan,	his	reaction	changes	her	mind.	I	 saw	 the	 blood	 rising	 from	his	 collar.	 He	was	 cross	with	me.	How	could	he	be?		And	 then	 in	 the	stinging	 focus	of	his	gaze	 I	understood	 that	he	had	pulled	a	lot	of	strings,	had	pissed	off	a	lot	of	people	in	order	to	get	the	backstreet	girl	 set	up	where	her	emotions	would	not	show.	He	was	looking	after	me	for	Matthew,	but	for	the	museum	as	well	(p.16).	As	will	be	the	case	throughout	the	novel,	Catherine	modifies	her	emotional	behaviour	 in	 response	 to	 being	 reminded	 of	 the	 uneven	 power	 dynamic	that	 exists	 between	 her	 and	 Eric,	 with	 this	 being	 expressed	 particularly																																																									41	Peter	Carey,	The	Chemistry	of	Tears	(London:	Faber	and	Faber,	2012),	p.	12.	
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through	 his	 position	 as	 a	 representative	 of	 her	 elite	workplace.	 As	 such,	Eric	effectively	manages	Catherine’s	affective	 responses	 in	 the	same	way	that	he	oversees	her	work	at	the	museum,	and	he	situates	the	imperative	for	her	to	mourn	well	(that	is,	privately,	without	interruption	of	labour)	as	necessary	 to	 the	museum’s	 successful	 functioning.	 The	 swan	 automaton,	Eric	hopes,	will	become	a	‘profit	centre’	for	the	museum,	and	the	project	of	mourning	 that	will	 see	Catherine	 choose	 this	mechanical	 beast	 as	 a	 new	love	object	is	simultaneously	a	necessary	and	useful	expenditure	of	labour	that	 benefits	 the	 Swinburne	 financially.	 Mourning	 ‘normally’,	 then,	 also	appears	here	as	a	way	of	maintaining	worker	efficiency.			 Further	 to	 this,	 however,	 Eric	 also	 animates	 the	 museum	 into	 a	desiring	entity.	Catherine	has	to	work	privately	in	the	Annexe	building,	he	says,	because	they	‘must	placate	the	edifice’,	a	turn	of	phrase	that	suggests	there	 is	 a	 sacrificial	 element	 to	 Catherine’s	 withdrawal	 from	 the	 main	museum	 building.	 ‘The	 museum’	 as	 an	 idea	 is	 used	 here	 as	 a	 kind	 of	governing	principle	standing	in	for	social	power	and	the	norms	of	affective	behaviour	 that	 this	 requires.	 This	 ‘edifice’	 demands	 that	 Catherine	 be	exiled	from	within	its	walls	until	she	has	completed	her	mourning	process	–	the	restoration	of	the	automaton	–	after	which	she	may	rejoin	the	sphere	of	the	social;	or,	more	specifically,	 the	main	museum	community.	 Indeed,	in	 the	closing	pages	of	 the	novel	when	 the	restored	swan	 is	 ‘on	BBC	and	CNN	and	television	sets	around	the	world’,	Catherine	is	rewarded	by	Eric	with	dinner	at	the	Ivy	(‘fabulous	flinty	Chablis	and	oysters’)	her	adherence	to	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 edifice	 having	 granted	 her	 not	 only	 re-entry	 to	 the	social	 but	 also	 introduction	 to	 a	 scene	 of	 particular	 privilege.	 In	 part,	Catherine	accepts	her	social	banishment	as	appropriate,	if	not	necessarily	desirable,	and	her	grief	is	predominantly	enclosed	by	small	and	restrictive	spaces:	the	Annexe;	the	tube;	her	room	at	home;	a	taxi;	a	rented	room	at	a	nearby	 pub.	 She	 is	 equally	 intent	 on	 completing	 the	 restoration	without	disruption,	 and	 even	 though	 her	 reading	 of	 Henry’s	 diaries	 reveals	 the	possibility	 that	 the	 automaton	 may	 be	 carrying	 a	 secret,	 she	 refuses	 to	yield	to	repeated	requests	from	her	assistant	to	investigate	this	possibility	
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further	 by	 x-raying	 the	 nineteenth-century	 chassis	 that	 holds	 the	machine’s	mechanism.	Henry	Brandling’s	diaries	show	that	 there	are	many	convergences	between	his	situation	and	Catherine’s	own.	For	them	both,	the	automaton	promises	 to	 be	 an	 object	 of	 recovery,	 a	 future-oriented	 object,	 just	 as	mourning	 is	 a	 future-oriented	 process,	 moving	 forward	 toward	 healing	and	completion.	Also	for	them	both,	being	 in	proximity	to	the	automaton	requires	 a	 kind	 of	 looking	 away,	 a	 refusal	 to	 engage	 with	 or	 seek	 to	uncover	 the	 secrets	 that	 may	 quite	 literally	 live	 within	 its	 mechanism.	Henry	has	 commissioned	 the	 automaton	 in	 the	hope	 that	 it	will	 enchant	his	 critically	 ill	 young	son	Percy	back	 to	health.	 In	order	 to	do	so	he	has	travelled	from	England	to	Karlsruhe	in	Germany	to	seek	out	a	clockmaker	expert	 enough	 to	 build	 a	 copy	 of	 Jacques	 Vaucanson’s	 famous	 duck	automaton,	notorious	at	the	time	of	its	creation	for	its	apparent	ability	to	eat	grain	and	then	promptly	defecate.	Henry’s	relationship	with	his	wife	is	in	 tatters,	 and	 he	 has	 embarked	 on	 the	 expedition	 mainly	 due	 to	 her	insistence	 that	 he	 travel	 away	 from	 their	marital	 home.	When	 he	 finally	reaches	 Karlsruhe	 he	 is	 laughed	 at	 and	 thought	 strange	 by	 the	 various	people	he	meets,	most	of	whom	are	unable	to	understand	him.	Eventually,	he	 encounters	 the	 ‘giant’	 Sumper,	who	along	with	his	 female	 companion	Frau	Helga	and	her	son,	Carl,	insists	on	transporting	Henry	to	the	isolated	village	 of	 Furtwangen	 where	 he	 vows	 to	 construct	 the	 automaton	 to	Henry’s	specifications.		Although	 Henry’s	 son	 is	 still	 living	 when	 he	 leaves	 home,	 he	becomes	 less	 and	 less	 certain	 that	 this	 is	 the	 case	 after	 receiving	 no	communication	from	either	Percy	or	his	wife.	Just	as	Eric	hopes	will	be	the	case	 for	 Catherine,	 the	 automaton	 becomes	 Henry’s	 replacement	 love	object,	 identified,	 as	 it	 is	 for	 Eric	 and	 Catherine,	 with	 the	 promise	 of	recovery.	 	 Henry	 is	 intent	 on	 remaining	 distant	 from	 the	 supernatural	goings-on	 involving	 his	 companions	 and	 their	 relationship	 to	 the	automaton	 and	 its	 construction,	 which	 he	 soon	 learns,	 contrary	 to	 his	wishes,	 will	 be	 a	 swan	 rather	 than	 a	 duck.	 Unlike	 Eric,	 who	 encourages	
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Catherine	 to	 abstain	 from	 investigating	 the	 automaton	 and	 its	 secrets,	Sumper	 is	 enraged	 by	 Henry’s	 refusal	 to	 question	 some	 of	 the	 strange	objects	 and	 events	 that	 he	 encounters.	 These	 are	 many:	 copper	 cables	running	from	the	roof	of	the	mill	house	where	the	workshop	is	located	into	the	 surrounding	 earth;	 the	 young	 Carl	 playing	 with	 a	 makeshift	 battery	that	reanimates	a	dead	mouse;	the	appearance	of	a	‘tiny	engine’	with	one	large	and	one	small	wheel.	Whilst	Catherine	understands	 these	 things	 to	be	 anachronistic,	 Henry	 simply	 dismisses	 them,	 his	 main	 concern	 being	that	they	take	time	away	from	the	manufacture	of	his	duck.		Sumper	 is	 inspired	 in	 his	 mission	 to	 build	 the	 automaton	 by	 his	London	 mentor,	 Sir	 Albert	 Cruickshank,	 whose	 life	 and	 inventions	 (the	mathematical	 ‘Cruickshank	engine’)	are	clearly	based	on	those	of	Charles	Babbage	 and	 his	 analytical	 ‘Difference’	 engine.	 Sumper	 refers	 to	Cruickshank	 as	 a	 ‘Superior	 Being’	 and	 reads	 to	 Henry	 from	 his	 book	‘Mysterium	 Tremendum,’	 which	 appears	 to	 be	 an	 account	 of	 a	 visit	 to	another	realm	or	planet,	inhabited	by	‘“creatures	far	superior	to	any	idea	your	 human	 imagination	 can	 conceive”’	 (p.170).	 To	 look	 upon	 these	beings,	 Cruickshank	 suggests,	 is	 to	 refigure	 the	 very	 nature	 of	 seeing,	 to	find	oneself	 ‘“in	 the	 same	 state	 as	 a	 fly	whose	microscopic	 eye	has	been	changed	to	one	similar	to	a	man’s”’	(p.170).	This,	Sumper	suggests,	 is	the	position	 Henry	 also	 finds	 himself	 in,	 suffering	 from	 a	 ‘blindness’	 that	prevents	him	seeing	what	he	has	already	judged	to	be	‘impossible’	(p.153).	As	 the	 passage	 above	 makes	 clear,	 seeing	 (or	 not-seeing)	 is	associated	 in	 the	 text	 with	 limitations	 to	 human	 vision,	 not	 only	 in	 the	sense	 that	 there	 might	 be	 (and	 indeed	 is)	 a	 practical	 limit	 on	 what	 the	‘normal’	 human	 eye	 is	 able	 to	 perceive,	 but	 also	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 willed	blindness	 that	 comes	 into	 play	 when	 the	 centrality	 of	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	humanness	 in	 the	order	of	 things	 is	called	 into	question.	For	both	Henry	and	Catherine,	the	automaton	and	its	potential	secrets	threaten	just	such	a	disruption.	 In	 the	 present	 day,	 however,	 Catherine’s	 eagerness	 to	 look	away	 from	the	machine	she	 is	building	 is	 troubled	by	her	proximity	 to	a	melancholic	 who	 insists	 on	 retaining	 a	 questioning	 relationship	 to	 the	
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hidden	and	 lost,	a	relationship	that	prioritises	 ‘unworking’	over	recovery	and	repair.		
III.	 Amanda	Snyde	I	can’t	say	how	unusual	it	is	when	you	find	a	young	conservator	with	this	 degree	 of	 will.	 I	 saw	 it	 would	 now	 be	 my	 job,	 not	 only	 to	reconstruct	 the	 swan,	 but	 to	 harness	 all	 this	 dangerous	 energy	(p.20).	So	says	Catherine	when	she	begins	work	with	her	new	assistant,	the	young	and	brilliant	Amanda	Snyde.		Whereas	Catherine,	fascinated	as	she	is	with	Henry’s	 diaries,	 is	 inclined	 to	 a	 scepticism	 similar	 to	 Henry’s	 regarding	Sumper’s	grand	claims	(‘I	could	not	possibly	accept	that	Cruickshank	was	a	superior	being	or	that	animals	might	have	a	higher	mental	 life’),	Amanda	becomes	 obsessed	 with	 the	 wooden	 hull	 that	 formerly	 housed	 the	mechanism	of	the	swan,	believing	that	it	contains	a	dark	secret	(p.201).	As	is	apparent	from	the	utterance	above,	Catherine	believes	it	is	necessary	to	manage	(or	‘harness’)	Amanda’s	affective	responses,	just	as	Eric	has	done	in	her	own	case.	This	 leads	 to	 a	battle	of	wills	between	 the	 two	women,	with	 Amanda	 pushing	 Catherine	 to	 x-ray	 the	 wooden	 hull	 and	 reveal	anything	that	might	be	held	inside.		Amanda	 is	 also	 grieving.	 Every	 day,	 Catherine	 discovers,	 she	watches	live	webcam	footage	of	oil	flooding	into	the	waters	of	the	Gulf	of	Mexico	 after	 the	 explosion	 of	 the	 Deepwater	 Horizon	 drilling	 rig.	 The	distant	origins	of	 this	 contemporary	oil	 spill,	Amanda	believes,	 are	 to	be	found	in	the	automaton’s	wooden	hull,	which	she	considers	to	be	‘a	kind	of	wooden	horse	whose	double	skin	had	been	produced	to	smuggle	[…]	the	‘secrets’	of	an	internal	combustion	engine’	(p.268).	The	components	of	this	engine	were	planted,	Amanda	insists,	by	‘ghosts,	fabulous	beings’	intent	on	destroying	 humankind,	 the	 machinery	 having	 been	 unwittingly	transported	 to	England	by	Henry	Brandling	 in	 the	hull	of	his	automaton.	
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Although	Catherine	is	aggrieved	as	well	as	unnerved	by	Amanda’s	claims,	they	also	affect	her	 in	more	complex	ways.	She	feels	an	 ‘awful	chill’when	Amanda	suggests	the	contents	of	the	hull	might	be	 ‘totally	anachronistic’,	and	is	similarly	sickened	by	the	webcam	images	of	the	oil	spill,	which	she	goes	home	and	watches	‘for	hours	on	end’	(pp.206,	162).	She	describes	the	disaster	as	‘an	‘accident’	in	inverted	commas,	and	it	leads	her	to	reflect	on	the	 relationship	 between	 the	 oil	 spill	 and	 all	 the	 ‘bright	 and	 poisonous	invention’	that	Henry	has	described	in	his	diaries	(p.164).	In	contrast,	Eric	Croft	is	intent	on	denying	any	weight	or	urgency	to	Amanda’s	grief	(‘there	was	a	big	 feature	 in	Slate	[…]	 about	 the	psychological	damage	caused	by	the	oil	 spill.	Her	 feelings	are	normal.	 She’s	upset.’)	 as	well	 as	 specifically	situating	her	affective	responses	as	symptoms	of	an	 illness	that	might	be	managed	medically	 (p.210).	He	describes	Amanda’s	 time	 spent	watching	the	 webcam	 of	 the	 oil	 spill	 as	 an	 ‘addiction’,	 and	 when	 she	 strikes	Catherine	 after	being	denied	 an	 x-ray	of	 the	hull,	 Eric	puts	 it	 down	 to	 ‘a	mess-up	at	Boots,	apparently.	 […]	Now	she	has	her	pills	again,	she’s	 fine’	(p.236).	In	this	way,	Eric	situates	Amanda’s	affective	responses	to	both	the	oil	 spill	 and	 the	 automaton	 as	 pathological,	 suggesting	 that	 they	 might	qualify	 as	 symptoms	 of	 melancholia’s	 more	 contemporary	 heir,	depression.42	Once	again,	Eric’s	description	of	Amanda	works	at	 the	 level	of	cultural	diagnosis	to	identify	good	and	bad	ways	of	responding	to	loss,	even	 down	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 his	 analysis	 of	 Amanda’s	 behaviour	 is	 drawn	straight	from	a	Slate	article.	Both	Eric	and	Catherine	are	able	to	diagnose	Amanda’s	behaviour	as	pathological	because	the	site	of	loss	she	identifies	–	 the	 internal	 combustion	 engine	 hidden	 within	 the	 automaton	 –	 is	understood	by	them	both	to	be,	quite	literally,	empty.		For	Freud,	neither	melancholics	nor	 those	around	 them	are	able	 to	‘see	clearly’	what	has	been	 lost.	This	suggests,	he	argues,	 that	 the	object-loss	suffered	is	‘withdrawn	from	consciousness’,	as	opposed	to	mourning,	where	 ‘nothing	 about	 the	 loss	 […]	 is	 unconscious’	 (Mourning	 and	
Melancholia,	p.245).	Ahmed	sums	this	up	bluntly:	for	Freud,	melancholics																																																									42	For	more	on	this	see	Darian	Leader:	The	New	Black:	Mourning,	Melancholia	and	Depression	
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‘do	 not	 know	what	 they	 are	missing’	 (Promise	 of	Happiness,	 p.140).	 The	point	 she	makes	about	 this	 claim	 is	 that	 it	 involves	a	 judgment	made	by	others	who	are	not	able	to	see,	or	share	in,	the	object	that	has	been	lost.		To	read	others	as	melancholic	would	be	to	read	their	attachments	as	death-wishes,	 as	 attachments	 to	 things	 that	 are	 already	 dead.	 To	diagnose	 melancholia	 would	 become	 a	 way	 of	 declaring	 that	 their	love	 objects	 are	 dead.	 Others	 would	 be	 judged	 as	 melancholic	because	they	have	failed	to	give	up	on	objects	that	we	have	declared	dead	on	their	behalf.	The	diagnosis	of	melancholia	would	thus	involve	an	 ethical	 injunction	 or	 moral	 duty:	 the	 other	 must	 let	 go	 by	declaring	the	objects	that	we	declare	dead	as	being	dead	in	the	way	that	we	declare	(p.141).	In	Ahmed’s	terms,	then,	the	sustained	and	struggling	relationship	with	the	lost	 object	 that	 characterises	 melancholia	 is	 only	 made	 visible	 as	 such	because	other	members	of	an	affective	community	do	not	share	 the	 loss;	that	 is	 to	say,	 they	have	 let	 it	go.	 In	The	Chemistry	of	Tears	a	melancholic	response	to	loss	is	reframed	as	an	imperative	to	understand	certain	losses	as	 empty	 or	 absent.	 In	 other	 words,	 other	 members	 of	 the	 affective	community	 understand	 the	 loss	 being	 grieved	 by	 the	 melancholic	 as	necessarily	 unavailable	 to	 consciousness	 because,	 rather	 than	 having	taken	place	and	then	‘let	go’,	they	would	deny	that	it	ever	took	place	at	all.	Amanda’s	 attachment	 to	 and	 engagement	 with	 the	 automaton	 and	 its	history	 is	 understood	 to	 be	 a	 melancholic	 one	 because	 the	 loss	 she	identifies	 as	having	occurred	 (the	 Industrial	Revolution	weaponised	as	 a	means	 of	 ensuring	 human	 species	 death)	 counteracts	 an	 Enlightenment	narrative	 that	 sees	 this	 historical	 moment	 as	 an	 affirmation,	 not	unravelling,	of	 the	human.	 In	Amanda’s	version	 the	human	 is	 completely	decentred,	humanity’s	perceived	agency	 in	 this	age	of	 invention	revealed	to	 be	 as	 mechanical	 as	 the	 engines	 it	 brought	 into	 being.	 This	 vision	 is	described	 in	 an	 extract	 Amanda	 claims	 to	 have	 come	 from	 Henry	Brandling’s	 diary,	 but	 which	 Catherine	 decides	 she	 must	 have	 written	herself.	
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	 And	the	filth	shall	spew	forth	from	the	depths,	like	black	bile,	like	gall,	and	the	ocean	shall	be	as	a	mother	giving	wormwood	from	her	breasts.	The	truth	will	be	like	a	razor	no	tongue	dare	touch.	A	multitude	of	idiots	shall	flee	back	and	forth	on	rivers	of	tar,	an	awful	honking	like	generations	of	geese.	[…]	The	cruel	famines,	the	drought	–	all	will	be	enigma	and	injustice.	And	any	who	sees	the	truth	will	be	called	mad.	Is	it	you	unlucky	woman?	Then	you	will	be	stoned	and	thrown	into	a	moat.	
Mysterium	Tremendum.	There	were	ghosts,	fabulous	beings,	but	they	were	our	enemies	and	we	died,	not	knowing	what	had	happened,	all	and	every	one	(p.270).	In	 this	 apocalyptic	 vision,	 given	 in	 biblical	 terms,	 humans	 are	 ‘idiots’	speaking	 a	 language	 as	 unintelligible	 as	 the	 ‘honking’	 of	 geese,	 killed	 ‘all	and	 every	 one’	 by	 the	 intervention	 of	 the	 fabulous	 beings	 both	 Amanda	and	Sumper	believe	in.	Amanda’s	attachment	to	the	automaton’s	hull	and	its	 secrets	 is	 conceived	 by	 those	 around	 her	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 madness,	 not	because	the	present-day	effects	of	 the	 Industrial	Revolution	(the	oil	spill,	climate	 change,	 mass	 extinction)	 are	 denied	 as	 sites	 of	 grief	 –	 on	 the	contrary,	 Catherine	 in	 particular	 is	 as	 troubled	 and	 moved	 by	 these	 as	Amanda	 is	–	but	because	her	narrative	of	 loss	decentres	 the	human.	The	hull	must	necessarily	be	empty	of	the	kind	of	machine	Amanda	envisages	might	lie	within	because,	rather	than	having	been	‘declared	dead,’	the	kind	of	story	she	wants	to	tell	about	‘superior	beings’	should	not	exist	at	all.	It	is	a	misunderstanding,	an	error,	an	imaginative	madness:	there	is	nothing	to	be	found	here.	Amanda’s	 attachment	 to	 this	 narrative	 of	 murderous	 ‘supreme	beings’	has	a	particular	relationship,	then,	to	visibility	and	ways	of	seeing.	The	diary	extract	 reminds	us	of	 the	way	 that	 the	melancholic,	with	 their	problematic	 attachment	 to	 a	 lost	 object	 not	 shared	 as	 such	 by	 their	affective	community,	 is	understood	as	seeing	 the	world	differently	–	 that	
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is,	as	seeing	things	that	aren’t	there.	In	the	apocalyptic	times	to	come,	the	diary	 explains,	 ‘any	 who	 sees	 the	 truth	 will	 be	 called	 mad’.	 	 Amanda	labours	throughout	the	text	to	flag	up	the	automaton	as	a	site	of	loss	that	she	 believes	 to	 have	 been	 mistakenly	 identified	 as	 empty,	 and	 the	 text	explores	this	 idea	in	 literal	terms	through	Amanda	and	Catherine’s	 fierce	disagreement	over	whether	the	large	hull	should	be	x-rayed.	Therefore	in	
The	 Chemistry	 of	 Tears	 melancholic	 critical	 agency	 presents	 a	 drive	 to	make	 loss	 visible,	 primarily	 through	 persistent	work	 that	 seeks	 to	 show	that	a	site	or	object	of	 loss	has	been	hidden,	or	kept	secret.	 In	this	sense,	Freud’s	 suggestion	 that	 melancholic	 object-loss	 is	 ‘withdrawn	 from	consciousness’	 can	 be	 refigured	 in	more	 radical	 terms.	 The	melancholic	struggle	 which	 asks	 questions	 about	 the	 identity	 or	 specificity	 of	 that	which	has	been	lost	(the	validity	of	which	is	always	decided,	as	Ahmed	has	shown,	 from	 outside)	 can	 instead	 be	 understood	 as	 the	 productive	identification	 of	 a	 site	 of	 conflict,	 a	 site	 where	 loss	 is	 contested	 or	suppressed	in	some	way.		In	 The	 Chemistry	 of	 Tears,	 then,	 melancholic	 attachment	 means	maintaining	 a	 questioning	 relationship	 to	 loss,	 a	 relationship	 that	 asks	both	the	melancholic	and	those	who	would	diagnose	them	as	such	to	look	
again.	This	involves	the	taking	apart	of	objects	both	literally	(the	proposed	x-ray	of	the	hull)	and	via	reading	practices	that	would	seek	to	expose	the	historical	 and	 cultural	 workings	 of	 these	 same	 objects.	 This	 happens	primarily	 in	 two	 ways;	 firstly,	 by	 reimagining	 the	 relationship	 between	certain	 objects,	 loss	 and	 time,	 and	 secondly	 by	 contesting	 the	 limits	 of	human	vision	 in	order	 to	 challenge	 the	 idea	 that	visibility,	or	 the	visible,	might	have	an	unproblematic	relationship	to	truth.	
	
IV.	 Time	Carey’s	novel	is	animated	by	questions	about	time,	particularly	regarding	the	ways	that	it	might	be	measured	or	experienced.	Catherine,	of	course,	is	a	horologist,	and	as	such	her	day-to-day	work	focuses	on	the	maintenance	
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and	repair	of	clocks,	a	family	occupation	first	taken	up	by	her	grandfather	and	 then	 her	 father.	 The	 fact	 that	 this	 family	 tradition	 began	 as	 a	patriarchal	 one	 gestures	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 clocks	 in	 the	 text	 are	 identified	with	 conservatism;	 indeed	 Catherine	 is	 the	 first	 female	 horologist	 the	museum	has	ever	had	and	as	such	is	viewed	as	something	of	a	‘freak’	(p.4).	Michelle	 Bastian	 points	 out	 that	 the	 association	 of	 clocks	 with	 the	maintenance	 of	 the	 status	 quo	 is	 a	 common	 one	 across	 various	 cultural	forms,	where	‘the	clock	continues	to	symbolise	capitalist	forms	of	control	and	domination,	as	well	as	the	constraining	of	progressive	impulses	more	generally.’43	For	Bastian,	Western	philosophical	 inquiries	 focusing	on	 the	nature	of	time	have	also	tended	to	portray	clocks	as	devices	that	‘obscure	more	 complex	 understandings	 of	 time’	 because	 they	 are	 understood	 as	focusing	on	a	linear	progression	that	does	not	represent	the	authenticity	of	lived	experience	(p.8).	In	this	sense,	there	is	an	element	of	cruelty	present	in	cultural	representations	of	clock	time.	As	Bastian	puts	it:	Their	 relentlessly	 turning	 hands	 have	 become	 a	 familiar	 way	 of	representing	the	cruel	disconnects	between	the	 ‘time	of	experience’	and	the	‘time	of	the	world’	–	the	hand	that	continues	on	even	though	a	 loved	one	has	died,	 refuses	 to	pause	when	we	are	 late,	or	 rebuffs	plans	to	skip	ahead	when	we	are	anxiously	waiting	(pp.9-10).	This	 viewpoint	 on	 clock	 time	 is	 certainly	 represented	 in	 the	 novel.	 For	Catherine,	 the	steady	 ticking	of	clocks	 that	had	previously	always	been	a	source	of	comfort	torments	her	now	that	Matthew	is	dead,	culminating	in	her	putting	three	of	them	inside	her	fridge	at	home,	a	‘frightening’	decision	that	 she	sees	as	 ‘an	extremely	violent	act	 (p.147).	 ‘I	had	spent	my	entire	life	 foolishly	 seduced	by	 ticking	clocks,’	 she	explains,	 ‘never	bothering	 to	hear	 the	 horror	 underneath	 (p.148).	 In	 losing	 Matthew,	 Catherine	 has	found	herself	out	of	synch	with	clock	time	as	she	has	always	understood	it.	In	 this	 sense,	 she	 inhabits	a	new	kind	of	 temporality,	 a	melancholic	 time	governed	by	loss.																																																										43	Michelle	Bastian,	‘Liberating	Clocks:	Developing	a	Critical	Horology	to	Rethink	the	Potential	of	Clock	Time	(Forthcoming)’,	New	Formations,	p.	2.	
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Eng	and	Kazanjian	identify	an	ongoing	engagement	with	the	past	as	one	 of	 the	 defining	 features	 of	 melancholia	 as	 Freud	 originally	conceptualises	it.	They	oppose	this	to	the	same	relationship	in	mourning,	where	 they	 argue	 the	 past	 is	 declared	 ‘resolved,	 finished	 and	 dead’	Melancholia’s	 relation	 to	 the	 past,	 in	 contrast,	 is	 ‘ongoing	 and	 open’	 and	leads	to	an	ethically	productive	‘continuous	engagement	with	loss	and	its	remains’	(Loss,	p.4).	Similarly,	Martin	Middeke	and	Christina	Wald	identify	a	 ‘sense	 of	 temporal	 difference’	 as	 one	 of	 two	 seminal	manifestations	 of	melancholic	 loss	 (the	 other	 being	 object	 loss).	 This	 comes	 about,	 they	argue,	as	a	result	of	a	kind	of	awakening	to	the	reality	of	the	loss	of	one’s	own	 life,	 so	 that	 a	 loss	 of	 time	 occurs	 in	 addition	 to	 a	 loss	 of	 object.44	Ahmed	 also	 describes	 this	 effect	 in	 spatial	 terms,	 suggesting	 that	 the	failure	of	the	melancholic	to	 ‘get	over’	 loss	leaves	them	‘facing	the	wrong	way’,	with	the	consequence	of	this	being	that	they	must	be	‘redirected,	or	turned	 around’	 (p.141).	 As	 is	 apparent,	 then,	 melancholia	 is	 commonly	understood	 to	 coincide	 with	 a	 sense	 of	 temporal	 asynchronicity	 in	 the	sense	 that	 the	 melancholic	 imagines	 and	 experiences	 different	 ways	 of	being	in	as	well	as	out	of	(clock)	time.			Bastian,	 however,	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	 ways	 that	Western	 clock	time	 is	 produced	 rather	 than	 existing	 as	 an	 objective,	 eternal	 truth,	suggesting	 that	 telling	 the	 time	 by	 a	 clock	 should	 be	 understood	 as	 a	statement	 of	 faith,	 rather	 than	 of	 fact.45	Rather	 than	 flowing	 without	interruption,	Bastian	argues	that	clock	time	is	subject	to	‘gaps	and	breaks’	(Liberating	Clocks,	p.9).	Clocks	are	late,	they	are	fast	and	they	can	fail	to	match	up	with	each	other.	We	change	them	when	we	shift	time	zones,	for	daylight	saving	time	(DST)	or	even	when	we	just	want	to	trick	ourselves	into	getting	up	earlier.	Further,	clocks	do	not	represent	a	single	line	of	time.	The																																																									44	M.	(Martin)	Middeke	and	Christina	Wald,	The	Literature	of	Melancholia :	Early	Modern	to	
Postmodern	(Houndmills,	Basingstoke,	Hampshire,	UK ;	New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2011),	p.	4.	45	Michelle	Bastian,	‘Fatally	Confused:	Telling	the	Time	in	the	Midst	of	Ecological	Crises’,	Journal	of	
Environmental	Philosophy,	9.1	(2012),	23–48.	
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time	that	we	currently	call	clock	time	is	Universal	Coordinated	Time	(UTC)	which	is	itself	derived	from	an	effort	to	coordinate	two	other	time	 standards,	 namely	 International	 Atomic	 Time	 (TAI)	 and	Universal	Time	(UT1).	Along	with	others	such	as	GPS	Time	(GPST),	these	time	standards	produce	different	kinds	of	time	that	are	derived	from	different	phenomena,	flow	in	different	ways	and	do	not	always	match	up	(p.10).	The	consequence	of	this,	Bastian	explains,	is	that	clocks	in	the	West	cannot	be	seen	as	apolitical	or	immune	to	relationships	of	power.	She	calls	for	the	development	of	a	 ‘critical	horology’	that	would	pay	attention	to	the	ways	that	 both	 clocks	 and	 clock	 time	 are	 produced,	 as	well	 as	 exploring	who	might	 be	 able	 to	 do	 that	 producing	 (p.15).	 Sarah	 Sharma	 has	 done	something	 similar	 in	 a	 recent	 ethnographic	 study	 of	 individuals	 and	communities	 whose	 lives	 frequently	 intersect	 with	 or	 are	 shaped	 by	notions	of	 time	 (examples	 include	 taxi	 drivers	 and	 followers	of	 the	 slow	food	 movement).	 Sharma	 uses	 the	 word	 temporality	 to	 refer	 to	 an	‘awareness	 of	 power	 relations	 as	 they	 play	 out	 in	 time.’46	Although	 she	describes	 the	 clock	as	 ‘only	one	chronometer’	of	 the	ways	 in	which	 time	might	 be	 produced	 through	 relationships	 of	 power,	 she	 argues	 that	 the	problem	of	time	more	generally	 is	a	site	of	 ‘biopolitical	 intervention’,	not	only	 for	 traditional	 institutions	 of	 power	 like	 the	 state,	 market	 and	military,	 but	 also	 for	 ‘pharmaceutical	 companies,	 airliners,	 wellness	enterprises,	 and	 the	 hospitality	 and	 tourism	 industry’	 (p.18).	 Bastian	makes	 this	 same	 point	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 ways	 that	 subjects	 (or	 non-subjects)	 might	 be	 able	 to	 come	 into	 contact	 with	 one	 another,	 arguing	that	time	is	not	a	quantitative	measurement,	but	rather	‘a	powerful	social	tool	 for	 producing,	 managing,	 and/or	 undermining	 various	understandings	of	who	or	what	is	in	relation	with	other	things	or	beings’	(Fatally	Confused,	p.25).	
																																																								46	Sarah	Sharma,	In	the	Meantime:	Temporality	and	Cultural	Politics	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2014),	p.	4.	
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In	 this	way,	 then,	 time	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 one	 of	 the	 forms	 of	power	 governing	 judgements	 about	 the	 social	 undesirability	 of	melancholia.	 If	 time	 is	 focused	 on	managing	 communities	 and	 the	 ways	that	they	relate	in	the	sense	that	Bastian	and	Sharma	describe	here,	then	it	is	not	surprising	that	the	main	way	in	which	melancholia	is	diagnosed	is	as	a	kind	of	temporal	lag,	so	that	the	melancholic	is	understood	to	be	behind	or	out	of	synch	with	others	around	them,	in	need	of	being	‘turned	around.’	Their	 refusal	 to	 coordinate	 with	 the	 social	 time	 of	 non-melancholic	subjects	would	also	be	understood	as	a	threat	to	the	collective	‘statement	of	 faith’	 that	 sees	 most	 daily	 activities	 and	 ways	 of	 being	 in	 the	 world	governed	by	an	adherence	to	time	as	it	 is	measured	by	the	clock.	Bastian	points	 out	 that	 ‘individual	 and	 collective	 judgements	 about	 significance	and	relevance	are	utilized	 in	the	process	of	recognizing	what	counts	as	a	change	 that	 is	 significant	 enough	 to	 produce	 a	 “before”	 and	 an	 “after”’	(Fatally	Confused,	 p.28).	This	might	 easily	be	 a	description	of	 the	way	 in	which	melancholia	 is	 produced	 and	diagnosed;	 a	 lost	 object	 imagined	 as	either	already	dead	or	never	born	(that	is,	insignificant)	is	seen	to	lock	the	melancholic	 into	 an	 endless	 ‘before’	 relation,	 never	 able	 to	move	 to	 the	‘after’	 which	 is	 the	 completed	 work	 of	 normal	 mourning	 and	 the	accompanying	return	to	the	social.	Asynchronicity,	then,	is	another	way	in	which	melancholia	might	 flag	 up	 or	 point	 toward	 a	 site	 of	 conflict	 with	regard	to	loss,	in	particular	by	exposing	some	of	the	ways	in	which	time	is	produced	 and	 deployed	 in	 order	 to	 foreclose	 the	 possibility	 of	 certain	kinds	of	losses	remaining	engaged	with	a	disruptive	‘past.’		To	return	to	The	Chemistry	of	Tears,	Catherine’s	violent	decision	to	put	her	clocks	 inside	 the	 fridge	means	more	 than	a	grief-fuelled	reaction	against	the	conservatism	of	clock	time.	Clocks	in	the	novel	have	more	to	do	with	 instability	 than	 constant	 measurement,	 and	 their	 presence	 is	wrapped	up	with	the	asynchronicity	of	melancholic	time	in	the	ways	that	they	 exceed	 or	 disrupt	 the	 meaning	 of	 time-keeping.	 Whilst	 the	 clocks	Catherine	places	inside	her	fridge	are	easily	identified	as	such	(they	are	of	the	traditional	wind-up	kind),	there	is	another	timepiece	in	the	novel	that	
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is	not	so	immediately	recognisable:	the	swan	automaton.	This	is	officially	categorised,	 it	 turns	 out,	 as	 a	 ‘Sing-song’	 (Eric	 Croft’s	 particular	 area	 of	expertise);	 this	 is	 the	 general	 eighteenth-century	 term	 for	 the	 elaborate	clocks	and	watches	which	the	English	East	India	Trading	Company	sold	in	large	 quantities	 to	 China,	 the	 name	 coming	 from	 the	 music	 boxes	 with	which	many	of	them	were	fitted.47	The	categorisation	included	mechanical	toys	 that	 relied	 on	 the	 same	 kinds	 of	mechanism	 as	 clocks,	 such	 objects	being	 ‘one	 of	 the	 very	 few	 classes	 of	 goods	which	 the	West	 could	 offer,	before	the	age	of	full	industrial	production,	of	interest	to	the	East’;48	or,	as	Catherine	 puts	 it	 ‘those	 perfect	 imperial	 misunderstandings	 of	 oriental	culture	 we	 so	 successfully	 exported	 to	 China	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century’	(Carey,	p.6).	Whilst	 the	swan	automaton	might	not	be	easily	 recognisable	as	 the	more	elaborate	relative	of	clocks	and	watches,	it	certainly	acts	to	measure	time,	 albeit	 unconventionally.	 The	 internal	 combustion	 engine	 that	Amanda	 believes	 is	 housed	 in	 the	 automaton’s	 hull	 is	 the	 site	 of	 an	anachronism	that	calls	into	question	the	kinds	of	‘befores’	and	‘afters’	that	tell	a	particular	story	about	human	progress	and	the	Industrial	Revolution.	Similarly,	the	copper	cables	on	Sumper’s	house;	Carl’s	voltaic	battery;	the	‘engine’	he	rides	and	play	with:	all	of	these	have	arrived	anachronistically	in	the	pages	of	Henry’s	diaries,	and	Catherine	knows	it.	The	building	of	the	automaton	in	eighteenth-century	Switzerland	and	the	twenty-first	century	Gulf	oil	spill	become	dislocated	in	time	so	that	both	Catherine	and	Amanda	begin	 to	 question	 a	 linear	 narrative	 that	 would	 see	 one	 as	 necessarily	following	the	other.	If,	as	Amanda	believes,	the	purpose	of	the	oil	spill	(the	environmental	 self-destruction	of	 the	human	species),	precedes	–	 indeed	demands	 –	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 internal	 combustion	 engine,	 rather	 than	being	an	unintended	result	of	that	act	of	invention,	then	time	and	history																																																									47	J.	M.	Braga,	‘A	Seller	of	“Sing-Songs” :	A	Chapter	in	the	Foreign	Trade	of	China	and	Macao’,	Journal	
of	Oriental	Studies,	6	(1961),	p.	69.	48	Joseph	Needham,	Ling	Wang,	and	Derek	J.	de	Solla	Price,	Heavenly	Clockwork :	The	Great	
Astronomical	Clocks	of	Medieval	China,	2nd	ed.	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1986),	p.	150.	
	 43	
are	 both	 out	 of	 synch.	 Catherine	 and	 Amanda’s,	 ability	 to	 make	connections	 between	 these	 events,	 and	 to	 think	 critically	 about	 them,	 is	presented	 here	 as	 the	 result	 of	 their	 ability	 to	 participate	 in	 a	 kind	 of	melancholic	 vision.	 If,	 the	 novel	 posits,	 melancholia	 itself	 disrupts	 the	meaning	of	‘before’	and	‘after’,	then	something	about	the	experience	of	this	gives	 the	 melancholic	 subject	 a	 capacity	 to	 ‘see’,	 or	 try	 to	 make	perceivable,	 other	 moments	 that	 also	 work	 in	 this	 way.	 Specifically,	Carey’s	 text	 indicates	 that	 the	melancholic	 experience	 of	 being	 out	 of	 or	behind	time	gives	the	individual	melancholic	subject	insight	into	how	that	same	 situation	 might	 be	 playing	 out	 on	 a	 species	 level,	 the	 context	 of	which	here	is	ecological	disaster.		As	Bastian	points	out,	in	terms	of	climate	change	‘humans	are	failing	to	 coordinate	 with	 some	 of	 the	 most	 important	 changes	 shaping	 the	current	world’,	and	unless	different	ways	of	telling	the	time	are	found	the	effect	for	the	human	species	will	continue	to	be	that	of	‘not	being	in	time,	of	 being	 out	 of	 synch	 and	 uncoordinate’	 (Fatally	 Confused,	 p.33).	 For	Bastian,	the	standard	form	of	time	told	using	UTC	(Coordinated	Universal	Time,	which	 integrates	 both	 solar	 and	 atomic	 time	 by	 adding	 additional	‘leap	seconds’)	is	not	up	to	the	task	of	measuring	or	recording	the	dramatic	changes	taking	place	across	the	planet,	predominantly	as	a	result	of	global	warming.	It	does	not	provide	us	with	a	measure	of	 the	 time	before	and	after	the	 mass	 extinction	 event	 currently	 taking	 place,	 before	 and	 after	resource	depletion,	before	and	after	dramatic	changes	 in	sea	 levels,	before	 and	 after	 climate	 change.	 Rather	 than	 representing	 the	urgency	 and	 danger	 of	 these	 changes,	 clock	 time	 emphasizes	continuity	and	similarity	across	all	moments	and	projects	an	empty	and	unending	future	(p.33).	In	 this	 sense,	 then,	 the	 human	 species	 also	 finds	 itself	 ‘out	 of	 time’	(perhaps	 literally),	 in	 the	 same	 way	 that	 the	 melancholic	 subject	 is	considered	 to	 be,	 and	 Carey’s	 novel	 combines	 these	 two	 experiences	 in	
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order	to	suggest	that	melancholic	ways	of	being	in	the	world	might	open	up	 a	 critical	 dialogue	 about	 how	 humans	 relate	 to	 the	 planet	 as	 a	 love	object,	and	how	this	attachment	might	work	in	time.	In	his	recent	study	of	the	rise	of	steam	power,	Fossil	Capital	(2016),	Andreas	 Malm	 has	 also	 drawn	 attention	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 thinking	 about	climate	 change	 also	means	 thinking	 about	 time,	 arguing	 that	 ‘at	 its	 core	[…]	climate	change	is	a	messy	mix-up	of	time	scales.’49	For	 every	 year	 global	 warming	 continues	 and	 temperatures	 soar	higher,	living	conditions	on	earth	will	be	determined	more	intensely	by	 the	 emissions	 of	 yore,	 so	 that	 the	 grip	 of	 yesteryear	 on	 today	intensifies	 –	 or,	 put	 differently,	 the	 causal	 power	 of	 the	 past	
inexorably	 rises,	 all	 the	 way	 up	 to	 the	 point	 when	 it	 is	 indeed	 ‘too	late.’	The	significance	of	 that	 terrible	destiny,	so	often	warned	of	 in	climate	 change	 discourse,	 is	 the	 final	 falling	 in	 of	 history	 on	 the	
present	(p.9)	Malm	 is	keen	here	 to	highlight	 the	accumulative	dangers	of	 atmospheric	CO2,	the	release	of	which	in	the	present	day	is	rendered	more	dangerous	due	 to	 the	 ‘billions	 of	 tonnes	 already	 out	 there’	 (p.7).	 In	 this	 way,	 the	burning	of	fossil	fuels	in	Britain	during	and	after	the	Industrial	Revolution	(which	accounted,	Malm	explains,	for	more	than	half	the	world’s	emissions	for	 a	 large	part	 of	 the	nineteenth	 century)	 only	 reveals	 its	 full	 historical	and	 ecological	 significance	 by	 way	 of	 the	 impact	 it	 will	 have	 on	 future	generations	 and	 the	 ‘warped	 ethical	 structure’	 that	 this	 creates	 (p.8).	Again,	 I	would	argue	 that	 this	 resembles	a	melancholic	 relation	whereby	the	 past	 comes	 to	 dominate	 and	 inform	 the	 actions	 of	 subjects	 in	 the	present	 by	way	 of	 the	 kind	 of	 sustained	 engagement	 that	 contemporary	theorists	 associate	with	melancholic	 critical	 agency.	 Put	 simply,	 the	 past	
cannot	be	declared	dead.	
																																																								49	Andreas	Malm,	Fossil	Capital:	The	Rise	of	Steam-Power	and	the	Roots	of	Global	Warming	(London:	Verso,	2016),	p.	8.	
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Malm’s	words	here	also	conceptualise	the	Industrial	Revolution	and	the	accompanying	birth	of	what	he	calls	 the	 ‘fossil	economy’	as	a	kind	of	Doomsday	device.	Made	most	famous	by	Stanley	Kubrick’s	Dr	Strangelove	(1964),	 the	 term	refers	 to	 a	machine	 that	 theoretically	has	 the	power	 to	wipe	 out	 all	 human	 life	 on	 the	 planet	 at	 once	 –	 hence	 ‘doomsday.’	 Clare	Colebrook	points	out	that	the	nuclear	bomb	is	the	classic	example	of	such	a	machine,	being	the	‘archetypal’	or	‘exemplary’	Doomsday	device:	If	 we	 take	 the	 classic	 figure	 of	 the	 Doomsday	 device,	 particularly	looking	 at	 the	 concept	 of	 device,	 it	 has	 a	 notion	 of	 ‘techne’	 or	technology,	which	is	something	that	one	develops	to	enhance	life	or	extend	 life.	 It	 also	 has	 the	 capacity	 to	 then	 take	 on	 its	 own	momentum	and	turn	back	and	destroy	life.50	In	Malm’s	work	the	fossil	economy	plays	just	such	a	role	in	the	fate	of	the	human	 species,	 even	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 his	 concentration	 on	 the	workings	 of	 capital	 in	 this	 arrangement	 emphasises	 that	 this	‘enhancement’	 of	 life	 was	 intended	 for	 the	 bourgeois,	 rather	 than,	 for	example,	Britain’s	industrial	workers.51	His	description	above,	and	indeed	his	 book	 as	 a	 whole,	 emphasise	 what	 Colebrook	 refers	 to	 as	 the	 ‘tragic	narrative	 quality’	 of	 the	 Doomsday	 device	 idea.	 This	 is	 to	 do,	 Colebrook	suggests,	 with	 the	 ‘intentionality’	 at	 work	 in	 the	 story	 of	 these	 devices.	‘Humans	devise	or	 intentionally	create	something,’	she	explains,	 ‘but	that	very	 act	 of	 their	 own	 intentionality	 or	mastery	 has	 this	 tragic	 quality	 of	coming	back	and	destroying	their	own	mastery.’	In	 The	 Chemistry	 of	 Tears	 the	 swan	 automaton	 would	 seem	 to	exemplify	the	idea	of	a	Doomsday	device	as	Malm	understands	it,	literally	signifying	 the	 birth	 of	 the	 Industrial	 Revolution	 via	 the	 internal	combustion	 engine	 it	 may	 or	 may	 not	 hold	 inside.	 In	 its	 disruption	 of	‘befores’	 and	 ‘afters’	 it	 also	 draws	 those	 around	 it	 into	 a	 melancholic																																																									50	HKW	Anthropocene,	Cary	Wolfe	and	Claire	Colebrook	|	Dialogue	|	The	Anthropocene	Project.	An	
Opening	<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YLTCzth8H1M>	[accessed	26	April	2017].	51	Malm	argues	that	Britain	is	the	‘incontestable	birthplace’	of	the	fossil	economy.	(13)	
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relation	with	 the	past	 that	demands	critical	 reflection	on	 the	meaning	of	history	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 the	 present	moment.	 It	 is	 only	 through	 a	 kind	 of	melancholic	 vision,	 the	 text	 suggests,	 that	 the	 swan	 really	 makes	 any	sense.	This	vision,	it	seems,	involves	and	necessitates	a	process	of	tracing	relationships	of	causality	that	may	not	be	linear	or	chronological	but	must	still	be	understood	as	 ‘living’	 in	the	present	moment,	despite	the	ways	in	which	 they	 may	 have	 been	 declared	 empty	 or	 dead.	 Anne	 Enderwitz’s	description	of	how	Freud	imagines	melancholia	to	relate	to	time	is	useful	here;	 she	 explains	 ‘the	 way	 in	 which	 Freud	 determines	 the	 relation	between	 past	 and	 present	 in	 melancholia	 implies	 a	 complex	 temporal	framework	 that	 might	 best	 be	 described	 as	 ‘“synchronicity	 of	 the	 non-synchronic.”’52	This	 phrase,	 she	 clarifies,	 explains	 the	 way	 that	 Freud’s	melancholia	‘entails	the	co-existence	of	objects	and	desires	from	different	time	 periods	 in	 the	 present	 self’	 (p.174).	 Enderwitz	 refers	 here	 to	 the	incorporation	 of	 the	 lost	 object	within	 the	melancholic	 ego,	 asking	 us	 to	imagine	the	melancholic	psyche	in	topographical	terms	just	as	Butler	does.	In	 these	material	 terms,	Amanda’s	version	of	 the	 swan	automaton	might	be	understood	as	literally	embodying	this	idea	of	the	‘synchronicity	of	the	non-synchronic’,	 holding	 within	 itself	 (the	 hull	 that	 ostensibly	 should	house	 the	 mechanism)	 components	 of	 a	 machine	 that	 should	 not	 exist	until	 much	 further	 in	 the	 future,	 a	 machine	 the	 ecologically	 devastating	effects	of	which	can	only	be	comprehended	in	the	present	moment.		To	put	Amanda’s	 interpretation	of	 the	automaton	and	 its	purpose	aside	 for	 a	 moment,	 however,	 even	 without	 this	 speculative	 version	 of	events	 the	 swan’s	body	still	 tells	 a	 story	about	 invention	and	desire	 that	brings	 it	 into	 dialogue	 with	 industrialisation	 and	 the	 contemporary	 oil	spill.	 Catherine	 experiences	 this	 affectively	 when	 she	 reads	 Henry	Brandling’s	 diaries,	 unable	 to	 shake	 the	 feeling	 not	 only	 that	 they	 are	written	 with	 some	 knowledge	 of	 the	 twenty-first	 century,	 but	 also	 that	
																																																								52	Anna	Enderwitz,	‘Modernist	Melancholia	and	Time	The	Synchronicity	of	the	Non-Synchronic	in	Freud,	Taylor	and	Conrad’,	in	The	Literature	of	Melancholia	Early	Modern	to	Postmodern,	ed.	by	Martin	Middeke	and	Christine	Wald	(Houndsmills:	Palgrave,	2011),	pp.	173–86	(p.	174).	
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they	 are	 meant	 for	 her	 in	 particular.	 ‘Might	 Henry	 Brandling	 have	anticipated	 Catherine?’	 she	 wonders.	 ‘He	 anticipated	 someone	 would	watch	him	through	the	wormhole,	that	was	clear’	(p.167).	The	‘wormhole’	is	Catherine’s	 term	for	 the	 feeling	of	 temporal	shrinkage	she	experiences	when	reading	Henry’s	story;	 indeed,	she	believes	that	rather	than	simply	reading,	she	has	in	some	way	been	there	building	the	swan	with	them	all,	a	witness	(p.163).	Catherine’s	use	of	the	wormhole	concept	seems	to	me	to	be	another	manifestation	of	the	‘synchronicity	of	the	non-synchronic’	that	Enderwitz	describes.	Rather	 than	using	wormholes	as	an	analogy	 for	her	reading	 process,	 for	 Catherine	 the	 wormhole	 idea	 seems	 instead	 to	express	the	affective	relationship	she	has	with	the	diaries,	and	once	again	it	 does	 so	 in	 temporal	 terms	 (the	 compression	 of	 spacetime)	 that	might	properly	be	conceived	as	melancholic.	In	recent	years	there	has	been	some	slippage	between	the	terms	‘wormhole’	and	 ‘black	hole’,	with	black	holes	being	posited	as	possible	entrance	to	and	exit	from	this	tube-like	passage	through	 spacetime.53	Both	 Catherine	 and	 Amanda	 consistently	 describe	the	Gulf	oil	 spill	 in	 terms	 that	call	 to	mind	a	black	hole,	particularly	as	 it	appears	 through	satellite	 images	on	the	webcam	that	 they	both	watch,	 ‘a	dense	 black	 centre	 with	 a	 rim	 of	 rusty	 red	 surrounded	 by	 a	 coral	 blue’	(p.224).	For	Catherine,	 this	 image	shows	the	 fulfilment	of	 the	 ‘bright	and	poisonous	invention’	made	visible	through	the	‘wormholes	in	time’	cut	by	‘Henry’s	sawtooth	penstrokes’.	The	oil	spill	functions	as	a	horrifying	‘exit’	point	for	the	development	of	 ideas	she	has	encountered	in	the	diary,	one	that	she	considers	to	be	‘the	end	of	history	itself’	(p.162).		Catherine’s	 melancholic	 ability	 to	 trace	 relationships	 of	 causality	through	 time	 and	 space	 is	 not	 necessarily	 indebted	 to	 Sumper	 and	 his	‘supreme	 beings’	 for	 its	 linkage	 of	 the	 automaton	 and	 the	 Gulf	 disaster,	however.	 We	 know	 she	 is	 highly	 distinguished	 in	 her	 field,	 and	 must	assume	that	she	has	some	expertise	 in	 the	history	of	 the	mechanisms	on	
																																																								53	David	Shiga,	‘Could	Black	Holes	Be	Portals	to	Other	Universes?’,	New	Scientist	<https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn11745-could-black-holes-be-portals-to-other-universes/>	[accessed	3	July	2017].	
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which	she	works.	Jessica	Riskin	has	written	extensively	about	the	machine	Henry	commissions	Sumper	to	build	(but	which	he	does	not	receive),	the	grain-eating	duck	designed	by	Vaucanson	 in	1739.	This	duck	–	a	popular	sensation	 when	 it	 went	 on	 display	 –	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 famous	 of	 an	experimental	group	of	machines	that	first	became	fashionable	at	the	end	of	the	 seventeenth	 century:	 automata	 that	 sought	 to	 closely	 reproduce	 the	natural	 functions	 of	 the	human	and	 animal	 subjects	 on	which	 they	were	based.	 54 	Riskin	 points	 out,	 however,	 that	 the	 development	 of	 these	automata	 took	 place	 alongside	 the	 rise	 of	 a	 different	 kind	 of	machinery,	devices	 like	 the	 automatic	 loom	 that	 were	 beginning	 to	 be	 used	 as	 a	substitute	 for	 human	 labour	 in	 industrial	 settings	 (p.115).	 Vaucanson	himself,	 it	 turns	 out,	 used	 the	 skills	 he	had	 acquired	making	human	 and	animal	 automata	 to	 build	 his	 own	 automatic	 loom,	 on	 which	 Charles	Babbage	 in	 turn	 modelled	 his	 analytical	 engine	 (Riskin,	 pp.	 146,	 149).	(Recall	 that	 the	 character	 of	 Arthur	 Cruickshank,	 designer	 of	 the	Difference	 Engine,	 one	 of	 Sumper’s	 ‘Supreme	 Beings’	 and	 possible	mastermind	 of	 the	 hidden	 internal	 combustion	 engine,	 is	 a	 thinly	 veiled	depiction	of	Babbage.)	 In	 this	sense,	 then,	 the	swan’s	body	does	hold	the	key	 to	 the	 automated	manufacturing	world	 of	 the	 future;	 not	 literally	 in	terms	 of	 mechanical	 parts	 but	 rather	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	mechanisms	that	allow	 it	 to	eat,	 swim,	and	play	are	 the	very	same	 that	will	allow	the	development	of	industrial	machinery.	Both	Amanda	and	Catherine,	in	their	own	 way,	 work	 to	 trace	 these	 connections	 across	 time	 and	 to	 think	critically	about	their	meaning.	So	 far,	 then,	 I	 have	 attempted	 to	 identify	 points	 at	which	 the	 text	positions	the	melancholic	subject	as	gaining	access	to	a	critical	vision	that	functions	to	‘unwork’	and	identify	some	of	the	relationships	(both	human	and	 more-than-human)	 that	 govern	 a	 contested	 site	 of	 loss.	 Up	 to	 this	point	I	have	concentrated	on	exploring	how	this	might	work	in	relation	to	time,	 but	 I	want	 to	 extend	 this	 line	 of	 enquiry	 now	 to	 ask	 how	 the	 text																																																									54	Jessica	Riskin,	The	Restless	Clock:	A	History	of	the	Centuries-Long	Argument	over	What	Makes	
Living	Things	Tick	(Chicago:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2016),	p.	114.	
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imagines	 ‘unworking’	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 objects	 or	 ‘things’	 that	 its	 human	protagonists	encounter.			
V.	 Seeing	&	Steampunk	When	 Catherine	 polishes	 the	 tarnished	 swan’s	 beak	 with	 methylated	spirits	and	cotton	buds,	she	reveals	words	inlaid	in	silver	on	its	underside:	
Illud	aspicis	non	vides.	At	a	loss,	she	is	forced	to	call	Eric	Croft	to	translate.	It	means,	he	explains,	 ‘“you	cannot	see	what	you	can	see’’’	(p.253).	These	words	get	to	the	heart	of	the	novel’s	fraught	relationship	with	the	visible,	in	 particular	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 text	 asks	 questions	 about	 what	 it	means	 to	 associate	 the	 visible	 world	 with	 authenticity,	 or	 truth.	 For	Sumper	 in	 particular	 this	 is	 a	 source	 of	 frustration,	 especially	 when	 it	comes	 to	 Henry,	 whom	 he	 believes	 to	 be	 invested	 in	 a	 selectiveness	 of	vision	that	remains	unreceptive	to	phenomena	beyond	his	understanding,	and	which	Sumper	sees	as	related	to	the	different	kinds	of	what	we	might	call	 lifeliness	 that	 Henry	 is	 prepared	 to	 accept	 into	 his	 worldview.	Most	urgently,	 Sumper	 demands	 that	 Henry	 expand	 this	 perspective	 with	regards	 to	 the	 ‘Superior	 Beings’	 his	 mentor	 Cruickshank	 describes	 in	
Mysterium	Tremendum,	beings	which	most	 closely	 resemble	 seahorses	 in	their	 scheme	 of	 movement	 but	 are	 also	 made	 up	 of	 ‘numerous	convolutions	of	tubes,	more	analogous	to	the	trunk	of	the	elephant	than	to	anything	 else’	 (p.170).	 Henry	 records	 the	 question	 Sumper	 addresses	 to	him	 in	 his	 diary:	 ‘What	 if	 I	 walked	 along	 this	 road	 and	 it	 was	 suddenly	illuminated	by	blazing	 sea	horses?	Would	 I	 be	 able	 to	 see	what	 I	 judged	impossible?’	(p.154)	Here	the	possibility	of	seeing,	and	in	particular	seeing	differently,	 is	dependent	on	a	 recalibration	of	worldview	 for	 the	viewing	subject.	Sumper,	however,	is	also	infuriated	by	this	problematic	as	it	unfolds	from	the	other	side;	that	is	in	the	sense	that	the	‘seen’	might	be	accepted	without	question.	This	frustration	manifests	itself	particularly	strongly	in	relation	to	the	duck	automaton	Henry	initially	requests.	Sumper	refuses	to	
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reproduce	 Vaucanson’s	 machine	 due	 predominantly	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	famed	process	of	digestion	and	excretion	did	not	actually	 ‘work’	because	‘“its	anus	was	not	connected	to	its	bowel’’’	(p.170).	For	Sumper,	this	firmly	brands	Vaucanson	a	‘fraud’	whereas	he	himself	is	not	a	cheat	and	refuses	to	dabble	 in	 ‘false	digestive	systems’	 (p.154).	Sumper’s	 ire	 in	 this	matter	seems	 to	 be	 directed	 less	 at	 the	 engineering	 limitations	 that	 prevented	Vaucanson’s	duck	from	actually	swallowing,	digesting	and	excreting	grain	than	at	the	steps	taken	by	Vaucanson	to	trick	his	audience	into	believing	in	the	success	of	this	process	by	making	the	unique	selling	point	of	his	duck	its	transparency,	enabled	by	the	fact	that	 ‘its	gilded	copper	feathers	were	perforated	 to	 allow	 an	 inside	 view’	 (Riskin,	 p.133).	 Controversially,	however,	just	as	Sumper	describes,	the	illusion	of	digestion	was	dispelled	a	year	after	the	duck	was	first	exhibited:	A	close	observer	of	the	Duck’s	swallowing	mechanism	found	that	the	food	did	not	continue	down	the	neck	and	into	the	stomach	but	rather	stayed	 at	 the	 base	 of	 the	mouth	 tube.	 Reasoning	 that	 digesting	 the	food	by	dissolution	would	 take	 longer	 than	the	brief	pause	 that	 the	Duck	 took	 between	 swallowing	 and	 expulsion,	 this	 observer	concluded	 that	 the	grain	 input	and	excrement	output	were	entirely	unrelated	 and	 that	 the	 tail	 end	 of	 the	 Duck	must	 be	 loaded	 before	each	act	with	phony	excrement	(Riskin,	p.135).	Not	 only	 does	 the	 text	 ask	 questions	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	human	 bodies	 and	machine	 bodies,	 then,	 but	 it	 also	 suggests	 that	 these	relationships	only	become	truly	visible	or	identifiable	through	a	process	of	unworking	 that	 would	 critically	 examine	 the	 conditions	 that	 enable	 or	preclude	 this	 kind	 of	 ‘seeing.’	 	 Once	 more	 the	 text	 presents	 this	 as	 the	prerogative	of	a	melancholic	vision	that	would	be	drawn	to	and	invested	in	sites	 of	 loss	 that	 are	 yet-to-be-made-visible;	 that	 is,	 constellations	 of	ungrievability.			 Carey	 focuses	 his	 novel’s	 enquiry	 into	 visibility	 by	 playing	 with	genre;	 specifically,	 by	 leaning	 into	 some	 of	 the	 generic	 conventions	 of	
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steampunk.	 Steampunk	 as	 a	 genre	 first	 emerged	 through	 works	 of	 late	1980s	 fiction	 that	 imagined	 alternate	 Victorian	 universes,	 defined	predominantly	 by	 anachronistic	 kinds	 of	 technology.	 Such	 technological	advances	were	posited	as	able	to	‘radically	alter	the	course	of	history	and	open	 up	 possible	 future	 techno-cultural	 worlds’,	 with	 these	 alternate	universes	 indebted	 to	 the	 earlier	 fiction	 of	 H.G	Wells	 and	 Jules	 Verne.55	Following	 this,	 steampunk	 has	 also	 become	 a	 lifestyle	 subculture	whose	followers	 are	 interested	 in	 crafting	 practices	 that	 ‘produce	 fanciful	Victorian	gadgets	 […]	or	refurbish	contemporary	 technological	objects	 to	make	 them	 look	and	 feel	 “Victorian”	 in	order	 to	 challenge	 contemporary	technological	 design’	 (Forlini,	 p.72).	 The	 subculture	 encompasses	 a	wide	range	of	practices,	 including	perhaps	most	 famously	 the	donning	of	neo-Victorian	 costumes	 that	 are	 accessorised	 by	 the	 mechanical	 devices	adored	by	steampunks,	such	as	‘top	hats	that	hide	or	support	technological	gadgets’	 and	 	 ‘crinolines	 and	 corsets	 that	 leave	 part	 of	 the	 construction	bare.’56	Carey’s	novel	draws	on	and	plays	with	several	of	these	identifying	features	 of	 steampunk	 in	 order	 to	 flag	 up	 its	 participation	 in	 the	 genre.	Henry	is	of	course	writing	in	1854	at	the	height	of	the	Victorian	Age,	and	Sumper’s	anachronistic	mechanical	creations	certainly	offer	an	alternative	historical	moment	where	 technology	 is	working	 out	 of	 time.	 Catherine’s	occupation	 as	 horologist	 also	 gives	 a	 nod	 to	 steampunk	 and	 its	 love	 of	timepieces,	 with	 ‘cogs,	 springs,	 sprockets,	 wheels	 and	 hydraulic	 motion’	fetishized	 in	 the	 subculture.	Even	more	explicitly,	The	Chemistry	of	Tears	refers	 to	 what	 Rebecca	 Onion	 describes	 as	 a	 ‘favourite	 steampunk	speculation’:	 that	 Charles	 Babbage	 successfully	 completed	 work	 on	 his	Difference	 Engine,	 resulting	 in	 considerable	 social	 change.57	This	 idea	 is	the	subject	of	one	of	the	genre’s	defining	novels,	William	Gibson	and	Bruce																																																									55	Stefania	Forlini,	‘Technology	and	Morality:	The	Stuff	of	Steampunk’,	Neo-Victorian	Studies,	3.1	(2010),	72–98	(p.	72).	56	Jenny	Sundén,	‘Steampunk	Practices:	Time,	Tactility,	and	a	Racial	Politics	of	Touch’,	Ada:	A	Journal	
of	Gender,	New	Media,	and	Technology,	2014,	n.p.	<http://adanewmedia.org/2014/07/issue5-sunden/>.	57	Rebecca	Onion,	‘Reclaiming	the	Machine:	An	Introductory	Look	at	Steampunk	in	Everyday	Practice’,	Neo-Victorian	Studies,	1.1	(2008),	138–63.	
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Sterling’s	The	Difference	Engine	(1990),	and	is	represented	in	Carey’s	text	in	the	persona	of	the	‘Genius’	Albert	Cruickshank,	designer	of	an	enormous	calculating	engine	and	also,	Amanda	believes,	of	 the	 internal	 combustion	engine	secreted	in	the	hull	of	the	swan	automaton.			 For	 many	 of	 the	 people	 who	 participate	 in	 this	 subculture,	 the	various	 ways	 they	 interact	 with	 steam	 technology	 (writing,	 wearing,	making)	are	viewed	as	a	‘highly	liberatory	counterculture	practice	(hence,	the	 addition	 of	 the	 world	 “punk”)	 (Onion,	 p.139).	 Importantly	 for	 my	analysis	 here,	 this	 is	 primarily	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 their	 interest	 in	exposing	 the	 mechanisms	 of	 technological	 objects	 is	 presented	 as	essentially	democratising	 in	the	sense	that	 it	makes	 ‘tinkering’	accessible	to	 the	 non-professional,	 critiquing	 the	 ‘fundamental	 opacity	 of	contemporary	 technology’	 (Forlini,	 p.81).	 In	 this	 sense,	 steampunk	cultures	 are	deeply	 concerned	with	examining	 ideas	of	 (in)visibility,	 and	with	developing	practices	that	seek	to	‘unwork’	objects	in	order	that	their	histories	of	creation	might	be	seen,	or	read,	by	those	that	encounter	them.	A	conflict	manifests	here,	however,	between	the	ways	in	which	this	might	be	understood	as	an	ethical	practice	–	one	that,	in	Stefania	Forlini’s	view,	directs	 attention	 to	 the	 human	 subjects’	 enmeshment	 in	 networks	 of	relationality	 in	 order	 to	 ‘re-envision	 radically	 our	 relationship	 to	technology	 and	 morality’	 –	 and	 the	 concomitant	 sense	 in	 which	steampunks	 are	 invested	 in	 a	 conception	 of	 ‘complete’	 knowledge	 that	they	see	as	nostalgically	rooted	in	the	past	(Forlini,	npn;Onion).			 Steampunk	 scholar	 Cory	 Gross	 uses	 the	 word	 ‘melancholic’	 to	describe	 the	 kinds	 of	 steampunk	practice	 that	 he	 sees	 as	 being	properly	critical,	 and	 for	Gross	 this	has	much	 to	do	with	 visibility	 in	 terms	of	 the	ways	 certain	histories	 are	 variously	 obscured	or	 revealed	by	 steampunk	texts.	 Melancholic	 steampunk,	 he	 suggests,	 drawing	 on	 Celeste	Olalquiaga’s	 work	 on	 kitsch,	 is	 intent	 on	 ‘re-experiencing’	 rather	 than	‘reinterpreting’	 the	 historical	 Victorian	 moment	 fetishized	 by	 this	subculture.	 For	 Gross,	 this	 is	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 second	 category	 of	steampunk	that	he	names	as	 ‘Nostalgic’,	 in	which	 ‘we	find	the	creation	of	
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the	 Victorian	 Era	 as	 a	 Romantic	myth	 infused	with	 utopian	 desires	 and	generally	 ignoring	the	more	uncomfortable	genuine	history	of	that	era.’58	Nostalgic	steampunk,	Gross	suggests,	‘revels,	much	like	Victoriana	itself,	in	the	elegance	and	the	spectacle	of	the	Empire.	It	forgets,	or	chooses	not	to	remember,	 the	dirtiness	 and	 imperialism	of	 this	 same	Empire’	 (p.62).	 In	Gross’s	 analysis,	 then,	 the	 functioning	 of	 ‘nostalgic’	 steampunk	 is	contingent	on	a	kind	of	deliberate	forgetting	that	is	also	simultaneously	a	refusal	to	make	certain	subjects	visible.			 To	give	an	example	of	this	kind	of	historical	 ‘forgetting’	within	the	steampunk	genre	we	might	turn	to	Eric	Williams,	who	in	1944	argued	that	the	 Atlantic	 slave	 trade	 was	 indispensable	 to	 the	 developments	 of	 the	Industrial	 Revolution,	 a	 claim	 that	 insisted	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	capitalism	 and	 slavery	 and	 which	 has	 famously	 become	 known	 as	 the	‘Williams	 thesis.’	 Despite	 numerous	 attempts	 to	 refute	 his	 claims	 there	now	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 critical	 consensus	 on	 the	 broad	 accuracy	 of	 his	arguments;	or	as	Guy	Emerson	Mount	puts	 it,	 ‘few	doubt	any	 longer	that	an	 intersection,	 or	 at	 least	 a	 set	 of	 shared	 coordinates,	 exist	 between	slavery	and	capitalism.’59	As	Robin	Blackburn	explains:	The	connections	between	triangular	trades	and	textiles	were	so	close	that	 in	some	periods	 (e.g.	1770	or	1790)	an	 investment	 in	one	was	tantamount	 to	an	 investment	 in	 the	other.	 It	 is,	perhaps,	 significant	that	when	the	slave	trade	became	a	centre	of	controversy	in	British	politics,	 leading	 textile	manufacturers	 were	willing	 to	 defend	 it	 on	the	grounds	that	it	was	a	valuable	component	of	national	trade.60	This	means,	then,	as	Jenny	Sundén	points	out	in	her	article	on	the	politics	of	touch	in	steampunk	as	they	relate	to	different	racialised	bodies,	that	by																																																									58	Cary	Gross,	‘Varieties	of	Steampunk	Experience’,	Steampunk	Magazine,	2007,	60–63	(p.	62).	59	Guy	Emerson	Mount,	‘Capitalism	and	Slavery:	Reflections	on	the	Williams	Thesis’,	Black	Perspectives,	2015,	n.p.	<http://www.aaihs.org/capitalism-and-slavery-reflections-on-the-williams-thesis/>	[accessed	8	July	2017].	60	Robin	Blackburn,	The	Making	of	New	World	Slavery :	From	the	Baroque	to	the	Modern,	1492-1800	(London ;	New	York:	Verso,	2010),	p.	550.	
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returning	to	the	Industrial	Revolution	as	a	site	of	celebration	–	and	indeed,	
play	 –	 nostalgic	 forms	 of	 steampunk	 necessarily	 operate	 by	 ‘obliterating	the	black	bodies	underpinning	the	machinery	of	the	Industrial	Revolution’	so	 that	 ‘the	 pain	 of	 slave	 others	 is	 what	 lies	 beneath	 the	 steampunk	fantasy’	 (npn).	 Sundén’s	 language	 here	 (‘what	 lies	 beneath	 the	 […]	fantasy’)	 intentionally	 engages	 with	 the	 politics	 of	 visibility	 that	 is	 so	important	 to	 the	 steampunk	 project,	 pointing	 out	 that	 their	 demand	 for	transparency	 in	engineering	occludes	as	well	as	actively	seeks	to	repress	the	 violent	 histories	 contained	 in	 the	 objects	 they	 so	 fetishise.	 In	 other	words,	 ‘you	 cannot	 see	 what	 you	 can	 see.’	 In	 his	 characterisation	 of	melancholic	steampunk	Gross	similarly	relies	on	the	language	of	visibility	in	 order	 to	 elucidate	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 this	 aspect	 of	 the	 genre	moves	away	 from	 the	 utopian	 conceptions	 of	 its	 nostalgic	 counterpart.	 In	melancholic	steampunk,	he	writes:	We	see	the	very	things	Nostalgic	Steampunk	tries	so	hard	to	 ignore	brought	 out	 into	 the	 glaring	 sun.	 We	 see	 the	 corruption,	 the	decadence,	the	imperialism,	the	poverty	and	the	intrigue.	And	we	see	them	 not	 as	much	 as	 an	 indictment	 of	 the	 Victorian	 era	 but	 as	 an	indictment	of	our	own,	whether	directly	or	by	chopping	away	at	our	society’s	Victorian	roots	(p.63).	For	Gross	this	is	the	way	in	which	melancholic	steampunk	prioritises	‘re-experiencing’	over	‘reimagining.’	Melancholia	in	this	analysis,	then,	draws	on	the	same	collapsing	of	synchronicity	that	I	have	argued	Carey	presents	as	 peculiar	 to	 a	 critical	 melancholic	 vision:	 the	 past	 infiltrates	 and	reorganises	 the	 present	 in	 order	 to	 make	 ethical	 demands	 on	 the	experiencing	 subject.	 However,	 whilst	 Carey’s	 text	 ostensibly	 belongs	 to	the	 category	 of	 ‘melancholic	 steampunk’	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 engages	critically	 rather	 than	 fetishistically	 with	 steampunk	 tropes,	 the	 novel	offers	 a	more	 complex	politics	 of	 visibility	 than	 is	 accounted	 for	 in	most	theories	 of	 steampunk.	 This	 is	 evident,	 for	 example,	 in	 the	 critical	perspectives	 on	 steampunk	 that	 I	 have	 engaged	 with	 here;	 whilst	 both	Sundén	 and	 Gross	 advance	 critiques	 of	 the	 movement	 that	 address	 the	
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lack	 of	 political	 or	 social	 consciousness	 in	 many	 elements	 of	 the	subculture,	 they	 are	 both	 still	 reliant	 on	 a	 language	 of	 visibility	 that	assumes	 the	 ‘seen’	 and	 the	 ‘unseen’	 to	 be	 stable	 concepts	 that	might	 be	unproblematically	moved	between.	 In	 this	 sense,	both	Sundén	and	Gross	fall	into	the	very	trap	they	are	seeking	to	avoid	by	investing	in	the	‘striving	for	 complete	 comprehension’	 that	 characterises	 steampunk	 engineering.	Furthermore,	 as	 Onion	 points	 out,	 this	 kind	 of	 thinking	 is	 not	 socially	radical	but	instead	colonial	in	nature,	because	‘the	idea	that	such	a	type	of	comprehension	 may	 indeed	 be	 possible	 […]	 enthusiastically	 echoes	aspects	of	Victorian	thought.’		 In	contrast,	what	Carey’s	novel	makes	clear	in	the	way	it	talks	about	the	 visible	 world	 and	 kinds	 of	 ‘seeing’	 is	 that	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 remain	critical	about	what	‘full’	visibility	might	mean	(the	truth	‘brought	out	into	the	glaring	sun’)	because	there	are	always	already	structural	conditions	in	existence	that	prohibit	and	police	the	kinds	of	bodies/things/objects	that	are	 able	 to	 become	 visible	 in	 the	 first	 place.61	As	 such	 the	 text	 does	 not	offer	the	reader	a	‘reveal’	that	would	solve	once	and	for	all	the	mystery	of	the	contents	of	the	automaton’s	hull.	Instead,	Catherine	and	Amanda	(the	novel’s	two	present-day	melancholics	and	female	versions	of	steampunk’s	traditional	 ‘gentleman-scientist	 and/or	 tinkerer’	 figure)	 argue	 over	 the	possibility	of	x-raying	the	vessel,	a	fierce	disagreement	that	culminates	in	Amanda	 slapping	 Catherine’s	 face	 (Onion,	 p.144).	 As	 the	 novel	 ends,	although	Catherine	declares	‘I	will	X-ray	the	damn	thing	[…]	why	not?’	the	reader	 never	 knows	 the	 outcome,	 and	 as	 such	 the	 conflicting	 narratives	that	 surround	 the	automaton	and	 its	 secret	 are	held	 in	 abeyance.	 In	 this	sense,	 Catherine,	 Amanda	 and	 also	 the	 reader	 remain	 in	 a	 relationship	with	 the	site	of	 loss	 that	 is	 the	hull	and	 its	violent	history	 that	manifests	melancholic	 critical	 agency	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 I	 have	 argued	 for	 here,	 by	pointing	 to	 a	 place	 of	 undeclared	 loss	without	 investing	 in	 the	 idea	 that	this	 same	 loss	 might	 easily	 become	 known.	 	 Rather,	 the	 hull	 of	 the	automaton	is	set	up	as	a	site	of	conflict	that	demands	attention	be	paid	to																																																									61	Onion,	p.	144.	
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the	 conditions	 that	 have	 kept	 it	 unseeable,	 rather	 than	 to	 efforts	 that	would	reveal	its	imagined	‘true’	nature.		 Carey’s	decision	to	engage	with	the	steampunk	genre,	 then,	 is	one	that	makes	apparent	both	 the	possibilities	and	 limits	of	 ‘unworking’	as	a	critical	 model,	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 his	 subject	 material	 (Catherine’s	bereavement)	is	such	that	this	conversation	about	visibility	also	becomes	one	about	grievability:	who	or	what	can	become	grievable?		However,	the	text	 also	 folds	 this	 inquiry	 into	 another,	 similar	 question,	 one	 to	 which	steampunk	as	a	genre	ostensibly	has	more	to	contribute:	who	or	what	gets	to	 become	human?	 Stefania	 Forlini	 has	 argued	 that	 steampunk	practices	ultimately	 disrupt	 the	 ontological	 categories	 that	 separate	 humans	 from	the	technological	objects	they	make	or	use.	Drawing	on	Bruno	Latour,	she	sees	 this	 as	 engendering	 a	 redistribution	 of	 agency	 that	 leads	 to	 an	abandonment	of	the	‘thing/human	poles’	and	opens	on	to	‘a	more	nuanced	understanding	 of	 the	 intimate	 relationships	 between	persons	 and	 things	(p.73).	 She	 sees	 this	 decentring	 of	 the	 human	 as	 part	 of	 a	 morally	productive	 project	 promising	 that	 by	 developing	 more	 ethical	relationships	 with	 ‘things,’	 humans	 will	 in	 turn	 develop	 more	 ethical	relationships	with	each	other	(p.82).	For	Forlini,	 this	process	 takes	place	through	 a	 practice	 of	 ‘reading’	 that	 bears	 similarities	 to	 the	 act	 of	melancholic	‘unworking’	I	have	foregrounded	in	this	chapter.		In	both	its	 literary	and	material	manifestations,	steampunk	is	about	learning	to	read	all	that	is	folded	into	any	particular	created	thing	–	that	is,	learning	to	connect	the	source	materials	to	particular	cultural,	technical,	 and	 environmental	 practices,	 skills,	 histories,	 and	economies	of	meaning	and	value	(p.73).	This	 takes	 place,	 Forlini	 suggests,	 through	 an	 affective	 and	 material	engagement	 with	 technological	 objects	 that	 is	 predominantly	environmental	 in	nature,	 so	 that	 this	 ‘reading’	process	encounters	 things	by	 asking	 ‘where	 their	 component	materials	 came	 from,	 by	what	means	they	 are	 made,	 by	 which	 persons	 and	 corporations,	 and	 with	 what	
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environmental	 impact’	 (p.92).	 For	 Forlini,	 this	 is	 not	 only	 a	 key	 skill	 for	green	 movements,	 but	 also	 fosters	 ‘ethical	 ways	 of	 being	 in	 the	 world’	(p.92)	 Promising	 as	 this	 might	 seem,	 even	 Forlini	 herself	 seems	 to	 be	having	 a	 hard	 time	 believing	 that	 the	 animating	 principle	 of	 steampunk	might	be	so	radical.	The	barrier	to	such	a	‘socially	responsible’	steampunk	practice,	she	warns,	is	that	‘their	idealisation	of	mastery	risks	re-inscribing	the	 values	 of	 liberal	 humanism	 onto	 posthumanism	 and	 may	 instead	perpetuate	a	fantasy	of	control	and	domination	as	old	as	technology	itself’	(pp.73-4).	She	offers	 this	caveat	several	 times	more	during	 the	course	of	her	 argument,	 ending	 by	 suggesting	 that	 it	 is	 only	 in	 recognising	 their	fundamental	 ‘lack’	 of	 this	 mastery	 that	 humans	 (and	 presumably	steampunks)	 will	 be	 able	 to	 move	 beyond	 these	 ‘relationships	 of	domination’	(pp.91-2).			 The	 issue	 that	 Forlini	 comes	 up	 against,	 I	 would	 suggest,	 is	 that	steampunk	 as	 a	 genre	 has	 a	 certain	 investment	 in	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	‘humanness’	 that	means	 it	will	always	shy	away	 from	truly	 interrogating	what	 the	 ‘human’	might	mean.	 The	 reading	 or	 ‘unworking’	 process	 that	Forlini	argues	steampunks	apply	to	‘things’	and	their	history	of	creation	is	one	that	must	necessarily	also	be	applied	to	the	concept	of	humanness	that	animates	 steampunk	 texts	and	 leads	 to	 the	 condition	of	 their	 emergence	being	 the	 foregrounding	 of	 white,	 colonial,	 rational,	 ‘Man.’62	If,	 as	 Onion	suggests,	 steampunks	are	 ‘enamoured	of	 technology	and	convinced	of	 its	ability	to	endow	man	with	a	stronger	sense	of	his	own	humanity	and	his	interconnections	with	the	material	world’,	 then	the	 ‘unworking’	of	 things	that	 Forlini	 ascribes	 as	 a	 radical	 possibility	 of	 the	 genre	 might	 be	understood	 as	 simply	 taking	 place	 in	 order	 to	 reify	 the	 very	 humanness	that	she	would	posit	it	as	subverting	(p.143).		 Carey’s	 novel,	 instead,	 both	 inhabits	 and	 rejects	 the	 steampunk	genre	 in	 order	 to	 stage	 a	 conversation	 about	 grievability,	 humans,	nonhumans	 and	 things	 that	 utilises	melancholic	 agency	 as	 a	 critical	 tool																																																									62	This	is	the	term	used	by	Sylvia	Wynter	to	describe	this	formation	
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that	is	always	against	completion.	In	this	way,	his	melancholic	protagonists	always	assume	that	there	is	a	kind	of	lack	embedded	in	bodies,	objects	and	moments	that	might	seem	to	offer	a	sense	of	fullness,	and	they	maintain	an	interest	in	taking	these	things	apart	in	ways	that	may	or	may	not	be	literal.	This	 critical	 perspective	 can	 be	 seen	 at	 work	 in	 Amanda’s	 (and	Catherine’s)	 obsession	 with	 the	 contents	 of	 the	 hull,	 in	 their	 uncanny	encounters	with	automatons	that	disrupt	humanness,	and	in	the	way	that	life	in	the	novel	is	never	far	from,	or	sometimes	even	distinguishable	from,	death.	What	this	brings	about	in	the	text	is	predominantly	an	unsettling	of	subjectivity;	this	means	that	the	problem	of	loss,	or	of	grievability,	comes	into	 focus	 alongside	 an	 enquiry	 into	 how	 this	 subjectivity	 might	 be	distributed	 unevenly	 between	 bodies,	 objects,	 or	 things.	 In	 order	 to	explore	 the	 ways	 that	 these	 problematics	 shape	 the	 narrative	 of	 The	
Chemistry	of	Tears,	the	remainder	of	this	chapter	will	focus	on	reading	the	novel	alongside	the	recently	popular	theoretical	formation	known	as	new	materialism.		
VI.	 Whos	&	Whats	
	 The	Chemistry	of	Tears	 begins	with	Matthew	Tindall’s	death,	 so	as	readers	we	never	get	to	meet	him.	Instead,	we	come	to	know	the	dead	man	only	through	Catherine’s	fragmented	recollections,	which	revolve	without	exception	 around	 the	 completeness	 and	 perfection	 of	 his	 physical	 body.	She	 tells	 us	 he	 was	 ‘tall	 and	 slender’	 with	 ‘the	 most	 gorgeous	 legs’,	‘physically	graceful’	with	‘thick’	hair	and	a	mouth	that	‘was	large,	soft	and	always	 tender’	 (pp.	 51,	 138,	 4).	 Her	 obsessive	 recourse	 to	 a	 selective	reimagining	 of	 Matthew’s	 body,	 depicted	 as	 a	 site	 of	 almost	 excessively	vital	 life,	 perhaps	 appears	 only	 reasonable	 in	 the	 event	 of	 his	 sudden,	traumatic	 absence.	 Yet,	 given	 that	 the	 opening	 timeframe	of	 the	novel	 is	also	 that	 of	 Matthew’s	 mortality,	 this	 compulsion	 is	 also	 a	 recursive	performance	 of	 abjection	 displaying	 her	 simultaneous	 repulsion	 by	 and	fascination	with	the	real-time	degeneration	of	this	same	body.	
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	 This	pattern	first	manifests	itself	 in	a	section	of	the	text	that	gives	us	Catherine’s	thoughts	on	waking	the	morning	after	Matthew’s	death	and	trying	 to	 come	 to	 terms	 with	 the	 transformation	 that	 has	 taken	 place:	‘Matthew	 was	 completely	 gone	 forever.	 His	 poor	 body	 was	 lying	somewhere	 in	 this	stinking	heat.	No,	 in	a	 refrigerator	with	a	 label	on	his	toe.	Or	perhaps	he	was	already	trapped	inside	a	coffin’	(p.17).	There	are	a	few	things	going	on	in	this	passage,	all	of	which	work	to	express	a	conflict	in	 Catherine’s	 thinking	 that	 sees	 her	 imagined	 Matthew	 shift	 between	being	 a	 ‘who’	 (vital	 and	 alive)	 and	 a	 ‘what’	 (passive,	 trapped	 object).	Immediately,	 she	wants	 to	 enact	 a	 separation	between	Matthew	and	 the	body	 that	 once	 hosted	 him;	 whilst	 Matthew	 is	 ‘gone	 forever’	 his	 ‘poor	body’	 remains	 behind,	 discarded	 and	 devoid	 of	 agency	 (it	 is	 ‘lying	somewhere’,	 or	 perhaps	 ‘trapped’	 in	 a	 coffin).	 This	 separation	 of	 body	from	‘Matthew’	isn’t	working	properly	here	for	her,	however,	because	her	words	 still	 endow	 the	body	 left	behind	with	animacy;	Matthew’s	body	 is	only	able	to	be	‘trapped’	by	the	coffin	she	imagines	it	placed	inside	because	it	maintains	a	certain	aliveness	that	makes	this	imprisonment	unbearable.	This	is	expressed	in	the	shift	from	possessive	pronoun	(‘his	poor	body’)	to	personal	pronoun	‘he	was	already	trapped.’	Lying	in	a	refrigerator	‘with	a	label	 on	 his	 toe’,	 Matthew’s	 corpse	 also	 recalls	 one	 of	 the	 mechanical	objects	 that	Catherine	works	 to	 restore;	 categorised,	preserved	and	 filed	away	to	be	repaired	at	some	point	in	the	future.	This	passage	is	exemplary,	then,	of	perhaps	the	major	problem	that	guides	and	shapes	the	novel:	how	might	 different	 kinds	 of	 bodies	 (and	 this	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 the	 organic)	inhabit	 liminal	 spaces	 between	 life	 and	 nonlife	 –	 or,	 to	 put	 this	 less	precisely	but	more	usefully	–	whoness	and	whatness?			 I	borrow	the	terms	‘who’	and	what’	here	from	Jacques	Derrida	and	his	 posthumously	 published	 final	 seminar	 series,	 The	 Beast	 and	 the	
Sovereign.	The	seminars	focus	on	what	Derrida	describes	as	the	‘reciprocal	haunting’	of	the	figure	of	the	‘sovereign’	by	the	‘beast’,	and	vice	versa,	and	continue	 the	 theoretical	 interest	 in	 the	 animal	 that	 can	 be	 traced	throughout	his	work,	emerging	most	notably	in	The	Animal	That	Therefore	
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I	 Am. 63 	Derrida	 is	 particularly	 interested	 in	 the	 ways	 that	 the	human/animal	species	line	is	compulsively	drawn	and	redrawn	as	part	of	what	he	calls	 ‘our	dogged	determination	to	hunt	down	what	 is	proper	to	man’	(p194).	In	The	Beast	and	the	Sovereign,	as	David	Wills	points	out,	his	critique	 of	 speciesism	 extends	 beyond	 the	 question	 of	 the	 animal	 to	‘include	 the	 relation	 of	 living	 to	 nonliving’	 so	 that	 he	 advances	 a	 more	radical	ethical	argument	‘involving	the	status	of	what	lives	[le	vivant].’64	It	is	 in	 this	 sense	 that	Derrida	uses	 the	 terms	 ‘who’	 and	 ‘what’	 in	 order	 to	argue	that	death	undoes	and	makes	unimportant	the	distinction	between	the	two.	What	 if,	 at	 bottom,	 the	 distinction	 between	what	 and	who	 came	 to	sink	 into	 indifference,	 into	 the	 abyss?	 To	 die,	 basically,	 just	 as	 the	common	condition	of	both	beast	and	sovereign,	qua	living	beings,	is	to	be	exposed	to	death,	and	to	a	death	that	always	risks	coming	back	from	who	to	what,	to	reduce	who	to	what,	or	to	reveal	the	“what”	of	“who.”	Is	to	die	not	to	become	“what”	again?	A	“what”	that	anybody	will	always	have	been.	(Beast	and	Sovereign,	p.137).		In	 this	 sense,	 Derrida	 moves	 the	 conversation	 away	 from	 attempts	 to	define	human	against	animal,	subject	against	object.	Rather	than	focusing	on	 the	 cultural	 and	 ontological	 structures	 that	might	 lead	 to	 beings	 and	things	 being	 labelled	 as	 any	 of	 these	 terms,	 or	 how	 these	 may	 be	rethought,	 he	 focuses	 instead	 on	 the	 way	 that	 death	 undoes	 this	distinction	 at	 the	 level	 of	 matter.	 It	 is	 this	 unravelling	 of	 whoness	 and	whatness,	 living	 and	 nonliving	 that	 confronts	 and	 obsesses	 Catherine	every	time	that	she	engages	with	Matthew’s	death	and	the	terrible	return	to	 whatness	 of	 his	 body.	 What	 Carey’s	 novel	 does	 then,	 which	 is	 of	particular	interest	to	me	here,	is	suggest	that	this	moment	of	unravelling	is	affectively	 experienced	by	 those	who	are	 exposed	 to	death	 through	 loss.																																																									63	Jacques	Derrida	and	others,	The	Beast	&	the	Sovereign.	Vol.	1	(	London:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2009),	p.	17.	64	David	Wills,	Review	of	The	Beast	and	the	Sovereign,	Volume	1,	by	Jacques	Derrida,	Notre	Dame	
Philosophical	Reviews,	2010,	p.	n.p.		
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Namely	the	novel	implies	that	grief,	and	specifically	melancholic	responses	to	 loss,	 reorient	 a	 bereaved	 subject’s	 understanding	 of	what	 it	means	 to	
have	 life,	 and	 that	 this	 disrupts	 binary	 oppositions	 like	 who/what	 and	living/nonliving,	 as	 well	 as	 that	 subject’s	 own	 interpretation	 of	 their	relationship	to	these	concepts.	The	corollary	of	this	is	that	the	question	of	who	or	what	gets	to	be	seen	as	grievable	in	the	first	place	is	also	troubled	in	 the	 text,	 a	 question	 that	 of	 course	 incorporates	 anxieties	 about	which	bodies	and	beings	are	to	be	understood	as	‘human.’			 Much	 of	 this	 anxiety	 is	 focused	 on	 the	 other	 body	 occupying	 a	disproportionate	 amount	 of	 Catherine’s	 attention;	 the	 damaged	 and	ambiguous	swan	automaton	that	 is	set	 to	become	brighter,	stronger,	and	more	 whole	 as	 Matthew	 slowly	 disintegrates.	 The	 giving	 to	 life	 that	Catherine	offers	the	swan	in	her	daily	ritual	of	caretaking	and	recovery	is	shadowed	by	Matthew’s	death	and	the	physical	changes	taking	place	in	his	body.	She	is	repulsed	by	imagining	 ‘bacteria,	 fungi,	the	protozoa,	the	way	our	bodies	attack	themselves	when	we	die’,	preferring	instead	‘to	think	of	us	as	something	dry	and	crumbly,	with	no	relation	to	the	moisture-laden	sheen	of	our	decay’	(p.25).	For	Catherine,	the	bodies	of	both	Matthew	and	the	 swan	 shift	 at	 various	 times	 and	places	 between	different	 ontological	states,	so	that	the	contrasting	relation	she	describes	above	between	a	kind	of	 mechanical	 dryness	 and	 an	 organic	 decay	 is	 broken	 down	 and	ultimately	 unable	 to	 be	maintained.	 As	 such,	 distinguishing	 between	 the	‘mechanical’	and	the	‘biological’	not	only	becomes	more	and	more	difficult	for	Catherine,	but	essentially	 less	useful	as	a	means	of	defining	what	 the	changes	 taking	 place	 in	 both	 these	 strange	 bodies	mean	 for	 her.	 This	 is	particularly	 evident	 in	 a	 passage	 in	which	 she	 gives	 a	 description	 of	 the	moment	 the	 restored	swan	 is	displayed	and	made	 to	work	at	a	publicity	event	for	the	museum’s	benefactors:			
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No	one	moved	or	spoke.	Every	eerie	movement	was	smooth	as	a	living	thing,	a	snake,	an	eel,	a	swan	of	course.	We	stood	in	awe	and,	no	matter	how	many	hundred	hours	we	had	worked	on	 it,	 this	 swan	was	never,	not	for	a	moment,	familiar,	but	uncanny,	sinuous,	lithe,	supple,	twisting,	winding,	graceful.	As	 it	 twisted	 to	 look	 into	one’s	eyes,	 its	own	stayed	darkest	ebony	until,	at	that	point	when	the	sun	caught	the	dark	wood,	they	blazed.	It	had	no	sense	of	touch.	It	had	no	brain.	It	was	as	glorious	as	God	(pp.261-2).		 Although	 throughout	 the	 passage	 the	 swan	 is	 described	 as	 an	 ‘it’,	Catherine	can	only	contextualise	the	automaton	by	referencing	the	various	living	 bodies	 and	 organic	 adjectives	 that	 she	 sees	 as	 coming	 closest	 to	capturing	its	substance.	Thus,	the	swan	is	fish,	bird,	reptile	and	wood	all	at	once,	 ‘sinuous,’	 ‘supple,’	 ‘winding’	 and	 ‘graceful’,	 with	 these	 sense	impressions	gathered	together	in	an	effort	to	find	a	manner	of	expressing	the	swan’s	slippery	being	that	shifts	away	from	a	binary	relation	where	it	might	 be	 either	 a	 living,	 moving,	 biological	 being	 or	 an	 extraordinarily	effective	 mechanism	 but	 never	 both.	 As	 such,	 Catherine’s	 vision	 of	 the	swan,	mediated	as	it	is	by	her	newly	painful	attentiveness	to	the	lifeliness	and	 deathliness	 of	 bodies,	 manages	 to	 find	 some	 kind	 of	 middle	 way	through	 a	 problem	 that	 Jessica	 Riskin	 argues	 was	 dramatized	 in	 the	eighteenth	 century	 by	 automatons	 like	 Vaucanson’s	 defecating	 duck.		Riskin	 suggests	 that	 in	 building	 the	Duck,	 Vaucanson	 achieved	 a	 kind	 of	‘masterful	 incoherence’	 that	brought	together	and	refused	to	resolve	two	contradictory	 and	 competing	 claims	 –	 ‘that	 living	 creatures	 were	essentially	 machines	 and	 that	 living	 creatures	 were	 the	 antithesis	 of	machines.’65	This,	 Riskin	 explains,	 is	 a	 dilemma	 that	 consistently	 shapes	the	course	of	modern	science	after	the	seventeenth	century	and	gives	rise	to	 the	 development	 of	 two	 rival	 traditions	 of	 thought.	 On	 the	 one	 hand	there	 is	 the	 ‘mechanical	 clockwork’	 model	 that	 banishes	 sentience	 and	agency	 from	nature,	 thereby	 paradoxically	 relying	 on	 an	 argument	 from																																																									65	Jessica	Riskin,	‘The	Defecating	Duck,	Or,	the	Ambiguous	Origins	of	Artificial	Life’,	Critical	Inquiry,	29.4	(2003),	599–633	(p.	612).	
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design	that	presumes	the	existence	of	‘a	supernatural	divine	intelligence’;	whilst	on	the	other	there	is	an	alternative	‘active-mechanist	tradition’	that	prefers	 to	 consider	 the	 idea	 of	 agency	 or	 vital	 force	 as	 innate	 (Restless	
Clock,	 p.	 337).	 For	 Riskin,	 Vaucanson’s	 Duck	 is	 crucial	 to	 this	 history	 of	ideas,	to	the	point	that	in	contemporary	times	humans	are	still	invested	in	the	 ‘continual	 redrawing	 of	 the	 boundary	 between	 human	 and	machine	and	 redefinition	 of	 the	 essence	 of	 life	 and	 intelligence’,	 a	 project	 ‘whose	rudiments	were	established	two	and	a	half	centuries	ago	by	the	defecating	Duck	that	didn’t.’66	She	goes	so	far	as	to	argue	that	Vaucansons’	Duck	and	the	 other	 automatons	 displayed	 alongside	 it	 launched	 a	 ‘taxonomic	dynamic’	that	continues	today	in	any	conversation	about	artificial	life	and	involves	 ‘sorting	 the	 animate	 from	 the	 inanimate,	 the	 organic	 from	 the	mechanical,	 the	 intelligent	 from	 the	 rote,	 with	 each	 category	 crucially	defined,	as	in	any	taxonomy,	by	what	is	excluded	from	it.’			 Whether	you	agree	with	Riskin	about	this	or	not,	Carey’s	text	is	also	interested	 in	 the	 ways	 that	 taxonomic	 exercises	 like	 this	 work,	 and	 his	choice	 to	 use	 the	 Duck	 (reborn	 as	 a	 swan)	 to	 focus	 his	 enquiry	 into	lifeliness	 suggests	 that	 he	 also	 sees	 Vaucanson’s	 automaton	 as	 a	 useful	starting	 point	 for	 such	 questions.	 Indeed,	 Carey	 has	 Catherine	 refer	directly	 to	 the	 thinker	 whose	 intervention	 into	 the	 debate	 about	mechanical	life	is	perhaps	most	well	known:	René	Descartes.		Really,	truly,	anyone	who	has	ever	observed	a	successful	automaton,	seen	its	uncanny	lifelike	movements,	confronted	its	mechanical	eyes,	any	 human	 animal	 remembers	 that	 particular	 fear,	 that	 confusion	about	 what	 is	 alive	 and	 what	 cannot	 be	 born.	 Descartes	 said	 that	animals	were	 automata.	 I	 have	 always	 been	 certain	 that	 it	was	 the	threat	 of	 torture	 that	 stopped	 him	 saying	 the	 same	 held	 true	 for	human	beings	(pp.18-19).		I	would	disagree	with	Catherine	here,	as	it	seems	to	me	that	the	separation	of	 human	 soul	 (and	mind)	 from	physical	 body	 that	Descartes	 argued	 for																																																									66	Riskin,	‘The	Defecating	Duck,	Or,	the	Ambiguous	Origins	of	Artificial	Life’,	p.	633.	
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(with	nonhuman	animals	understood	as	living	machines	without	this	extra	‘soul’)	 rather	 depends	 on	 a	 distinction	 being	 made	 between	 (rational,	thinking)	 humans	 and	 (mechanical)	 animals	 in	 order	 to	 work	 properly;	that	is,	it	involves	the	kind	of	definition	by	exclusion	that	Riskin	posits	as	central	 to	 taxonomies.	 As	 Catherine	 makes	 clear	 here,	 however,	 she	 is	more	 than	 happy	 to	 consider	 the	 human	 body	 in	 mechanical	 terms,	explaining	 ‘neither	 Matthew	 nor	 I	 had	 time	 for	 souls.	 That	 we	 were	intricate,	chemical	machines	never	diminished	our	sense	of	wonder	(p.19).	Yet	 after	 her	 bereavement	 this	 decisiveness	 leaves	 her,	 and	 as	 we	 have	seen	she	struggles	to	articulate	the	meaning	of	Matthew’s	physical	body	as	it	moves	 through	 the	world	after	his	death.	 In	 this	 sense,	what	begins	 to	trouble	 the	 grieving	 Catherine	 is	 not	 primarily	 the	 human/animal	distinction	 that	 preoccupies	Descartes,	 but	 the	more	 general	 problem	 of	how	different	bodies	might	be	identified	as	living	or	dead;	‘who’	or	‘what’.	Essentially	 what	 happens	 for	 Catherine	 is	 that	 after	 Matthew’s	 death	something	 about	 the	 taxonomic	 process	 that	 theoretically	 should	distinguish	between	living	and	dead	bodies	goes	wrong,	or	stops	working	properly	 for	 her.	 She	 experiences	 this	 as	 a	 primarily	 visual	 sensory	disruption	 that	makes	 itself	 known	 in	 affective	 encounters	with	 strange	bodies;	 encounters	 that	 are	 principally	 to	 do	 with	 feelings	 of	 loss	 in	relation	 to	 these	 bodies,	 and	 that	 as	 such	 refigure	 and	 complicate	 her	understanding	of	the	grievable.			 This	 is	 particularly	 evident	 in	 her	 interactions	 with	 the	 swan	automaton,	 and	 I	will	 talk	 about	 this	 in	 some	detail	 presently.	However,	she	 also	 experiences	 this	 sensory/taxonomic	 disruption	 in	 other	 more	minor	ways;	she	describes	Henry	Brandling’s	notebook	as	having	‘died	in	mid-air’	 after	 she	 throws	 it	 across	 the	 room	 in	 frustration,	 its	 shattered	remnants	becoming	Henry’s	‘crumbling	ashes	[…]	Henry	Brandling’s	bones	and	ashes…’	(p.90).	A	blue	cube	is	found	hidden	in	the	hull	which	seems	to	be	the	same	one	Henry	describes	Sumper’s	young	assistant	Carl	making	all	those	 years	 ago	 and	 Catherine	 describes	 it	 as	 ‘deeply	 evasive,	 sad	 and	melancholic,	a	study	in	blue	but	also	something	like	a	small	boy’s	slippers	
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placed	 beneath	 his	 bed	 three	 thousand	 summer	 nights	 ago’	 (p.148).	Objects	or	‘things’	seem	to	take	on	life	and	then	lose	it	again;	they	live	and	then	die,	or	both	at	once,	or	the	other	way	around.	In	this	way	Catherine’s	interactions	with	 her	 environment	 proceed	 through	 affective	 glitches	 as	she	 forms	 melancholic	 attachments	 to	 strange	 bodies	 that,	 to	 return	 to	Ahmed’s	 argument,	might	 seem	 improper	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 trouble	conventional	taxonomies	of	lifeliness;	that	is,	Catherine	refuses	to	declare	‘the	objects	that	we	declare	dead	as	being	dead	in	the	way	that	we	declare’	(Ahmed,	 p.	 141).	 	 However,	 these	 improper	 attachments	 would	 be	understood	 as	 such	 not	 because,	 as	 Ahmed	 suggests,	 an	 affective	community	would	 insist	that	they	relate	to	 losses	that	have	already	been	mourned	 (love	objects	 that	have	already	been	declared	dead)	but	 rather	because	this	community	would	dispute	the	idea	that	they	might	have	ever	lived	in	the	first	place.		
VII.	 New	Materialism	&	Melancholic	Vision		 In	 order	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 these	 ‘improper’	 attachments	 that	Catherine	 forms,	 and	 to	 think	 through	 some	 of	 the	 ways	 that	 these	moments	 of	 sensory	 disruption	 also	 bring	 into	 focus	 questions	 of	grievability,	I	turn	now	to	new	materialism.	The	types	of	scholarship	that	fall	 under	 this	 label	 are	 wide-ranging	 and	 interdisciplinary,	 but	 all	 are	interested	 in	prioritising	attentiveness	 to	matter	as	 it	moves	through	the	world,	whether	this	means	thinking	through	human	and	nonhuman	bodies	in	the	conventional	sense	or	excavating	bits	of	‘liveliness’	from	‘what	might	seem	 to	 be	 most	 inert:	 rocks,	 machines,	 dead	 bodies.’67	Perhaps	 most	crucially,	 new	 materialists	 see	 matter	 as	 having	 agency.	 Diana	 Leong	points	 out	 that	 although	 the	 disciplinary	 projects	 of	 these	 theorists	 are	‘appropriately	diverse,’	they	collectively	insist	on	understanding	matter	as																																																									67	Chad	Shomura,	‘Exploring	the	Promise	of	New	Materialisms’,	Lateral,	2017,	p.	n.p.	<http://csalateral.org/issue/6-1/forum-alt-humanities-new-materalist-philosophy-promise-new-materialisms-shomura/>.	
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‘lively,	 self-directed,	 agential,	 creative,	 and	 always	 in	 the	 process	 of	becoming.’68	In	a	recently	published	collection	of	essays,	Diana	Coole	and	Samantha	 Frost	 similarly	 describe	 the	 way	 that	 new	 materialists	 see	matter	 as	 ‘possessing	 its	 own	 modes	 of	 self-transformation,	 self-organization,	 and	 directedness,	 and	 thus	 no	 longer	 as	 simply	 passive	 or	inert.’	69	Jane	Bennett,	arguably	the	most	visible	of	the	theorists	currently	working	on	new	materialism,	uses	Latour’s	 term	 ‘actant’	 to	 refer	 to	both	human	 and	 nonhuman	materiality,	 and	 she	 is	 likewise	 interested	 in	 the	‘vitality’	of	matter,	 ‘the	capacity	of	 things	–	edibles,	commodities,	storms,	metals	–	not	only	to	 impede	or	block	the	will	and	designs	of	humans	but	also	 to	 act	 as	 quasi	 agents	 or	 forces	 with	 trajectories,	 propensities,	 or	tendencies	 of	 their	 own’	 (p.viii).	 Bennett’s	 shorthand	 for	 this	 is	 ‘Thing-power’	(p.xvi).		 One	of	the	reasons	this	branch	of	theory	is	so	useful	is	because,	as	will	be	apparent	from	the	Bennett	argument	above,	new	materialism	puts	pressure	on	the	category	of	the	human.	Not	only	is	this	work	interested	in	drawing	 out	 what	 Kyla	 Wazana	 Tompkins	 calls	 ‘the	 thingness	 of	 the	human’,	 but	 as	 she	 explains,	 it	 is	 also	 ‘interested	 in	 speculating	 about	 a	world	in	which	the	human	subject	is	not	centered,	or	even	central.’70	Coole	and	 Frost	 agree,	 arguing	 that	 new	 materialist	 work	 ‘disturbs	 the	conventional	 sense	 that	 agents	 are	 exclusively	 humans	who	 possess	 the	cognitive	 abilities,	 intentionality,	 and	 freedom	 to	 make	 autonomous	decisions’	[…](New	Materialisms,	p.	10).	In	this	sense,	then,	reading	Carey’s	novel	alongside	new	materialism	allows	for	an	analysis	of	grievability	that	does	not	insist	on	(or	at	 least	prioritise)	humanness	as	a	prerequisite	for	affective	attachment,	and	therefore	loss.	This	is	certainly	not	to	argue	that	
																																																								68	Diana	Leong,	‘The	Mattering	of	Black	Lives:	Octavia	Butler’s	Hyperempathy	and	the	Promise	of	the	New	Materialisms’,	Catalyst:	Feminism,	Theory,	Technoscience,	2.2	(2016),	p.	n.p.	<http://catalystjournal.org/ojs/index.php/catalyst/article/view/100>	[accessed	8	August	2017].	69	Diana	H.	Coole	and	Samantha	Frost,	New	Materialisms :	Ontology,	Agency,	and	Politics	(Durham,	North	Carolina ;	London:	Duke	University	Press,	2010),	p.	10.	70	Kyla	Wazana	Tompkins,	‘On	the	Limits	and	Promise	of	New	Materialist	Philosophy’,	Lateral,	5.1	(2016),	n.p..	<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.25158/L5.1.8>.	
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humans	 should	 be	 a	 secondary	 concern	 when	 thinking	 about	 loss	 and	grief,	but	 rather	 to	 refuse	 to	 take	 for	granted	 the	 inclusivity	of	 that	 term	when,	as	Tompkins	points	out,	the	‘objecthood’	that	opposes	humanness	is	‘a	 historical	 category	 with	 roots	 in	 larger	 political	 systems	 like	 racial	capitalism,	biopolitics,	or	colonialism’	(Tompkins,	npn).		 Furthermore,	 new	 materialism	 offers	 a	 particularly	 timely	analytical	 framework	 for	 the	 increasing	 amount	 of	 fiction	 that	 takes	anthropogenic	climate	change	as	 its	theme,	with	The	Chemistry	of	Tears	a	prime	example	of	this	trend.	Contemporary	scholarship	grouped	under	the	banner	 of	 new	materialism	 is	 united	 in	 positioning	 itself	 as	 a	 necessary	response	 to	 our	 particular	 moment	 of	 ecological	 crisis.	 These	 theorists	believe	our	 contemporary	historical	moment	necessitates	 a	 ‘new’	way	of	imagining	the	material	world	and	the	various	interactions	that	take	place	across	 it,	 not	 least	 because	 visible	 and	 felt	 changes	 like	 anthropogenic	extinction,	 weather	 pattern	 changes,	 and	 rising	 sea	 levels	 are	 occurring	across	the	globe.	Tompkins	suggests	that	this	is	one	of	the	arenas	in	which	new	materialist	thinking	might	prove	particularly	useful	in	the	sense	that	it	 is	 able	 to	 offer	 ‘a	 reckoning	 with	 planetary	 thought	 and	 the	 material	world	[…]’	(npn).	Coole	and	Frost	similarly	argue	that	it	 is	crucial	to	turn	to	materialism	at	a	time	when	‘we	are	finding	our	environment	materially	and	 conceptually	 reconstituted	 in	 ways	 that	 pose	 profound	 and	unprecedented	 normative	 questions’	 (p.6).	 For	 Chad	 Shomura,	 the	decentring	of	 the	human	via	 the	affirmation	of	 its	entanglement	with	the	nonhuman	 (‘animals,	 vegetables,	 and	 minerals’)	 that	 characterises	 New	Materialism	means	that	it	rejects	‘fantasies	of	human	mastery’	and	as	such	is	‘particularly	helpful	in	addressing	the	crises	instigated	or	intensified	by	anthropogenic	 climate	 change’	 (npn).	 Diana	 Leong	 sees	 the	 new	materialisms	 as	 belonging	 to	 a	 number	 of	 recent	 theoretical	 approaches	that	choose	 to	 focus	on	the	nonhuman,	and	that	appear	 ‘grounded	 in	 the	need	 to	 develop	 strategies	 of	 coexistence	 attuned	 to	 the	Anthropocene’s	political	and	ecological	crisis’	(npn).	For	the	most	part	these	scholars	see	the	ethical	payoff	of	their	projects	as	grounded	in	attempts	to	foreground	
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the	enmeshment	and	interdependence	of	agential	bodies.	New	materialists	argue	 that	 humans	 must	 recognise	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 their	 lives	 and	bodies	are	intertwined	with,	for	example,	nonhuman	animals,	objects,	and	aspects	of	the	natural	world,	with	this	being	a	necessary	step	towards	the	awakening	of	an	ecological	conscience	(or	conscientiousness)	 that	would	contribute	 to	 the	 development	 of	more	 sustainable	ways	 of	 living	 in	 the	Anthropocene:	Such	 a	 newfound	 attentiveness	 to	 matter	 and	 its	 powers	 will	 not	solve	 the	 problem	 of	 human	 exploitation	 or	 oppression,	 but	 it	 can	inspire	a	greater	sense	of	the	extent	to	which	all	bodies	are	kin	in	the	sense	 of	 inextricably	 enmeshed	 in	 a	 dense	 network	 of	 relations	(Bennett,	p.13).	As	will	be	apparent	from	Bennett’s	words	here,	a	theoretical	practice	that	seeks	 to	 move	 away	 from	 subject/object	 distinctions	 necessarily	 has	something	to	contribute	to	work	on	loss	that	problematizes	the	ways	that	such	 distinctions	 prohibit	 certain	 expressions	 of	 grief.	 	 Indeed,	 some	theorists	whose	work	 shares	 similarities	with	 new	materialism	 (notably	Donna	Haraway,	Deborah	Bird	Rose,	and	Thom	van	Dooren)	see	an	ethic	of	 entanglement	 as	 inspiring	 humans	 to	 live	 more	 sustainable	 lives	directly	because	 of	 its	 relation	 to	 problems	 of	 loss	 in	 the	 Anthropocene.	Haraway’s	 version	 of	 Bennett’s	 ‘enmeshment’	 is	 called	 ‘staying	with	 the	trouble’,	which	for	her	entails	the	process	of	‘making	oddkin’.71	Companion	species,	Haraway	argues,	must	become-with	each	other	 in	a	manner	 that	invalidates	human	exceptionalism,	 and	 thinking	about	and	 feeling	 loss	 is	one	 of	 the	 ways	 to	 best	 achieve	 this.	 ‘Grief	 is	 a	 path	 to	 understanding	entangled	 living	 and	dying’,	 she	writes;	 ‘human	beings	must	 grieve	with,	because	we	are	in	and	of	this	fabric	of	undoing’	(Staying	with	the	Trouble,	p.39).	 The	 new	 materialists	 are	 already	 engaging	 with	 the	 questions	 of	attachment	 and	 loss	 that	 interest	 me	 here	 as	 they	 play	 out	 against	 a	background	 of	 global	 change	 and	 precarity,	 and	 Carey’s	 novel	 asks																																																									71	Haraway,	p.	18.	
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questions	 about	 the	 lifeliness	 and	deathliness	 of	matter	 on	both	 a	micro	(Matthew’s	 death)	 and	 macro	 (human	 species	 extinction)	 level	 whilst	demonstrating	the	ways	in	which	the	global	and	the	individual	are	always	already	intertwined.			 These	are	the	ways,	then,	in	which	I	find	new	materialism	useful	as	an	 analytical	 formation	 in	 this	 context.	 However,	 I	 would	 also	 like	 to	engage	here	with	some	of	the	criticisms	that	have	been	made	of	the	field,	as	 it	 seems	 to	me	 that	 bringing	 new	materialism	 into	 dialogue	with	 the	power	to	‘unwork’	that	I	have	here	afforded	to	melancholic	critical	agency	might	 go	 some	 way	 toward	 drawing	 out	 as	 well	 as	 addressing	 some	 of	these	 hypothesised	 problems.	 	 Many	 of	 these	 critical	 responses	 to	 new	materialist	work	begin	by	asking	questions	about	the	work	the	word	‘new’	is	doing	in	the	title	of	this	emerging	field,	and	so	I	will	begin	here	too.			 In	 a	 thoughtful	 article	 called	 ‘On	 the	 Limits	 and	 Promise	 of	 New	Materialist	Philosophy,’	Kyla	Wazana	Tompkins	calls	attention	to	the	fact	that	 ‘the	putative	“newness”	of	the	field	is	in	fact	a	resurrection	of	an	old	body	 of	 thinking	 that	 reaches	 back	 several	 centuries	 to	 Spinozan	monism.’72	As	such,	it	is	necessary	to	ask	‘what	is	the	heroic	narrative	that	its	putative	“newness”	seeks	to	instantiate?’	(npn)	:	A	non-human	centered	ontology	and	ethics;	a	sense	of	the	biological	world	 as	 vital	 and	 alive;	 an	 idea	 of	 the	 body	 as	 having	 a	 life	 and	conversation	of	its	own,	with	itself;	and,	most	centrally	and	crucially,	the	 idea	 that	 planetary	 life	 should,	 must	 be,	 and	 will	 be	 at	 the	determinative	 center	 of	 political	 world-making:	 these	 are	epistemologies	and	ontologies	 that	can	hardly	be	said	 to	have	been	recently	 invented	 but	 rather	 are	 familiar	 to,	 among	 others,	 First	nations	 and	 Indigenous	 peoples;	 to	 those	 humans	who	 have	 never	been	quite	human	enough	as	 explored,	 for	 instance,	 in	postcolonial	and	 revolutionary	 black	 thought;	 to	 some	 strands	 of	 feminist	thinking,	for	instance,	de	Beauvoir’s	thinking	about	the	objecthood	of																																																									72	Tompkins,	p.	n.p..	
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women;	and	 to	other	non-Western	medical	and	spiritual	modalities	(npn).	Tompkins	 is	 concerned	 here	 about	 the	 pervasive	 omission	 of	 (in	particular)	questions	of	 race	 from	new	materialist	 thinking,	 arguing	 that	minoritarian	subjects	and	histories	‘haunt	the	edges’	of	certain	strands	of	its	 theoretical	 though	 (npn).	 Diana	 Leong	 similarly	 argues	 that	 new	materialist	work	proceeds	through	the	‘disavowal	or	misreading	of	race	as	a	 stagnant	 analytical	 framework’	 (npn).	 In	 ignoring	 the	 work	 of	 critical	race	 scholars,	 she	 argues,	 strands	 of	 new	 materialism	 secure	 the	“newness”	of	their	field	by	eliding	the	complex	genealogies	of	this	kind	of	materialist	thinking:	Proscribed	from	the	realm	of	the	human,	black	intellectuals	have	had	to	 think	 within	 and	 through	 the	 categories	 of	 the	 non-human	 and	inhuman	 to	 pursue	 new	ways	 of	 being	 in	 the	 world.	 Philosophical	questions	about	the	vitality	and	agency	of	the	human,	the	animal,	and	the	 object	 are	 therefore	 longstanding	 in	 the	 fields	 of	 Black	 studies	(Leong,	npn.)	Other	critical	responses	 to	new	materialism	have	also	suggested	that	 the	‘newness’	it	stands	for	should	be	treated	with	caution.	In	2008	Sara	Ahmed	published	 an	 article	 called	 ‘Some	 Preliminary	 Remarks	 on	 the	 Founding	Gestures	 of	 the	 “New	 Materialism”’	 which	 has	 since	 proved	 extremely	influential	to	debates	about	the	ways	in	which	the	new	materialisms	have	instantiated	 themselves	 as	 an	 emerging	 field	 of	 inquiry.	 In	 it	 she	 argues	that	 this	scholarship	 is	 founded	on	a	gesture	of	rejection;	specifically	 the	denunciation	 of	 previous	 feminist	 scholarship	 as	 uninterested	 in	matter,	or	 ‘anti-biological’	(Preliminary	Remarks,	p.24).	Ahmed	finds	 in	this	trend	an	 idea	 (that	 feminist	work	 before	 new	materialism	 ignores	 the	 body	 in	order	 to	 focus	 on	 ‘language,	 signification	 and	 culture’73)	 that	 has	 been	
																																																								73	Sara	Ahmed,	‘Some	Preliminary	Remarks	on	the	Founding	Gestures	of	the	“New	Materialism”’,	
The	European	Journal	of	Women’s	Studies,	15.1	(2008),	23	(p.	25).	
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‘taken	for	granted	as	a	common	reference	point’	so	that	those	claiming	it	often	fail	to	cite	specific	examples	of	the	ways	it	unfolds	in	practice	or	how	it	 might	 be	 tracked	 across	 texts	 or	 bodies	 of	 work	 (pp.	 25-7).	 Nikki	Sullivan	has	similarly	expressed	a	frustration	with	 ‘the	claim,	repeated	of	late	with	mantra-like	monotony,	 that	 (usually	nameless)	 feminist	and/or	social	constructionists	–	even	those	whose	work	appears	to	focus	on	 ‘the	body’	–	routinely	ignore	the	matter	of	corporeal	life.’74		 As	 Peta	 Hinton	 and	 Xin	 Liu	 have	 suggested,	 then,	 the	 major	critiques	 of	 New	Materialism	 as	 an	 emerging	 field	 are	 organised	 by	 the	suggestion	that	 ‘it	contains	a	gesture	of	abandonment.’75	That	is	to	say,	as	is	evident	in	the	critical	positions	I	have	briefly	outlined	above,	there	is	a	consensus	 that	 ‘new	 materialism’s	 proclaimed	 critical	 nuances	 and	transformative	 potentials	 are	 enabled	 in	 the	 very	 act	 of	 renouncing	 the	sites	of	political	 and	ethical	 engagements	 that	have	defined	 feminist	 and	postcolonial	 praxis’	 (Hinton	 and	 Liu,	 p.128).	 In	 Ahmed’s	 critique,	 this	gesture	 of	 abandonment	 is	 framed	 specifically	 as	 one	 of	 forgetting.	 ‘You	can	only	argue	for	a	return	to	biology	by	forgetting	the	feminist	work	on	the	 biological	 […],’	 she	 writes.	 ‘In	 other	 words,	 you	 can	 only	 claim	 that	feminism	 has	 forgotten	 the	 biological	 if	 you	 forget	 this	 feminist	 work’	(Preliminary	Remarks,	p.	27).			 It	seems	to	me	that	this	emphasis	on	notions	of	abandonment	and	forgetting	returns	us	to	the	ways	in	which	attachment	is	understood	in	the	critical	discourse	on	mourning	and	melancholia	that	has	been	the	subject	of	 this	 chapter.	 Specifically,	 critiques	 of	 new	 materialism	 argue	 for	 a	sustained	(melancholic)	engagement	with	objects	of	attachment	that	have																																																																																																																																																			<https://doi.org/http://journals.sagepub.com.sheffield.idm.oclc.org/doi/pdf/10.1177/1350506807084854>.	74	Nikki	Sullivan,	‘The	Somatechnics	of	Perception	and	the	Matter	of	the	Non/Human:	A	Critical	Response	to	the	New	Materialism’,	European	Journal	of	Women’s	Studies,	19.3	(2012),	299–313	(p.	299).	<https://doi.org/10.1177/1350506812443477>.	75	Peta	Hinton	and	Xin	Liu,	‘The	Im/Possibility	of	Abandonment	in	New	Materialist	Ontologies’,	
Australian	Feminist	Studies,	30.84	(2015),	128–45	(p.	128)	<https://doi.org/10.1080/08164649.2015.1046304>.	
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either	 been	 declared	 dead	 (feminist	 engagement	 with	 the	biological/material)	or	never	allowed	to	become	visible	at	all	(critical	race	theory,	particularly	the	work	of	black	scholars).	As	such,	I	believe	that	the	kind	of	melancholic	critical	agency	I	have	argued	for	here	–	one	focused	on	maintain	 a	 questioning	 relationship	 to	 losses	 that	 might	 be	 hidden	 or	disavowed	through	its	complication	of	the	temporal,	visible,	and	grievable	–	can	be	productively	brought	into	dialogue	with	new	materialism	in	order	to	draw	attention	to	some	of	the	objects	it	has	abandoned,	the	things	that,	in	 Tompkins’	 words,	 ‘haunt	 the	 edges’	 (npn).	 Of	 course,	 as	 I	 have	made	clear,	 the	work	of	new	materialists	has	much	 to	offer	my	analysis	of	The	
Chemistry	of	Tears	by	drawing	attention	to	the	ways	that	matter	begins	to	‘matter’	 differently	 at	 a	 time	 when	 the	 global	 ecological	 environment	 is	rapidly	 changing,	 with	 the	 place	 or	 cohesiveness	 of	 the	 category	 of	 the	‘human’	 increasingly	being	 called	 into	question	as	part	 of	 these	 changes.	As	 such,	 I	 would	 like	 my	 inquiry	 into	 the	 ways	 these	 two	 theoretical	formations	 might	 productively	 intersect	 to	 emerge	 out	 of	 a	 reading	 of	several	 striking	moments	 in	 Carey’s	 text	 in	which	 grief	 is	 understood	 as	affectively	 reorienting	 Catherine’s	 responses	 to	 ‘matter.’	 In	 short,	 I	 am	interested	 in	 how	 Carey’s	 novel	 provides	 an	 account	 of	 the	 political	meanings,	in	the	broadest	sense,	embedded	in	objects	and	beings,	life	and	death,	subjectivity	and	agency.		 I	 began	 this	 section	 by	 giving	 some	 examples	 of	 the	 ways	 the	who/what	relation	(understood	primarily	as	the	taxonomical	organisation	of	 living	 and	 dead	 bodies)	 starts	 to	 be	 troubled	 for	 Catherine	 after	Matthew	dies	and	she	confronts	what	this	means	for	him	(and	her)	on	the	level	of	matter	by	 imagining	his	physical	degeneration.	 I	 turn	now	to	 the	swan	automaton	and	the	large	hull	that	contains	its	mechanism,	the	body	that	is	doubled	with	Matthew’s	in	the	text	and	which	is	set	to	come	back	to	life	 as	 his	 slowly	 deteriorates.	 It	 is	 through	 several	 striking	 encounters	with	the	automaton	and	its	hull	that	Catherine	experiences	once	more	an	unravelling	 of	 the	 what/who	 relation	 just	 as	 she	 does	 with	 Matthew’s	body,	 an	 unravelling	 that	 calls	 her	 attention	 to	 the	 ways	 that	 death	
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organises	and	moves	through	this	particular	body,	too.	Here	is	the	moment	that	Catherine	enters	her	studio	to	find	the	mechanism	and	parts	of	what	she	still	believes	to	be	a	duck	automaton	waiting	for	her:	In	the	left	hand	corner	of	the	room,	nearest	to	the	door	and	therefore	behind	my	left	shoulder	when	I	first	entered,	was	an	iridescent	grey	tarpaulin	thrown	across	some	objects,	the	largest	one	of	which	stood	about	four	foot	high.	I	thought	of	a	beached	sting	ray,	some	undead	thing	washed	ashore	in	La	dolce	vita.	When	the	rational	brain	woke	up,	I	understood	what	
must	lie	beneath	the	tarp	–	an	upper	and	lower	cylinder	driven	by	a	weight,	 thirty	 levers	that	could	be	connected	with	different	parts	of	the	duck’s	skeletal	system	to	make	it	drink,	et	cetera	[…]	(p.56).	Here,	in	the	moment	before	her	‘rational	brain’	wakes	up	and	she	decides	that	what	she	sees	is	an	array	of	cylinders	and	levers	(note	the	word	‘must’	here	–	what	‘must’	lie	beneath	the	tarp	rather	than	what	‘does’	lie	beneath	it)	 Catherine	 encounters	 several	 objects	 that	 escape	 her	 comprehension.	As	such,	her	initial	response	(that	she	is	faced	with	an	‘undead’	stingray)	is	an	 affective	 one,	 characterised	by	 sensory	disruption.	 In	 new	materialist	terms,	Catherine’s	reaction	to	the	ostensibly	inanimate	objects	in	front	of	her	would	point	 to	 some	of	 the	ways	 that	matter,	 rather	 than	 remaining	static,	can	instead	be	recognized	as	‘indeterminate,	constantly	forming	and	reforming	in	unexpected	ways’	(Coole	and	Frost,	p.10).	In	similar	terms	we	might	 also	 understand	 her	 ability	 to	 perceive	 the	 shifting	 lifeliness	inhabiting	 and	 transforming	matter	 as	 being	 related	 to	 the	way	 that	 her	encounter	 with	 the	 automaton	 parts	 is	 characterised	 by	 an	 affective,	sensory	openness	(the	moment,	as	Catherine	describes	it,	before	‘rational’	awakening).	Tompkins,	for	instance,	finds	Dana	Luciano’s	suggestion	that	‘“the	 most	 compelling	 contribution	 of	 the	 new	 materialisms	 is	 not	conceptual	 or	 analytic	 […]	 but	 sensory”	 to	 be	 ‘the	 most	 intellectually	exciting	 reading	 of	 New	 Materialism’s	 critical	 potential’	 (npn).	 She	 is	drawn	in	particular	to	this	argument	from	Luciano:	‘The	attempt	to	attend	
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to	 the	 force	 of	 liveliness	 of	matter	will	 entail	 not	 just	 a	 reawakening	 or	redirection	 of	 critical	 attention,	 but	 a	 reorganizing	 of	 the	 senses.’ 76	Similarly,	 for	 Bennett,	 the	 ethical	 task	 for	 what	 she	 calls	 the	 ‘vital	materialist’	 is	 to	 ‘cultivate	 the	 ability	 to	 discern	 nonhuman	 vitality,	 to	become	 perceptually	 open	 to	 it’	 (cited	 in	 Tompkins,	 npn).	 Certainly	Bennett	 in	 particular	 understands	 this	 sensory	 opening	 as	 broadly	affirmative	 in	 nature,	 part	 of	 the	 ethics	 of	 enmeshment	 she	 shares	with	many	others	 in	 the	 field.	 In	 this	regard,	sensing	the	vitality	(or,	as	 I	have	called	 it	 here,	 lifeliness)	 in	 matter	 leads	 to	 recognition	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	perceiving	subject	that	‘all	bodies	are	kin’;	that	is,	they	share	this	material	vitality	and	as	such	should	be	 treated	 ‘more	carefully,	more	strategically,	more	 ecologically’	 (p.	 13.)	 This	 is	 of	 course	 a	 valuable	 insight,	 one	 that	certainly	has	much	to	contribute	to	an	ethics	of	care	in	our	contemporary	moment.	How	are	we	to	account,	however,	for	the	less	affirmative	aspects	of	 such	 sensory	 encounters:	 the	ways	 in	which	 this	 experience	might	 be	disgusting,	frightening,	tinged	with	horror?		 The	‘beached	stingray’	that	Catherine	thinks	of	when	she	looks	over	at	 the	 half-concealed	 objects	 is	 an	 abject	 thing,	 ‘undead’,	 calling	 to	mind	the	monstrous	dead	fish	that	washes	ashore	at	the	end	of	Federico	Fellini’s	
La	Dolce	Vita	 (1960).	 In	 this	 sense,	 it	 seems	 unlikely	 that	 she	would	 be	easily	moved	to	a	recognition	of	the	fish’s	(or	automaton’s)	body	as	kin	to	her	own	in	the	way	that	Bennett	describes.	Rather,	this	vision	once	more	manifests	 the	melancholic	 critical	 agency	 I	 have	 described.	 Although	 the	‘matter’	 with	 which	 Catherine	 engages	 does	 have	 an	 emotional	 and	sensory	 impact	 on	 her,	 an	 impact	 usefully	 theorised	 via	 a	 turn	 to	 new	materialist	work,	 the	most	 important	 aspect	 of	 her	 affective	 response	 is	the	way	 in	which	 it	allows	her	 to	see	 the	presence	of	death	 in	 that	same	material	body.	Specifically,	 in	complicating	 life/death	distinctions	 for	her	(revealing	 the	 “what”	 in	 the	 “who”)	 the	 loss	 of	 Matthew	 has	 caused	Catherine	 to	 similarly	 ‘unwork’	 other	 bodies/objects/things	 in	 her	environment,	so	that	she	not	only	sees	their	vital	 lifeliness,	but	also	their																																																									76	Tompkins.	
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deathliness.	 Importantly,	 indeed,	 this	 visual	 ‘unworking’	 is	 historical	 in	nature	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 forms	 causative	 links	 between	 the	 objects	Catherine	sees	in	the	present	moment	and	the	ways	in	which	these	objects	might	be	part	of	relations	that	extend	across	time.			 After	 deciding	 that	 she	 is	 faced	 with	 cylinders	 and	 levers,	 rather	than	 a	 dead	 animal,	 she	 takes	 away	 the	 tarpaulin	 covering	 the	 objects,	although	she	now	thinks	of	this	covering	as	a	‘shroud.’	If	 a	 moment	 later,	 I	 was	 replacing	 it,	 it	 was	 not	 because	 of	 the	ingenious	mechanism,	but	because	of	a	wooden	object	placed	beside	it.	Even	that	was	nothing,	of	course,	nothing	at	all.	It	was	just	a	sort	of	wooden	hull	that	had	probably	once	contained	the	mechanism,	but	I	was	in	a	waking	nightmare	and	the	brain	reported	a	failed	cremation,	a	 burned	 roast	 dinner,	 a	 black	 and	 formless	 fear.	 Professionally,	 I	understood	the	pitch-black	underside,	but	what	 I	saw	was	the	shell	of	 a	 huge	 bivalve,	 crusty,	 flaking,	 disinterred	 from	 tar.	 I	 smelled	napalm,	creosote,	burned	pig,	death	(p.57).	Here,	 then,	 Catherine	 experiences	 a	 second	 distressing	 response	 to	 the	objects	 in	 the	 room,	 one	 more	 severe	 than	 the	 first	 and	 focused	 in	particular	on	the	wooden	hull	which	Amanda	will	later	become	so	certain	carries	 the	parts	of	 an	 internal	 combustion	engine	over	 to	England	 from	Sumper’s	workshop.	 The	 ‘reorganizing	 of	 the	 senses’	 that	 takes	 place	 in	this	encounter	is	not	only	visual;	this	time	Catherine	is	also	confronted	by	various	terrible	smells.	Indeed,	there	can	be	no	doubt	here	that	the	vitality	she	 finds	present	 in	 the	hull	 is	 terrible	and	disturbing.	There	 is	 far	more	deathliness	 than	 lifeliness	 present	 here;	 filtered	 through	 the	 ‘waking	nightmare’	of	her	loss,	the	hull	appears	to	Catherine	as	full	of	horror	and	composed	 of	 various	 abjected	 elements,	 having	 apparently	 assimilated	aspects	of	 the	 living	and	dead	 things	 involved	 in	 its	violent	construction.	Crucially,	however,	 these	things	all	share	something	 in	common.	They	all	bear	 some	 relation	 to	 the	 practices	 of	 mechanised	 industry	 that	 are	complicit	 in	 the	 contemporary	 ecological	 crisis	 that	 the	 Deepwater	
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Horizon	oil	spill	 is	 just	one	visible	instance	of,	and	their	presence	next	to	each	 other	 reinforces	 this.	 For	 example,	 the	 ‘burned	 roast	 dinner’	 and	‘burnt	pig’	might	simply	call	to	mind	practices	of	meat-eating,	but	side	by	side	 with	 ‘tar’	 and	 ‘napalm’	 it	 becomes	 apparent	 that	 these	 images	 are	associated	 with	 the	 intensive	 industrial	 agriculture,	 more	 commonly	known	as	‘factory’	farming.	‘Tar’,	and	the	huge	bivalve	‘disinterred’	from	it,	represents	the	petroleum	industry	that	makes	its	presence	felt	throughout	the	novel,	and	‘napalm’	the	war	machine.	Intersection	and	enmeshment	is	apparent	 here	 then,	 but	 in	 order	 to	 suggest	 the	ways	 in	which	 all	 these	industrial	practices	 feed	off	 and	reinforce	each	other:	 the	wars	waged	 in	the	name	of	 oil,	 the	 creosote	 that	 is	 used	 to	preserve	 and	 smoke	 animal	flesh,	 the	death	 that	 is	both	prerequisite	 for	and	 intended	outcome	of	all	these	 things.	 The	 images	 and	 smells	 Catherine	 is	 visited	 by	 all	 have	 in	common	a	 relation	 to	burning	 and	 fire,	 and	 the	bodies	burning	 are	both	human	and	nonhuman.	What	 these	sensory	nightmares	enact,	 then,	 is	an	unravelling	of	 the	who/what	relation	 that	erases	 this	distinction;	 leaving	nothing	 but	 flesh,	 a	 shared	 vulnerability	 to	 death	 that	 spans	 across	 and	beyond	it.			 In	 this	 sense,	 then,	 Catherine’s	 vision	 of	 the	 hull	 might	 certainly	cultivate	something	like	the	ecological	sensibility	Bennett	is	looking	for	by	painting	a	picture	of	enmeshment	as	shared	exposure	to	death,	rather	than	life.	Most	importantly	for	my	analysis	here,	however,	her	unworked	image	of	 the	 hull	 draws	 links	 between	 the	 object	 as	 it	 appears	 in	 the	 present	moment,	acting	as	a	suture-point	that	holds	together	the	novel’s	interest	in	the	story	of	the	duck	and	beyond	that	the	development	of	mechanisation	into	industrial	technologies.	As	such,	finding	the	‘deathliness’	in	an	object	might	 here	 also	 be	 understood	 as	 locating	 and	 being	 confronted	 by	 its	historicity.	 The	moment	 of	 ‘unworking’	 that	 takes	 place	when	 Catherine	encounters	 the	hull	 in	her	studio	combines	both	 the	 temporal	and	visual	forms	 of	 disruption	 that	 this	 chapter	 has	 suggested	 emerge	 from	melancholic	critical	agency.	This	means	that	Catherine’s	melancholic	gaze	
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here	is	a	remembering	one;	a	gaze	that	is	confronted	by	historical	relations	and	disavowed	losses	and	that	redistributes	the	grievable.			 Nikki	 Sullivan	 points	 out	 that	 by	 positing	 ‘matter’	 as	 an	intellectually	 neglected	 object	 in	 this	 way,	 many	 theorists	 of	 new	materialism	 ‘presuppose	 something	 called	 matter	 –	 albeit	 some	 “thing”	whose	 substance,	 whose	 boundaries	 are	 relational,	 undecidable,	 and	constantly	 in	 flux	 –	 and	 in	 doing	 so,	 constitute	 “it”	 (matter)	 as	 a	 priori’	(p.309).	 This	 would	 amount	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 new	 materialists	 assume	‘matter’	 to	 be	 a	 ‘thing’	 ready	 and	 available	 for	 theorising,	 without	necessarily	considering	the	sense	in	which	different	kinds	of	‘matter’	have	emerged	 and	 been	 designated	 as	 such	 in	 different	 ways.	 Mel	 Y.	 Chen’s	work	 is	 invaluable	 here.	 Their	 book	 Animacies:	 Biopolitics,	 Racial	
Mattering,	 and	 Queer	 Affect	 builds	 on	 but	 departs	 from	 new	 materialist	work	 by	 focusing	 on	 ‘animacy’	 as	 a	 construct.	 Chen	 is	 particularly	interested	 in	 the	 linguistic	 concept	of	an	 ‘animacy	hierarchy’,	 a	 structure	(or	 ‘grammar’)	 which	 ‘conceptually	 arranges	 human	 life,	 disabled	 life,	animal	 life,	plant	 life,	and	 forms	of	nonliving	materials	 in	orders	of	value	and	 priority.’77	This	 enables	 them	 to	 discuss	 the	 ways	 that	 animacy	 is	specifically	 ‘nonneutral’	 as	 a	 concept	 in	 that	 it	 is	 shaped	 in	particular	by	race,	sexuality	and	ability:	Race	 because	 the	 formation	 of	 animal	 and	 animality	 has	 been	enriched	 by	 colonial	 histories;	 sexuality	 because	 the	 discussions	 of	kind,	 genre,	 production,	 and	 reproduction	 with	 regard	 to	 such	 an	ontology	 inevitably	 call	 forth	 concerns	 of	 sexuality	 broadly	conceived;	 ability	 because	 the	 human	 body	 and	 subject	 have	resolutely	been	imagined	as	able-bodied,	in	a	god’s	image	(p.234).	What	Chen’s	work	insists	on,	then,	is	that	attention	be	paid	not	only	to	the	processes	by	which	 ‘animacy’	 is	distributed	as	well	 as	withheld,	but	also	and	crucially	to	the	historical	trajectories	of	these	processes.	In	this	sense,																																																									77	Mel	Y.	Chen,	Animacies :	Biopolitics,	Racial	Mattering,	and	Queer	Affect	(Durham,	NC:	Duke	University	Press,	2012),	p.	13.	
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Chen	redirects	attention	 to	perception	and	affect	as	diagnostic	 tools	 that	
act	on	as	well	as	on	behalf	of	experiencing	subjects.	‘It	seems	that	animacy	and	 its	 affects	 are	mediated	 not	 by	whether	 you	are	a	 couch,	 a	 piece	 of	metal,	 a	 human	 child,	 or	 an	 animal,’	 they	 argue,	 ‘but	 by	 how	 holistically	you	 are	 interpreted	 and	 how	 dynamic	 you	 are	 perceived	 to	 be’	 (p.210).	Sullivan	makes	a	similar	argument	once	again	in	relation	to	the	large	body	of	 new	 materialist	 discourse	 that	 situates	 the	 emerging	 discipline	 as	 a	reaction	 to	 the	 way	 in	 which	 matter	 has	 been	 under-theorised.	 She	suggests	that	this	perspective	is	the	‘vehicle	and	effect	of	a	very	particular,	situated	optics’	 (p.300).	For	Sullivan,	 this	 is	an	 important	point	 that	new	materialist	 thinkers	 in	 particular	 should	 reflect	 on,	 because,	 she	 argues,	‘‘matter’	is	inextricable	from	the	I/eye	that	perceives	it:	perception	makes	‘matter’	 matter,	 it	 makes	 ‘some-thing’	 (that	 is	 no-thing)	 (un)become	 as	
such,	it	makes	‘it’	intelligible	(p.300).	Whilst	I	am	unconvinced	that	vision	can	be	segregated	off	from	other	sensory	experiences	in	this	way	(Chen’s	work	offers	a	much	fuller	account	of	perception	as	an	embodied	encounter	with	the	world),	what	interests	me	about	Sullivan’s	argument	is	the	sense	in	 which	 she	 emphasises	 the	 perceiving	 subject’s	 responsibility	 for	 and	implication	 in	the	ways	 in	which	they	 ‘see’	matter.	She	refers	to	this	as	a	‘somatechnics	 of	 perception’,	 a	 term	 she	 coins	 to	 describe	 the	 ways	 in	which	soma	(the	body	in	the	world)	and	techné	(orientations	to	the	world,	like	‘ways	of	seeing,	knowing	feeling,	moving,	being,	acting	and	so	on’)	are	tangled	together	(p.302).	Crucially,	however,	the	orientations	–	or	ways	of	negotiating	 the	world	 –	 that	make	 up	 the	 ‘technics’	 of	 somatechnics	 are	‘learned	within	a	particular	tradition	or	ontological	context	(are,	 in	other	words,	situated),	and	function	(often	tacitly)	to	craft	(un)becoming-with	in	very	specific	ways’	(Sullivan,	pg.	302).	Necessarily	then,	perception,	when	understood	 as	 exemplifying	 this	 kind	 of	 situated	 somatechnics,	 presents	‘an	 orientation	 to	 the	 world	 in	 which	 the	 I/eye	 is	 always-already	 co-implicated,	 co-indebted,	 co-responsible’	 (p.302).	This	means	 that	what	 is	really	at	stake	in	Sullivan’s	argument	is	an	invitation	to	consider	the	gaze	of	the	perceiving	subject	as	inseparable	from	the	conditions	in	which	that	same	 gaze	 has	 come	 to	 be.	 Because	 of	 this,	 she	 makes	 it	 clear,	 certain	
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subjects	 will	 have	 an	 ocular	 orientation	 to	 the	 world	 that	 may	 be,	 for	example,	anthropomorphising,	colonising,	or	heteronormative.	To	put	this	back	into	Chen’s	terms:	how	‘holistically’	you	interpret	the	world,	and	how	‘dynamic’	you	perceive	it	to	be	(the	animacy	you	allow	to	different	things),	are	effects	of	the	somatechnics	of	perception	in	which	you	are	personally	implicated.		 To	return	once	more	to	Catherine	and	her	nightmare	vision	of	the	hull,	Chen	and	Sullivan’s	work	enriches	the	reading	I	have	so	far	offered	of	this	 textual	 moment	 by	 pointing	 to	 the	 sense	 in	 which	 Catherine’s	‘remembering’	 gaze	 is	 also	 turned	 back	 on	 herself.	 That	 is,	 there	 is	something	 about	 the	 way	 loss	 has	 unworked	 Catherine’s	 modes	 of	perception	 that	 also	 applies	 to	 her	 own	 situatedness;	 it	 reveals	 her	 own	complicity	 in	 the	violent	structures	 that	she	sees	brought	 together	 in	 the	abject	 hull.	 Catherine	 clearly	 understands	 the	 hull	 to	 be	 enmeshed	with	histories	of	industrialisation,	just	as	Amanda	does	when	she	points	to	it	as	the	 hiding	 place	 for	 Sumper’s	 combustion	 engine.	 As	 such,	 her	 terrible	vision	 is	 inseparable	 from	her	obsession	with	 the	Deepwater	Horizon	oil	spill	 and	 that	 disaster’s	 own	 status	 as	 a	 powerful	 visual	 symbol	 of	anthropogenic	 ecological	 damage.78	It	 seems	 apparent	 from	 this	 that	 the	deathliness	Catherine	finds	present	in	the	hull	is	related	to	anthropogenic	climate	change	in	the	same	way	that	Amanda’s	vision	of	 its	purpose	is.	 It	follows,	 then,	 that	 by	 drawing	 attention	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 she	 is	responsible	 for	 and	 implicated	 in	 her	 own	 perceptual	 schema,	 a	 critical	melancholic	 ‘remembering’	 gaze	 works	 to	 reveal	 how	 Catherine	 herself	might	be	culpable	in	the	history	of	that	deathliness.		 The	 agents	 of	 this	 history,	 as	 discussed	 above,	 are	 the	 large-scale	mechanised	 industries	(war,	oil,	meat)	that	subtend	what	Tompkins	calls																																																									78	Indeed,	Chen	sees	the	visual	politics	of	the	oil	spill	as	exemplifying	the	sense	in	which	(in	new	materialist	terms)	matter	might	be	seen	as	agential	in	ways	that	threaten	anthropogenic	fantasies	of	mastery.	The	‘pure	animation	of	the	oil’,	they	point	out	‘was	dramatized	and	literalized	by	video	coverage	of	the	spewing	drill	pipe	in	the	water’	so	that	its	animacy	was	‘spectacular	to	the	degree	that	it	dramatized	the	uncontrollable	shifting	or	transformation	of	matter.’	
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‘Christological	racial	capitalism.’	This	structure,	she	argues,	is	responsible	for	the	current	planetary	crisis	because	it	relies	on	a	‘human-centred	logic’,	one	that	‘produces	categories	of	beings	designated	as	animal	or	object,	in	the	 name	 of	 extracting	 value	 and	 labor-energy’	 (npn).	 Nicholas	Mirzoeff	attributes	 the	 same	 function	 (the	 shifting	 and	 categorising	 of	 beings	between	 human/	 nonhuman/	 object/	 property)	 to	 the	 logic	 of	(neo)colonialism,	 which	 is	 centred,	 he	 argues,	 on	 ‘questions	 of	 the	definition	of	life,	how	to	make	distinctions	and	how	to	see	difference.’79		He	also	 sees	 these	 practices,	 rooted	 in	 imperialism	 and	 the	 slave	 trade	 that	enabled	 and	 was	 enabled	 by	 the	 emergence	 of	 capitalism,	 as	predominantly	 liable	 for	 the	mass	 species	 extinction	 and	 climate	 change	that	 characterises	 the	 proposed	 new	 geological	 epoch	 of	 the	Anthropocene.	 For	 this	 reason,	 his	 mantra	 has	 become	 ‘it’s	 not	 the	Anthropocene,	it’s	the	white	supremacy	scene’	expressive	of	his	belief	that	‘it	is	not	all	people	that	are	indicted	by	the	onset	of	the	Anthropocene	but	a	specific	set:	colonial	settlers,	enslavers,	and	would-be	imperialists’	(npn).		 To	 begin	 to	 conclude,	 then,	 whilst	 I	 do	 not	 wish	 to	 form	 an	argument	 here	 for	 Catherine’s	 personal	 imbrication	 in	 these	 categories	and	 their	 oppressive	history	 (although	 I	 think	 that	would	be	possible),	 I	would	 suggest	 that	The	Chemistry	of	Tears	 situates	 the	museum	space	 in	which	 its	 narrative	 unfolds	 as	 deeply	 implicated	 in	 these	 histories.	 In	Britain	 in	 particular,	 the	 legacy	 of	museums	 is	 also	 that	 of	 empire,	with	many	 of	 these	 institutions	 established	 with	 the	 express	 purpose	 of	displaying	 objects	 from	 the	 colonies	 in	 order	 to	 ‘proclaim	 the	merits	 of	empire’. 80 	In	 the	 nineteenth	 and	 early	 twentieth	 centuries	 dedicated	natural	history	museums	provided	homes	for	the	considerable	number	of	specimens	 brought	 back	 from	 expeditions	 ‘in	 search	 of	 the	 strange	 and	wonderful	 fauna	of	 foreign	 lands’,	with	these	exhibits	part	of	an	 imperial	
																																																								79	Nicholas	Mirzoeff,	‘It’s	Not	The	Anthropocene,	It’s	the	White	Supremacy	Scene.	Or,The	Geological	Color	Line.’,	Forthcoming	in	After	Extinction	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press).	80	Robert	Aldrich,	‘Colonial	Museums	in	a	Postcolonial	Europe’,	African	and	Black	Diaspora:	An	
International	Journal,	2.2	(2009),	137–56	(p.	138)		
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taxonomic	project	to	classify	and	order	as	many	beings	as	possible.81	John	Miller	 points	 out	 that	 these	 systems	 of	 classification	 ‘further	 buttressed	the	 ideology	 of	 empire	 by	 resolving	 beings	 into	 a	 ‘natural’	 hierarchy	 of	higher	and	lower	animals,	those	destined	to	exercise	dominion	over	others	and	those	that	were	unavoidably	their	prey’,	whilst	ethnologists	included	humans	 in	 this	 schema	 so	 that	 ‘the	 European	 could	 contentedly	 look	 to	science	for	a	validation	of	racial	superiority’	(Miller,	pp.65-6).	It	is	certain,	then,	that	museum	spaces	played	a	major	role	in	producing	the	‘categories	of	beings	designated	as	animal	or	object’	that	Tompkins	identifies	as	part	of	the	human-centred	logic	of	racial	capitalism	and	the	planetary	crisis	she	sees	it	as	originating	(npn).		 The	fictional	Swinburne	Museum	at	which	Catherine	works	is	not	a	dedicated	 museum	 of	 natural	 history,	 however.	 Reviews	 of	 the	 novel	repeatedly	point	out	 the	Swinburne’s	 similarity	 to	London’s	Victoria	and	Albert	 Museum	 (V&A),	 a	 resemblance	 that	 Carey	 has	 endorsed	 in	interviews	 by	 revealing	 that	 part	 of	 his	 research	 for	 the	 book	 involved	corresponding	with	a	horologist	presently	working	at	the	V&A.	As	one	of	these	interview	points	out,	whilst	the	Swinburne	is	not	the	V&A,	‘it	has	its	warren	of	tunnels	and	back	areas	and	its	conservation	protocols	and	office	politics.’82	The	V&A	museum’s	connections	to	empire	are	equally	as	strong	as	those	of	its	natural	history	siblings.	Renamed	the	Victoria	and	Albert	in	1899,	 its	 first	 incarnation	was	 in	1857	as	 the	South	Kensington	Museum	and	 its	 purpose	 was	 to	 enshrine	 what	 Tim	 Barringer	 calls	 ‘a	 uniquely	modern	 world-view,	 that	 of	 Victorian	 imperialism.’ 83 	The	 museum	displayed	objects	from	areas	in	which	Britain	had	colonial	 interests,	with	Barringer	 suggesting	 that	 ‘the	 procession	 of	 objects	 from	 peripheries	 to																																																									81	John	Miller,	Empire	and	the	Animal	Body :	Violence,	Identity	and	Ecology	in	Victorian	Adventure	
Fiction	(London ;	New	York:	Anthem	Press,	2012),	pp.	62–63.	82	‘Peter	Carey’s	The	Chemistry	of	Tears’,	CBC	News	<http://www.cbc.ca/news/entertainment/peter-carey-s-the-chemistry-of-tears-1.1173468>	[accessed	11	September	2017].	83	Tim	Barringer,	‘The	South	Kensington	Museum	and	the	Colonial	Project’,	in	Colonialism	and	the	
Object:	Empire,	Material	Culture,	and	the	Museum,	ed.	by	T.	J.	Barringer	and	Tom	Flynn	(London:	Routledge,	1998),	pp.	11–27	(p.	11).	
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centre	 symbolically	 enacted	 the	 idea	 of	 London	 as	 the	 heart	 of	 empire’	(Colonialism	and	the	Object,	p.11).	He	explains	that	when	the	museum	was	re-opened	 as	 the	 V&A	 in	 1909,	 despite	 a	 toning	 down	 of	 its	 ‘didactic	mission,’	 the	 building	 confirmed	 its	 role	 as	 ‘the	 most	 spectactular	repository	of	 the	material	culture	of	empire’	(p.27).	 It	 is	 likely,	 then,	 that	Carey	is	interested	in	the	legacies	of	empire	that	modelling	the	Swinburne	on	 the	 V&A	 bring	 into	 dialogue	 with	 his	 narrative,	 given	 that	 the	 swan	automaton	 has	 been	 brought	 into	 Eric	 Croft’s	 hands	 in	 the	 first	 place	because	 of	 its	 connection	 to	 the	 ‘Sing-Song’	 clocks	 that	 were	 profitable	colonial	 exports,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 fact	 that	 Henry	 Brandling	 is	 of	 course	 a	Victorian	gentleman	whose	family’s	money	comes	from	investment	in	that	most	 colonial	 of	 enterprises:	 the	 railways.	 So	Carey	 certainly	 follows	 the	connections	 between	 the	 history	 of	 empire	 and	 that	 of	 industrialisation,	and	 it	 is	 in	Catherine’s	 vision	of	 the	hull	 that	 this	 relation	 is	most	 richly	expressed.		 In	 essence,	 then,	 when	 Catherine	 sees	 the	 hull	 ‘unworked’,	 its	relationship	 to	 both	 past	 and	 future	 is	 exposed	 as	 well	 as	 temporally	disturbed.	She	is	brought	to	an	understanding	of	the	ways	it	is	both	lifely	and	 deathly	 but	 also,	 more	 importantly,	 of	 the	 sense	 in	 which	 she	perceives	it	in	the	way	she	does	because	of	her	situatedness	in	a	particular	environment.	 As	 such,	 the	 terrible	 affect	 of	 her	 vision	might	 be	 usefully	attributed	to	the	fact	that	it	invites	her	to	take	responsibility	for	the	ways	in	 which	 this	 particular	 material	 body	 manifests	 itself	 to	 her.	 She	 finds	herself	shamefully	responsible	for	and	vulnerable	to	the	dreadful	reality	of	environmental	catastrophe	that	so	terrifies	her.	This	affective	complexity	goes	far	beyond	the	realisation	of	shared	materiality	that	Bennett	sees	as	the	ethical	payoff	of	her	new	materialist	politics.			 In	 this	 chapter	 I	 have	 argued	 that	The	Chemistry	 of	Tears	 reveals	that	 the	attention	new	materialism	pays	 to	 the	 importance	of	dislocating	human	 agency	 in	 our	 present	 ecological	 moment	 must	 crucially	 be	supplemented	 with	 what	 I	 see	 as	 the	 potential	 of	 a	 critical	 melancholic	agency	 to	 trouble	 sites	 where	 losses	 have	 been	 made	 invisible	 or	
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disowned.	 I	hope	 that	 such	a	 theoretical	move	might	offer	an	alternative	model	 of	 enmeshment	 or	 imbrication	 that	 attends	 to	 the	 historical	conditions	 that	 allow	 the	 emergence	 of	 certain	 kinds	 of	material	 agency	whilst	 suppressing	 and	 even	 killing	 others.	 Bringing	 melancholic	 vision	into	dialogue	with	new	materialism	might	offer	a	way,	I	suggest,	to	address	the	micropolitical	 focus	 that	 Diana	 Leong	 argues	 currently	 characterises	the	 discipline,	 and	 in	 doing	 so	 to	 prioritise	 the	 dislocation	 of	 oppressive	structures	that	she	rightly	sees	as	vital	to	such	a	project	(npn).		 	
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Chapter	Two	
	
Narcissistic	Attachments:	A	Melancholic	Reading	of	
De-Extinction	Projects	
	
	
	
Introduction	
		 On	30th	July,	2003,	a	Pyrenean	ibex	kid	was	delivered	by	caesarean	section.	It	was	immediately	obvious	that	the	young	female	was	struggling	to	breathe,	and	she	died	just	a	few	minutes	later;	a	necropsy	revealed	that	the	ibex	had	developed	a	large,	non-functional	lobe	in	her	lung,	the	mass	of	which	 had	 fatally	 impaired	 her	 breathing.	 For	 the	 few	minutes	 that	 she	lived,	however,	this	kid	was	the	only	member	of	her	species	present	on	the	planet,	 the	 Pyrenean	 ibex	 having	 been	 declared	 officially	 extinct	 on	 6th	January	 2000,	 when	 the	 last	 female	 (known	 as	 Celia)	 was	 found	 dead,	crushed	beneath	a	tree.		As	such,	the	birth	of	the	kid	heralded	the	first	real	‘de-extinction’	event	when	a	DNA	test	confirmed	that	she	was	‘genetically	identical’	to	cells	that	had	been	taken	from	Celia	four	years	previously.84				 De-extinction	 refers,	 broadly,	 to	 the	 process	 of	 technologically	reproducing	an	extinct	organism.	As	might	be	expected,	 there	have	been	many	 objections	 raised	 to	 such	 projects,	 particularly	 after	 the	 2013	TEDxDeExtinction	conference	held	in	Washington	DC	caused	de-extinction	to	 hit	 the	 headlines	 like,	 in	 the	 words	 of	 Beth	 Shapiro,	 an	 evolutionary	biologist	who	works	with	ancient	DNA	‘only	new	wars,	missing	airplanes,	or	resurrected	mammoths	can’.85	Here,	scientists	 in	charge	of	current	de-																																																								84	J.	Folch	and	others,	‘First	Birth	of	an	Animal	from	an	Extinct	Subspecies	(Capra	Pyrenaica	Pyrenaica)	by	Cloning’,	Theriogenology,	71.6	(2009),	1026–34.		85	Beth	Alison	Shapiro,	How	to	Clone	a	Mammoth:	The	Science	of	de-Extinction	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2015),	p.	189.	
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extinction	projects	gave	talks	alongside	dissenting	voices	keen	to	explore	the	 ethical	 issues	 raised	 by	 biological	 resurrection.	 These	 are	 many:	alongside	 concerns	 about	 the	 artificial	 nature	 of	 de-extinct	 animals,86	it	has	been	pointed	out	that	many	proposed	de-extinction	candidates	would	not	return	to	the	same	ecological	environment	that	once	sustained	them,	and	 that	 the	 reappearance	 of	 such	 animals	 might	 impact	 negatively	 on	human	 communities	 in	 various	 ways.87	Furthermore,	 scientists	 involved	with	 the	 various	 de-extinction	 projects	 have	 (perhaps	 predictably)	 been	accused	of	hubris;	after	the	TEDx	event	Shapiro	began	to	receive	menacing	hate	mail	that	claimed	she	was	‘playing	God’	and	‘was	going	to	bring	about	the	 end	 of	 the	 world’	 (p.	 192).	 Environmental	 philosophers	 Thom	 van	Dooren	 and	 Deborah	 Bird	 Rose	 also	 recently	 intervened	 in	 this	 debate	when	they	expressed	concerns	about	the	affective	ethics	of	such	projects.	They	 suggest	 that	 in	 our	 current	 moment	 of	 anthropogenic	 mass	extinction,	rather	than	rushing	to	embrace	techno-fixes	like	de-extinction,	we	 should	 instead	 realise	 that	 ‘dwelling	 with	 extinction	 –	 taking	 it	seriously,	not	rushing	to	overcome	it	–	may	actually	be	the	more	important	political	and	ethical	work.’	For	van	Dooren	and	Rose,	this	work	involves	a	process	of	mourning	that	they	argue	might	‘open	us	into	an	awareness	of	our	 dependence	 on	 and	 relationships	 with	 those	 countless	 others	 being	driven	over	the	edge	of	extinction.’88				 This	chapter	 is	 in	part	a	response	to	van	Dooren	and	Rose’s	claim	that	de-extinction	projects	are	positioned	as	an	alternative	to	the	cultural	and	 political	 work	 of	 mourning	 that	 they	 see	 as	 a	 vital	 response	 to	
																																																								86	Shapiro	explains	that	‘genetically	pure	versions	of	any	extinct	species,	are	likely	not	possible’	but	also	argues	that	‘a	mammoth	will	not	have	to	be	pure	in	order	to	be	received	as	a	mammoth.’	(How	
to	Clone	a	Mammoth)	130.	Thus	in	the	case	of	the	passenger	pigeon,	for	example,	a	successfully	resurrected	passenger	pigeon	would	in	fact	be	a	genetically	edited	band-tailed	pigeon,	their	closest	living	relative.			87	Dolly	Jørgensen,	‘Reintroduction	and	De-Extinction’,	BioScience,	63.9	(2013),	719–20	<https://doi.org/10.1093/bioscience/63.9.719>.	88	Thom	van	Dooren	and	Deborah	Bird	Rose,	‘Keeping	Faith	with	the	Dead:	Mourning	and	De-Extinction’,	Australian	Zoologist,	2015,	n.p.	
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anthropogenic	 extinction.	 Following	 their	 suggestion	 that	 de-extinction	projects	 are	 reluctant	 to	 engage	with	mourning	work,	 I	 argue	 here	 that	these	scientific	endeavours	can	be	understood	as	 inherently	melancholic.	In	reading	these	projects	as	such,	I	focus	on	the	concepts	of	identification	and	 ambivalence	 that	 are	 central	 to	 Freud’s	 theorisation	 of	melancholia,	and	 I	 argue	 that	 looking	 at	 these	 key	 ideas	 in	 relation	 to	 de-extinction	reveals	 the	 way	 that	 notions	 of	 human	 exceptionalism	 can	 be	problematized	 by	 a	 psychoanalytic	 reading	 of	 these	 scientific	 projects.	Indeed,	 I	believe	that	a	melancholic	reading	of	 these	projects	shows	how	they	exhibit	a	radical	potential	to	rethink	cross-species	relationships	that	exceeds	and	undercuts	what	would	appear	to	be	their	more	conservative,	nostalgic	 agenda,	 and	 that	 this	 ultimately	 has	 ethical	 implications	 for	rethinking	the	violence	currently	present	in	these	relations.			 In	turning	to	psychoanalysis	to	read	de-extinction	projects	and	the	relations	 that	 structure	 them,	 I	 follow	 Shoshana	 Felman	 in	 regarding	Freud’s	 work	 as	 an	 ‘invitation	 to	 interpretation’	 rather	 than	 an	authoritative	set	of	knowledge	that	might	reveal	some	kind	of	 literary	or	social	‘truth.’89	Similarly,	I	value	the	way	that	psychoanalysis	is	able	to,	in	Stephen	Frosh’s	words,	‘direct	attention	towards	the	unconscious’	in	order	to	track	patterns	of	desire	as	they	appear	in	literary	and	cultural	texts,	and	it	 is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	 I	 find	 Freud’s	 work	 useful	 in	 helping	 trace	 the	forms	 of	 human-animal	 attachment	 at	 work	 in	 de-extinction	 projects	(Psychoanalysis	 Outside	 the	 Clinic,	 p.220).	 I	 believe	 that	 reading	 de-extinction	projects	as	melancholic	 in	Freud’s	original	sense	makes	visible	certain	 intriguing	 aspects	 of	 human/non-human	 relationality	 that	structure	these	endeavours	and	would	otherwise	have	remained	obscure;	as	 such	 Freud’s	 work	 serves	 to	 open	 up	 thinking	 in	 this	 area,	 whilst	necessarily,	as	Frosh	puts	it,	remaining	‘partial’	(p.221).		
																																																									89	Shoshana	Felman,	‘Turning	the	Screw	of	Interpretation’,	in	Literature	and	Psychoanalysis :	The	
Question	of	Reading,	Otherwise	(New	Haven:	Yale	French	Studies,	1977),	p.	116.	
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I.	 Melancholic	attachments	
		 Whilst	selective	or	back-breeding	has	been	proposed	as	one	means	of	 achieving	 de-extinction,	 the	 technique	 that	 has	 generated	 extensive	scientific,	 media	 and	 public	 interest	 is	 based	 on	 established	 cloning	technology,	and	relies	on	the	existence	of	high	quality	DNA	fragments	from	extinct	animals.	 	As	 such,	 animals	 that	became	extinct	 relatively	 recently	are	 the	 best	 candidates	 for	 this	 process,	 with	 examples	 including	 the	passenger	pigeon,	gastric	brooding	frog,	and	thylacine,	also	known	as	the	Tasmanian	 tiger.	 	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 gastric	 brooding	 frog,	which	became	extinct	 in	1983,	preserved	genetic	material	exists	that	can	be	transferred	into	the	egg	cell	of	a	close	relative	of	the	extinct	animal	in	order	to,	theoretically,	create	an	embryo	for	implantation	into	a	surrogate	mother,	in	a	process	known	as	somatic	cell	nuclear	transfer	(SCNT).90	For	animals	 such	 as	 the	 thylacine	 or	 even	 the	 woolly	 mammoth,	 whose	remaining	fragments	of	DNA	are	damaged	and	difficult	to	read,	scientists	aim	 to	 sequence	 the	 genome	 of	 the	 extinct	 creature	 as	 best	 they	 can.	 In	these	cases	they	use	the	DNA	of	living	members	of	a	closely	related	species	as	a	scaffold	91;	 if	sequencing	is	achieved,	the	next	step	is	to	manufacture	the	extinct	DNA	so	that	the	same	process	of	 implantation	into	an	egg	cell	can	be	carried	out.	92			 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Pyrenean	 ibex	 kid	 born	 in	 2003,	 somatic	 cell	nuclear	 transfer	 was	 used.	 The	 live	 birth	 was	 the	 culmination	 of	 many	years’	 work	 by	 a	 team	 operating	 in	 the	 Ordesa	 valley,	 a	 remote	mountainous	area	of	 the	Spanish	Pyrenees	home	 to	 the	 last	 few	of	 these																																																									90	Michael	Archer,	How	We’ll	Resurrect	the	Gastric	Brooding	Frog,	the	Tasmanian	Tiger	<https://www.ted.com/talks/michael_archer_how_we_ll_resurrect_the_gastric_brooding_frog_the_tasmanian_tiger?language=en>	[accessed	28	October	2016].	91	Jacob	S.	Sherkow	and	Henry	T.	Greely,	‘What	If	Extinction	Is	Not	Forever?’,	Science,	340.6128	(2013),	32–33.	92	For	more	on	this,	see	Beth	Shapiro’s	book	How	to	Clone	a	Mammoth:	The	Science	of	De-Extinction		and	also	her	April	2015		talk	at	TEDxDeExtinction	“How	to	bring	a	mammoth	back	to	life”,	available	on	the	TEDx	website	
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Pyrenean	 ibex,	 more	 commonly	 known	 as	 the	 bucardo.	Bucardo	 were	 a	subspecies	of	the	Spanish	ibex,	well	adapted	to	extreme	habitats	like	high	mountains	 and	 cold	 winters;	 once	 widespread,	 they	 were	 hunted	intensively	 throughout	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 when	 their	 decreasing	numbers	caused	hunters	to	travel	from	all	over	Europe	to	try	and	kill	what	had	now	become	a	rare	trophy.	They	were	thought	to	have	become	extinct	in	the	early	twentieth	century,	so	when	the	small	community	in	the	Ordesa	valley	was	discovered,	 conservation	efforts	were	expended	 to	 raise	 their	numbers,	which	proved	unsuccessful.	From	1989	scientists	began	to	study	the	reproduction	of	 the	bucardo	 in	captivity,	and	attempts	were	made	to	transfer	 ibex	 embryos	 first	 into	 domestic	 goats,	 and	 then,	 more	successfully,	 to	 goat/Spanish	 ibex	 hybrids.	 In	 1999,	 skin	 biopsies	 were	taken	from	Celia,	by	now	the	last	of	her	species,	and	cells	from	these	were	taken	 to	 two	 different	 laboratories	 to	 be	 multiplied	 and	 then	 frozen.	 A	team	led	by	Dr	Jose	Folch	then	began	work	transferring	the	nuclei	of	these	bucardo	 cells	 into	 goat	 cells	 that	 had	 been	 emptied	 of	 their	 own	 DNA,	producing	cloned	bucardo	embryos	 that	 in	2003	were	 implanted	 into	44	hybrid	goats.	Of	 these	44,	only	7	became	pregnant,	and	only	one	mother	carried	to	term,	giving	birth	to	the	bucardo	kid	whose	short	life	confirmed	that	‘de-extinction’	had	now	become	a	genuine	possibility.93	At	some	point	in	this	story	then,	conservation	work	(a	 focus	on	keeping	bucardos	alive,	either	 in	 the	wild	 or	 captivity)	was	 replaced	 by	 research	 geared	 toward	resurrecting	 the	 bucardo	 through	 cloning,	 with	 the	 example	 above	showing	just	how	much	work	this	entailed	over	a	number	of	years.	In	this	sense,	the	scientists	working	on	the	Pyrenean	ibex	project	would	appear	to	have	 taken	 the	 approach	 environmentalist	 Stewart	 Brand	 suggests	 is	characteristic	 of	 de-extinction	 efforts	 and	 most	 appropriately	 addresses	the	challenges	posed	by	mass	extinction;	‘Don’t	mourn.	Organize.’94		
																																																								93	TEDx	Talks,	The	First	De-Extinction:	Alberto	Fernandez-Arias	at	TEDxDeExtinction	<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5eMqEQw9Fbs>	[accessed	28	October	2016].	94	Stewart	Brand,	The	Dawn	of	de-Extinction.	Are	You	Ready?	<https://www.ted.com/talks/stewart_brand_the_dawn_of_de_extinction_are_you_ready?language=en>	[accessed	28	October	2016].	
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		 Brand,	establisher	of	the	Long	Now	Foundation	and	founder	of	the	project	 Revive	 &	 Restore,	 an	 initiative	 investigating	 the	 possibility	 of	bringing	 back	 the	 passenger	 pigeon,	 made	 this	 claim	 as	 part	 of	 his	presentation	at	TEDxDe-Extinction,	dismissing	affective	responses	such	as	sorrow,	 anger	 or	 grief	 as	 useless	 in	 the	 context	 of	 contemporary	 mass	anthropogenic	 extinction.95	Van	 Dooren	 and	 Rose’s	 paper	 comes	 as	 a	response	 to	 Brand’s	 comments,	 which	 they	 find	 ‘disturbing’	 and	 see	 as	expressing	 ‘a	 deep	 misunderstanding	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 mourning’;	conversely,	 they	 see	 mourning	 as	 precisely	 ‘not	 opposed	 to	 practical	action’	 but	 instead	 ‘the	 foundation	 of	 any	 sustainable	 and	 informed	response’	 to	 species	 loss,	 a	 response	 they	 situate	 as	 dependent	 on	 the	process	 of	 working-through	 that	 Freud	 identifies	 as	 characteristic	 of	mourning	(Keeping	Faith	With	the	Dead,	n.p.).	What	would	it	mean,	then,	to	read	 the	 rejection	 of	 mourning	 work	 that	 Brand	 suggests	 typifies	 de-extinction	projects	as	symptomatic	of	a	melancholic	attachment	to	the	lost	species	they	seek	to	resurrect?			 In	Mourning	and	Melancholia,	although	Freud	situates	melancholia	as	a	pathological	 response	 juxtaposed	 to	 the	 ‘normal	affect’	of	mourning,	throughout	 his	 essay	 he	 struggles	 with	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 two	and,	 as	 Judith	Butler	notes,	 his	portrait	 of	melancholia	 ‘continually	blurs	into	 his	 view	 of	 mourning’	 (Psychic	 Life,	 p.	 172).	 Freud	 situates	 both	conditions	 as	 responses	 to	 the	 loss	 of	 a	 loved	object	made	 visible	 in	 the	grieving	 subject	 through	 symptoms	 of	 dejection,	 loss	 of	 interest	 in	activities	 and	 the	 outside	 world	 and	 a	 loss	 of	 the	 capacity	 to	 love	(Mourning	 and	 Melancholia,	 p.	 244).	 In	 mourning,	 these	 external	manifestations	of	grief	are	accompanied	by	intense	internal	work	that	sees	libido	withdrawn	from	the	lost	love	object	in	a	process	carried	out	‘bit	by	bit,	at	great	expense	of	time	and	cathectic	energy’,	resulting	eventually	in																																																									95	A	major	report	published	by	the	Living	Planet	Index	in	2016	warns	that	the	world	is	on	track	to	lose	two-thirds	of	wild	animals	by	2020.	‘Living	Planet	Report	2016	|	WWF’	<http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/all_publications/lpr_2016/>	[accessed	28	October	2016].	
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full	detachment	of	 the	ego	 from	the	 lost	object,	 so	 that	 the	ego	 ‘becomes	free	 and	 uninhibited	 again’,	 able	 to	 seek	 out	 a	 new	 love	 object.	 In	melancholia,	 Freud	 claims,	 this	 process	 of	 working-through	 does	 not	occur;	instead	of	libido	being	gradually	detached	from	the	lost	love	object	and	once	more	turned	outward,	it	is	instead	withdrawn	into	the	ego,	with	the	result	that	an	identification	is	established	between	the	ego	and	the	lost	object	(p.249).	To	put	it	in	slightly	different	terms,	a	melancholic	reaction	to	 loss	works	 to	 transfer	 the	affect	of	 loss	 from	 the	vanished	 love	object	onto	 the	 ego;	 this	 means	 that,	 in	 Freud’s	 terms,	 an	 object-loss	 is	transformed	 into	 an	 ego-loss,	 and	 he	 explains	 that	 this	 process	 of	identification	 is	 able	 to	 occur	 due	 to	 the	 narcissistic	 nature	 of	 the	attachment	to	the	 love-object	 in	melancholia,	a	point	that	 I	will	return	to	later	in	more	detail	due	to	its	relevance	for	my	argument	here.	To	sum	up,	then,	for	Freud	the	affect	of	mourning	is	opposed	to	that	of	melancholia	in	that	 after	 a	 process	 of	working-through	 the	mourner	 is	 able	 to	 choose	 a	new	love	object,	whereas	the	melancholic	becomes	engaged	in	a	prolonged	identification	with	the	lost	object	that	prevents	such	a	reattachment	being	able	 to	 occur.	 In	 this	 way,	 de-extinction	 projects	 can	 be	 identified	 as	melancholic	 in	 the	sense	that	 the	scientists	 involved	are	either	unable	or	unwilling	 to	 seek	 out	 new	 love	 objects,	 instead	 remaining	 engaged	with	the	 extinct	 animals	 that	 they	 refuse	 to	 declare	 dead.	 For	 example,	scientists	working	on	the	Long	Now	Foundation’s	Revive	&	Restore	project	are	 committed	 to	 resurrecting	 the	 passenger	 pigeon,	 which	 became	officially	 extinct	 in	 1914	 after	 being	 slaughtered	 by	 humans	 throughout	the	 nineteenth	 century.96	In	 Freud’s	 terms,	 this	 would	 be	 a	 melancholic	identification	that	refuses	detachment	from	the	lost	object	(the	passenger	pigeon),	 whereas	 a	 mourning	 response	 would	 involve	 a	 process	 of	working-through	allowing	for	the	eventual	choice	of	a	new	love	object;	for	example,	 in	the	context	of	extinction	this	might	 involve	instead	taking	up	
																																																								96	See:	Joel	Greenberg,	A	Feathered	River	across	the	Sky:	The	Passenger	Pigeon’s	Flight	to	Extinction,	1st	U.S.	ed.	(New	York:	Bloomsbury,	2014).	and	‘About	the	Passenger	Pigeon’,	Revive	&	Restore,	2015	<http://reviverestore.org/about-the-passenger-pigeon/>	[accessed	29	October	2016].	
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conservation	efforts	on	 the	behalf	 of	 any	one	of	 the	 large	number	of	 the	living	bird	species	whose	populations	are	currently	in	huge	decline.97			 As	 I	 noted	 earlier	 in	 this	 chapter,	 many	 contemporary	commentators	have	 suggested	 that	 the	melancholic	 reaction	 to	 loss	 is	 in	fact	ethical	in	its	refusal	to	abandon	the	lost	object.98	In	their	2003	volume	
Loss,	David	 L.	 Eng	 and	David	 Kazanjian	 seek	 to	 resituate	melancholia	 as	politically	 productive	 rather	 than	 nostalgic	 or	 reactionary,	 arguing	 that	they	 ‘find	 in	Freud’s	conception	of	melancholia’s	persistent	struggle	with	its	lost	objects	not	simply	a	“grasping”	and	“holding”	on	to	a	fixed	notion	of	the	 past	 but	 rather	 a	 continuous	 engagement	with	 loss	 and	 its	 remains’	(4).	This	continuous	engagement	with	the	 lost	object	makes	 itself	known	through	the	 ‘critical	agency’	 that	Freud	claims	becomes	active	within	 the	ego	as	a	result	of	the	process	of	melancholic	 identification;	this	agency	is	manifested	outwardly	as	a	‘disturbance	of	self-regard’	that	sees	the	subject	represent	 their	 ego	 as	 ‘worthless,	 incapable	 of	 any	 achievement	 and	morally	despicable’,	a	trait	that	Freud	argues	is	absent	in	mourning	and	as	such	 is	 the	 primary	means	 of	 identifying	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 melancholic	response	to	loss.	Recall,	he	claims	that	this	is	able	to	happen	because	of	the	identification	the	ego	makes	with	the	object	that	has	been	lost	(that	is,	the	ego	 and	 the	 lost	 object	 have	 become	 one	 and	 the	 same)	 so	 these	 self-reproaches	are	in	fact	‘reproaches	against	a	loved	object	which	have	been	shifted	away	 from	 it	 on	 to	 the	patient’s	own	ego’	 (p.	248).	This	 causes	 a	kind	 of	 splitting	within	 the	 ego,	where	 one	 part	 sets	 itself	 ‘over	 against’	another	and	 ‘judges	 it	critically’	as	 it	would	do	with	an	object,	and	Freud	aligns	 this	 critical	 agency	with	what	 he	 believes	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	major	institutions	of	the	ego:	conscience	(p.	247).	Crucially,	however,	Freud	sees	the	 actions	 of	 this	 critical	 agency	 (self-reproaches,	 accusations	 of																																																									97	See	Van	Dooren.	98	For	some	examples	of	and	commentary	on	this	see:	Ahmed,	The	Promise	of	Happiness.	;	Eng	and	Kazanjian.	;	Jacques	Derrida,	Pascale-Anne	Brault,	and	Michael	Naas,	The	Work	of	Mourning	(Chicago ;	London:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2001).	;	Nouri	Gana,	Signifying	Loss :	Toward	a	
Poetics	of	Narrative	Mourning	(Lewisburg	[Pa.]:	Bucknell	University	Press,	2011).	;	Khanna,	Dark	
Continents.	
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immorality)	 as	 the	 conscious	 representation	 of	 the	 subject’s	 ambivalent	relation	to	their	lost	love	object,	the	nature	of	which	is	repressed	(p.	257).	That	is	to	say,	Freud	argues	that	in	melancholia	the	relation	to	the	object	is	one	characterised	by	some	kind	of	ambivalence,	a	conflict	of	love	and	hate,	and	he	 claims	 that	 the	presence	of	 ambivalence	 in	 this	 relation	prevents	the	subject	from	becoming	conscious	of	the	particulars	of	this	struggle,	as	they	 would	 do	 in	 mourning.	 Instead,	 this	 conflict	 is	 represented	 in	consciousness	 ‘as	 a	 conflict	 between	 one	 part	 of	 the	 ego	 and	 the	 critical	agency’	 –	 so,	 as	 self-beratement.	 As	 such,	 I	 argue	 that	 a	 melancholic	reading	of	de-extinction	projects	should	attend	to	and	seek	to	make	visible	the	ambivalence	present	in	the	object	relation	between	proponents	of	de-extinction	 and	 the	 lost	 animals	 they	 wish	 to	 resurrect,	 a	 relation	 of	ambivalence	which	I	suggest	is	ethically	productive.	Therefore,	I	will	now	go	on	to	locate	how	critical	agency	might	be	active	in	these	projects,	and	to	examine	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 Freud’s	 concepts	 of	 identification	 and	ambivalence	 are	 useful	 in	 tracing	 the	 unconscious	 workings	 of	 human-animal	relations	that	such	a	reading	allows	to	emerge.		
	
II.	 Object	Loss	&	Ego	Loss	
		 As	 I	 explained	 above,	 the	 critical	 agency	 present	 in	 melancholia	leads	the	experiencing	subject	to	both	understand	and	present	themselves	as	 ‘morally	 despicable’	 not	 only	 in	 the	 present	moment	 but	 in	 terms	 of	their	 entire	 lived	 experience;	 indeed,	 Freud	 suggests	 that	 ‘dissatisfaction	with	 the	 ego	 on	 moral	 grounds	 is	 (melancholia’s)	 most	 outstanding	feature’	(p.248).	He	explains	that	the	melancholic	‘is	not	of	the	opinion	that	a	change	has	taken	place’	but	instead	extends	their	self-criticism	back	over	the	past;	they	declare	that	they	were	‘never	any	better’	(p.246).	For	Freud,	as	Chapter	One	of	this	thesis	showed,	this	self-reproaching	critical	agency	is	 directed	 back	 toward	 and	 focused	 on	 the	 individual	 melancholic.	However,	 I	 would	 like	 to	 move	 on	 now	 to	 consider	 the	 ways	 that	 de-extinction	projects	might	be	read	as	exhibiting	these	same	patterns	of	self-reproach	 on	 a	 species,	 rather	 than	 an	 individual	 level.	 	 Declarations	 of	
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historical	 immorality	 (the	 ‘never	 better’	 that	 Freud	 describes)	 are	 a	 key	feature	 of	 public	 speeches	 made	 by	 many	 proponents	 of	 de-extinction,	who	stress	humanity’s	responsibility	for	extinction	rates	at	the	same	time	as	 suggesting	 that	 humans	 have	 a	 moral	 obligation	 to	 redress	anthropogenic	extinction.	The	most	vocal	commentators	on	this	issue	are	the	three	men	who	have	most	publicly	demonstrated	their	commitment	to	de-extinction	projects:	Stewart	Brand,	Michael	Archer	and	Ben	Novak.	 In	his	address	at	the	TEDxDeExtinction	conference,	Brand	declared,	‘the	fact	is,	humans	have	made	a	huge	hole	 in	nature	 in	the	 last	10,000	years.	We	have	 the	 ability	now,	 and	maybe	 the	moral	 obligation,	 to	 repair	 some	of	the	damage.’	In	National	Geographic	he	argues	that	with	resurrection	will	come	 ‘redemption.’	99	Michael	 Archer,	 the	 man	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 team	attempting	to	de-extinct	the	gastric	brooding	frog,	which	goes	by	the	name	‘The	Lazarus	Project’,	echoes	these	comments.	He	claims,	‘we	have	a	moral	imperative	to	try	to	undo	the	colossal	disasters	of	this	kind	for	which	we	are	responsible.’100	Finally	Ben	Novak,	who	works	at	Revive	&	Restore	on	the	 passenger	 pigeon	 project,	 frames	 the	 responsibility	 he	 also	 believes	humans	have	to	‘restore’	extinct	animals	as	an	ethically	necessary	refusal	to	let	go	of	loss	(or,	to	mourn),	reproaching	humanity	for	having	‘forgotten’	the	 passenger	 pigeon.	101In	 melancholic	 terms,	 Freud	 argues	 that	 this	‘disturbance	of	 self-regard’	 (which	 is,	 as	here,	always	publicly	expressed,	suggesting	a	kind	of	 ‘satisfaction	 in	self-exposure’)	points	 to	 the	 fact	 that	the	melancholic	has	suffered	a	loss	of	ego,	rather	than	of	object,	as	a	result	of	the	identification	the	ego	has	formed	with	the	lost	love	object	(p.	247).	In	 this	 sense,	 then,	 the	 self-berating	 discourse	 of	 de-extinction	 points	 to	the	fact	that	not	only	has	an	identification	been	made	between	human	ego	and	(lost)	animal	object,	but	further,	that	the	loss	of	these	animals	has	in	fact	materially	 impoverished	 the	human	ego;	 that	 is	 to	say,	 something	 in																																																									99	Stewart	Brand,	for	National	Geographic	NewsPUBLISHED	March	12,	and	2013,	‘Opinion:	The	Case	for	Reviving	Extinct	Species’,	National	Geographic	News,	2013.	[accessed	30	September	2017].	100	Brian	Switek,	‘How	to	Resurrect	Lost	Species’,	National	Geographic	News,	2013.		[accessed	29	October	2016].	101	“How	to	Bring	Passenger	Pigeons	All	the	Way	Back:	Ben	Novak	at	TEDxDeExtinction”	Video	at	TEDxTalks’,	TEDxTalks.		[accessed	29	October	2016].	
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the	human	has	been	lost,	too.	 	Again,	 I	say	‘the	human’	here	because	it	is	clear	that	Brand,	Archer	and	Novak	do	not	identify	this	impoverished	ego	in	individual,	personal	terms	(as	Freud	would	do)	but	rather	conceptualise	it	 as	 shared,	 or	 communal.	 As	 such,	 de-extinction	 projects	 appear	 to	 be	invested	in	the	concept	of	a	kind	of	collective	human	species	ego.				 This	 notion	 is	 a	 problematic	 one,	 not	 least	 because	 it	 works	 to	obscure	the	myriad	differences	between	members	of	the	human	species	by	suggesting	 they	might	 share	 the	 same	 investments	 in	 the	 future	 of	 that	species;	of	course,	this	also	works	backwards	too	by	implying	the	burden	of	 guilt	 for	 nonhuman	 extinction	 is	 also	 equally	 distributed	 across	humanity.102	In	 this	case,	an	emphasis	on	 the	use	of	 the	word	 ‘we’	 in	 the	words	of	all	three	men	could	be	dismissed	as	a	simple	marketing	ploy	that	emphasises	shared	responsibility	and	shared	profit.				 Within	 the	 parameters	 of	 a	 melancholic	 reading,	 however,	 and	focusing	on	the	process	of	 identification	that	sees	 the	ego	merge	with	 its	lost	 love	object,	 the	positing	of	a	collective	human	species	ego	materially	and	 affectively	 impoverished	 by	 animal	 loss	 allows	 a	 more	 radical	potential	to	emerge	in	this	discourse:	an	avowal	of	the	imbrication	of	the	nonhuman	within	 the	 human.	 The	 repeated	 invocation	 of	 this	 collective,	and	 supposedly	 damaged,	 human	 ego	 in	 relation	 to	 nonhuman	 death	implies	 an	 inextricable	 relationship	 between	 human	 and	 nonhuman	 life	characterised	 not	 by	 the	 ‘practical’	 value	 of	 biodiversity	 or	 ecosystem	stability	 but	 by	 the	 imperative	 of	 maintaining	 a	 certain	 wellbeing	 or	
psychical	 health	 in	 the	 human	 species.	 	 As	 such,	 a	 melancholic	 reading																																																									102	The	problems	that	I	identify	here	in	relation	to	the	concept	of	a	human	species	ego	parallel	similar	recent	debates	on	the	application	of	the	neologism	‘Anthropocene’	to	the	current	geological	epoch,	with	the	analogous	flattening	of	humanity	that	this	implies	(i.e.	equal	human	responsibility	for	the	geological	changes	that	have	irrevocably	altered	the	planet,	as	well	as	a	lack	of	engagement	with	the	unequal	global	distribution	of	human	suffering	that	will	result	from	these	changes	).	This	has	led	some	theorists	to	prefer	the	term	‘Capitalocene’	for	this	same	epoch.	For	a	nuanced	examination	of	this	debate	see	Anthropocene	or	Capitalocene?	Nature,	History,	and	the	Crisis	of	
Capitalism,	ed.	by	Jason	W.	Moore.	
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points	 to	 the	 way	 that	 certain	 patterns	 of	 attachment	 in	 de-extinction	discourse	undermine	human	exceptionalism.	Such	a	challenge	is	vital,	van	Dooren	suggests,	because	it	is	human	exceptionalism	that	is	at	the	root	of	‘our	 inability	to	really	get	–	 to	comprehend	at	any	meaningful	 level	–	the	multiple	 connections	 and	 dependencies	 between	 ourselves	 and	 these	disappearing	others:	 a	 failure	 to	 appreciate	 the	ways	 in	which	we	are	at	stake	in	one	another,	all	the	ways	in	which	we	share	a	world’	(Flight	Ways,	p.140).			 I	 want	 to	 turn	 now	 to	 examine	 the	 narcissistic	 attachments	 that	Freud	argues	characterise	melancholia	in	order	to	break	down	the	concept	of	ego/object	identification	a	little	more,	and	to	show	how	this	process	of	identification	 functions	 in	 the	context	of	de-extinction	projects	 to	 further	reveal	 the	 complex	ways	 that	 humans	 and	 animals	might	 be	 ‘at	 stake	 in	one	another.’	 In	 line	with	 the	argument	 I	have	made	above	 for	using	 the	notion	of	a	human	species	ego	 to	 track	 the	patterns	of	 identification	and	attachment	at	work	in	de-extinction	projects,	when	I	refer	to	the	‘human’	below	 I	 have	 this	 collective	 subject	 ego	 in	mind,	 rather	 than	 any	 of	 the	specific	individuals	involved	in	de-extinction	initiatives.				
III.	 Narcissistic	Attachments	
		 In	 his	 editor’s	 note	 to	Mourning	 and	Melancholia	 James	 Strachey	suggests	 that	 the	 paper	 be	 regarded	 as	 ‘an	 extension	 of	 the	 one	 on	narcissism	which	 Freud	 had	written	 a	 year	 earlier.’103	He	 refers	 here	 to	1914’s	 On	 Narcissism:	 An	 Introduction,	 and	 suggests	 it	 was	 Freud’s	introduction	 of	 narcissism	 as	 a	 concept	 that	 allowed	 him	 to	 reopen	 the	subject	 of	 melancholia	 he	 had	 put	 to	 the	 side	 years	 earlier.	 Indeed,	 in	
Mourning	 and	 Melancholia	 it	 is	 the	 idea	 of	 narcissistic	 attachment	 that																																																									103	James	Strachey,	‘Editor’s	Note’,	in	The	Standard	Edition	of	the	Complete	Psychological	Works	of	
Sigmund	Freud.	Volume	XIV	(1914-1916),	On	the	History	of	the	Psycho-Analytic	Movement,	Papers	on	
Metapsychology	and	Other	Works	(London:	Vintage,	2001),	p.	240.	
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really	allows	Freud	 to	pull	mourning	and	melancholia	apart;	he	 suggests	that	 it	 is	 in	 fact	 the	 propensity	 to	 make	 narcissistic	 object-choices	 that	predisposes	 a	 subject	 to	melancholia,	 although	 regrets	 that	 this	 ‘has	 not	yet	been	confirmed	by	observation’	(p.	250).			 Narcissism	in	Freud’s	 terms	refers	 to	a	 libidinal	 investment	 in	 the	self:	 in	 ‘On	 Narcissism’	 he	 argues	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 ‘primary	 and	normal	 ‘	 form	 of	 this	 in	 all	 human	 beings,	 and	 associates	 this	 with	 the	instinct	 of	 self-preservation	 that	 may	 ‘justifiably	 be	 attributed	 to	 every	living	creature.’104.	He	posits,	however,	the	existence	of	a	secondary	type	of	narcissism;	 this	 also	 functions	 by	 drawing	 libidinal	 investment	 inward,	into	 the	 ego,	 and	occurs	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 subject	making	object-choices	based	 on	 identification;	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 they	 are	 ‘seeking	 themselves	 as	 a	love-object’	 (On	 Narcissism,	 p.	 88).	 It	 is	 this	 narcissistic	 kind	 of	 object-choice	that	Freud	suggests	produces	a	melancholic	response	 if	and	when	this	chosen	love	object	is	lost:	the	narcissistic	object-choice	regresses	into	‘original	narcissism’	because	love	for	the	object	is	instead	replaced	by	the	ego	identifying	itself	as	that	object	in	order	that	the	love-relation	‘need	not	be	given	up’	(Mourning	and	Melancholia,	p.249).	Freud	gives	a	summary	of	the	 ‘paths’	 he	 says	 may	 lead	 to	 a	 person	 making	 a	 narcissistic	 object	choice,	explaining	that	this	person	(a	‘him’	in	Freud’s	work)	may	choose	to	love	objects	that	he	associates	with:		 a) what	he	himself	is	(i.e.	himself),	b) what	he	himself	was,	c) what	he	himself	would	like	to	be,	d) someone	who	was	once	part	of	himself	(On	Narcissism,	p.90).		
																																																								104	Sigmund	Freud,	James	Strachey,	and	Anna	Freud,	‘On	Narcissism:	An	Introduction’,	in	The	
Standard	Edition	of	the	Complete	Psychological	Works	of	Sigmund	Freud.	Volume	XIV	(1914-1916),	On	
the	History	of	the	Psycho-Analytic	Movement,	Papers	on	Metapsychology	and	Other	Works	(London:	Vintage,	2001),	p.	74.	
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To	 return	 once	 more	 to	 de-extinction	 projects,	 I	 want	 to	 suggest	 that	examining	 their	melancholic	 attachment	 to	 lost	 species	 in	 the	 context	 of	narcissistic	 object-choice	 further	 illuminates	 the	ways	 that	 relationships	between	different	kinds	of	human	and	nonhuman	life	are	being	imagined	in	these	initiatives,	and	I	believe	that	this	can	be	tracked	in	two	particular	ways.				 Firstly,	 Freud’s	 positing	 of	 narcissistic	 object-choice	 as	 one	 of	 the	conditions	 of	 possibility	 for	 melancholia	 suggests	 that	 the	 chosen	 ‘love-object’	in	de-extinction	discourse	–	extinct	animals	–	has	been	selected	on	a	narcissistic	basis.	This	means	that	it	may	be	possible	that	the	patterns	of	human	 desire	 (again,	 understood	 on	 a	 species	 rather	 than	 an	 individual	level)	 at	 work	 in	 de-extinction	 projects	 are	 directed	 toward	 extinct	animals	because	of	a	process	of	 identification	whereby,	 in	Freud’s	 terms,	humans	 have	 sought	 themselves	 as	 a	 love	 object.	 	 This	 suggests	 that	 a	reading	of	the	attachments	that	structure	de-extinction	projects	works	to	reveal	 not	 only	 human	 dependence	 on	 the	 nonhuman	 (in	 the	 sense	 of	psychical	 health	 that	 I	 described	 earlier),	 but	 more	 specifically	 the	impossibility	 of	 their	 straightforward	 separation;	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 in	 this	context	 humans	 are	 identifying	 with	 animals.	 This	 also	 means	 that	 the	impoverishment	 of	 human	 ego	 operative	 in	 this	 context,	 (which	 I	described	 earlier	 as	 consciously	 expressed	 in	 the	 self-berating	 ‘critical	agency’	 of	 de-extinction	 discourse)	 does	 not	 only	 occur	 because	 a	melancholic	 response	 causes	 the	 (human)	 ego	 to	 identify	 with	 the	 lost	(animal)	 object	 after	 the	 fact,	 but	 conversely,	 suggests	 that	 the	entanglement	of	human	and	animal	is	actually	the	structural	possibility	for	melancholia.	To	put	it	another	way,	humans	must	have	already	made	this	identification	with	animals	in	order	to	have	selected	them	as	a	love-object	on	 a	 narcissistic	 basis,	 otherwise,	 as	 Freud	 explains,	 the	 melancholic	response	 that	 allows	 narcissistic	 object-choice	 to	 regress	 to	 ‘pure’	narcissism,	would	not	be	 likely	to	occur.	This	extends	the	argument	I	am	making	 here	 for	 the	 imbrication	 of	 the	 nonhuman	 in	 the	 human	beyond	
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the	scope	of	de-extinction	projects	by	suggesting	that	processes	of	human-animal	identification	are	already	at	work	outside	of	these	contexts.			 Secondly,	 I	want	to	turn	to	the	 last	of	 the	 four	 ‘paths’	 listed	above	that	Freud	suggests	may	lead	to	a	narcissistic	choice	of	love-object,	where	he	 explains	 that	 a	 subject	 may	 form	 a	 love-relation	 with	 someone	 they	understand	as	having	once	been	‘part	of’	themselves.	In	the	context	of	de-extinction	projects,	 then,	 this	would	open	up	 the	possibility	 that	humans	might	have	narcissistically	selected	animals	as	love-objects	as	a	means	of	repairing	some	kind	of	 fissure	or	 loss	 in	the	human	ego.	This	 idea	makes	more	sense	 in	 the	context	of	Freud’s	 later	work	when	he	came	 to	revisit	his	 thoughts	 on	 melancholia,	 rejecting	 his	 earlier	 claim	 that	 it	 was	 a	‘pathological’	 relation	 to	 loss	and	 instead	resituating	 the	 identification	of	ego	with	object	as	not	only	 ‘common	and	 typical’	but	also	as	essential	 to	the	formation	of	the	ego	in	the	first	place.		Rather,	he	explains,	the	process	is	a	‘frequent’	one	that	‘makes	it	possible	to	suppose	that	the	character	of	the	ego	is	a	precipitate	of	abandoned	object-cathexes	and	that	it	contains	the	 history	 of	 those	 object-choices’	 (Ego	 and	 the	 Id,	 p.18).	 In	 this	 way,	Freud	 suggests	 that	 the	 ego	 may	 in	 fact	 be	 built	 upon	 the	 lost	 objects	drawn	inside	it	as	the	result	of	melancholic	identification,	so	that,	in	Judith	Butler’s	words,	the	‘character’	of	the	ego	‘appears	to	be	the	sedimentation	of	 objects	 loved	 and	 lost,	 the	 archaeological	 reminder,	 as	 it	 were,	 of	unresolved	grief’	(Psychic	Life,	p.133).			 In	 the	 context	 of	 de-extinction	 then,	 the	 narcissistic	 choice	 of	animals	 as	 love-objects,	 and	 the	 resulting	 melancholic	 identification	 of	(human)	ego	with	(animal)	object,	gestures	toward	the	possibility	that	an	ejection	 of	 the	 animal	 from	 the	 human	 ego	 (so	 that	 animals	 are	missed	when	once	they	were	‘part	of’	that	ego)	might	be	understood	as	one	of	the	‘objects	 loved	 and	 lost’	 that	 serve	 to	 produce	 that	 same	 ego	 in	 the	 first	place;	that	is,	humans	narcissistically	attach	to	the	animal	object	because	it	is	understood	as	having	been	 taken	 from	them.	The	originary	 loss	of	 the	animal	 from	within	 the	human	ego	 can	be	attributed	 to	 the	 (in	 this	 case	
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psychological)	workings	 of	 human	 exceptionalism;	 a	 distinction	 is	made	between	 human	 and	 nonhuman	 animals	 (animals	 do	 not	 belong	 in	 the	human	ego),	 so	 that	 these	nonhuman	animals	 come	 to	be	understood	as	outside	 of	 and,	 in	 this	 context,	 lost	 from	 the	 human.	 In	 this	 sense	 then,	paying	 close	 attention	 to	 the	 configurations	 of	 attachment	 operative	within	 de-extinction	 projects	 allows	 human	 exceptionalism	 to	 be	understood	as	a	form	of	 loss	that	works	to	both	produce	and	impoverish	the	human	ego.	That	is,	the	lost	animal	object	can	be	comprehended	as	one	of	the	‘abandoned	object-cathexes’	upon	which	Freud	suggests	the	human	ego	 is	 constructed.	As	 such,	 this	 lost	 animal	object	 can	be	 theorised	as	 a	kind	of	residue	or	remainder	within	the	ego	that	makes	it	possible	for	the	human	subject	to	remember	the	animal	as	‘someone	who	was	once	part	of	himself’,	leading	to	a	narcissistic	attachment	that	seeks	to	recover	that	lost	‘part.’(On	Narcissism,	p,90)105			 In	 terms	 of	 the	 argument	 I	 am	 making	 here,	 that	 a	 melancholic	reading	of	de-extinction	projects	makes	visible	some	of	the	complex	ways	that	 humans	 and	 animals	 are	 psychically	 and	 materially	 entwined,	understanding	human	exceptionalism	as	entailing	ego	loss	not	only	works	to	show	how	humans	and	animals	are	entangled,	but	also	goes	further	in	suggesting	that	a	denial	of	this	entanglement	ignores	the	ways	that	the	ego	is	impoverished,	or	wounded,	without	these	relations.	Judith	Butler	speaks	to	 this	 impoverishment	of	 ego	when	arguing	 that	 the	 substitution	of	 ego	for	object	that	characterises	melancholia	‘does	not	quite	work’.	For	Butler,				 The	turn	from	the	object	to	the	ego	can	never	quite	be	accomplished;	it	 involves	 figuring	 the	 ego	 on	 the	model	 of	 the	 object	 […];	 it	 also	involves	 the	 unconscious	 belief	 that	 the	 ego	might	 compensate	 for	
																																																								105	Whilst	my	argument	here	focuses	on	thinking	through	human	exceptionalism	specifically	in	psychoanalytical	terms,	there	is	of	course	already	a	large	and	established	body	of	theoretical	work	that	traces	the	workings	of	this	concept	historically	and	culturally.	See	in	particular:	Matthew	Calarco:	Zoographies:	The	Question	of	the	Animal	from	Heidegger	to	Derrida;	Cary	Wolfe,	Animal	
Rites:	American	Culture,	the	Discourse	of	Species,	and	Posthumanist	Theory.	
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the	 loss	 that	 is	 suffered.	To	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 ego	 fails	 to	provide	such	 compensation,	 it	 exposes	 the	 faultlines	 in	 its	 own	 tenuous	foundations	(Psychic	Life,	p.169).		In	this	argument,	then,	the	melancholic	ego	identifies	with	the	object	that	has	been	 lost	 in	order	 to	make	up	 for	 that	 loss,	 to	be	a	 ‘substitute’	 for	 it.	What	Butler’s	work	holds	open	here	is	the	possibility	that	in	failing	to	do	this,	a	melancholic	response	to	loss	opens	up	the	ego	to	a	critical	gaze.	To	put	this	another	way,	in	exposing	the	‘faultlines’	in	the	foundations	of	the	ego,	melancholia	exposes	its	partiality;	that	is,	the	way	that	the	ego	cannot	exist	without	the	lost	objects	that	structure	and	produce	it.	In	the	case	of	de-extinction	 projects,	 this	would	mean	 calling	 attention	 to	 the	 fact	 that	humans	cannot	function	as	a	substitute	for	the	extinct	animals	that	inhabit	the	 place	 of	 the	 lost	 object	 in	 this	 melancholic	 relation,	 because	 human	exceptionalism	would	be	 revealed	as	one	of	 the	 ‘tenuous	 foundations’	 of	the	ego,	a	 faultline	characterised	by	 loss.	As	such,	 I	would	 like	 to	salvage	this	 idea	 of	 the	 ego	 as	 impoverished,	 or	 wounded,	 by	 losses	 that	 it	 is	unable	 to	compensate	 for.	This	notion	 is	ethically	productive	 in	 that	 it	 is	able	to	nurture	the	understanding	that,	as	I	have	argued	here,	humans	and	animals	are	implicated	in	one	another,	but	particularly	in	the	sense	that	it	suggests	 that	 different	 kinds	 of	 animal	 losses	 are	 not,	 as	 de-extinction	might	hope,	replaceable.				 Referring	 to	 the	 impoverishment	 of	 the	 ego	 in	 melancholia,	however,	once	more	recalls	the	‘critical	agency’	that	Freud	sees	at	work	in	this	process,	the	public	performance	of	self-beratement	that	identifies	the	melancholic	as	having	suffered	a	 loss	(or	 impoverishment)	of	ego,	rather	than	 of	 object.	 Freud	 explains	 that	 this	 critical	 agency	 is	 the	 conscious	representation	 of	 another	 of	 the	 preconditions	 for	 melancholia;	 the	
ambivalence	 that	 characterises	 the	 subject’s	 relation	 to	 the	 love	 object.	Butler	 suggests	 that	 the	 ambivalence	 present	 in	 melancholia	 (and	 the	critical	 agency	or	 self-beratement	 that	makes	 this	 visible)	 is	 caused,	 as	 I	
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have	 discussed,	 by	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 ego	 to	 compensate	 for	 loss	 by	successfully	 identifying	 with	 and	 replacing	 the	 lost	 object.	 As	 such,	ambivalence	 in	 the	 melancholic	 relation	 proceeds	 from	 the	impoverishment	of	ego	that	results	when	it	 fails	to	substitute	for	the	lost	object	 ‘in	 a	 way	 that	 satisfies	 (that	 is,	 to	 overcome	 its	 status	 as	 a	substitution)’	(Psychic	Life,	p.169).	Crucially,	however,	Freud	explains	that	the	nature	of	 this	ambivalent	relation	 is	repressed,	so	 that	 ‘everything	to	do	 with	 these	 struggles	 due	 to	 ambivalence	 remains	 withdrawn	 from	consciousness’	(Mourning	and	Melancholia,	p.257).	Therefore,	the	action	of	the	 critical	 agency	 (self-reproaches	 and	 self-beratement)	 is	 simply	 the	conscious,	 or	 observable	manifestation	 of	 the	 ambivalence	 of	 the	 object-relation,	the	particulars	of	which	are	in	fact	hidden	from	the	subject.	This	means	 that	 the	 ‘true’	 aspect	 of	 ambivalence,	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 ego	 to	substitute	for	the	lost	object	and	the	impoverishment,	or	wounding,	of	ego	that	 this	 causes,	 is	 not	 available	 to	 consciousness.	 As	 such,	 the	 (human)	subject	is	unable	to	understand	the	structural	and	affective	importance	of	the	ego’s	relation	to	lost	(animal)	love	objects,	and	the	potential	that	I	have	argued	such	an	understanding	holds	for	the	refiguring	of	ethical	relations	cannot	be	put	to	work.		 In	light	of	this,	I	want	to	turn	once	more	to	de-extinction	projects	to	examine	 how	 ambivalence	 works	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 melancholic	attachment	 to	 lost	 species	 that	 this	 chapter	 has	 argued	 such	 projects	demonstrate.			
IV.	 Ambivalence		 I	 began	 this	 chapter	 by	 noting,	 following	 Stephen	 Frosh,	 that	 a	Freudian	psychoanalytic	reading	of	a	cultural	formation	like	de-extinction	projects	must	necessarily	always	be	partial.	Up	to	this	point,	I	have	tried	to	track	 the	 patterns	 of	 desire	 and	 attachment	 in	 these	 projects	 and	 have	argued	 that	 these	 inhabit	 a	 radical	 potential	 for	 acknowledging	 and	rethinking	 human	 and	 animal	 entanglement	 against	 human	
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exceptionalism.	However,	such	a	psychoanalytic	reading	necessarily	traces	unconscious	patterns	of	desire,	and	although	I	have	argued	that	these	are	ethically	 productive,	 they	 are	 not	 visible	 in	 the	material	 practices	 of	 de-extinction	 projects,	 which	 have	 been	 and	 will	 certainly	 be	 the	 cause	 of	much	 animal	 suffering	 in	 addition	 to	 other	 effects,	 both	 known	 and	unknown.	 In	 this	 sense	 then,	 the	 ethically	 valuable	 ‘continuous	engagement	with	loss’	that	Eng	and	Kazanjian	see	in	melancholia,	and	the	‘critique	of	the	status	quo’	that	Khanna	attributes	to	its	critical	agency,	are	not	 observable	 in	 de-extinction’s	 melancholic	 relation	 to	 lost	 species.	 It	would	seem,	then,	that	it	matters	deeply	how	this	continuous	engagement	plays	out,	and	as	such	a	melancholic	reading	should	always	be	attentive	to	the	specificity	of	the	kinds	of	loss	it	seeks	to	uncover	and	trace.	As	such,	I	want	 to	 briefly	 examine	 some	 of	 the	 material	 effects	 that	 de-extinction	projects	might	have	for	the	animals	involved.		 As	I	have	explained,	the	reality	of	the	ambivalent	relation,	which	in	the	 case	 of	 de-extinction	 projects	 would	 be	 the	 failure	 of	 humans	 to	substitute	 for	 lost	 animal	 species,	 is	 not	 available	 to	 consciousness,	 and	instead	 is	 expressed	 through	 the	 self-berating	 activity	 of	 the	 critical	agency.	As	this	chapter	has	shown,	this	critical	agency	can	be	observed	at	work	 in	 de-extinction	 discourse	 in	 the	 way	 that	 its	 proponents	 situate	humanity	as	morally	responsible	 for	 the	resurrection	of	 lost	species.	The	effect	 of	 this	 ambivalence	 then,	 as	 it	 is	 manifested	 consciously,	 is	 not	 a	reflection	 on	 the	 generality	 of	 human-animal	 dependency,	 but	 instead	 a	targeted	 selection	 of	 certain	 animals	 that	 are	 seen	 as	 more	 morally	deserving	of	human	attention	in	this	context.	The	effect	of	this	is	that	these	animals	(so-called	‘candidates’	for	de-extinction)	are	prioritised	over	other	animal	 bodies;	 Thom	 van	Dooren	 refers	 to	 such	 practices	 as	 ‘regimes	 of	violent	care’,	which	he	defines	as	occurring	when	‘intimate	care	for	some	[…]	 bodies,	 some	 species,	 sits	 alongside	 the	 domination,	 coercion	 and	abandonment	of	others’	(Flight	Ways,	p.92).	Just	one	example	of	this	as	it	occurs	 in	 de-extinction	 projects	 are	 the	 surrogate	 mothers	 that	 will	 be	forcibly	 impregnated	 with	 cloned	 embryos;	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Pyrenean	
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ibex	these	were	the	44	hybrid	goats	that	played	host	to	Celia’s	cloned	DNA.	Recall,	 only	 seven	 of	 these	 became	 pregnant,	 and	 the	 one	 mother	 who	carried	 to	 term	 lost	 her	 baby	 within	 minutes	 of	 its	 birth.	 As	 such	 it	 is	important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 melancholic	 attachments	 at	 work	 in	 de-extinction	 projects	 function	 only	 with	 regard	 to	 specific	 kinds	 of	nonhuman	 animals.	 Ian	 Lowe,	 the	 President	 of	 the	 Australian	Conservation	 Foundation,	 has	 described	 them	 succinctly	 as	 ‘special	animals’.	Lowe	is	referring	here	to	their	value	in	terms	of	biodiversity,	but	the	 selection	 of	 de-extinction	 candidates	 is	 evidently	 influenced	 by	 the	established	 preference	 for	 ‘specialness’	 that	 similarly	 skews	 both	environmental	and	public	 interest	 toward	the	kinds	of	animals	 that	have	come	 to	 be	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘charismatic	 megafauna’.	 In	 this	 sense,	 it	 is	apparent	 that	 the	 ‘critical	 agency’	 at	 work	 in	 de-extinction	 projects	functions	 partially;	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 it	 is	 ignorant	 of	 the	 connection	 to	 and	dependence	 on	 all	 animals	 that	 the	 unconscious	 workings	 of	 the	ambivalent	 relation	make	 visible	 in	 the	 human	 ego.	 Furthermore,	whilst	extinct	animals	are	the	focus	of	these	projects	and	also	my	interest	here,	it	is	 crucial	 to	 remember	 also	 that	 other	 kinds	 of	 animal	 deaths	 are	legitimised	by	means	of	a	continual	reinforcement	of	their	separation	from	the	human	to	the	point	that	not	only	the	animals	themselves,	but	also	their	deaths,	become	consumable	in	different	ways.	Therefore	it	is	clear	that	the	pattern	and	direction	of	narcissistic	 attachment	 in	de-extinction	projects	(and	 human-animal	 relations	more	 generally)	 is	 selective	 and	 limited	 to	certain	kinds	of	animals	for	reasons	that	are	beyond	this	discussion.			 Finally,	 another	 important	 material	 effect	 of	 de-extinction	 on	 the	lives	 of	 the	 animals	 it	 involves	would	 be	 the	 captive	 rearing	 that	would	become	 necessary	 if	 de-extinction	 succeeded	 and	 young	 animals	 were	born.	Raising	animals	in	captivity	brings	with	it	a	number	of	practical	and	ethical	problems,	as	is	demonstrated	by	this	same	practice	as	it	currently	exists	in	a	zoo	or	conservation	setting.	Shapiro	explains	that	some	species	‘suffer	 terribly’	 in	 captivity	 –	 ‘they	 have	 shorter	 life	 expectancy,	 rarely	reproduce,	 and	 even	 develop	 psychological	 disorders’,	 and	 de-extinct	
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animals	would	face	the	added	challenge	of	being	reared	amongst	a	social	group	 that	 would	 necessarily	 be	 that	 of	 a	 different	 (if	 closely	 related)	species	(Mammoth,	p.169).	In	this	scenario,	 it	would	also	be	necessary	to	negotiate	parent-child	relationships,	particularly	in	relation	to	imprinting;	van	Dooren	 explains	 that,	 for	 example,	 some	birds	 raised	 in	 captivity	 by	“parents”	 of	 another	 species	 ‘tend	 to	 preferentially	 associate	 with	individuals	 of	 these	 kinds,	 individuals	 that	 look	 and	 sound	 like	 their	“parents”’(Flight	 Ways,	 p.95).	 Whatever	 else,	 it	 is	 certain	 that	 these	animals	would	be	subjected	to	what	Matthew	Chrulew	calls	an	 ‘intensive	anatomo-politics	of	the	animal	body’,	involving	‘regular	testing,	extraction	of	 fluids,	 transportation,	 enforced	 tranquilisation,	 separation	 and	recombination	 of	 social	 groups,	 imposed	 breeding	 and	 the	 removal	 of	offspring.’106	In	this	sense,	Chrulew	argues,	these	animals	would	not	have	‘full’	or	‘flourishing’	lives,	but	instead	would	live	a	‘wounded	life,	robbed	of	vital	connectivities	and	expressions’	(Life	and	Death	at	the	Zoo,	p.139).107			 Rather	than	a	defence	of	the	material	practices	of	de-extinction	as	necessary	or	ethical,	then,	this	chapter	has	been	an	attempt	to	show	how	a	psychoanalytic	 reading	 of	 these	 projects	 might	 illuminate	 the	 radical	potential	 they	 exhibit	 to	 rethink	 cross-species	 relationships,	 a	 latent	possibility	 that	 exceeds	 and	 undercuts	 what	 would	 appear	 to	 be	 their	more	conservative,	nostalgic	agenda.	Further,	it	has	been	an	effort	to	make	conscious	 the	 workings	 of	 ambivalence	 that	 structure	 melancholia	 and	point	to	the	ego’s	partiality;	that	is,	the	fact	that	it	exists	because	of	the	lost	objects	that	structure	and	produce	it,	not	in	spite	of	these.	I	believe	that	in	the	 context	 of	 human-animal	 relations	 making	 visible	 the	 ambivalence	present	in	the	object	relation	between	proponents	of	de-extinction	and	the	lost	animals	they	wish	to	resurrect	 is	an	important	and	necessary	ethical	
																																																								106	‘AHR	50	(May	2011):	Matthew	Chrulew:	Managing	Love	and	Death	at	the	Zoo:	The	Biopolitics	of	Endangered	Species	Preservation’,	p.	148		[accessed	30	October	2016].	107	Chrulew	makes	this	argument	about	contemporary	breeding	programs	at	the	zoo,	not	specifically	in	relation	to	de-extinction,	but	the	intervention	into	animal	life	would	be	the	same	in	both	contexts.		
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project,	 one	 this	 chapter	 has	 sought	 to	 enact.	 Further,	 bringing	 these	processes	 into	 consciousness	 challenges	 human	 exceptionalism	 by	demonstrating	 how	 de-extinction	 projects	 are	 always	 already	psychologically	invested	in	human	and	animal	entanglement.	Rather	than	suggesting	 that	 this	 justifies	 the	 activities	 of	 de-extinction	 projects,	however,	 I	 would	 instead	 argue	 that	 the	 insight	 into	 human-animal	dependency	 that	 has	 been	 sketched	 out	 here	 should	 invite	 reflection	 on	the	 importance	 of	 all	 animal	 beings	 to	 human	 life,	 as	well	 as	 prompting	enquiry	into	the	kinds	of	desires	or	investments	animals	might	have	in	this	relationship.	That	is	to	say,	we	might	consider	our	connection	not	only	to	animals	that	have	become	extinct	because	of	human	activity,	or	those	that	are	currently	endangered	for	the	same	reason,	but	also	to	all	those	animals	currently	subject	to	varying	degrees	of	violence	at	the	hands	of	humans,	so	that	we	might	consider,	 in	Robert	McKay’s	words,	how	to	 ‘live	well’	with	them.108		 	
																																																								108	Robert	McKay,	‘More-than-Human	Life	Well-Lived?’,	Sheffield	Animals	Research	Colloquium,	2015.	
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Chapter	Three	
	
‘Futurity’s	Unquestioned	Value’:	Precarious	
Subjects	in	The	Hunter	and	A	Child’s	Book	of	True	
Crime	
	
	
	
Introduction			 On	 April	 16th,	 2014,	 the	 Daily	 Mirror	 ran	 a	 front-page	 story	highlighting	 the	sharp	 increase	 in	 food	bank	use	 throughout	 the	UK.	The	headline	read,	‘Britain,	2014.	We’re	the	sixth	largest	economy	in	the	world.	We	have	more	millionaires	than	ever	before…	So	why	have	we	handed	out	ONE	MILLION	food	parcels?’	In	smaller	type	the	paper	added	‘new	figures	reveal	 330,	 000	 went	 to	 hungry	 children.’	 A	 full-page	 photograph	 of	 a	young	white	child	illustrated	the	story;	her	eyes	are	full	of	tears	and	a	trail	of	snot	runs	from	her	nose.	She	appears	to	be	in	great	distress.	109		 This	photograph	became	 the	 subject	of	 great	 controversy	when	 it	was	 revealed	 by	 a	 blogger	 to	 be	 a	 stock	 image	 purchased	 by	 the	Mirror	from	 the	 Getty	 Images	 photo	 agency.110	It	 had	 in	 fact	 been	 taken	 in	 San	Francisco	 in	 2009,	 and	 uploaded	 to	 the	 photo	 sharing	website	 Flickr	 by	photographer	Lauren	Rosenbaum,	the	mother	of	the	child	in	question.	She	explains	on	her	Flickr	page	that	her	daughter’s	tears	were	actually	caused	by	 the	 loss	 of	 an	 earthworm,	 named	 Flower,	 whom	 she	 had	 befriended	whilst	 playing	 in	 the	 park	 (Brown,	Guardian).	 This	 revelation	 sparked	 a	far-ranging	debate	about	media	ethics	and	authenticity.	‘Imagine	the	stink																																																									109	‘AHR	50	(May	2011):	Matthew	Chrulew:	Managing	Love	and	Death	at	the	Zoo:	The	Biopolitics	of	Endangered	Species	Preservation’,	p.	148		[accessed	30	October	2016].	110	Roy	Greenslade,	‘Daily	Mirror’s	“Crying	Girl”	Picture	Lands	the	Paper	in	an	Ethical	Row’,	The	
Guardian,	16	April	2014,	section	Media		[accessed	25	September	2017].	
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if	we’d	used	a	pic	of	an	actual	child	who	had	received	food	parcels’	was	the	response	 from	 the	 Daily	 Mirror’s	 editor,	 Lloyd	 Embley	 (Greenslade,	
Guardian).	 Jane	 Merrick,	 writing	 for	 the	 Independent,	 also	 defended	 the	
Mirror,	claiming	‘it	was	absolutely	right	to	jar	its	readers	into	noticing	this	shocking	 statistic	 by	 using	 a	 highly	 emotive	 picture	 of	 a	 crying	 child.’111	Merrick’s	point	–	 that	 the	capacity	of	 the	photograph	 to	emotionally	 ‘jar’	readers	was	a	valuable	means	of	encouraging	them	to	care	about	the	rise	in	 juvenile	 food	 bank	 use	 –	 was	 addressed	 in	 the	 Guardian	 by	 the	columnist	Andrew	Brown,	who	pointed	out	that	images	like	the	one	on	the	
Mirror’s	front	 cover	 serve	a	particular	purpose	and	have	done	 for	a	 long	time.	 ‘The	 great	 innovation	 of	 universalist	 religions,	 starting	 with	Christianity,’	he	wrote,	 ‘is	the	idea	that	it	doesn't	actually	matter	who	the	child	is,	or	where	it	is	crying.	We	have	an	immediate	duty	of	compassion’	(Brown,	Guardian).	Brown’s	words	here	 focus	attention	on	the	ways	that	such	affecting	child-images	can	be	(and	indeed	are)	used	as	shorthand	for	particular	moral	 narratives	 of	 care,	 vulnerability,	 neglect	 or	 violence.	 As	such,	they	wield	great	symbolic	power.			 Lee	Edelman	makes	the	power	of	such	child-oriented	symbolism	the	focus	of	his	2004	polemic,	No	Future,	in	which	he	advocates	a	queerness	that	 would	 refuse	 to	 engage	 with	 the	 futurity	 it	 is	 seen	 to	 threaten.	 He	focuses	 on	 this	 idea	 through	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 capital-C	 ‘Child’,	 an	emblematic	conception	that	he	makes	clear	is	‘not	to	be	confused	with	the	lived	experience	of	any	historical	children.’112	His	interest	lies,	specifically,	in	 the	 ways	 this	 figure	 becomes	 enmeshed	 with	 political	 life	 so	 that	 it	comes	 to	 be	 imagined	 as	 ‘the	 fantasmic	 beneficiary	 of	 every	 political	intervention’	 (Edelman,	 p.	 2).	 As	 such,	 the	Child	 serves	 as	 the	 symbol	 of	society’s	 collective	and	aspirational	 future,	 the	emblem	of	what	Edelman	calls	‘futurity’s	unquestioned	value’	(p.4).	He	argues:																																																									111	Jane	Merrick,	‘How	to	Picture	Child	Poverty:	The	Mirror	May	Have	Used	a	Stock	Photo’,	The	
Independent,	2014		[accessed	25	September	2017].	112	Lee	Edelman,	No	Future :	Queer	Theory	and	the	Death	Drive	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2004),	p.	11.	
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	 Historically	 constructed	 […]	 to	 serve	 as	 the	 repository	 of	 variously	sentimentalized	 cultural	 identifications,	 the	 Child	 has	 come	 to	embody	 for	us	 the	 telos	of	 the	social	order	and	come	 to	be	seen	as	the	one	for	whom	that	order	is	held	in	perpetual	trust	(p.11).		Edelman	is	at	pains	to	make	clear	the	absolute	indispensability	not	only	of	the	Child	to	visions	of	the	political	future,	but	also	visions	of	the	future	to	the	political.	As	he	sees	 it,	 the	two	are	 irrevocably	 linked,	so	that	 ‘we	are	no	more	able	to	conceive	of	a	politics	without	a	fantasy	of	the	future	than	we	are	able	to	conceive	of	a	future	without	the	figure	of	the	Child’	(p.11).	But	 what	 if	 the	 inability	 to	 conceive	 of	 a	 vision	 of	 the	 future	 became	 a	genuine	 possibility?	 What	 would	 that	 mean,	 not	 only	 for	 the	 political	imaginary,	but	also	for	the	symbolic	power	of	the	Child	figure?		 We	are	currently	 living	through	a	mass	extinction	event,	the	largest	since	 an	 asteroid	 impact	 wiped	 out	 the	 dinosaurs	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	Cretaceous	 period	 sixty-six	 million	 years	 ago.	 This	 crisis,	 sometimes	referred	to	as	the	‘sixth	extinction’,	has	seen	species	going	extinct	in	record	numbers	and	is	commonly	understood	as	being	caused	by	anthropogenic	activity. 113 	Clare	 Colebrook	 has	 suggested	 that	 one	 of	 the	 particular	challenges	for	the	human	species	in	this	new	age	of	extinction	is	that	‘“we”	are	 finally	 sensing	 both	 our	 finitude	 as	 a	 world-forming	 and	 world-destroying	species.’114	For	Colebrook,	the	mass	 loss	of	nonhuman	life	that	characterises	the	sixth	extinction	effects	a	kind	of	epistemological	rupture	in	humanist	narratives	of	progress	by	calling	attention	to	the	fact	that	the	human	 species	 ultimately	 faces	 a	 similar	 fate.	 As	 such,	 she	 argues,	 ‘one	would	not	assume	 the	 future	would	only	need	 to	be	altered	 in	degree	 in	
																																																								113	For	a	detailed	and	interdisciplinary	account	of	the	sixth	extinction	and	what	it	means	for	particular	species,	see	Elizabeth	Kolbert,	The	Sixth	Extinction:	An	Unnatural	History	(London:	Bloomsbury,	2014).	114	Claire	Colebrook,	Death	of	the	PostHuman:	Essays	on	Extinction.	Vol.	1:	...,	Critical	Climate	Change	(London:	Open	Humanities	Press,	2014),	p.	32.	
	 109	
order	for	life	to	continue:	one	would	ask	whether	the	future	would	be	one	of	life’	(Colebrook,	p.	57).	It	is	easy	to	read	Edelman’s	work	with	extinction	in	mind	and	note	the	problem	it	would	pose	to	the	political	as	he	imagines	it.		 Whatever	 refuses	 the	 mandate	 by	 which	 our	 political	 institutions	compel	 the	 collective	 reproduction	 of	 the	 child	 must	 appear	 as	 a	threat	not	only	 to	 the	organization	of	 a	 given	 social	 order	but	 also,	and	 far	 more	 ominously,	 to	 social	 order	 as	 such,	 insofar	 as	 it	threatens	a	 logic	of	 futurism	on	which	meaning	always	depends	(p.	11).		This	 chapter,	 then,	 will	 explore	 the	 relationship	 between	 extinction,	futurity,	and	the	Child	that	I	have	briefly	sketched	here.	In	order	to	think	through	these	connections	I	bring	work	on	queer	negativity	that	positions	the	 queer	 subject	 in	 an	 antagonistic	 relation	 to	 the	 future	 into	conversation	 with	 two	 novels	 that	 engage	 with	 the	 current	 extinction	crisis	 that	 I	 have	 suggested	 also	 poses	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 future	 imaginary.	Specifically,	I	am	interested	in	tracking	the	ways	that	the	symbolic	 ‘Child’	figure	Edelman	diagnoses	 as	 animating	political	 and	 cultural	 discussions	about	the	future	is	also	deployed	in	representations	of	extinction.	I	explore	how	 these	 insights	 from	 queer	 theory	 make	 it	 possible	 to	 read	 these	fictional	 texts	 as	 similarly	 reluctant	 to	 engage	 with	 futurity,	 with	 these	anxieties	played	out	through	an	engagement	with	precarious	subjects	like	the	child.			 This	enquiry	will	focus	on	Chloe	Hooper’s	2002	novel	A	Child’s	Book	
of	 True	 Crime,	 and	 Julia	 Leigh’s	 The	 Hunter,	 published	 in	 2000.	 Both	fictional	texts	are	set	in	Tasmania	and	have	questions	of	extinction	at	their	heart.	 Hooper’s	 novel	 is	 narrated	 by	 Kate	 Byrne,	 a	 twenty-two	 year	 old	school	 teacher	who	 lives	and	works	 in	 the	 fictional	 town	of	Endport	and	becomes	 fascinated	by	 the	events	 surrounding	a	young	woman	 from	 the	town’s	 murder	 some	 years	 previously.	 Kate	 decides	 to	 write	 down	 the	
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events	of	the	murder	in	a	format	suitable	for	the	children	in	her	class,	and	her	 children’s	 detective	 story	 weaves	 through	 the	 novel,	 narrated	 by	 a	‘bush	gang’	made	up	of	various	extinct	and	endangered	Australian	animals.	Leigh’s	novel	The	Hunter	 focuses	on	the	actions	of	 its	protagonist,	known	only	 as	 ‘M’,	 who	 is	 employed	 by	 an	 unnamed	 biotech	 company	 to	investigate	 a	 reported	 sighting	 of	 the	 last	 ever	 thylacine	 (also	 known	 as	the	 ‘Tasmanian	 tiger’),	 a	 dog-like	marsupial	 officially	 declared	 extinct	 in	Tasmania	in	1986.	M’s	task	is	to	kill	the	animal	and	then	harvest	its	organs	and	DNA,	but	his	assignment	is	made	more	complicated	when	he	becomes	involved	in	the	lives	of	the	family	paid	to	be	his	hosts.			 In	 both	 texts	 anxieties	 about	 nonhuman	 extinction	 are	 played	 out	within	 narratives	 that	 explore	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 human	 children.	 As	such,	 both	 novels	 allow	 an	 insight	 into	 the	 ways	 that	 the	 ‘Child’	 figure	Edelman	 describes	 inhabits	 and	 shapes	 cultural	 (as	 well	 as	 political)	responses	 to	 our	 current	 planetary	 extinction	 crisis.	 This	 connection	 is	evident	 on	 a	 structural	 level	 in	 that	 both	 texts	 frustrate	 expectations	 of	conventional	 narrative	 ‘progress’	 because	 they	 are	 troubled	 by	 and	reluctant	 to	 engage	 with	 futurity	 in	 just	 the	 way	 Edelman	 suggests	queerness	 might	 be.	 In	 this	 sense,	 they	 maintain	 a	 melancholic	 relation	against	 the	 future,	 with	 their	 investment	 in	 ‘backwards	 feelings’	 also	drawing	 attention	 to	 the	ways	 that	 representations	of	 both	 children	 and	extinct/endangered	 animals	 are	 wrapped	 up	 in	 questions	 of	 national	identity	and	the	national	past.115				
I. Queer	negativity:	feeling	backwards	
		 In	 2005,	 the	MLA	Annual	 Convention	 in	Washington	DC	 hosted	 a	panel	called	 ‘The	Antisocial	Thesis	 in	Queer	Theory.’	Panel	members	Tim	Dean,	 Lee	 Edelman,	 Judith	 Halberstam,	 and	 José	 Muñoz	 joined	 the																																																									115	Heather	Love,	Feeling	Backward :	Loss	and	the	Politics	of	Queer	History,	1st	Harvard	University	Press	pbk.	ed.	(Cambridge,	Mass. ;	London:	Harvard	University	Press,	2007).	
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organiser,	Robert	L.	Caserio,	in	locating	the	origins	of	this	‘antisocial	thesis’	in	 Leo	 Bersani’s	 1995	 work,	 Homos.116	Here,	 Caserio	 explains,	 Bersani	questions	the	 ‘compatability	of	homosexuality	with	civic	service’,	arguing	that	 homosexual	 opposition	 to	 certain	 kinds	 of	 community	 is	 in	 fact	politically	 valuable.	 Caserio	 claims	 that	 in	 asking	 the	question	 ‘“should	 a	homosexual	be	a	good	citizen?”’	Bersani	‘inspired	a	decade	of	questions	of	queer	 unbelonging’	 (Caserio,	 p.	 819).	 Following	 Bersani,	 queer	 theorists	who	endorse	the	antisocial	thesis	are	interested	in	effecting	a	shift	 in	the	ways	 that	 the	 social	 is	 thought,	 so	 that	 the	 emphasis	moves	 away	 from	what	 Judith	 Halberstam	 calls	 ‘projects	 of	 redemption,	 reconstruction,	restoration,	 and	 reclamation’	 toward	 ways	 of	 being	 in	 the	 world	 that	embrace	negativity	(Caserio,	p.823).	They	see	the	workings	of	this	 ‘queer	negativity’	as	a	reaction	against	and	alternative	to	the	emphasis	in	liberal	gay	 politics	 on	 the	 extension	 of	 certain	 rights	 (marriage,	 parenthood)	 to	gay	citizens.	117				 For	 Heather	 Love,	 such	 efforts	 to	make	 gay	 citizens	more	 legally	visible	 are	 particularly	 problematic	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 ‘threaten	 to	obscure	 the	 continuing	 denigration	 and	 dismissal	 of	 queer	 existence’	(Feeling	 Backward,	 p.10)	 In	 Feeling	 Backward	 she	 addresses	 what	 she	understands	to	be	a	similar	conflict	at	the	heart	of	queer	studies	between	the	 affirmation	 of	 gay	 and	 lesbian	 experience	 and	 an	 emphasis	 on	remembering	 histories	 of	 queer	 suffering	 (Love,	 pp.1-3).	 Attempts	 to	rehabilitate	 these	 histories	 of	 damage	 and	 violence	 in	 order	 that	 they	might	 be	 used	 for	 ‘positive	 political	 purposes’	 leave	 her	 concerned	 that	‘queer	 studies,	 in	 its	 haste	 to	 refunction	 such	 experiences,	 may	 not	 be	adequately	 reckoning	 with	 their	 powerful	 legacies’	 (p.	 19).	 In	 this	 way,	Love	suggests	contemporary	queer	subjects	can	be	understood	as	facing	a	choice	 between	 engagement	with	 the	 past	 and	 affirmation	 of	 the	 future	that	 finds	 them	 ‘“looking	 forward”	while	 […]	 “feeling	backward”’	 (p.	 27).																																																									116	Robert	L.	Caserio	and	others,	‘The	Antisocial	Thesis	in	Queer	Theory’,	PMLA,	121.3	(2006),	819–28.	117	See	Caserio	and	others,	p.	819;	Edelman,	p.	19.	
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‘Rather	than	disavowing	the	history	of	marginalization	and	abjection’	she	writes,	 ‘I	 suggest	 that	we	 embrace	 it,	 exploring	 the	ways	 it	 continues	 to	structure	 queer	 experience	 in	 the	 present’	 (p.	 29).	 For	 Love,	 this	means	engaging	with	 and	 leaning	 into	 these	 ‘backwards	 feelings’	 a	move	which	simultaneously	reckons	with	the	ways	that	queerness	has	historically	been	perniciously	associated	with	a	kind	of	‘backwardness’.			 Whether	 understood	 as	 throwbacks	 to	 an	 earlier	 stage	 of	 human	development	or	as	children	who	refuse	to	grow	up,	queers	have	been	seen	 across	 the	 twentieth	 century	 as	 a	 backward	 race.	 Perverse,	immature,	 sterile,	 and	 melancholic:	 even	 when	 they	 provoke	 fears	about	the	future,	they	somehow	also	recall	the	past	(Love,	p.	6).		In	 this	 sense,	 then,	 Love’s	 proposal	 that	 queer	 studies	 (as	well	 as	 queer	subjects)	lean	into	and	engage	with	‘backwardness’	is	also	an	invitation	to	inhabit	 a	 position	 that	 has	 been	 identified	 with	 queerness	 in	 negative	terms.	As	such,	her	work	shares	similarities	with	Edelman’s.	He	also	sees	the	 self-identification	 of	 queers	 with	 negativity	 as	 a	 way	 to	 redress	 the	workings	of	a	liberal	politics	that	seeks	to	rehabilitate	queerness	from	this	association	 (No	Future,	p.	 3).	 	 Both	 Edelman	 and	 Love	 point	 out	 that	 at	bottom,	a	desire	to	refute	or	move	beyond	this	identification	simply	means	‘shifting	the	figural	burden	of	queerness	to	someone	else’	(Edelman,	p.27).	For	Love,	this	means	that	‘one	may	enter	the	mainstream	on	the	condition	that	one	breaks	ties	with	all	those	who	cannot	make	it’	(p.	10).	Those	left	behind	 by	 promises	 of	 liberal	 inclusion	 include	 ‘the	 non-white	 and	nonmonogamous,	 the	 poor	 and	 the	 genderdeviant,	 the	 fat,	 the	 disabled,	the	unemployed,	the	infected,	and	a	host	of	unmentionable	others’(p.	10).	Edelman	 makes	 this	 point	 in	 slightly	 different	 terms	 by	 arguing	 that	queerness	inhabits	a	structural	position	of	social	negativity	that	is	vital	to	a	political	project	of	imagining	the	future;	that	is,	it	takes	the	place	of	the	death	drive	(non-reproductivity)	that	 is	always	opposed	to	a	Child	 figure	that	 guarantees	 the	 future.	 As	 such,	 a	 negatively	 figured	 queerness,	imagined	 as	 posing	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 Child,	 is	 in	 fact	 the	 very	 condition	 of	
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possibility	 for	 this	 figure’s	 emergence.	 As	 Edelman	 makes	 clear,	 the	supposed	danger	posed	 to	 this	Child	by	queerness	 legitimates	 a	political	realm	 that	 restricts	 the	 freedoms	 of	 othered	 subjects	 in	 the	 name	 of	safeguarding	this	Child’s	imaginary	future:		We	encounter	this	 image	on	every	side	as	the	lives,	the	speech,	and	the	freedoms	of	adults	face	constant	threat	of	legal	curtailment	out	of	deference	 to	 imaginary	 Children	 whose	 futures,	 as	 if	 they	 were	permitted	 to	 have	 them	 except	 as	 they	 consist	 in	 the	 prospect	 of	passing	 them	 on	 to	 Children	 of	 their	 own,	 are	 construed	 as	endangered	by	the	social	disease	as	which	queer	sexualities	register	(p.	19)		As	 such,	 Edelman	 argues,	 the	 fact	 that	 political	 visions	 of	 the	 future	 are	organised	 around	 these	 imaginary	 Children	 and	 their	 imaginary	 futures	means	that	the	‘absolute	privilege	of	heteronormativity’	is	preserved	at	all	times.	 He	 names	 this	 political	 and	 cultural	 formation	 ‘reproductive	futurism’	(p.2).	Queer	negativity,	then,	would	name	the	‘unthinkable’	space	inhabited	by	 those	not	 ‘“fighting	 for	 the	 children”’,	 those	who	 refuse	 the	logic	 of	 reproductive	 futurism	 by	 refusing	 to	 adhere	 to	 the	 logic	 that	privileges	the	emblematic	Child	over	real	beings	(pg.3).	For	Edelman	this	means	an	emphatic	turn	away	from	the	future	in	an	embrace	of	negativity	that	 refuses	 to	 organise	 itself	 around	 principles	 of	 hope	 or	 redemption,	seeing	 these	 things	 as	 simply	 too	 aligned	 with	 the	 political	 project	 of	reproductive	futurism	to	be	rehabilitated	for	a	more	radical	project.	Or,	as	Edelman	 puts	 it,	 ‘the	 future	 is	 mere	 repetition	 and	 just	 as	 lethal	 as	 the	past.’	 ‘What	is	queerest	about	us,’	he	writes,	 ‘and	queerest	within	us,	and	queerest	 despite	 us	 is	 this	 willingness	 to	 insist	 intransitively	 –	 to	 insist	that	the	future	stop	here’	(p.	31).		 Edelman’s	 project	 has	 been	 one	 of	 the	most	 influential	 to	 engage	with	 the	 ‘antisocial	 thesis.’	 As	 Caserio	 acknowledged	 in	 the	 published	conference	debates	that	followed	the	2005	MLA	panel,	 there	was	a	sense	
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in	 which	 the	 contributors	 overidentified	 the	 antisocial	 thesis	 with	Edelman’s	 work.	 Despite	 some	 panelists	 arguing	 against	 the	 project	 of	queer	negativity	as	proposed	in	No	Future,	Caserio	noted	that	it	was	hard	for	them	to	 ‘fully	escape	Edelman’s	force’	(Caserio,	p.	820).	The	power	of	Edelman’s	 polemic	 is	 such	 that	 contemporary	work	 on	 queer	 negativity	often	follows	him	in	situating	the	importance	of	such	a	project	in	relation	to	 the	 concepts	 of	 reproductivity	 and	 childhood	 that	 he	 deploys	 so	forcefully.	 Sara	 Ahmed,	 for	 example,	 has	 recently	 argued	 for	 the	recognition	of	‘queer	pessimism’	as	a	significant	affect,	one	that	‘refuses	to	organize	 its	 hope	 for	 happiness	 around	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 child	 or	 other	tropes	 for	 reproductivity’	 (Promise	of	Happiness,	p.162).	 Similarly,	 Judith	Halberstam’s	latest	project	The	Queer	Art	of	Failure	thinks	through	some	of	the	ways	that	queerness	has	been	aligned	with	failure	due	to	the	fact	that	‘success	 in	 a	 heteronormative,	 capitalist	 society	 equates	 too	 easily	 to	specific	 forms	 of	 reproductive	 maturity	 combined	 with	 wealth	accumulation.’118 	Heather	 Love,	 however,	 differentiates	 her	 project	 of	imagining	 a	 ‘backward	 future’	 from	 Edelman’s.	 Where	 he	 insists	 on	 the	absolute	 suspension	 of	 the	 future	 and	 future	 imaginaries,	 Love	 sees	 the	turn	 away	 from	 the	 future	 in	 her	 work	 as	 simply	 a	 side-effect	 of	 its	prioritisation	of	backwardness	(p.	147)	As	such,	it	is	the	gesture	of	feeling	backwards	 that	 defines	 her	 contribution	 to	 theories	 of	 queer	 negativity,	rather	than	that	of	refusing	the	future.	In	the	sense	that	Love’s	work	insists	on	 the	 importance	 of	 maintaining	 an	 attachment	 to	 a	 past	 that	 others	would	seek	to	move	beyond,	then,	it	engages	with	melancholia,	which	she	understands	 to	 be	 a	 particularly	 queer	 form	of	 affect.	 This	 is	 not,	 as	 she	makes	 clear,	 because	 she	 imagines	 homosexuality	 and	 melancholia	 to	share	some	kind	of	naturalised	relation,	but	 is	rather	due	to	the	fact	that	she	 sees	 this	 link	 as	 being	 undeniably	 present	 in	 queer	 culture	 and	therefore	deserving	of	critical	attention	(p.	20).		
																																																								118	Judith	Halberstam,	The	Queer	Art	of	Failure	(Durham,	N.C. ;	London:	Duke	University	Press,	2011),	p.	2.	
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In	tracking	anxieties	about	nonhuman	extinction,	children,	and	the	future	 as	 they	 appear	 in	The	Hunter	 and	A	Child’s	 Book	 of	 True	 Crime,	 I	keep	 in	 mind	 both	 these	 iterations	 of	 queer	 negativity.	 That	 is,	 I	 am	interested	 in	 analysing	 the	 ways	 that	 both	 texts	 variously	 close	 off	relationships	 to	 futurity	 as	 well	 as	 seek	 out	 melancholic	 connections	 to	past	 histories	 of	 damage	 and	 suffering,	 histories	 that	 in	 this	 context	 are	related	 to	 the	 legacy	 of	 colonialism	 as	 it	 haunts	 settler	 society.	 In	 this	chapter,	extinction	is	figured	as	presenting	an	alternative	structural	threat	to	 ‘the	 logic	 of	 futurism’	 than	 that	 of	 the	 queerness	 Edelman	 shows	occupies	 that	position,	 and	 following	his	 theory	 and	 that	of	 Love,	 I	 trace	the	 ways	 that	 this	 affects	 the	 narrative	 representation	 of	 both	 human	children	and	nonhuman	animals.		
II. Extinction,	children,	and	precarious	subjects.	
		 Sara	 Ahmed	 is	 inspired	 by	 Edelman’s	 work	when	 she	 chooses	 to	conduct	 readings	 of	 dystopian	 imaginaries.	 These	 forms	 interest	 her	because,	she	explains,	‘they	take	as	a	starting	point	the	possibility	that	the	future	might	be	something	we	have	already	lost.’	As	such	they	offer	visions	not	 only	 of	 unhappy	 futures	 but	 also	 engage	 with	 ‘the	 possibility	 of	 no	future	 at	 all,	where	no	 future	 is	not	 conceived	of	 as	unhappiness	 (which	would	be	predicated	on	the	survival	of	a	subject)	but	no	hap,	no	chance,	no	possibility’	(Ahmed,	p.163).	As	I	have	already	suggested,	mass	nonhuman	extinction	and	 the	climate	crises	 that	 contribute	 to	 it	not	only	 show	 that	the	future	will	be,	as	Ahmed	puts	it,	‘	a	time	of	loss’,	but	also	gesture	to	the	possibility	(and	indeed	inevitability)	of	human	species	extinction.	As	such,	extinction	discourse	is	in	a	sense	structured	by	the	difficulty	of	imagining	futurity,	as	well	as	in	some	sectors	the	problem	of	how	to	sell	and	market	images	 of	 a	 future	 understood	 as	 stable	 and	 worthy	 of	 investment	 (for	
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example	 in	 the	 case	 of	 geoengineering	projects	 that	 seek	 to	mitigate	 the	effects	of	climate	change	without	addressing	its	structural	causes).119		 Responses	 to	 this	 aporia	 in	 ecological	 thinking	 can	 be	 generally	understood	 as	 organised	 into	 those	 that	 are	 future-oriented	 and	 others	that	 advocate	 for	 a	 ‘backwards’	 approach	 that	 would	 take	 stock	 of	 the	potential	causes	of	the	current	extinction	and	climate	crises.	For	example	Ashley	 Dawson,	 in	 his	 book	 Extinction:	 A	 Radical	 History,	 takes	 up	 the	second	 position.	 Although	 his	 project	 is	 to	 imagine	 how	 it	 would	 be	possible	 to	build	 a	 radical	 anti-capitalist	 conservation	movement,	 and	as	such	 might	 seem	 focused	 on	 futurity,	 he	 makes	 it	 clear	 that	 such	 a	movement	 could	 only	 emerge	 from	 a	 historically	 located	 understanding	that	 ‘the	 extinction	 crisis	 is	 at	 once	 an	 environmental	 issue	and	 a	 social	justice	 issue,	 one	 that	 is	 linked	 to	 long	histories	 of	 capitalist	 domination	over	 specific	 people,	 animals,	 and	 plants.’120	Rob	 Nixon	 makes	 a	 similar	point	when	developing	his	concept	of	the	‘slow	violence’	that	he	suggests	characterises	much	environmental	catastrophe.121	In	preferring	 this	 term	over	that	of	‘structural’	violence,	Nixon	argues	that	he	is	drawing	attention	to	 the	 temporal	 dimension	 of	 destruction	 that,	 in	 his	 words,	 ‘occurs	gradually	 and	 out	 of	 sight’	 (Nixon,	 p.	 2).	 In	 this	 sense	 he	 can	 also	 be	understood	 as	 advocating	 for	 a	 kind	 of	 dispersed,	 backwards	 thinking	characterised	by	processes	 of	memorialising	when	he	 claims	 that	 ‘in	 the	long	arc	between	the	emergence	of	slow	violence	and	 its	delayed	effects,	both	the	causes	and	the	memory	of	catastrophe	readily	fade	from	view	as	the	casualties	incurred	typically	pass	untallied	and	unremembered’	(pp.	8-9).			
																																																								119	For	an	interesting	and	varied	analysis	of	the	ways	such	projects	relate	to	the	future	in	the	theological	imagination,	see	Theological	and	Ethical	Perspectives	on	Climate	Engineering:	Calming	
the	Storm,	ed.	by	Forrest	Clingerman	and	Kevin	J.	O’Brien	(Lanham:	Lexington	Books,	2016).		120	Ashley	Dawson,	Extinction:	A	Radical	History.	(New	York:	OR	Books,	2016),	p.	84		121	Rob	Nixon,	Slow	Violence	and	the	Environmentalism	of	the	Poor	(Cambridge,	Mass.:	Harvard	University	Press,	2011).	
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The	future-oriented	approach	could	perhaps	be	best	summed	up	by	the	de-extinction	projects	 that	were	 the	 focus	of	 the	previous	 chapter	 in	this	 thesis,	 which	 evolutionary	 biologist	 Beth	 Shapiro	 explains	 captivate	her	 ‘because	 de-extinction	 uses	 awesome,	 exciting,	 cutting-edge	technology	 to	 take	 a	 giant	 step	 forward	 (Mammoth,	 p.	 206).’	 Such	endeavours	look	forward	to	the	future	by	seeking	to	manage	and	mitigate	planetary	 disaster	 in	 a	 similar	manner	 to	 the	 geo-engineering	 projects	 I	described	 above.	 Indeed,	 the	 debate	 over	 whether	 to	 ‘mourn’	 extinct	species	 or	 not	 that	 I	 engaged	 with	 in	 Chapter	 Two	 is	 exemplary	 of	 the	tension	 in	 such	 discourse	 between	 ‘forwards’	 and	 ‘backwards’	 thinking.	Stewart	Brand,	proclaiming	 ‘don’t	mourn,	organise!”	belongs	to	the	camp	of	 those	who	are	 invested	 in	addressing	extinction	 through	 future	 ‘fixes’,	whilst	 Thom	 van	 Dooren	 and	 Deborah	 Bird	 Rose’s	 argument	 that	mourning	lost	animals	is	an	ethical	project	is	premised	on	the	assumption	that	thinking	extinction	necessitates	a	backward	turn.	Whilst,	as	I	argued	in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 these	 projects	 it	 is	 the	 birth	(although	 crucially,	 not	wellbeing)	 of	 nonhuman	 children	 that	 is	 seen	 as	guaranteeing	this	future	disrupts	species	relations,	for	the	most	part	such	initiatives	still	use	the	rhetoric	of	reproductive	futurism	that	privileges	the	symbolic	 human	 Child.	 Take	 Stewart	 Brand’s	 comments	 in	 his	 opinion	piece	on	de-extinction	for	National	Geographic,	for	example.	He	claims	that	conservationists	 are	 ‘learning	 the	 benefits	 of	 building	 hope	 and	 building	on	 hope’	 with	 de-extinct	 species	 being	 ‘beacons	 of	 hope.’	 He	 then	specifically	 situates	 the	 benefits	 of	 de-extinction	 as	 a	means	 not	 only	 of	enriching	 the	 lives	 of	 children,	 but	 also	 as	 engendering	 in	 them	 an	environmental	consciousness	 that	will	naturally	be	passed	on	when	 they	become	parents	themselves:		 The	current	generation	of	children	will	experience	the	return	of	some	remarkable	creatures	in	their	lifetime.	It	may	be	part	of	what	defines	their	generation	and	their	attitude	to	the	natural	world.	They	will	drag	their	parents	to	zoos	to	see	the	woolly	mammoth	and	growing	populations	of	captive-bred	passenger	pigeons,	ivory-billed	
	 118	
woodpeckers,	Carolina	parakeets,	Eskimo	curlews,	great	auks,	Labrador	ducks,	and	maybe	even	dodoes.122		Such	 rhetoric	 is	 omnipresent	 in	discussions	of	 ecological	 crisis,	which	 in	posing	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 future	 naturally	 poses	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 Child	 who	stands	for	that	future.	Political	and	legal	discourse	on	this	issue	more	often	than	not	concerns	itself	with	protecting	and	legislating	on	behalf	of	future	generations	that	are	frequently	conceptualised	as	inhabiting	a	permanent	childhood.	 Whilst	 legal	 commentators	 such	 as	 Edward	 Page	 have	suggested	that	climate	change	presents	‘a	clear	source	of	intergenerational	inequality	of	opportunity’,	and	the	World	Future	Council,	 formed	in	2004	and	 calling	 itself	 ‘the	 voice	 of	 future	 generations’	 sees	 one	 of	 its	 main	achievements	 as	 the	 fact	 that	 ‘the	United	Nations	 general	 assembly	 now	considers	 the	 rights	 of	 future	 generations	 in	 global	 deliberations’,	 policy	documents	like	the	1987	Brundtland	Report	specifically	characterise	these	ambiguous	 future	 generations	 as	 dispossessed	 children. 123 	This	environmental	 report,	 put	 together	 by	 the	 United	 Nations	 World	Commission	 on	 Environment	 and	 Development,	 is	 addressed	 to	 the	‘young’	 in	 particular,	 and	 claims	 that	 a	 focus	 on	 global	 sustainability	 is	necessary	 to	 avoid	 ‘undermining	 our	 children’s	 fundamental	 right	 to	 a	healthy,	 life-enhancing	 environment.’	 They	 claim	 that	 whilst	environmental	resource	accounts	 ‘may	show	profit	on	the	balance	sheets	of	 our	 generations,	 […]	our	 children	will	 inherit	 the	 losses.’124	This	 same	discursive	 pattern	 in	 also	 evident,	 for	 example,	 in	 a	 recent	 collaborative	campaign	 between	 UNICEF	 and	 Save	 the	 Children,	 which	 claims	 that	‘action	on	climate	change	is	fundamentally	about	the	action	we	must	take	
																																																								122	Brand,	March	12,	and	2013.	123	Edward	Page,	Climate	Change,	Justice	and	Future	Generations	(Cheltenham:	Edward	Elgar,	2007),	p.	58;	World	Future	Council	(WFC),	‘National	Policies	&	International	Instruments	to	Protect	the	Rights	of	Future	Generations	(Working	Paper)’,	p.	2		[accessed	4	May	2014].	124	World	Commission	on	Environment	and	Development,	Our	Common	Future	(Oxford;	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1987).	
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to	protect	children’s	futures	and	the	legacy	we	want	to	leave	for	them.’125	These	 same	 anxieties	 are	 expressed	 in	 popular	 culture	 through	 the	increasingly	 large	 number	 of	 post-apocalyptic	 novels	 and	 films	 that	conclude	with	a	single	child,	pregnancy,	or	adapted	family	unit	signifying	hope	 for	 the	 survival	 of	 the	 human	 species.	 Perhaps	 the	 example	 that	springs	most	readily	to	mind	(and	one	used	by	both	Edelman	and	Ahmed	as	 an	 instance	of	 reproductive	 futurism	 in	 action)	 is	P.	D.	 James’s	 	 novel	
Children	of	Men	(1992),	made	into	a	film	of	the	same	name	in	2006.	Other	examples	 might	 include	 Cormac	 McCarthy’s	 The	 Road	 (2006),	 Justin	Cronin’s	Passage	trilogy	 (2010-2016),	and	a	host	of	original	and	adapted	films	including	I	Am	Legend	(2007),	28	Days	Later	(2002),	The	Terminator	(1984),	and	Oblivion	(2013).			 The	risk	of	such	an	investment	in	the	Child,	as	Edelman	points	out,	is	that	this	figure’s	entitlement	to	‘claim	full	rights	to	its	future	share	in	the	nation’s	 good’	 always	 comes	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 ‘limiting	 the	 rights	 “real”	citizens	are	allowed’	(p.	11).	In	the	context	of	ecological	thinking,	then,	and	particularly	 as	 this	 manifests	 in	 legislation,	 the	 risk	 of	 prioritising	 this	continuously	deferred	figure	is	the	subordination	of	the	rights	of	subjects	that	 are	 already	 living.	 This	 is	 especially	 problematic	 because	 both	 the	responsibility	 for	 and	 consequences	 of	 environmental	 crises	 are	 already	unevenly	distributed.	As	Peter	Newell	and	Matthew	Paterson	put	it:		 Behind	 the	 cosy	 language	 used	 to	 describe	 climate	 change	 as	 a	common	 threat	 to	 all	 humankind,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 some	 people	 and	countries	 contribute	 to	 it	 disproportionately,	while	 others	 bear	 the	brunt	 of	 its	 effects.	 What	 makes	 it	 a	 particularly	 tricky	 issue	 to	address	 is	 that	 it	 is	 the	 people	 that	will	 suffer	most	 that	 currently	
																																																								125	Jasmine	Burgess,	‘Climate	Change:	Children’s	Challenge’	(Unicef	UK,	2013),	p.	7	[accessed	12	June	2014].	
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contribute	 least	 to	 the	 problem,	 i.e.	 the	 poor	 in	 the	 developing	world.126		Yet	 the	 image	 of	 the	 endangered	 Child	 endures	 in	 conversations	 about	extinction	 and	 climate	 change.	 Whilst	 Edelman’s	 argument	 frames	 the	Child	 figure	 as	 threatened	 by	 (and	 in	 need	 of	 protection	 from)	 queer	sexualities,	 Paul	 Kelleher	 broadens	 the	 field	 of	 culpability	 by	 suggesting	that	 this	 is	 the	 default	 mode	 of	 representation	 for	 any	 portrayal	 of	children.	‘In	order	to	reflect	on	our	relationships	with	children,’	he	argues,	‘in	 order	 to	 conceive	 of	 childhood	 as	 such,	 we	 must	 put	 the	 child	 in	danger.’127		 Why,	as	a	way	to	think	about	children,	have	we	become	accustomed	to	 beginning	with	 an	 image	 of	 the	 “child”	 in	 danger	 and	 only	 then	(assuming	then	ever	comes,	working	our	way	back	to	the	boy	or	girl	in	the	room?	The	“child”	I	speak	of	here	refers	not	to	a	group	or	class	of	children,	or	any	one	identifiable	child,	but	rather	the	figure	of	no	
child	in	particular,	a	figure	whose	lack	of	particularity	enables	a	great	deal	of	thinking	and	speaking	–	not	to	mention	legislating	and	policy	making	 –	 about	matters	 of	 so-called	 general,	 national,	 or	 universal	concern	(Kelleher,	p.	151).		Kelleher’s	argument	here	clearly	crosses	over	with	Edelman’s	(both	were	published	 in	 the	 same	year),	 but	his	work	 is	 particularly	useful	 not	 only	because	 the	argument	above	speaks	directly	 to	 the	rhetorical	patterns	of	the	environmental	policy	makers	cited	here,	but	because	he	pays	extensive	attention	to	the	way	children	are	framed	as	endangered	in	a	more	general	sense.	 Kelleher’s	 words	 here	 gesture	 to	 the	 way	 that	 his	 ‘no	 child	 in	
																																																								126	Peter	(Peter	John)	Newell	and	Matthew	Paterson,	Climate	Capitalism :	Global	Warming	and	the	
Transformation	of	the	Global	Economy	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2010),	p.	7.	127	Paul	Kelleher,	‘How	to	Do	Things	with	Perversion:	Psychoanalysis	and	the	“Child	in	Danger”’,	in	
Curiouser:	On	the	Queerness	of	Children,	ed.	by	Steven	Bruhm	and	Natasha	Hurley	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2004),	pp.	151–71	(p.	151).	
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particular’	 (Edelman’s	 ‘Child’)	 becomes	 emptied	 of	 meaning	 precisely	because	of	the	sense	in	which	it	emerges	as	a	precarious	subject	(the	child	in	danger).	This	is	especially	useful	as	a	means	of	drawing	attention	to	the	ways	that	talking	about	(or	writing	about,	for	my	purposes	here)	children	presents	a	problem	of	representation	 in	 that	 the	emptiness	of	 this	 figure	also	opens	it	up	to	a	struggle	for	meaning.	It	 is	 in	this	sense	that	I	would	like	 to	 draw	 an	 analogy	 here	 between	 the	 Child	 figure,	 and	 extinct	 and	endangered	animals.		 Ursula	Heise	argues	that	stories	about	nature	and	biodiversity	are	generally	made	to	fit	a	narrative	template	that	suggests	both	these	things	‘have	done	nothing	but	deteriorate	under	the	impact	of	modern	societies’	(a	claim	she	is	sceptical	about),	with	this	template	made	to	work	‘through	a	pervasive	logic	of	what	biologists	usually	call	proxy	and	literary	scholars	call	 synecdoche	–	 the	part	 standing	 in	 for	 the	whole.’128	One	of	 the	ways	that	this	happens,	she	explains,	is	through	a	focus	on	‘a	fairly	narrow	set’	of	animals	 (whether	 endangered	 or	 extinct);	 so-called	 charismatic	megafauna	 like	whales,	 gorillas,	 bears	 and	 visually	 striking	 birds	 (Heise,	p.23).	 The	 result	 of	 this,	 Heise	 explains,	 is	 that	 the	 focus	 on	 a	 single	aesthetically	 appealing	 species	 ‘blocks	 from	 view	 other	 species,	 lacking	those	 qualities,	 that	 may	 be	 more	 endangered	 or	 more	 crucial	 for	ecosystemic	functioning’	(p.	24).	Already	then,	we	can	begin	to	see	that	the	representation	 of	 extinct	 or	 endangered	 animals	 replicates	 that	 of	 the	Child	 figure	 as	 certain	 symbolically	 powerful	 animals	 come	 to	 dominate	the	field	of	conservation	science	and	ecological	activism	to	the	detriment	of	others	 (not	 to	mention,	 as	Heise	points	out,	plants).129	This	 relation	 is	perhaps	most	 fully	 evident	 in	 conservation	 work	 in	 which	 	 ‘introduced’	species	are	the	subject	of	eradication	programs	that	prioritise	the	lives	of	other,	more	‘authentic’	animals,	with	the	racially	coded	reference	to	these																																																									128	Ursula	K.	Heise,	Imagining	Extinction:	The	Cultural	Meanings	of	Endangered	Species	(Chicago ;	London:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2016),	p.	22.	129	Heise	argues	that	‘conservation	science	[…]	shows	preferences	in	its	objects	of	study	that	broadly	parallel	public	biases.’	(pp.	24-5.)	
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species	as	‘invasive’	calling	to	mind	the	way	that	the	Child	is	imagined	as	in	need	of	protection	 from	 threatening	 (non-white,	 queer)	others	 (Heise,	p.	29).				 Representations	of	endangered	and	extinct	animals	also	follow	the	same	 logic	 as	 those	 that	 figure	 the	 Child	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 Kelleher	describes	 when	 the	 emergence	 of	 their	 subjectivity	 is	 premised	 on	 and	arises	out	of	the	ways	that	they	are	imagined	as	being	in	danger.	Kathryn	Yusoff	 refers	 to	 this	 as	 ‘subjectivity	 declared	 through	 precarity’,	 arguing	that	this	‘prepares	an	ontological	field	for	the	subject	in	which	dependence	is	 already	 inscripted	 in	 the	 material	 conditions	 of	 emergence.’	 The	example	 she	 gives	 is	 that	 of	 an	 orang-utan	 pictured	 in	 an	 area	 of	deforestation.	 By	 being	 declared	 in	 this	way,	 she	 explains,	 the	 animal	 is	‘already	an	abandoned	being.’130	It	is	in	this	same	sense	that	the	individual	‘last’	 animal	 (an	elegiac	 subject	declared	 through	precarity)	 stands	 in,	 as	Heise	would	 put	 it,	 synecdochically	 for	 the	 rest	 of	 its	 species,	 so	 that	 its	own	 particular	 ‘material	 conditions	 of	 emergence’	 are	 obscured	 in	 the	same	way	that	those	of	the	symbolic	‘Child’	figure	are.			 I	 don’t	 wish	 to	 suggest	 here	 that	 the	 emblematic	 figures	 of	 the	‘Child’	and	 the	extinct/endangered	animal	are	simply	equivalent;	 indeed,	there	are	numerous	differences	in	the	way	that	these	figures	are	deployed	that,	 although	 of	 interest	 to	 me,	 are	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 chapter.	Rather,	I	want	to	argue	that	they	are	both	symbolic	forms	that	trouble	the	future	 imaginary,	 and	 because	 they	 raise	 similar	 questions	 about	representational	logic,	when	they	converge	in	narratives	about	extinction	their	 precarious	 subjectivity	 sets	 up	 certain	 formal	 expectations	 (about	their	 right	 to	 be	 protected	 or	 rescued)	 that	 are	 frustrated	 by	 the	 two	novels	on	which	this	chapter	focuses.	Theories	of	queer	negativity	provide	a	useful	analytic	 framework	 in	which	to	explore	the	ways	that	both	texts																																																									130	Kathryn	Yusoff,	‘Aesthetics	of	Loss:	Biodiversity,	Banal	Violence	and	Biotic	Subjects’,	
Transactions	of	the	Institute	of	British	Geographers,	37.4	(2012),	578–92	(p.	586).	[accessed	28	November	2013]	
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organise	 these	 representations	 of	 children	 and	 endangered/extinct	animals	 by	 engaging	 with	 the	 conflict	 between	 future-oriented	 and	‘backwards’	 thinking	 that	 I	 have	 suggested	 frequents	 narratives	 of	environmental	crisis.			
	
III. Troubled	futures	
		 Both	The	Hunter	and	A	Child’s	Book	of	True	Crime	figure	children	as	precarious	subjects.	In	The	Hunter,	M	lodges	in	a	remote	house	at	the	foot	of	the	mountain	that	he	periodically	ascends	in	pursuit	of	the	thylacine.	A	grieving	 family	 inhabits	 this	 house;	 a	 young	 girl	 (Sass)	 and	 her	 even	younger	brother	 (Bike)	are	 in	 charge	whilst	 their	mother	Lucy	sleeps	all	day	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 copious	 amounts	 of	 prescription	medication.	Their	 father,	 Jarrah	 Armstrong,	 is	 believed	 dead	 after	 climbing	 the	mountain	months	previously	 in	search	of	 the	same	thylacine	 that	M	now	pursues.	 Sass	 and	 Bike	 are	 undoubtedly	 in	 need	 of	 adult	 care	 –	 on	 M’s	arrival	 the	 house	 is	 filthy	 and	 ‘a	 black	 mould	 clouds	 the	 ceiling	 and	walls.’131			 In	 A	 Child’s	 Book	 of	 True	 Crime,	 this	 precarious	 subjectivity	 is	explicitly	 gendered;	with	 children	 in	danger	 for	 the	most	part	 exhibiting	the	 ‘feminized	 infantile	 vulnerability’	 that	 Lauren	Berlant	 has	 called	 ‘the	scene	 of	 national	 anxiety.’132	Whilst	 children	 appear	 often	 in	 the	 novel,	because	 the	narrator	Kate	 is	a	primary	school	 teacher	and	 the	 text	often	focuses	 on	 her	 conversation	 with	 her	 classes,	 it	 is	 Kate	 herself	 who	presents	 the	 exemplary	 endangered	 ‘Child’	 in	 the	 novel.	 Despite	 being	twenty-two,	 she	 exhibits	 a	 constant	 and	 unwavering	 nostalgia	 for	childhood	(‘I	wished	I	really	were	a	little	girl’),	and	has	found	becoming	a	teacher	‘like	crossing	to	the	other	side’,	unable	to	stop	herself	‘feeling	like	
																																																								131	Julia	Leigh,	The	Hunter	(London:	Faber,	2000),	p.	9.		
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a	spy.’133	Kate	is	engaged	in	a	love	affair	with	Thomas	Marne,	the	father	of	her	favourite	pupil,	and	Thomas’s	wife	Veronica	has	recently	published	a	true	crime	story	retelling	 the	events	of	 the	1983	murder	of	 local	woman	Ellie	Siddell	called	Murder	at	Black	Swan	Point.	At	the	time	of	her	murder	Ellie	 was	 also	 in	 an	 adulterous	 relationship	 with	 the	 local	 veterinarian	Graeme	Harvey,	whose	wife	Margaret	–	 the	main	 suspect	 in	 the	killing	–	vanished	without	a	trace	on	the	same	day	that	Ellie	was	brutally	stabbed.	Kate	 is	obsessed	with	both	Ellie’s	story	and	Veronica’s	retelling	of	 it,	and	believes	it	is	being	replayed	in	real	time	with	the	role	of	murdered	young	woman	 being	 hers	 this	 time	 around.	 ‘I	 understood	 Ellie’	 she	 explains,	‘because	I	gave	her	my	own	story’	(p.	71).	Kate	imagines	Ellie,	like	herself,	as	being	so	vulnerable	that	she	has	had	to	be	‘protected	from	bad	things	so	strenuously	that	the	slightest	irregularity	–	like	the	tattooed	woman	once	seen	 bathing	 –	 could	 overwhelm’	 (p.	 66).	 Furthermore,	 she	 sees	 young	female	victims	 like	Ellie	as	 characterised	by	 the	 lack	of	particularity	 that	Kelleher	attributes	to	the	child	in	danger	motif.	As	part	of	Kate’s	newfound	interest	 in	 true	 crime	 narratives,	 she	 has	 come	 to	 believe	 that	 the	 same	photographs	are	used	 inside	all	 the	 true	crime	books	–	 ‘they’d	 found	 the	ultimate	photograph	of	a	murder	victim	in	her	school	uniform	which	they	reused	over	and	over,	alternating	others	from	their	doomed	girls	series’	(p.	132).			 In	both	texts	the	precarious	subjectivity	of	children	is	also	mirrored	by	 and	 intertwined	 with	 that	 of	 endangered	 and	 extinct	 animals,	 most	specifically	 the	 thylacine.	 In	The	Hunter,	M’s	mercenary	 quest	 to	 kill	 the	thylacine	and	harvest	 its	organs	 is	 juxtaposed	against	 the	decision	of	 the	missing	Jarrah	Armstrong	(who	it	transpires	has	also	seen	the	tassie	tiger)	to	 keep	 this	 discovery	 secret	 from	 everyone	 except	 his	 family.	 As	 such	Leigh’s	 narrative	 holds	 out	 the	 hope,	 as	 Tony	 D’Aeth	 has	 argued,	 that	through	 time	 spent	with	 Jarrah’s	 children,	M	will	 decide	 to	 abandon	 his	
																																																								133	Chloe	Hooper,	A	Child’s	Book	of	True	Crime :	A	Novel	(London:	Jonathan	Cape,	2002),	pp.	19,	47.	
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hunt	 and	 let	 the	 tiger	 live	 out	 its	 days	 in	 peace.134	In	A	Child’s	Book	 the	thylacine	is	also	foregrounded	in	the	alternative	version	of	Murder	at	Black	
Swan	Point	that	Kate	decides	to	write	to	explain	the	story	of	Ellie	Siddell’s	murder	to	children.	This	story	takes	up	alternative	chapters	of	the	novel,	and	is	told	by	a	group	of	animal	detectives	who	are	investigating	the	crime.	This	group	is	made	up	of	native	Australian	animals	with	alliterative	names	(Kitty	Koala,	Wally	Wombat)	led	by	Terence	Tiger,	a	thylacine	who	keeps	his	 coat	 ‘superbly	 clean,	 despite	 his	 poverty’	 and	 has	 an	 interest	 in	psychologically	 profiling	 murderers	 (p.	 209).	 All	 the	 animals	 in	 this	‘bushgang’	are	suffering	from	post-traumatic	stress	disorder	–	‘so	many	of	their	 furry	brethren,	 their	 feathered	 cousins	 and	most	 reptilian	 relatives	had	 had	 foul	 and	 bloody	 deeds	 committed	 against	 them’	 –	 and	 are	 not	doing	so	well	themselves.	Kitty	the	Koala	has	a	strain	of	chlamydia	that	has	left	her	blind	and	infertile;	Wally	the	Wombat’s	family	have	been	killed	by	feral	cats;	and	Terence,	of	course,	 is	extinct	(p.	183).	Kate	presents	 these	vulnerable	animals	as	companions	and	protectors	to	the	children	who	will	read	her	book,	and	throughout	the	novel	the	violence	done	to	animals	and	young	‘doomed	girls’	is	collated.			In	both	texts,	then,	the	threat	of	nonhuman	extinction	is	tied	to	the	fate	of	 the	novel’s	human	children.	 In	A	Child’s	Book	their	safety	depends	on	the	wellbeing	of	the	‘bushgang’	who	safeguard	them	from	violence,	and	in	 The	 Hunter	 M’s	 decision	 of	 whether	 to	 continue	 searching	 for	 the	thylacine	 is	seen	as	directly	related	to	 the	burden	of	care	 that	he	may	or	may	not	take	up	in	relation	to	Sass	and	Bike.	As	such,	the	futures	both	texts	imagine	for	human	children	are	shaped	by	the	ways	in	which	they	engage	with	 the	 problems	 nonhuman	 extinction	 poses	 to	 these	 futures,	 with	children	 and	 nonhuman	 animals	 figured	 as	 companions	 in	 precarious	subjectivity.	The	fact	that	‘dependence	is	already	inscripted	in	the	material	conditions	 of	 emergence’	 for	 these	 children	 and	 animals	 means	 that	 a	certain	set	of	assumptions	are	set	out	in	both	texts	relating	to	the	ways	in																																																									134	Tony	Hughes-d’Aeth,	‘Australian	Writing,	Deep	Ecology	and	Julia	Leigh’s	The	Hunter’,	Journal	of	
the	Association	for	the	Study	of	Australian	Literature,	1.0	(2006),	19–31	(p.	23).	
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which	 these	 vulnerable	 beings	 might	 fairly	 expect	 protection.	 In	 both	novels,	however,	such	expectations	are	disrupted	when	the	trajectories	of	both	 narratives	 fail	 to	 move	 toward	 a	 future	 that	 would	 guarantee	 the	safety	of	these	precarious	subjects.		 ***			 Both	 novels	 have	 at	 their	 heart	 what	 might	 be	 considered	exemplary	humanist	narratives	of	progress.	In	The	Hunter	this	plot	is	one	of	 scientific	 discovery	 and	 advancement,	 and	 in	 A	 Child’s	 Book	 of	 True	
Crime	one	of	 pedagogy,	 focusing	on	 the	processes	by	which	 children	 are	socialised	 into	 adulthood.	 In	 both	 texts,	 however,	 these	 narratives	 of	progress	fail	to	work	in	the	way	they	should;	they	falter,	go	wrong,	or	turn	backwards.	 By	 considering	 this	 disruption	 in	 terms	of	 Edelman’s	 ‘cult	 of	the	Child’,	however,	it	becomes	clear	that	Leigh	and	Hooper’s	treatment	of	progress	narratives	varies	according	 to	 the	extent	 to	which	reproductive	futurism	 is	 present	 as	 an	 idea	 in	 each	 text.	 In	 terms	 of	 The	 Hunter’s	exploration	of	extinction,	Leigh	performs	what	in	Edelman’s	terms	would	be	 the	 fairly	 conventional	 gesture	 of	 suggesting	 the	 failure	 to	 care	 for	children	means	the	failure	to	be	of	the	future.	In	contrast,	in	A	Child’s	Book	
of	True	Crime	Hooper	reflects	critically	on	the	ways	in	which	reproductive	futurism	 structures	 the	 stories	 that	 are	 told	 about	 extinction	 and	precarious	subjects,	with	the	text	ultimately	suggesting	a	turn	toward	the	past	is	one	means	of	moving	away	from	these	kinds	of	plots.			 Tony	D’Aeth	posits	the	existence	of	a	particularly	Australian	poetics	of	place	in	which	‘redemption	is	the	implicit	theme.’	This	idea	unfolds,	he	argues,	as	‘a	central	element	of	the	metaphysics	of	land	–	the	hostile	land,	the	 conquered	 land,	 the	merciless	 land,	 the	merciful	 land	 –	 that	 has	 run	through	Australian	place-writing	since	the	journals	of	exploration’	(D’Aeth,	p.	23)	As	such,	D’Aeth	claims,	The	Hunter	commits	something	of	a	heresy	when	 it	 leaves	M	 ‘unredeemed’	 (p.	22).	He	 refers	here	 to	 the	 fact	 that	M	does	in	the	end	carry	out	his	task	of	finding	and	murdering	the	thylacine,	
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after	 returning	 from	a	short	 time	away	 from	Tasmania	 to	 find	 the	house	abandoned.	Sass,	he	 finds	out,	has	been	badly	burned	after	a	stray	spark	from	the	 fire	next	 to	which	she	has	been	sleeping	sets	her	clothes	alight.	The	accident	has	torn	the	family	apart:	Sass	is	critically	ill	in	hospital,	Bike	is	 in	 foster	 care,	 and	 their	mother	has	 been	 institutionalised.	 For	D’Aeth	however,	 the	 fact	 that	 M	 does	 not,	 in	 the	 end,	 get	 to	 participate	 in	 a	redemption	narrative	is	not	a	failing	in	the	novel,	but	is	in	fact	‘the	point	of	the	novel’	(p.	22).	He	links	expectations	of	redemption	in	the	novel	to	M’s	interactions	 with	 the	 bereaved	 Armstrong	 family,	 suggesting	 that	 the	orthodox	outcome	of	such	an	encounter	as	it	plays	out	in	the	novel	form	is	usually	the	forming	of	a	new	family	unit.135		Still	 (we	 long	 to	 believe)	 children	 have	 strange	 effects	 on	 people,	they	can	soften	even	the	hardest	hearts,	and	then	there	is	the	woman	who	must	awake	and	she	too,	especially	given	her	own	demons,	will	surely	find	a	way	to	redeem	M	(p.	23).			By	 withholding	 this	 outcome	 from	 the	 reader,	 D’Aeth	 argues	 that	 Leigh	‘uses	 the	 humanist	 machinery	 of	 the	 novel	 form	 to	 expose	 the	 limits	 of	human-centred	 values’	 (p.	 28).	 Whilst	 I	 find	 his	 argument	 entirely	convincing,	 I	would	 like	to	push	it	a	 little	 further	here	by	suggesting	that	these	 ‘human-centred	 values’	 only	 ever	 function	 within	 a	 framework	 of	future	 oriented	 thinking	 that	 is	 focused	 on	 the	 infinite	 reproduction	 of	(valued	members	of)	 the	human	 species.	 Leigh’s	 subversion	of	 humanist	narrative	 form	 is	 in	 fact	 only	 able	 to	 occur	 because	 these	 narrative	conventions	 are	 reliant	 on	 and	 mobilised	 by	 the	 particular	 set	 of	expectations	 that	 crystallise	 around	 the	 Child	 figure.	 Sass	 and	 Bike	 are	precarious	subjects	whose	inclusion	in	the	text	enacts	the	expectation	that	narrative	 progression	 will	 only	 occur	 once	 M	 acknowledges	 his	 debt	 of	care	 and	 fulfils	 his	 position	 in	 the	 heteronormative	 family	 unit.	 The	possibility	of	such	an	outcome	is	gestured	toward	in	the	text,	making	it	all																																																									135	The	2011	film	adaptation	of	the	novel	which	stars	Willem	Defoe	concludes	with	M	arriving	at	a	school	to	meet	a	sad	looking	Bike,	who	immediately	runs	into	his	arms.	
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the	more	powerful	when	this	happy	resolution	never	materialises.	For	the	most	 part,	 it	 is	 M’s	 relationship	 with	 Bike	 that	 implies	 he	 may	 be	developing	 feelings	 for	 the	Armstrong	 family.	This	 is	particularly	evident	in	 an	 incident	 about	 halfway	 through	 the	 novel,	 where	 Bike	 secretly	follows	M	hoping	 that	 they	can	ascend	 the	mountain	 together.	M’s	anger	when	he	discovers	Bike’s	presence	causes	the	boy	to	break	down	in	tears,	and	 the	normally	 cold	M	 takes	Bike	 in	his	 arms	and,	moved	 to	 feel	 ‘how	tiny	 he	 is,	 and	 how	warm’,	 begins	whispering	words	 of	 comfort	 that	 he	remembers	hearing	from	his	own	mother	(Leigh,	p.	110).	The	developing	relationship	between	M	and	Bike	 is	also	 linked	to	the	expectation	that	M	may	call	off	his	hunt	for	the	thylacine,	after	Bike	shows	him	a	drawing	he	has	 done	 of	 the	 animal	 based	 on	 his	 father’s	 sighting,	 a	 piece	 of	information	 that	 is	 ‘top	 secret’	 (p.	 79).	 Bike’s	 obvious	 investment	 in	protecting	the	thylacine	offers	up	the	hope	that	in	learning	to	care	for	Bike,	M	will	also	learn	to	keep	his	secret.		 Cate	Kennedy’s	2009	novel	The	World	Beneath	depicts	what	might	be	understood	as	the	orthodox	version	of	this	narrative.136	Rich,	estranged	from	his	teenage	daughter	Sophie	for	most	of	her	life,	invites	her	on	a	trip	to	 hike	 across	 the	 Tasmanian	 Overland	 Track.	 An	 arrogant	 yet	inexperienced	 hiker,	 Rich	 orchestrates	 their	 separation	 from	 the	 rest	 of	the	 group,	 and	 they	 soon	 become	 lost	 in	 the	 wild	 landscape.	 On	 their	arrival	in	Hobart,	Sophie	is	saddened	and	angered	by	the	forlorn	thylacine	exhibit	 in	 the	 town’s	 museum,	 and	 they	 are	 both	 shocked	 when	 what	appears	to	be	a	Tasmanian	tiger	breaks	through	the	undergrowth	close	to	their	campsite.	Rich,	a	photographer	by	profession,	manages	to	take	a	few	shots	of	it	on	his	camera;	shots	that	could	make	him	famous.	Distressed	by	the	 idea	 that	 he	might	make	 the	photographs	public,	 Sophie	 attempts	 to	convince	her	 father	 that	 they	have	simply	seen	a	wild	dog.	The	climax	of	the	novel	sees	 them	estranged	as	helicopters	arrive	 to	rescue	 them	from	their	 isolated	 spot;	 as	 Sophie	 is	 about	 to	 leave	Rich	 ceremoniously	 pulls	
																																																								136	Cate	Kennedy,	The	World	beneath	(London:	Atlantic,	2010).	
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the	film	out	of	his	camera,	winning	back	her	trust.	As	the	novel	closes	we	learn	 that	 Rich	 has	 earned	 his	 place	 as	 a	 part	 of	 Sophie’s	 life.	 Crucially,	being	a	father	has	given	his	life	meaning.		 The	 plot	 of	 The	 World	 Beneath	 clearly	 replicates	 the	 logic	 of	reproductive	futurism	by	insisting	that	the	only	way	to	look	forward	is	to	participate	in	what	Caserio	calls	‘the	cult	of	family	[…]	that	never	questions	the	 value	 of	 biological	 reproduction	 and	 of	 children’s	 sensibilities’	(Caserio,	 p.	 820).	 That	 is,	 the	 novel’s	 imagining	 of	 an	 ecologically	 viable	future,	which	Sophie	suggests	can	only	be	achieved	by	keeping	people	out	of	‘wild	places’	(‘we	should	just	lock	them	up	and	throw	away	the	key	[…]	we	wreck	everything	we	touch’)	is	achievable	only	by	Rich	prioritising	his	relationship	with	his	daughter	by	acquiescing	to	her	desires.	 In	 this	way,	the	novel	suggests,	to	register	affect	for	the	Child	is	also	to	look	toward	a	hopeful	 future,	with	 this	 affective	 relation	 (Rich’s	 care	 for	 his	 daughter)	made	visible	 through	his	 treatment	of	 the	precarious	subject	with	which	she	is	twinned:	the	thylacine.	Although	it	might	seem	that	in	taking	such	a	different	 narrative	 direction	 (refusing	 to	 allow	 a	 hopeful	 future	 to	crystallise)	The	Hunter	 contradicts	 the	 logic	 of	 reproductive	 futurism,	 in	fact	 the	 novel	 does	 the	 opposite.	 All	 that	 happens,	 in	 fact,	 is	 a	 kind	 of	reversal	 of	 the	 events	 of	 The	 World	 Beneath	 that	 ultimately	 ends	 up	confirming	the	same	thing;	that	to	register	no	affect	for	a	Child,	especially	a	Child-in-danger,	is	to	be	turned	against	the	future	which	the	thylacine	once	more	stands	to	symbolise.			 M’s	characterisation	in	The	Hunter	works	to	confirm	a	claim	that	is	implicit	 in	 Edelman’s	 depiction	 of	 the	 negatively	 figured	 queer	 as	 ‘the	place	of	the	social	order’s	death	drive.’	This	is	that	in	belonging	to	the	side	of	 those	 ‘“not	 fighting	 for	 the	 children”’	 –	 i.e.	 by	 not	 prioritising	 the	precarious	subjectivity	of	the	Child	–	the	queer	is	imagined	as	inhabiting	a	subjectivity	 that	 is	 somehow	 less-than-human.	 This	 is	 apparent	 in	 what	D’Aeth	calls	M’s	‘android	relationship	to	the	world’,	arguing	that	his	mode	‘is	 not	 reflection	 but	 process	 […]	 he	 administrates	 himself,	 constantly	
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attending	 to	 data,	 and	managing	 his	 needs	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 task	 at	 hand’	(D’Aeth	p.p.	25-6).	One	of	the	effects	of	his	positioning	by	Leigh	as	a	kind	of	‘android	 hero’,	 D’Aeth	 suggests,	 is	 that	 he	 stands	 ‘outside	 of	 moral	frameworks’	(p.	26).	More	specifically,	I	would	argue,	M	stands	outside	of	the	 relational,	 family-based	 frameworks	 that	 are	 assumed	 to	 govern	morality,	 ‘anchored	 by	 neither	wife	 nor	 home,	 nor	 by	 a	 lover	 or	 even	 a	single	 friend’	 and	 having	 borrowed	 money	 so	 that	 his	 ‘only	 girlfriend’	could	 pay	 for	 an	 abortion	 after	 falling	 pregnant	 with	 his	 child.	 This	memory	 inspires	 little	 emotion	 in	him,	other	 than	 surprise	 that	 ‘after	 all	these	years	[…]	he	still	remembers’	(p.	69).			 Whilst	 it	 is	 clear,	 then,	 that	 M’s	 character	 is	 opposed	 to	reproductive	 futurism	 and	 its	 tenets	 (the	 Child	 and	 its	 family),	 his	figuration	as	an	agent	of	queer	negativity	is	also	tied	to	his	murder	of	the	thylacine.	 	 After	 killing	 the	 animal,	 he	 has	 a	 thought	 that	 ‘grows	 light	 in	him,	incandescent,’	the	thought	that	‘he	is	the	only	one:	the	only	one,	I	am	the	only	one’	(p.	167).	The	thylacine’s	death,	it	seems,	has	enabled	him	to	take	her	place	–	the	place	of	the	‘last.’	As	such,	he	takes	on	what	Katherine	Yusoff	refers	to	as	‘the	burden	of	representation’	carried	by	any	such	‘last’	animal.	Such	a	burden	is	related	to	the	same	kind	of	closing	down	that	M’s	murderous	 act	 enacts,	 Yusoff	 explains,	 because	 ‘while	 there	 are	 many,	there	 is	 possibility,’	 whereas	 ‘when	 there	 is	 only	 one	 there	 is	 only	 the	burden	of	representation,	of	representing	a	failure	to	become	(to	be	of	the	
future)’	 (Yusoff,	 p.	 589,	 my	 italics).	 As	 such,	 Leigh’s	 novel	 ties	 M’s	refutation	 of	 reproductive	 futurism	 to	 his	 killing	 of	 the	 thylacine,	suggesting	 that	 these	 different	 ways	 in	 which	 he	 refuses	 to	 ‘be	 of	 the	future’	are	in	fact	entangled.	In	performing	this	gesture,	the	text	makes	the	unfortunate	move	of	tying	M’s	inability	to	react	compassionately	to	scenes	of	extinction	to	his	non-participation	in	‘the	cult	of	the	family.’	In	this	way,	Leigh’s	 novel	 simply	 reproduces	 the	 discourse	 of	 reproductive	 futurism	that	would	see	 those	who	opt	out	as	positioned	against	 the	 future;	or,	 in	Edelman’s	terms,	queered.	Ultimately,	the	regrettable	consequence	of	such	a	formulation	is	that	the	text	leaves	no	space	open	for	the	development	of	
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a	queer	response	 to	problems	of	extinction,	a	response	that	might	 look	to	react	 to	 our	 current	 ecological	 crises	 in	 ways	 that	 move	 beyond	 the	privileging	of	heteronormative	(white,	wealthy)	family	units.		
IV.		 Feeling	backwards	
		 Ursula	 Heise	 argues	 that	 ‘the	 elegiac	mode	 dominates	 verbal	 and	visual	 representations	 of	 endangered	 species’,	with	 stories	 about	 extinct	or	threatened	animals	frequently	engaging	with	what	she	refers	to	as	the	‘politically	mobilizing’	potential	of	mourning	and	melancholia	 (Heise,	pp.	54,	35).	For	Heise,	The	Hunter	presents	just	such	an	example	of	an	elegiac	narrative	where	‘the	elegy	for	a	species	becomes	a	fulcrum	for	rethinking	development	 and	modernization’	 (p.	 46).	 	 Such	 narratives,	 she	 suggests,	predominantly	 work	 to	 critique	 histories	 of	 colonization	 and	modernisation	 and	 position	 them	 as	 responsible	 for	 extinction	 crises	 (p.	48).	In	doing	so,	she	argues,	they	also	raise	questions	of	national	identity,	with	this	usually	seen	as	diminished	or	altered	by	species	loss:		 In	 literary,	 visual,	 and	 musical	 representations	 of	 extinction,	biological	 crisis	 typically	 becomes	 a	 proxy	 for	 cultural	 concerns:	worries	about	 the	 future	of	nature,	on	one	hand,	and	one	 the	other	hand,	hopes	 that	a	part	of	one’s	national	 identity	and	culture	might	be	 preserved,	 revived,	 or	 changed	 for	 the	 better	 if	 an	 endangered	species	 could	 be	 allowed	 to	 survive	 or	 an	 extinct	 one	 could	 be	rediscovered	(p.	49).			Ostensibly,	Chloe	Hooper’s	Child’s	Book	of	True	Crime	might	be	seen	to	fit	this	 profile.	 Kate,	 is	 obsessed	 by	 the	 colonial	 past	 of	 Tasmania	 and	 the	ways	in	which	these	histories	are	obscured	in	the	contemporary	moment.	As	 a	 settler	 society,	 modern	 Tasmanian	 national	 identity	 is	 inescapably	tied	 to	 the	genocidal	extermination	of	 the	 island’s	 indigenous	peoples	on	
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which	 its	 community	 is	 built.137	Kate	 sees	 the	 numerous	 instances	 of	brutal	animal	death	on	 the	 island	as	symptomatic	of	 the	way	 that	such	a	violent	history	necessarily	 returns	 to	haunt	 its	 inhabitants.	 In	 this	 sense,	then,	A	Child’s	Book	might	be	understood	as	unfolding	in	the	‘elegiac	mode’	that	 Heise	 describes.	 However,	 Hooper’s	 novel	 remains,	 ultimately,	uninterested	 in	 the	 kind	 of	 redemption	 narrative	 that	 would	 see	 this	national	 identity	 ‘preserved,	 revived,	 or	 changed	 for	 the	 better.’	 Rather,	the	text	focuses	on	asking	(but	not	necessarily	answering)	questions	about	how	this	past	might	be	represented,	and	how	such	forms	of	representation	might	create	precarious	(or	victimised)	subjects	in	ways	that	obscure	the	reality	of	societal	power	relations.	Sceptical	of	a	future	that	promises	only	to	hold	more	violence,	and	interested	in	the	genealogies	of	this	violence,	A	
Child’s	 Book	 offers	 an	 example	 of	 the	 ‘feeling	 backwards’	 Heather	 Love	associates	with	attempts	to	lean	into	histories	of	suffering.	In	the	manner	of	the	backwards	turn	Love	theorises,	however,	the	text	does	not	suggest	that	such	an	engagement	 is	a	means	of	guaranteeing	a	hopeful	 future.	As	such,	 its	melancholia	 is	not	 ‘politically	mobilizing’	 in	the	sense	that	Heise	suggests,	 but	 rather	 a	 necessary	 refusal	 of	 what	 Emily	 Potter	 calls	Australia’s	 ‘rhetoric	 of	 Official	 Reconciliation	 […]	 predicated	 […]	 on	 the	transcendence	of	unclean	or	uncomfortable	pasts.’138		 In	 Kate’s	 narrative	 the	 town	 of	 Endport	 and	 its	 environs	 are	presented	 as	 exhibiting	 a	 kind	 of	 forced	 amnesia	 toward	 these	‘uncomfortable’	 pasts.	 This	 is	 evident	 in	 attempts	 to	 cover	 over	 or	repurpose	 sites	 that	 gesture	 toward	 this	 history;	 an	 endeavour	 that	inevitably	 fails	 to	 suppress	 the	 glimpses	 of	 violence	 that	 emerge,	palimpsest-like,	 into	 view.	 For	 the	 benefit	 of	 visiting	 tourists,	 Kate																																																									137	For	a	detailed	account	of	these	events	see	Lyndall	Ryan,	The	Aboriginal	Tasmanians,	2nd	ed.	(St.	Leonards,	NSW:	Allen	&	Unwin,	1996).	Also	Henry	Reynolds,	A	History	of	Tasmania	(Cambridge ;	Port	Melbourne,	Vic.:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2012),	pp.	47–87.	138	Emily	Potter,	‘Disorienting	Horizons:	Encountering	the	Past	in	Chloe	Hooper’s	A	Child’s	Book	of	True	Crime’,	Journal	of	the	Association	for	the	Study	of	Australian	Literature,	3.0	(2006),	95–102	(p.	95);	Ann	Curthoys,	‘Expulsion,	Exodus	and	Exile	in	White	Australian	Historical	Mythology’,	Journal	
of	Australian	Studies,	23.61	(1999),	1–19.	
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explains,	 ‘we	sweetened	history	by	making	fudge	on	the	site	of	the	brutal	Female	 Factory;	we	painted	 a	 gravestone	white	 to	 hide	 its	 convict	 stain’	(Hooper,	p.	150).	Efforts	to	make	the	site	of	the	former	penal	colony	more	palatable	 to	 tourists	 and	 inhabitants	 still	 acknowledge	 and	 engage	 with	Tasmania’s	 convict	 history,	 however.	 (Kate	 explains	 that	 some	 of	 her	university	 friends	 were	 ‘paid	 to	 welcome	 international	 visitors	 to	 the	airport	 wearing	 convict	 costumes.	 We	 thought	 the	 joke	 was	 on	 the	tourists’)	 (p.185).	 In	 contrast	 to	 this,	 as	 David	 Farrier	 points	 out,	 the	island’s	 history	 of	 indigenous	 genocide	 is	 ‘almost	 entirely	 erased.’139	The	dark	 traces	 of	 this	 past	 emerge	 in	 Kate’s	 environment	 through	 what	Farrier	 describes	 as	 the	 island’s	 ‘haunted,	 even	 pathological	 landscape’,	with	rocks	‘bruised	purple,	bruised	red	–	swollen	with	history,’	as	well	as	through	her	own	descriptions	of	these	past	events	(Farrier,	p.	7.;	Hooper,	p.	31).			 Runaway	 convicts	 […]	 learned	 bushcraft	 from	 the	 Aborigines	 and	disappeared	into	the	bush.	Meanwhile	the	Aborigines,	terrified	of	the	colonists’	 guns	 vomiting	 forth	 thunder,	 had	 their	 land	 cleared.	Dispossessed,	 they	 formed	 raiding	 parties,	 lighting	 decoy	 fires	 to	steal	 settler’	 guns	 and	 food.	 Settlers	 were	 speared,	 but	 during	 the	seven-year	 Black	 War	 the	 whites	 that	 died	 did	 not	 surpass	 the	number	that	arrived	monthly	on	each	new	convict	ship.	And	by	1839	most	of	the	indigenous	population	had	died	or	been	driven	away.	Our	local	history	 is	 the	Ur-true-crime	story,	and	 in	volume	after	volume	the	bodies	pile	up	(Hooper,	p.	98).		Here,	 Kate	 situates	 the	 murder	 of	 the	 indigenous	 population	 as	 an	originary	 act	 of	 violence	 that	 implicates	 all	 of	 Endport’s	 inhabitants.	 As	such,	the	suggestion	in	the	text	is	that	Kate	sees	the	brutal	extermination	of	 local	 wildlife	 (roadkill	 is	 such	 a	 problem	 that	 ‘most	 of	 our	 fauna	 is	displayed	by	the	side	of	 the	road’	(p.	37)),	as	well	as	Ellie	Siddell’s	death																																																									139	David	Farrier,	‘Animal	Detectives	and	“Anthropocene	Noir”	in	Chloe	Hooper’s	A	Child’s	Book	of	True	Crime’,	Textual	Practice,	2017,	1–19	(p.	7).	
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and	what	she	believes	are	Thomas	and	Veronica’s	plans	to	murder	her	as	simply	 inevitable	 consequences	 of	 the	 Endport	 community’s	 inherited	propensity	to	commit	acts	of	criminal	violence.	In	order,	it	seems,	to	grant	herself	a	kind	of	immunity	from	this	criminality	and	its	effects,	Kate	insists	on	characterising	herself	as	a	subject	in	need	of	protection:	that	is,	a	child.	These	 efforts	 to	 remain	 childlike	 are	 magnified	 in	 situations	 that	 are	generally	recognised	as	the	purview	of	adults,	most	notably	with	regard	to	her	sexual	relationship	with	Thomas.	She	speaks	to	him	‘in	a	nuanced	baby	talk’	 and	 he	 buys	 her	 sweet	 treats	 like	 ‘chocolate	mice	 and	 gingerbread	men’	 (pp.	 165,	 18).	When	 he	 drives	 away	 after	 one	 of	 their	 clandestine	meetings,	she	thinks,	‘wait	for	me,	I	don’t	want	to	go	to	school!	Can’t	I	stay	at	home	and	watch	television?’	(p.	43).		Her	narrative	voice	is	also	defined	by	a	mode	of	dense	self-analysis	that	structurally	performs	this	refusal	to	move	 forward,	 circling	 around	 her	 anxieties	 about	 adulthood,	 often	 in	relation	 to	 the	ways	 this	 is	 signalled	 on	 her	 body.	 She	 is	 still	 coming	 to	terms,	 she	 explains,	with	 ‘the	 shock	 of	 developing	 breasts’	 (p.	 114).	 Her	insistence	on	imagining	herself	to	be	in	danger	from	Veronica	and	Thomas	also	contributes	to	this	performance	of	precarity.	The	evidence	for	this	is	haphazard	 but	 convincing:	 her	 car’s	 fan	 belt	 has	 been	 tampered	 with;	someone	has	carved	the	words	 ‘I	know’	into	her	classroom	door;	she	has	received	 a	 number	 of	 unidentified	 phone	 calls.	 The	 novel’s	 structure	invites	us	to	assume	that	as	it	draws	nearer	to	revealing	the	real	murderer	of	Ellie	Siddell	(the	promise	of	Veronica’s	true	crime	book),	so	this	threat	to	Kate’s	life	will	also	reach	some	kind	violent	climax.		 As	 it	 turns	out,	 the	 text	withholds	both	of	 these	 things.	Veronica’s	book	sheds	no	new	 light	on	Ellie’s	murder,	which	remains	unsolved,	and	Kate’s	 showdown	 with	 the	 Marnes	 is	 something	 of	 a	 letdown,	 more	comical	 than	 frightening.	This	anticlimactic	outcome	achieves	 two	 things	that	 contribute	 to	 my	 positioning	 of	 the	 novel	 here	 as	 invested	 in	 a	‘backwards’	 turn.	 Firstly,	 the	 text	 remains	 uninterested	 in	 providing	 the	pleasure	of	resolution	that	would	situate	it	as	a	future-oriented	narrative;	one	 of	 the	 ‘projects	 of	 redemption,	 reconstruction,	 restoration,	 and	
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reclamation’	that	Halberstam	argues	queer	negativity	is	positioned	against	in	 its	 desire	 to	 challenge	 the	 norm	 of	 social	 thought	 (Caserio	 p.	 823).	Secondly,	 Kate’s	 confrontation	 with	 the	 Marne	 family	 punctures	 the	inflated	discourse	of	 reproductive	 futurism	 that	 sees	 the	Child	as	always	already	 in-danger	 by	 showing	 this	 to	 be	 a	 fantasy	 on	 her	 part.	 Her	encounter	with	Thomas	 and	Veronica	 takes	 place	 toward	 the	 end	 of	 the	novel.	She	arrives	at	 their	house,	drunk	and	with	a	knife	 in	her	purse,	 to	confront	 them	 about	 their	 son	 Lucien,	 who	 she	 believes	 has	 been	traumatised	by	his	mother’s	reimagining	of	the	Ellie	Siddell	murder.	After	she	has	forced	her	way	into	Lucien’s	bedroom	and	demanded	that	he	draw	a	picture	for	her	–	she	claims	that	his	drawing	will	reveal	‘the	real	story’	–	Thomas	 drags	 her	 out	 of	 the	 house.	 The	 expectation	 that	 Kate	 must	necessarily	 come	 to	 harm	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 Thomas	 and	 Veronica	 –	manufactured	by	the	twinning	of	her	story	with	Ellie	Siddell’s	–	is	deflated	when	 Thomas’s	 response	 to	 Kate’s	 pleas	 for	 her	 life	 is	 to	 return	 to	 his	house,	 yelling	 ‘‘Kate,	 not	 all	 things	 have	 to	 be	 so	 momentous!’’	 This	deliberately	anticlimactic	end	to	their	relationship	exposes	her	attachment	to	precarity	as,	ultimately,	manufactured,	as	is	her	assumption	that	Lucien	is	also	in	danger.			 Kate’s	 identification	with	 the	 figure	of	 the	 endangered	 child	 leads	her	to	construct	a	narrative	for	herself	 in	which	she	is	the	only	victim.	In	doing	so,	she	seeks	to	exempt	herself	 from	the	pervasive	criminality	that	she	attributes	to	the	other	members	of	her	community,	a	criminality	that	she	 ultimately	 sees	 as	 inherited	 generationally	 from	 the	 country’s	genocidal	 white	 settlers.	 In	 this	 sense,	 her	 fixation	 on	 claiming	 victim	status	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 refusal	 to	 really	 engage	with	 this	 brutal	 colonial	past	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 her	 own	 status	 as	 a	 privileged	 white	 subject.	 Ann	Curthoys	 has	 argued	 that	 ‘there	 is	 a	 special	 charge	 associated	 with	 the	status	of	victim	in	Australian	historical	consciousness’	with	the	country’s	popular	 historical	 mythology	 stressing	 ‘struggle,	 courage,	 and	 survi
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amidst	 pain,	 tragedy,	 and	 loss.’ 140 	Originally	 a	 means	 for	 asserting	ownership	 over	 land	 (the	 rights	 to	 it	 earned	 through	 ‘struggle,	 courage,	and	survival’),	she	suggests	that	these	victim	narratives	are	now	pervasive	enough	to	appear	 in	both	radical	and	conservative	versions	of	Australian	history	(p.	3).	As	I	suggested	is	the	case	with	Kate,	Curthoys	notes	that	‘the	emphasis	 in	white	Australian	popular	historical	mythology	on	 the	settler	as	victim	works	against	substantial	acknowledgement	and	understanding	of	a	colonial	past,	and	informs	and	inflames	white	racial	discourse’	(p.	4).	The	text’s	suggestion	that	Kate	similarly	wishes	to	abdicate	responsibility	for	 this	 past	 is	 not,	 I	 believe,	 accidental,	 but	 rather	 represents	 the	culmination	of	the	novel’s	investigation	into	the	ways	that	precarity	might	be	 constructed	 and	 manipulated.	 Indeed,	 the	 scenario	 plays	 out	 in	miniature	in	Kate’s	classroom,	where,	she	admits,	she	had	‘skirted	around	the	issue	of	genocide	[…]	only	asking	the	kids	to	write	their	own	versions	of	Aboriginal	Dreamtime	stories’	(p.	33).	However,	when	Thomas	suggests	that	 the	 children	 practise	 letter-writing	 by	 contacting	 the	 Tasmanian	parliament	 to	 advocate	 for	 the	Aboriginal	 Land	Acts	 to	 be	 passed,141	the	children	 arrive	 at	 school	 crying	 because	 their	 parents	 have	 ‘re-educated	them’:	 	 ‘They	 were	 going	 to	 lose	 their	 backyard,	 and	 therefore	 the	 new	swing	set	or	trampoline’	(p.	35).	Here,	the	wealthy	white	school	children	in	Kate’s	class	assert	 their	 (unquestioned	and	unquestionable)	rights	 to	 the	land	 by	 affirming	 a	 victim	 status.	 They	 stake	 their	 claim	 to	 the	 nation’s	future	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 indigenous	 population,	 figured	 here	 in	 the	negative	as	those	not	‘fighting	for	the	children.’					 A	Child’s	 Book’s	attitude	 to	 problems	 of	 extinction	 and	 the	 future	imaginary	differs	from	that	of	The	Hunter	in	that	this	novel	opts	out	of	the	logic	of	reproductive	futurism.	Where	The	Hunter	reinforces	the	culturally	prevalent	 notion	 that	 thinking	 about	 nonhuman	 extinction	 also	 means																																																									140	Curthoys,	p.	3.	141	The	text	is	set	at	a	very	particular	time	in	Australian	history	and	politics,	against	the	background	of	the	1992	Mabo	decision	that	led	to	the	introduction	of	‘Native	Title’.	This	new	law	recognised	Australia’s	First	Peoples	as	having	traditional	rights	to	their	lands.				
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thinking	about	human	children,	A	Child’s	Book	points	 instead	to	the	ways	in	which	subjects	that	have	been	designated	precarious	(like	the	Child,	or	the	extinct/endangered	animal)	do	not	pre-exist	the	social	processes	that	invent	them	as	such.	To	echo	Edelman,	this	is	not	to	argue	that	no	children	or	animals	really	face	danger,	but	instead	to	suggest	that	it	is	important	to	think	critically	about	the	subjects	that	are,	in	Love’s	words,	‘left	behind’	by	such	 designations.	 	 That	 is,	 the	 designation	 of	 certain	 subjects	 as	precarious	(and	thus	future-forming	in	the	demands	they	make	on	others	for	protection)	happens	at	 the	 expense	of	 other	 subjects	 that	 are	denied	access	to	such	vulnerability.	In	A	Child’s	Book,	the	ways	in	which	precarity	might	 be	 conceived	of	 as	 both	 irregularly	 distributed	 and	 also	malleable	are	exemplified	by	Kate’s	characterisation	of	Terence	Tiger,	who	comes	to	demonstrate	 the	 sense	 in	which	 the	 coherence	of	narratives	of	precarity	relies	primarily	on	 the	deployment	of	 representative	strategies	 that	 shift	over	time.			 As	Hooper	 surely	knows,	 the	body	of	 the	 thylacine	has	 long	been	a	site	 of	 conflict	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 debates	 over	 its	 representation.	 The	combination	of	its	striking	stripe	pattern,	elongated	tail	and	ability	to	open	its	 jaws	unusually	wide	 (almost	80	degrees)	give	 it	 a	unique	appearance	that	initially	made	it	hard	for	early	white	settlers	to	categorise	in	species	terms.	David	Owen	argues	that	this	uniqueness	ultimately	proved	to	be	‘its	undoing.’		The	earliest	Van	Diemen’s	Land	European	settlers,	[…]	had	to	‘invent’	it	–	and	they	did	so	in	a	welter	of	confusion,	wrongly	ascribing	to	it	the	 characteristics	 of	 known	 predatory	 mammals.	 In	 this	 way	 it	became	 a	 big	 cat/wolf/wild	 dog/hyaena	 hybrid,	 an	 elusive	 New	World	 creature	 as	 disturbing	 as	 the	 venom-spurred	 platypus	 was	bizarre.142																																																										142	David	Owen,	Thylacine :	The	Tragic	Tale	of	the	Tasmanian	Tiger	(Crows	Nest,	N.S.W.:	Allen	&	Unwin,	2003),	p.	4.	
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Carol	Freeman	has	 tracked	 the	ways	 that	 colonial	 representations	of	 the	thylacine	 tended	 to	 depict	 it	 as	 predatory	 and	 wolf-like	 in	 this	 way,	 a	strategy	 that	 (falsely)	 fuelled	 claims	 that	 it	was	a	 threat	 to	 livestock	and	encouraged	 hunters	 to	 kill	 the	 animal	 in	 large	 numbers	 in	 exchange	 for	bounty	payments.	Only	when	such	activities	had	pushed	 the	 thylacine	 to	the	 brink	 of	 extinction,	 Freeman	notes,	 did	 it	 begin	 to	 appear	 in	 natural	history	 works	 as	 a	 ‘relatively	 innocuous,	 dog-like	 animal.’143 	The	 last	‘Tassie	 Tiger’,	 known	 as	 Benjamin,	 died	 in	 the	 Hobart	 zoo	 in	 1936	 and	although	 the	 animal	 was	 listed	 as	 endangered	 for	 many	 years,	 the	Tasmanian	 Government	 finally	 declared	 it	 extinct	 in	 1986.	 Despite,	 this,	there	have	been	numerous	reported	sightings	of	the	thylacine	in	the	years	since	 Benjamin’s	 death,	 none	 of	 which	 have	 resulted	 in	 a	 living	 animal	being	 found. 144 	The	 thylacine	 has	 become,	 Stephanie	 Turner	 argues,	‘Tasmania’s	 brand	 logo’,	 often	 described	 in	 ‘a	 language	 of	 loss’	 that	suggests	 the	 animal	 might	 still	 exist,	 with	 the	 possibility	 of	 seeing	 a	thylacine	 a	 ‘heady	 attraction	 for	 Tasmanian	 visitors.’145	Even	 from	 the	brief	 outline	 I	 have	 given	 here	 it	 is	 easy	 to	 see	 how	 both	 scientific	 and	cultural	attitudes	towards	the	thylacine	have	shifted	from	representing	it	as	 dangerous	 (and	 therefore	 disposable)	 to	 figuring	 it	 as	 a	 precarious	subject	 in	 need	 of	 protection.	Whilst	 there	 is	 certainly	 a	 sense	 in	which	such	a	figuration	of	the	animal	is	borne	of	nostalgia,	its	spectral	presence	also	contributes	to	extinction’s	future	imaginary.		That	is,	the	idea	that	the	thylacine	 might	 still	 exist	 organises	 and	 mobilises	 Tasmanian	 national	identity	 by	 implying	 that	 ecological	 stability	 (and	 redemption)	 might	accompany	its	rediscovery.				
																																																								143	Carol	Freeman,	Paper	Tiger :	A	Visual	History	of	the	Thylacine	(Leiden:	Brill,	2010),	pp.	27–28.	144	For	more	on	the	thylacine	and	its	influence	on	contemporary	Tasmanian	conservation	projects,	see,	for	example,	David	Owen,	Thylacine :	The	Tragic	Tale	of	the	Tasmanian	Tiger	and	Robert	Paddle,	
The	Last	Tasmanian	Tiger :	The	History	and	Extinction	of	the	Thylacine,	1st	paperback	ed.	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2000).	145	Stephanie	S.	Turner,	‘Negotiating	Nostalgia:	The	Rhetoricity	of	Thylacine	Representation	in	Tasmanian	Tourism’,	Society	&amp;	Animals,	17.2	(2009),	97–114	(p.	97).	
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In	A	Child’s	Book	of	True	Crime	Hooper	short-circuits	such	a	future-oriented	narrative.	As	David	Farrier	points	out,	 ‘by	making	 the	 thylacine	the	 detective	 in	 her	 narrative,	 pursuer	 not	 pursued,	 Hooper	 is	 able	 to	explore	 the	 contingent	 nature	 of	 the	 competing	 narratives	 of	 the	 tassie	tiger’’	(p.	12).	As	Farrier’s	argument	suggests,	then,	the	text	is	interested	in	the	 ways	 the	 thylacine	 becomes	 available	 for	 representation	 as	 a	precarious	subject.	Crucially,	the	novel	suggests,	this	is	only	able	to	happen	by	 the	 animal’s	 body	 coming	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 site	 of	 emptiness,	waiting	 to	be	 filled,	 just	as	 its	hoped-for	 return	 is	 figured	 in	 the	national	imagination.	 Terence	 Tiger	 is	 particularly	 good	 at	 finding	 evidence,	 he	explains,	because	‘when	you’re	extinct,	people	look	you	straight	in	the	eye	and	assume	they	haven’t	seen	you’	(Hooper,	p.	183).		Necessarily,	 then,	 the	 ‘backwards	 feelings’	 that	 pervade	 Hooper’s	novel	 refuse	 the	 ‘politically	mobilizing’	 power	Heise	 attributes	 to	 elegiac	narrative.	 Instead,	 the	 text	 exposes	 the	ways	 in	which	 feelings	of	 loss	 as	well	as	calls	to	protect	certain	animals	and	humans	are	often	mobilised	by	the	 manipulation	 of	 precarious	 subjectivity	 and	 its	 accompanying	discourses	 of	 reproduction,	 redemption,	 and	 reconciliation.	 In	 thinking	about	 children	 and	 animals	 alongside	 each	 other,	 Hooper’s	 novel	 shows	the	 ways	 that	 precarious	 subjects	 come	 to	 be	 invented,	 and	 asks	 us	 to	think	critically	about	the	stories	we	tell	about	extinction,	compassion,	and	imagined	futures.		 	
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Chapter	Four	
	
Subjectivity	and	Interpretation	in	Trauma	Theory:		
Welcoming	the	Nonhuman	
	
	
	
Introduction	
		 The	 first	 section	 of	 this	 thesis	 explored	 theories	 of	mourning	 and	melancholia	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 group	 of	 contemporary	 texts	 about	 loss	 in	order	 to	 analyse	 how	 these	 texts	 made	 space	 for	 nonhuman	 bodies.	 I	examined	 the	processes	of	attachment	and	 identification	 that	shaped	 the	figuration	of	 these	nonhuman	bodies	 as	 lost	objects,	 as	well	 as	 the	ways	that	the	workings	of	such	processes	troubled	the	subjective	category	of	the	‘human.’	In	this	second	thesis	section	I	want	to	build	on	these	arguments	by	moving	on	to	explore	how	hospitable	contemporary	texts	are	to	these	attachments.	 In	 other	 words,	 how	 are	 these	 nonhuman	 spaces	 in	narratives	of	loss	kept	open,	and	in	what	sense	does	this	gesture	of	keeping	open	relate	 to	 the	processes	of	meaning-production	by	which	nonhuman	bodies	come	to	be	interpreted	in	literary	texts?			 In	 order	 to	 conduct	 this	 examination	 of	 nonhuman	 bodies	 and	interpretation	 I	 turn	 to	 another	 cultural	 formation	 influenced	 by	psychoanalysis,	what	 Roger	 Luckhurst	 calls,	 following	 Bruno	 Latour,	 the	‘exemplary	 conceptual	 knot’	 of	 trauma	 theory.	146	This	 is	 not	 because	 I	want	 to	 suggest	 that	 mourning	 and	 melancholia	 are	 superior	 analytical	tools	for	examining	narratives	about	extinction	and	climate	change,	whilst	the	theoretical	approaches	of	trauma	theory	are	more	appropriate	for	the	thematic	 schema	 addressed	 in	 this	 section	 (novels	 about	 animal																																																									146	Roger	Luckhurst,	The	Trauma	Question	(London:	Routledge,	2008),	p.	14.	
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‘ghostings’).147		Rather	I	believe	that	the	debates	about	interpretation	that	I	 argue	 here	 plague	 the	 field	 of	 trauma	 theory	 make	 it	 a	 particularly	suitable	 analytical	 framework	 through	 which	 to	 address	 questions	 of	meaning	and	subjectivity.				 When	 using	 the	 term	 ‘trauma	 theory’	 I	 refer	 specifically	 to	 what	Michael	 Rothberg	 defines	 as	 ‘classical	 trauma	 theory’	 and	 Roger	Eaglestone	 calls	 the	 ‘post-deconstructive	 strand’	 of	 trauma	 work.	 This	predominantly	 means	 the	 work	 of	 the	 American	 literary	 critic	 Cathy	Caruth,	as	well	as	her	colleagues	Dori	Laub	and	Shoshana	Felman,	and	the	intellectual	traditions	from	which	this	school	of	thought	emerges.	I	choose	to	focus	on	Cathy	Caruth’s	work	here	not	because	I	think	it	offers	the	best	model	 for	thinking	about	trauma	(rather	the	opposite,	as	 it	happens)	but	due	to	the	fact	that	I	see	the	psychoanalytical	approaches	that	subtend	it	as	 replicating	 the	 problematic	 of	 ‘holding	 on’	 and	 ‘letting	 go’	 that	 has	structured	my	inquiries	in	this	thesis.	In	the	context	of	trauma	theory	I	see	this	 conflict	 as	playing	out	 through	debates	about	 interpretation	 that	 set	up	an	opposition	between	either	working	through	(narrating)	experiences	of	trauma	or	remaining	in	an	aporetic	(unnarratable)	relation	to	them.				 In	 the	chapter	 that	 follows	 I	examine	 these	 interpretative	debates	and	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 they	 imagine	 the	 traumatised	subject.	 Following	 Ruth	 Leys	 and	 Susannah	 Radstone,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	Freudian	psychoanalytical	model	of	 trauma,	which	also	 informs	the	basic	tenets	 of	 classical	 trauma	 theory,	 relies	 on	 a	 model	 of	 sovereign	subjectivity	 that	establishes	the	breaching	of	an	 inside/outside	boundary	as	 endemic	 to	 the	 traumatic	 experience.	 I	 suggest	 that	 this	 sovereign	subject	 is	 only	 able	 to	 come	 into	 being	 by	 shielding,	 or	 exempting	 itself	
																																																								147	Indeed,	Michael	Rothberg	sees	climate	change	as	one	of	the	‘important	areas	of	concern’	for	contemporary	trauma	studies.	See		Rothberg,	‘Preface	Beyond	Tancred	and	Clorinda	-	Trauma	Studies	for	Implicated	Subjects.’,	in	The	Future	of	Trauma	Theory:	Contemporary	Literature	and	
Cultural	Criticism.,	ed.	by	Gert	Buelens,	Sam	Durrant,	and	Robert	Eaglestone	(London:	Routledge,	2014),	pp.	xi–xvii	(p.	xiv).	
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from,	 other	 kinds	 of	 subjectivity	 that	 are	 imagined	 as	 both	 invasive	 and	characterised	 by	 lack.	 	 This	 kind	 of	 othered	 subjectivity,	 I	 argue,	 is	exemplified	by	 the	 figure	of	 the	animal	whose	 imagined	privation	allows	the	 category	 of	 the	 ‘human’	 to	 emerge	 and	 as	 such	must	 necessarily	 be	held	 in	 an	 ‘outside’	 relation	 to	 this	 same	 human	 through	 the	 policing	 of	species	boundaries.	As	such,	 I	am	interested	 in	 the	ways	that	 this	animal	figure	inhabits	narratives	about	trauma,	and	particularly	in	the	ways	that	space	might	be	held	open	for	animals	in	this	context.	The	texts	I	focus	on	here	 figure	 animals	 in	 terms	of	 a	 traumatic	 ‘outside’	 (which	 they	 always	already	 are	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 constantly	 threaten	 to	 transgress	 the	species	boundary),	 and	 as	 such	 I	 analyse	 the	 kinds	of	meanings	 that	 are	available	to	them	in	these	narratives.	 I	argue	in	this	chapter	that	animals	are	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 debates	 about	 interpretation	 in	 the	 same	 way	 that	theories	of	trauma	are.	 	As	such,	I	suggest,	 it	 is	 important	to	examine	the	opportunities	 they	have	 to	 ‘mean’	differently	 in	 these	 texts	 in	 relation	 to	the	 way	 that,	 as	 sites	 of	 trauma,	 attempts	 to	 interpret	 their	 bodies	 are	affected	by	imperatives	to	either	successfully	work-through	their	presence	in	the	text	or	to	understand	it	as	aporetic.	Instead	of	this,	I	argue,	it	might	be	more	productive	to	think	about	how	the	figure	of	the	animal	might	be	read	 critically	 whilst	 also	 keeping	 space	 open	 for	 the	 multiplicity	 of	meanings	this	figure	might	contain.				 In	 readings	 of	 the	 first	 two	 texts	 I	 examine	 in	 this	 thesis	 section,	Evie	 Wyld’s	 novel	 All	 the	 Birds,	 Singing,	 and	 The	 Dogs	 of	 Littlefield	 by	Suzanne	Berne,	 I	argue	 that	such	an	objective	 fails	 to	be	achieved	due	 to	the	 different	 ways	 in	 which	 both	 texts	 remain	 attached	 to	 the	interpretative	 strategies	 of	 classical	 trauma	 theory.	 The	 final	 chapter	 of	this	 section	 focuses	on	Fiona	McFarlane’s	novel	The	Night	Guest,	which	 I	argue	 engages	 critically	 with	 processes	 of	 meaning-production	 as	 they	occur	in	the	context	of	trauma.	Ultimately,	I	suggest,	the	novel	allows	for	a	reading	of	animal	bodies	that	refuses	either	working-through	or	aporia	as	modes	of	interpretation,	and	is	instead	hospitable	to	holding	several	kinds	of	meaning	in	productive	tension.	This	chapter	will	set	out	the	theoretical	
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entanglements	 that	provide	 the	 context	 for	 this	argument,	 ending	with	a	brief	 reading	 of	 All	 the	 Birds,	 Singing,	 in	 which	 I	 show	 how	 the	 novel’s	privileging	 of	 Post-Traumatic	 Stress	 Syndrome	 (PTSD)	 as	 a	 traumatic	model	 acts	 to	 close	 down	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 mysterious	 animal	 that	haunts	its	pages.			
I.	 Trauma	theory	and	interpretative	work	
		 The	 history	 of	 trauma	 can	 be	 traced	 haphazardly	 across	 science,	medicine,	 and	 culture.	 In	 his	 genealogy	 of	 the	 concept,	 tracing	 its	development	from	the	nineteenth	century	and	then	through	the	invention	of	PTSD	as	a	diagnostic	category	post-Vietnam,	Roger	Luckhurst	suggests	trauma	owes	its	emergence	to	the	rise	of	‘the	technological	and	statistical	society	 that	 can	 generate,	multiply,	 and	 quantify	 the	 ‘shocks’	 of	modern	life’	 (Trauma	Question,	p.	 20).	 As	 such,	 he	 explains,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 note	that	throughout	its	history	trauma	is	always		‘in	major	part	a	medico-legal	concept	bound	up	with	economic	questions	of	compensation’	(p.	211).	 In	this	 sense	 trauma	 as	 a	 concept	 exceeds	 the	 context	 of	 the	 individual	sufferer	 and	 becomes	 imbricated	 in	 the	 structures	 of	 modernity;	specifically,	 Luckhurst	 argues,	 in	 relation	 to	 law,	 psychiatry	 and	industrialized	 warfare	 (p.	 20).	 As	 such,	 it	 presents	 ‘an	 intrinsically	interdisciplinary	conjuncture’,	both	in	terms	of	the	conditions	that	allow	it	to	 emerge	 as	 a	 diagnostic	 category	 as	 well	 as	 the	 responses	 that	 it	provokes.	An	attempt	to	engage	closely	with	this	wandering	and	complex	legacy	 is	necessarily	beyond	 the	 scope	of	 this	 chapter,	 and	as	 such	 I	will	limit	myself	to	a	brief	review	of	the	elements	of	this	history	as	they	relate	to	the	psychoanalytical	formulations	that	are	of	interest	here.148																																																										148	See	instead	Luckhurst’s	study,	cited	above,	which	is	a	brilliantly	comprehensive	engagement	with	the	history	of	trauma	that	ranges	widely	across	disciplines.	Luckhurst	describes	the	book	as	‘a	historical	genealogy	of	trauma	that	tries	to	make	sense	of	the	divergent	resources	that	have	been	knotted	into	the	concept	of	trauma	across	its	peculiarly	disrupted,	discontinuous	history.’	(p.	15).	
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Luckhurst	argues	that	general	scholarly	consensus	links	the	appearance	of	trauma	as	an	idea	to	the	development	and	expansion	of	the	railways	that	was	taking	place	 in	the	1860’s	(p.	21).	He	suggests	this	as	one	of	the	key	moments	 at	 which	 the	 general	 middle	 and	 upper	 class	 public	 were	exposed	to	some	of	the	corollaries	of	industrialisation,	namely	‘the	kinds	of	technological	violence	previously	restricted	to	factories’,	via	the	possibility	or	 reality	 of	 the	 railway	 accident	 and	 the	 consequences	 of	 this	 for	 the	person	 involved	 in	 it	 (p.21).	 Such	 consequences	 were	 predominantly	psychological	 affects	 disruptive	 of	 both	 sleep	 and	waking	 life,	 and	 these	diverse	 symptoms	 were	 eventually	 gathered	 together	 and	 put	 to	 work	under	 the	 ambivalent	 diagnosis	 of	 ‘railway	 spine.’	 This	 label	 referred	 to	the	 clinical	 consensus	 that	 the	 psychological	 disturbances	 caused	 by	railway	accidents	were	not	themselves	psychological	in	origin,	but	in	fact	had	a	physical	aetiology	in	‘micro	lesions	of	the	spinal	cord’	caused	by	the	collision.	149	Didier	 Fassin	 and	Richard	Rechtman	point	 out	 that	whilst	 it	was	 the	 German	 psychiatrist	 Hermann	 Oppenheim	 who	 first	 used	 the	more	 familiar	 term	 ‘trauma	neurosis’	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 condition,	 it	was	Freud	and	his	later	rival	Pierre	Janet	who	introduced	the	notion	of	psychic	causation	 into	 theories	 of	 trauma	 (p.31).	 Freud	 notes	 the	 connection	between	 railway	 spine	 and	 trauma	 toward	 the	 beginning	 of	 Beyond	 the	
Pleasure	Principle,	where	he	writes	‘a	condition	has	long	been	known	and	described	 which	 occurs	 after	 severe	 mechanical	 concussions,	 railway	disasters,	and	other	accidents	involving	a	risk	to	life.	It	has	been	given	the	name,	 traumatic	 neurosis.’150	Freud	 attributes	 the	 proliferation	 of	 ‘war	neuroses’	after	the	First	World	War	as	drawing	attention	to	this	condition	and	putting	‘an	end	to	the	temptation	to	attribute	the	cause	of	the	disorder	to	 organic	 lesions	 of	 the	 nervous	 system	 brought	 about	 by	 mechanical	force’	(p.	12).		
																																																								149	Didier	Fassin	and	Richard	Rechtman,	The	Empire	of	Trauma :	An	Inquiry	into	the	Condition	of	
Victimhood	(Princeton,	N.J.:	Princeton	University	Press,	2009),	p.	30.	150	Sigmund	Freud,	James	Strachey,	and	others,	The	Standard	Edition	of	the	Complete	Psychological	
Works	of	Sigmund	Freud.	Vol.	18	(1920-1922) :	Beyond	the	Pleasure	Principle,	Group	Psychology	and	
Other	Works	(London:	Vintage,	2001),	p.	12.	
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		 Despite	the	fact	that	Freud	is	an	important	and	controversial	figure	within	trauma	studies,	his	engagement	with	the	traumatic	neuroses	is,	as	Luckhurst	points	out,	 ‘actually	 rather	 intermittent’	 (p.	8).	His	work	often	speaks,	 indirectly	or	otherwise,	 to	 ideas	pertinent	 to	 the	development	of	the	 trauma	 paradigm;	 however	 his	 contributions	 are	 inconsistent	 and	complex,	 and	 the	 extraction	 from	 them	 of	 a	 fixed	 theory	 or	 conclusion	proves	 almost	 impossible.151 	His	 influence	 on	 theories	 of	 trauma	 can	initially	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 1937’s	 Studies	 in	 Hysteria,	 written	 in	collaboration	 with	 his	 colleague	 Joseph	 Breuer.	 Here,	 Freud	 and	 Breuer	argue	 for	 the	 usefulness	 of	 compounding	 the	 pathological	 reactions	 of	‘common’	 hysteria	 and	 traumatic	 neurosis	 in	 order	 to	 consider	 how	 a	‘traumatic	 hysteria’	 might	 present	 itself.	152	They	 suggest	 that	 traumatic	hysteria	 might	 be	 diagnosed	 when	 hysterical	 symptoms	 can	 be	 linked	backwards	 in	 time	 to	 an	 experience	 of	what	 they	 call	 ‘psychical	 trauma’	(Freud	 &	 Breuer,	 p.	 9).	 Famously,	 Freud	 and	 Breuer	 hypothesise	 this	psychical	 trauma	 as	 retroactive;	 they	 suggest	 it	 ‘operates	 like	 a	 foreign	body	which	must	 still	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	 present	 and	 effective	 agent	 long	after	it	has	penetrated’	(p.10).	As	a	result,	they	conclude	that:		 The	 precipitating	 event	 in	 some	way	 still	 continues	 to	 exercise	 an	effect	 years	 later,	 not	 indirectly	 through	 a	 chain	 of	 intermediary	causal	 links,	 but	 as	 a	 directly	 relating	 cause,	 in	 something	 like	 the	way	that	a	psychical	pain	remembered	in	waking	consciousness	will	still	 produce	 the	 secretion	 of	 tears	 later	 on:	 hysterics	 suffer	 for	 the	
most	part	from	reminiscences.	(p.	11,	italics	in	original).			The	 idea	 that	 trauma	might	be	 characterised	by	a	kind	of	belatedness	of	experience	 has	 proved	 tenacious.	 It	 is	 one	 of	 the	 elements	 at	 work	 in	trauma	theory	that	associates	it	so	closely	with,	and	makes	it	so	useful	for,																																																									151	See	Ruth	Leys	on	this.	Trauma:	A	Genealogy	(p.	274)	152	Sigmund	Freud	and	Joseph	Breuer,	Studies	in	Hysteria	(London:	Penguin,	2004),	p.	9.	
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a	 theorisation	 of	 hauntings.	 Further	 to	 this,	 however,	 it	 also	 invites	 and	even	necessitates	the	instigation	of	a	process	of	interpretation	that	would	seek	 to	 trace	 affective	 experiences	 in	 the	present	back	 to	 a	notional	 and	locatable	origin.	Freud	and	Breuer	make	this	explicit	in	their	discussion	of	the	kind	of	therapeutic	treatment	they	find	effective	for	such	a	condition.		
We	found,	at	 first	 to	our	great	surprise,	 that	 the	 individual	hysterical	
symptoms	disappeared	immediately	and	did	not	recur	if	we	succeeded	
in	 wakening	 the	 memory	 of	 the	 precipitating	 event	 with	 complete	
clarity,	 arousing	 with	 it	 the	 accompanying	 affect,	 and	 if	 the	 patient	
then	depicted	the	event	in	the	greatest	possible	detail	and	put	words	to	
the	affect	(p.	10,	italics	in	original).	
	Here	 we	 see	 an	 iteration	 of	 the	 kind	 of	 therapeutic	 ‘working-through’	closely	resembling	the	talking	cure	that	would	later	come	to	characterise	the	 psychoanalytic	 project.	 Processes	 of	 meaning-production	 are	 at	 the	heart	of	this	medical	encounter:	the	patient	must	choose	how	to	frame	and	then	 transmit	 their	 experience	 to	 a	 therapeutic	 listener,	 who	 in	 turn	accepts	 it	 as	 an	accurate	 (or	useful)	 retelling	of	 the	 traumatic	 event.	 For	Freud,	crucially,	 the	 therapeutic	worth	of	a	patient’s	story	of	 trauma	(i.e.	the	 extent	 to	 which	 it	 assists	 in	 an	 alleviation	 of	 their	 disruptive	symptoms)	 for	 the	most	 part	 takes	 precedence	 over	 establishing	 if	 that	same	 story	 successfully	 portrays	 a	 ‘real’	 event.	 His	 reluctance	 to	distinguish	 firmly	 between	 true	 and	 false	 memories	 of	 traumatic	experience	led	to	his	abandonment	of	the	seduction	theory	(the	idea	that	repressed	memories	of	real	childhood	sexual	abuse	were	 fundamental	 to	the	development	of	hysterical	symptoms	in	some	patients).	This	has	led	in	more	 recent	 years	 to	 ‘the	 scapegoating	 of	 Freud	 as	 the	 patriarch	 who	denied	 the	 traumatic	 realities	 of	 his	 women	 patients’	 (Luckhurst,	 p.49).	Luckhurst	defends	Freud	against	this	claim,	arguing:		 Freud	 never	 simply	 replaced	 the	 ‘real’	 event	 with	 a	 fantasy,	 truth	with	 falsity.	 Rather,	 he	 considered	 traumatic	 memories	 as	
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particularly	 hemmed	 in	 by	 resistances	 to	 being	 brought	 into	conscious	 recall,	 and	 were	 thus	 subject	 to	 multiple	 tricks	 of	transformation	 or	 displacement,	 intertwining	 the	 real	 and	fantasmatic	(p.	47).153		We	 come	 here	 to	 an	 example	 of	 the	 way	 in	 which	 issues	 of	 traumatic	interpretation	 intersect	 with	 and	 are	 necessarily	 shaped	 by	 the	 often-diverse	research	aims	of	those	contributing	to	the	field	of	trauma	studies.	For	 example,	 despite	 the	 key	 position	 Freud	 holds	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	aporetic	project	of	Caruthian	trauma	theory,	as	a	clinician	he	conceives	of	his	work	 as	 a	 scientific	method	 concerned	 primarily	with	 exploring	 and	refining	 the	 efficacy	 of	 therapeutic	 treatments.	 As	 such,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	understand	 that	 Freud’s	 allegiances	 are	 to	 the	 processes	 of	 working-through	 and	 resolution	 that	 align	 with	 the	 interests	 and	 concerns	 of	contemporary	 therapeutic	 practitioners,	 rather	 than	 the	 aporias	 of	cognitive	 expression	 that	 Caruth	 and	 her	 colleagues	 see	 as	 an	 inevitable	blockage	 to	 the	 relation	 of	 traumatic	 experience.	 In	 this	 sense	 then,	Freud’s	work	on	trauma	can	be	seen	as	aligned	with	the	imperative	to	‘let	go’	that	also	characterises	his	initial	response	to	the	problem	of	mourning.				 As	Luckhurst	points	out,	 the	aims	of	cultural	work	on	trauma	and	those	of	therapeutic	practices	should	not	be	collapsed	in	ways	that	fail	to	recognise	 the	different	contexts	 in	which	 they	both	operate.	As	he	notes,	‘aesthetic	 meditations	 that	 sustain	 irresolution	 and	 explore	 narrative	disjuncture	 are	 not	 written	 under	 the	 rubrics	 and	 aims	 of	 therapeutic	work	with	traumatized	people’	and	therefore	‘one	should	not	be	judged	by																																																									153	Ruth	Leys	echoes	Luckhurst	on	 this	point	when	 she	 claims	 that	 ‘for	Freud,	 at	 the	origin	 there	may	 well	 be	 a	 fundamental	 or	 originary	 dissimulation’	 (Trauma:	 A	 Genealogy,	 p.	 283).	 She	 also	argues	that	despite	fundamental	differences	of	opinion	between	Freud	and	his	one-time	influence	Pierre	 Janet	 on	 the	 sexual	 content	 of	 psychoanalysis,	 these	 are	 in	 fact	 less	 significant	 than	 ‘their	agreement	that,	 if	narration	cures,	 it	does	so	not	because	 it	 infallibly	gives	the	patient	access	to	a	primordially	personal	truth	but	because	it	makes	possible	a	form	of	self-understanding	even	in	the	absence	of	empirical	verification.’	(p.	117)		
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the	 other’	 (p.	 82).	 However,	 he	 later	 qualifies	 this	 statement	 when	 he	claims	 that	 ‘cultural	 theory	 too	 often	 demands	 that	 the	 impossible,	aporetic	 or	 melancholic	 response	 is	 the	 only	 appropriately	 ethical	condition	for	individuals	and	communities	defined	by	their	post-traumatic	afterwardsness,’	 whereas	 ‘psychiatric	 discourse	 assumes	 a	 plurality	 of	possible	 responses	 to	 traumatic	 impacts’	 (p.	 212).	 Luckhurst	 is	 at	 pains	here	to	suggest	the	existence	of	a	kind	of	flatness	in	cultural	trauma	theory	that	 acts	 to	 close	 down	 the	 possibility	 of	 multiple	 meaning-making	approaches	to	traumatic	experience.	Luckhurst	posits	the	kind	of	classical	trauma	theory	aligned	with	Caruth	and	her	colleagues	as	an	interpretative	mode	that,	in	contrast	to	the	way	Freud’s	later	version	of	working-through	engages	with	traumatic	narrative	as	it	becomes	therapeutic	to	the	patient,	instead	 acts	 on	 or	 reduces	 narrative	 meaning	 in	 pursuit	 of	 an	 (ethical)	truth.					 I	turn	now	to	look	at	classical	trauma	theory	in	the	context	of	these	questions.	This	work	originated	in	the	scholarship	of	several	members	of	the	 so-called	 ‘Yale	 School;	 in	 addition	 to	 Caruth,	members	 of	 this	 group	included	 Geoffrey	 Hartman,	 Shoshana	 Felman	 and	 Dori	 Laub.154	Despite	their	 contributions	 to	 this	 area	of	 research,	 I	will	 focus	here	on	Caruth’s	work	and	its	reception,	which	I	see	as	particularly	pertinent	to	the	aims	of	this	 chapter.	The	 influence	of	her	 theory	 is	 based	predominantly	on	 two	publications,	 the	 1995	 collection	Trauma:	Explorations	 in	Memory	 which	she	 edited	 and	 introduced,	 and	 her	 1996	 monograph	 Unclaimed	
Experience:	 Trauma,	 Narrative,	 and	 History.155 	In	 Unclaimed	 Experience	Caruth	offers	a	 ‘general	definition’	of	trauma,	which	she	describes	as	 ‘the	response	to	an	unexpected	or	overwhelming	violent	event	or	events	 that	are	not	fully	grasped	as	they	occur,	but	return	later	in	repeated	flashbacks,	nightmares,	 and	 other	 repetitive	 phenomena’	 (p.	 91).	 This	 definition																																																									154	For	a	full	account	of	the	evolution	of	Yale	School	trauma	theory,	see	Luckhurst	pp.	4-10	155	Cathy	Caruth,	Trauma :	Explorations	in	Memory	(Baltimore:	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1995);	Cathy	Caruth,	Unclaimed	Experience:	Trauma,	Narrative,	and	History,	Twentieth	Anniversary	edition	(Baltimore:	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	2016).	
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neatly	 encapsulates	 the	 two	 key	 characteristics	 Caruth	 attributes	 to	 the	traumatic	experience;	 firstly,	 the	unassimilable	nature	of	 the	experiential	event,	 and	 secondly	 the	 repetition	 compulsion	 that	 is	 triggered	 by	 that	same	 event.	 Caruth	 is	 influenced	 by	 Freud’s	 notion	 of	 hysterical	‘reminiscences’	 when	 she	 argues	 that	 ‘the	 event	 is	 not	 assimilated	 or	experienced	fully	at	the	time,	but	only	belatedly,	in	its	repeated	possession	of	 the	 one	 who	 experiences	 it’	 (Trauma,	 pp.	 4-5).	 Crucially,	 Caruth	attributes	ethical	value	to	the	aporia	presented	by	this	traumatic	moment,	specifically	 to	 what	 she	 conceives	 of	 as	 the	 difficulty	 of	 representing	 or	communicating	 an	 experience	 conceived	 of	 as	 unavailable	 to	 rational	consciousness.			 The	 transformation	 of	 trauma	 into	 a	 narrative	memory	 that	 allows	the	story	 to	be	verbalized	and	communicated,	 to	be	 integrated	 into	one’s	 own,	 and	 others’	 knowledge	 of	 the	 past,	 may	 lose	 both	 the	precision	and	the	force	that	characterized	traumatic	recall	(Trauma,	p.	153).		Whilst	 she	 sees	 this	 loss	 of	 precision	 and	 force	 as	 both	 regrettable	 and	important,	 Caruth	 firmly	 locates	 the	 ethical	 risk	 of	 communicating	 or	verbalizing	 trauma	 in	 what	 she	 calls	 the	 more	 ‘profound’	 loss	 of	 ‘the	event’s	 essential	 incomprehensibility,	 the	 force	 of	 its	 affront	 to	
understanding’	(Trauma,	p.	154,	italics	in	original).	She	sees	this	‘refusal	of	understanding’	 as	 ‘a	 fundamentally	 creative	 act’	 (p.	 155).	 Therefore,	 in	opposition	 to	 therapeutic	 processes	 of	 working-through,	 Caruth	 situates	an	 aporetic	 response	 as	 the	 only	 ethical	 means	 of	 approaching	 the	traumatic	 event.156	In	 contrast	 to	 Freud,	 then,	 her	 work	 has	 an	 ethical	
																																																								156	For	 Caruth	 (and	 her	 colleagues)	 the	 Holocaust	 is	 understood	 to	 be	 the	 archetypal	 traumatic	event,	and	as	such	her	work	 is	situated	 in	a	complex	tradition	of	 thought	(influenced	by	Theodor	Adorno)	that	sees	narratives	of	trauma	after	the	Holocaust	as	implicated	in	crises	of	representation.		
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investment	in	‘hanging	onto’	the	traumatic	experience,	rather	than	letting	it	go.157			 The	 opposition	 between	 working-through	 and	 aporia	 that	characterises	 the	 psychoanalytic	 narrative	 of	 trauma	 theory	 is	 theorised	slightly	 differently	 in	 the	 work	 of	 the	 historian	 Ruth	 Leys,	 whose	 own	genealogy	 of	 trauma	 seeks	 to	 establish	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 polarisation	 in	the	field	of	trauma	studies	between	work	that	takes,	variously,	a	mimetic	or	 an	anti-mimetic	 approach	 to	 theorising	 the	 traumatic	 experience.	The	mimetic	 position,	 for	 Leys,	 is	 associated	 with	 an	 understanding	 of	traumatic	symptoms	that	perceives	the	trauma	victim	as	having	identified	with	 (and	 be	 involved	 in	 the	 acting	 out/repetition	 of)	 a	 traumatic	experience	 not	 available	 to	 that	 traumatised	 subject	 for	 reflection	 or	representation.	 Conversely,	 anti-mimetic	 thinking	would	 seek	 to	 draw	 a	dichotomy	 between	 the	 traumatic	 event	 and	 an	 ‘autonomous	 subject’	understood	as	being	 ‘fully	constituted.’158		This	subject	would,	albeit	with	some	difficulty,	be	able	to	remember,	recover,	and	represent	their	trauma	in	ways	 that	might	 alter	or	 cast	doubt	on	 the	notion	 that	 the	experience	held	a	fundamental	or	elusive	truth.	I	would	suggest	then	that	the	mimetic	position	could	be	identified	with	a	paralysing,	aporetic	relation	to	trauma,	whilst	 the	 anti-mimetic	 approach	would	 imagine	 a	 subject	 able	 to	work-through	 their	 traumatic	 experience.	 Leys’	 identification	 of	 a	 constant	‘oscillation’	 between	 these	 two	 positions,	 then,	 would	 also	 point	 to	 the	ways	that	trauma	theory	has	been	(and	remains)	troubled	by	questions	of	interpretation	 that	 fail	 to	 resolve	 this	 conflict	 between	 narrative	 and	
																																																								157	Despite	this,	Caruth	does	situate	her	work	in	relation	to	and	as	drawing	from	scientific	studies	of	trauma	victims.	The	clinician	Bessel	van	der	Kolk,	whose	findings	feature	prominently	in	her	writing	as	justifications	for	her	own	theories,	particularly	influences	her.	Joshua	Pederson	suggests	this	as	a	partial	explanation	for	her	‘system’s	enduring	use	value’,	noting	that	‘because	she	constructed	her	critical	edifice	on	a	scientific	foundation,	her	theory	has	long	been	resistant	to	critique.’	See	Joshua	Pederson,	‘Speak,	Trauma:	Toward	a	Revised	Understanding	of	Literary	Trauma	Theory’,	Narrative,	22.3	(2014),	333–53	(p.	334)		158	Ruth	Leys,	Trauma :	A	Genealogy	(Chicago ;	London:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2000),	pp.	9,	299.	
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aporetic	approaches;	questions	that,	 I	want	to	suggest	here,	are	 linked	to	the	ways	that	it	imagines	subjectivity.		
II.		 The	‘subject’	of	trauma	theory			 Caruth	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 exemplifying	 the	 anti-mimetic	position,	 Leys	 argues,	 because	 she	 characterises	 the	 ‘unclaimed	experience’	of	 trauma	 ‘as	a	 literal,	nonsymbolic,	and	nonrepresentational	
memory	of	the	traumatic	event’	(p.	272).	This	is	typified	in	Caruth’s	work	by	her	description	of	the	traumatic	dream	as	‘the	literal	return	of	the	event	against	 the	 will	 of	 the	 one	 it	 inhabits’	 (Unclaimed,	 p.	 59).	 However,	 as	Susannah	 Radstone	 points	 out	 in	 her	 reading	 of	 Leys,	 it	 is	 important	 to	recognise	 that	 ‘mimetic	 and	 anti-mimetic	 tendencies	 cannot	 be	 strictly	divided	 from	 each	 other’,	 and	 rather	 than	 trying	 to	 resolve	 this	problematic	 Leys	 focuses	 instead	 on	 identifying	 ‘the	 contradiction	between	these	tendencies’	 in	 the	history	of	psychoanalytically	 influenced	approaches	 to	 trauma.	 In	 this	sense,	 then,	as	Radstone	makes	clear,	anti-mimetic	thinking	will	necessarily	always	contaminate	Caruth’s	work,	even	as	she	strives	toward	the	purity	of	the	mimetic	position.159			 For	Radstone,	whilst	Caruth’s	trauma	theory	might	seem	to	fit	more	easily	with	the	mimetic	paradigm	in	that	it	 ‘emphasizes	lack	of	recall	and	the	 unexperienced	 nature	 of	 trauma’,	 its	 emphasis	 on	 trauma	 as	 event-based	 also	 aligns	 it	with	 the	 anti-mimetic	 position	 (p.	 15).	 In	Unclaimed	
Experience	 Caruth	 frequently	 refers	 to	 traumatic	 experience	 as	 an	‘event’,160	and	Stef	Craps	sees	this	adherence	to	a	‘traditional	event-based	model	 of	 trauma,	 according	 to	 which	 the	 trauma	 results	 from	 a	 single,	extraordinary,	 catastrophic	 event’	 as	 one	 of	 the	 hallmarks	 of	 classical	
																																																								159	Susannah	Radstone,	‘Trauma	Theory:	Contexts,	Politics,	Ethics’,	Paragraph,	30.1	(2007),	9–29.	160	See	for	example,	p.	11:	‘In	its	most	general	definition,	trauma	describes	an	overwhelming	experience	of	sudden	or	catastrophic	events	in	which	the	response	to	the	event	occurs	in	the	often	delayed,	uncontrolled	repetitive	appearance	of	hallucinations	and	other	intrusive	phenomena.’	
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trauma	theory.	161	Caruth’s	emphasis	on	the	traumatic	event	arrives	in	her	theory	 through	 her	 privileging	 of	 Freud’s	 writings	 on	 trauma,	 which	Radstone	points	out	 ‘return,	 always,	 to	 trauma’s	 relation	 to	an	event’	 (p.	15).	 In	 Beyond	 the	 Pleasure	 Principle,	 such	 a	 formulation	 gives	 rise	 in	Freud’s	work	 to	 the	comparison	of	 the	mind	to	a	 ‘living	organism	[…]	an	undifferentiated	 vesicle	 of	 a	 substance	 that	 is	 susceptible	 to	 stimulation’	(p.	 26).	 Freud	 imagines	 this	 vesicle	 (a	 kind	 of	 single	 cell)	 as	 being	 in	possession	of	a	‘protective	shield	against	stimuli’,	and	goes	on	to	explain	‘	we	 describe	 as	 ‘traumatic’	 any	 excitations	 from	 outside	 which	 are	powerful	 enough	 to	 break	 through	 the	 protective	 shield’	 (pp.	 27,	 29).	Trauma	 is	 envisaged	 here	 as	 a	 sudden	 event	 powerful	 enough	 to	 pierce	this	protective	layer,	an	image	that	returns	to	the	original	Greek	meaning	of	 trauma	 as	 ‘wound’,	 which	 Catherine	 Malabou	 explains	 derives	 from	‘titrosko’	meaning	‘to	pierce’.	Trauma	thus	‘names	a	shock	that	forces	open	or	pierces	a	protective	barrier.’162	Caruth	takes	up	this	image	of	trauma	as	a	 mental	 wound	 in	 Unclaimed	 Experience,	 where	 she	 argues	 that	 this	‘wound	of	 the	mind	 […]	 is	not,	 like	 the	wound	of	 the	body,	 a	 simple	and	healable	event’	(p.	4).			 Such	a	figuration	of	the	traumatised	subject	is	characteristic	of	the	anti-mimetic	 paradigm,	 Radstone	 follows	 Leys	 in	 arguing,	 because	 it	allows	this	subject	to	be	‘theorized	as	sovereign,	if	passive’	(p.	15).	That	is,	it	 secures	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 bounded	 subject	 that	 the	 mimetic	 position	threatens	 to	 destabilise	 when	 it	 suggests	 traumatised	 subjects	 are	necessarily	 ‘absent	 from	 themselves	 and	 involuntarily	 mimicking	 a	 past	traumatic	 experience’	 (p.	 14).	 However,	 for	 Radstone,	 Freud’s	 work	ultimately	 fails	 (and	 refuses)	 to	 install	 sovereignty	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	subject	due	to	 the	emphasis	placed	on	 ‘the	mediating	role	of	unconscious	
processes	 in	the	production	of	 the	mind’s	scenes	and	meanings,	 including																																																									161	Stef	Craps,	Postcolonial	Witnessing:	Trauma	out	of	Bounds	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2013),	p.	31.	162	Catherine	Malabou	and	Steven	Miller,	The	New	Wounded :	From	Neurosis	to	Brain	Damage,	1st	ed.	(New	York:	Fordham	University	Press,	2012),	p.	6.	
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those	 of	 memory’163	(p.	 16).	 In	 contrast,	 she	 suggests,	 classical	 trauma	theory	 ‘dispenses	 with	 the	 layering	 of	 conscious/subconscious	 and	unconscious,	 substituting	 for	 them	 a	 conscious	 mind	 in	 which	 past	experiences	 are	 accessible,	 and	 a	 disassociated	 area	 of	 the	 mind	 from	which	past	experiences	cannot	be	accessed.’	By	flattening	the	topography	of	 subjectivity	 in	 this	 way,	 Radstone	 suggests,	 Caruth’s	 work	 loses	 	 ‘the	challenge	 to	 the	 subject’s	 sovereignty	 posed	 by	 the	 unconscious	 and	 its	wayward	processes’	(p.	16).				 The	 irony	 of	 this,	 Radstone	 makes	 clear,	 is	 that	 Caruth’s	 work	departs	 from	 the	 critical	 relationship	 to	 subjective	 autonomy	 and	sovereignty	that	the	scholarly	fields	subtending	her	work	(psychoanalysis,	poststructuralism	 and	 deconstruction)	 insist	 on.	 In	 doing	 so,	 her	 work	theorises	 an	 autonomous,	 bounded	 subject	 for	 whom	 trauma	 advances	from	an	invasive	‘outside’	in	an	act	of	traumatic	wounding.	For	Radstone,	this	 ultimately	 means	 that	 Caruth	 sets	 up	 an	 opposition	 between	 the	‘normal’	 and	 the	 pathological’:	 in	 other	 words,	 ‘one	 has	 either	 been	present	 at	 or	 has	 ‘been’	 traumatized	 by	 a	 terrible	 event	 or	 one	 has	 not’	(pp.18-19).	 It	will	be	useful	at	this	point	to	extend	Radstone’s	analysis	 in	order	 to	 examine	 how	 this	 binary	 opposition	 (normal/pathological)	 is	further	deployed	in	Caruth’s	work	through	her	reliance	on	the	notions	of	‘fullness’	and	 ‘truth’	 in	relation	to	traumatic	experience,	and	in	particular	how	these	ideas	inflect	her	approach	to	the	interpretation	of	literary	texts.			 ***			 Caruth	is	a	literary	theorist,	and	is	primarily	interested	in	the	ways	that	literary	texts	might	express	‘truths’	about	trauma.	She	sees	such	texts	as	uniquely	equipped	for	this	task	in	that	they	are	able	to	incorporate	‘the	radical	 disruption	 and	 gaps	 of	 traumatic	 experience’	 (Trauma,	 p.	 4).	Reading	 trauma	well	means	 paying	 attention	 to	 these	 same	moments	 of																																																									163	Freud’s	reluctance	to	see	traumatic	experience	as	‘literal’	in	Caruth’s	sense	led,	as	I	have	explained,	to	his	abandonment	of	the	seduction	theory.	
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disruption	 or	 omission	 as	 they	 appear	 in	 a	 literary	 text,	 perhaps	 most	obviously	as	they	problematize	or	interrupt	narrative.	It	is	not	difficult	to	find	examples	of	trauma	narratives	that	might	be	seen	to	function	in	this	way;	 indeed	 Luckhurst	 suggests	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 outline	 an	 emergent	international	canon	of	trauma	fiction	that	shares	this	‘implicit	aesthetic’	(p.	87).	For	Luckhurst	 the	 formation	of	such	a	 trauma	aesthetic	 is	bound	up	with	 the	 notion	 that	 ‘because	 a	 traumatic	 event	 confounds	 narrative	knowledge,	the	inherently	narrative	form	of	the	novel	must	acknowledge	this	in	different	kinds	of	temporal	disruption’	(p.	88).	Most	notably	in	the	case	of	Holocaust	literature	the	incorporation	of	different	kinds	of	rupture	into	 narrative	 also	 comes	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 a	moral	 position	 that	 refuses	 to	normalise	extremes	of	experience;	as	a	result	of	 this	 ‘formal	choices	 that	do	not	 find	ways	of	 figuring	 this	aporia	become	unethical’	 (Luckhurst,	p.	89).	Stef	Craps	and	Gert	Buelens	go	so	far	as	to	argue	that,	‘within	trauma	studies,	 it	 has	 become	 all	 but	 axiomatic	 that	 traumatic	 experiences	 can	only	 be	 adequately	 represented	 through	 the	 use	 of	 experimental,	(post)modernist	 textual	 strategies.’164	Indeed,	 both	 Laurie	 Vickroy	 and	Anne	Whitehead	emphasise	this	aspect	of	trauma	narrative	in	their	recent	studies	 of	 trauma	 fiction.	 Whitehead	 suggests	 that	 these	 narratives	 are	‘characterised	by	 repetition	 and	 indirection’	 in	 addition	 to	 temporal	 and	chronological	 collapse,165	and	 for	 Vickroy,	 ‘memory	 is	 explored	 through	affective	 and	 unconscious	 associations	 rather	 than	 through	 conscious	memories	 or	 structured	 plots.’166Luckhurst	 notes	 that	 an	 unexpected	consequence	 of	 this	 emphasis	 on	 a	 particular	 set	 of	 formal	 rules	 is	 that,	‘the	 aesthetic	means	 to	 convey	 the	 singularity	 of	 a	 traumatic	 aporia	 has	now	 become	 highly	 conventionalized,	 the	 narratives	 and	 tropes	 of	traumatic	fiction	easily	 identified’(pp.89-90).	 Joshua	Pederson	appears	to	express	frustration	with	the	fetishisation	of	such	narratives,	then,	when	he	
																																																								164	Stef	Craps	and	Gert	Buelens,	‘Introduction:	Postcolonial	Trauma	Novels’,	Studies	in	the	Novel,	40.1/2	(2008),	1–12	(p.	5).	165	Anne	Whitehead,	Trauma	Fiction	(Edinburgh:	Edinburgh	University	Press,	2004),	p.	3.	166	Laurie	Vickroy,	Trauma	and	Survival	in	Contemporary	Fiction	(Charlottesville,	Va. ;	London:	University	of	Virginia	Press,	2002),	p.	3.	
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suggests	that	theorists	might	like	to,	‘shift	their	attention	away	from	gaps	and	toward	actual	text’	(p.338).			 It	 is	 of	 course	 difficult	 to	 gauge	 if	 Caruth’s	 work	 has	 directly	influenced	fiction	writers,	but	many	texts	that	signify	as	trauma	narratives	certainly	prove	hospitable	to	the	kinds	of	reading	that	she	sees	as	properly	ethical.	Such	approaches	 to	reading	are	necessarily	bound	up	 in	complex	ways	 with	 ideas	 about	 how	 we	 might	 want	 to	 interpret	 texts	 and	 for	Caruth	such	epistemological	anxieties	are	also	proper	to	the	experience	of	trauma.	She	explains:		 If	 Freud	 turns	 to	 literature	 to	 describe	 traumatic	 experience,	 it	 is	because	 literature,	 like	psychoanalysis,	 is	 interested	 in	 the	complex	relations	between	knowing	and	not	knowing.	And	it	is	at	the	specific	point	at	which	knowing	and	not	knowing	intersect	that	the	language	of	 literature	 and	 the	psychoanalytic	 theory	of	 traumatic	 experience	precisely	meet	(Unclaimed	p.3).		Caruth	 situates	her	work	as	being	preoccupied	with	exactly	 this	 relation	between	knowing	and	not	knowing,	and	implies	that	she	is	concerned	with	the	 point	 at	which	 both	 these	 terms	 are	 held	 in	 equal	 play.	 Yet	 I	would	suggest	 that	 the	 ethical	 emphasis	 she	 seems	 to	 place	 on	 not	 knowing,	which	takes	place	through	her	privileging	of	non-representation,	is	reliant	on	a	paradoxical	belief	in	the	existence	of	a	kind	of	‘fullness’	of	knowledge	associated	with	sovereign	subjectivity.	See	for	example	this	statement:		 Trauma	is	not	locatable	in	the	simple	violent	or	original	event	in	an	individual’s	 past,	 but	 rather	 in	 the	way	 that	 its	 very	 unassimilated	nature-	 the	 way	 it	 was	 precisely	 not	 known	 in	 the	 first	 instance-	returns	to	haunt	the	survivor	later	on	(Unclaimed,	p.4,	my	italics).		In	 emphasising	 this	 latency	 as	 a	 property	 of	 trauma,	 Caruth	 engages	closely	 with	 Freud’s	 work,	 specifically	 his	 concept	 of	 ‘reminiscences’.			
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However,	as	I	explained	earlier	in	this	chapter,	Freud	ultimately	comes	to	see	a	quest	for	the	‘truth’	of	an	original,	triggering	event	as	subordinate	to	the	way	 the	 traumatised/hysterical	 subject	 chooses	 to	express	and	work	through	 their	 understanding	 of	 that	 experience	 in	 a	 therapeutic	 context.	Caruth’s	 deviation	 from	 this	 position	 is	 evident	 in	 her	 reiteration	 of	 the	idea	that	trauma	cannot	be	known,	or	fully	experienced,	at	the	time	of	its	occurrence.	In	persevering	with	this	concept	she	leans	on	the	idea	that	the	ability	to	‘know’	is	a	normative	condition	of	everyday	existence	preceding	and	only	undermined	by	the	traumatic	encounter.	In	other	words,	Caruth’s	theory	 relies	 on	 the	 postulation	 of	 a	 sovereign	 subject	 able	 to	 ‘fully’	comprehend	and	unproblematically	assimilate	 the	world	around	 them	 in	order	 to	 oppose	 to	 this	 a	 traumatised	 subject	 alienated	 from	 this	prelapsarian	 state.	 As	 such,	 she	 manages	 to	 situate	 sovereignty	 as	 a	normative	ontological	mode	in	a	move	that	others	the	traumatised	subject	and	brings	them	into	being	under	the	sign	of	privation.			 Insistent	reenactments	of	the	past	do	not	simply	serve	as	testimony	to	 an	 event,	 but	may	 also,	 paradoxically	 enough,	 bear	witness	 to	 a	past	that	was	never	fully	experienced	as	it	occurred.	Trauma,	that	is,	does	not	simply	serve	as	record	of	the	past	but	precisely	registers	the	force	of	 an	 experience	 that	 is	not	 yet	 fully	 owned	 (Caruth,	Trauma,	p.151,	my	italics).			Full	ownership	of	the	traumatic	encounter	is	held	out	through	the	‘not	yet’	as	 a	 reasonable	 (albeit	 infinitely	 deferred),	 expectation	 for	 the	 future	subject,	 with	 this	 figure	 of	 fullness	 also	 assimilated	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 an	ultimate	 ‘truth’	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 traumatic	 experience.	 This	 idea	 is	 also	expressed	 in	 another	 circular	 statement	 that	 relies	 on	 a	 process	 of	‘othering’	when	Caruth	argues	 that	 trauma’s	 ‘truth’	 is	 ‘bound	up	with	 its	crisis	of	truth’	(Trauma,	p.8.).			 Clearly,	issues	of	interpretation	are	touched	on	here:	how	might	we	access	this	‘truth’	at	the	heart	of	the	traumatic	experience?	How	might	we	
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read	 it?	 For	 Caruth	makes	 it	 clear	 that	 the	 disruption	 trauma	 causes	 in	experiential	 terms	 for	 her	 imagined	 normative	 subject	 (dissonance	affecting	that	subject’s	understanding	of	being-in-the-world),	also	extends	to	 the	 non-traumatised	 subject	 who	 seeks	 to	 interpret	 the	 traumatic	narrative.	 Her	 interpreting	 subject	 is	 conceived	 as	 having	 the	 ability	 to	perform	 a	 kind	 of	 direct	 and	 easy	 translation	 of	 related	 experience	 into	meaning,	 a	 process	 exploded	 by	 the	 traumatic	 encounter.	 She	 argues,	‘psychoanalytic	theory	[…]	listens	to	a	voice	that	it	cannot	fully	know	but	to	 which	 it	 nevertheless	 bears	 witness’(Unclaimed,	 p.9).	 Once	more,	 the	inescapable	 implication	 of	 her	 argument	 is	 that	 there	 must	 be	 a	conventional	means	 of	 attaining	 ‘full	 knowledge’	 that	 stands	 opposed	 to	the	 obfuscation	 of	 innate/readable	 meaning	 brought	 about	 by	 the	experience	of	trauma.			 I	 don’t	 want	 to	 argue	 here	 for	 a	 kind	 of	 depoliticized	 relativism	where	truths	would	not	be	 locatable,	or,	 indeed,	relevant.	 Instead,	 I	want	to	note	 that	Caruth	writes	herself	 into	advocating	an	ontology	of	 trauma	that	constructs	a	dichotomy	between	the	privation	of	a	traumatised	other	and	 a	 normative,	 cognitively	 ‘full’	 subject.	 	 It	 seems	 to	 me	 that	 this	formulation	is	an	effect	of	the	latent	humanism	of	Caruth’s	critical	thought.		Her	work	continually	presupposes	a	human	subject	that	is	fully	cognizant,	rational	 and	 agential	 in	 order	 to	 oppose	 to	 it	 an	 ‘other’	 devoid	 of	 these	capabilities.				 In	 line	 with	 the	 aims	 of	 this	 thesis,	 then,	 I	 want	 to	 explore	 what	happens	in	trauma	narratives	when	that	incomplete	other	appears	under	the	sign	of	the		‘animal.’			
III. Interpreting	traumatic	animals		
		 Cary	 Wolfe	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 act	 of	 ‘organic	 repression’	 that	Freud	locates	as	the	origin	of	the	human	in	Civilization	and	its	Discontents	(humans	 ‘begin	to	walk	upright	and	rise	above	 life	on	the	ground	among	
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blood	and	 feces’)	 is	based	on	 ‘what	 amounts	 to	a	 sacrifice	of	 the	animal,	and	more	broadly,	of	animality.’	167Therefore	whilst	Freud	saw	his	work	as	delivering	 a	 blow	 to	 ‘human	 narcissism’	 through,	 in	 Michael	 Lundblad’s	words,	 ‘the	psychoanalytic	discovery	that	the	human	mind	cannot	always	control	or	even	be	aware	of	its	unconscious	instincts’,	he	also	secured	the	sovereignty	of	this	human	subject	by	positing	its	emergence	as	dependent	on	 the	 abjection	 of	 the	 animal.168	Consequently	 although	 for	 Freud	 this	repressed	 animality	 remained	 latent	 in	 the	 human	 mind	 through	 the	workings	of	 the	unconscious,	Carrie	Rohman	argues	 that	his	work	aimed	‘to	 contain	 and	 control	 that	 unthinkable	 linkage.’169	As	 Caruth’s	work	 on	trauma	in	some	ways	inherits	this	way	of	thinking	about	subjectivity	due	to	 the	 fact	 she	 takes	Freud’s	writings	as	her	point	of	departure,	 it	 seems	fair	to	make	the	assumption	that	the	impoverished	subject	that	emerges	in	her	work	might	usefully	be	analysed	in	terms	of	its	animality,	as	well	as	in	the	sense	that	the	animal	 is	also	figured	in	psychoanalysis	as	a	traumatic	‘outside’	 to	 the	 sovereign	 human	 subject,	 constantly	 threatening	 to	infringe	 its	 borders.	 A	 further	 reason	 for	 examining	 the	 animal	 in	 this	context	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 as	 objects	 of	 intellectual	 inquiry	animals	(and	specifically	textual	animals)	share	with	the	trauma	concept	a	privileged	position	 in	debates	about	 interpretation.	Their	posited	alterity	is	either	made	narratable	through	anthropomorphisation,	or	reduced	to	an	impasse.170				 In	 The	 Animal	 That	 Therefore	 I	 Am,	 Jacques	 Derrida	 turns	 his	attention	 to	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 animal	 in	 the	 history	 of	 philosophy;	
																																																								167	Cary	Wolfe,	Animal	Rites :	American	Culture,	the	Discourse	of	Species,	and	Posthumanist	Theory	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2003),	p.	2;	Wolfe,	Before	the	Law,	p.	9.	168	Michael	Lundblad,	The	Birth	of	a	Jungle :	Animality	in	Progressive-Era	U.S.	Literature	and	Culture	(Oxford ;	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013),	p.	4.	169	Carrie	Rohman,	Stalking	the	Subject :	Modernism	and	the	Animal	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2009),	p.	22.	170	For	an	interesting	example	of	a	literary	representation	of	these	debates,	see	Elizabeth	Costello’s	response	to	Thomas	Nagel’s	What	is	it	like	to	be	a	bat?	in	The	Lives	of	Animals	by	J.M.Coetzee	(London:	Profile,	2000).	
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specifically,	 the	ways	 in	which	a	 long	 line	of	philosophical	 thinkers	have	sought	to	construct	and	maintain	a	distinction	between	human	and	animal	life.	This	complex	and	thoughtful	work	turns	on	what	it	might	mean	for	a	human	to	be	caught	in	the	animal	gaze,	beginning	as	Derrida	reflects	on	his	feelings	 of	 embarrassment	 at	 finding	 himself	 naked	 in	 front	 of	 his	 cat.	Derrida	is	at	pains	to	emphasise	the	singularity	and	specificity	not	only	of	this	particular	cat-encounter,	but	also	of	his	cat	herself.	He	writes:		 I	must	immediately	make	it	clear,	the	cat	I	am	talking	about	is	a	real	cat,	truly,	believe	me,	a	little	cat.	It	isn’t	the	figure	of	a	cat.	It	doesn’t	silently	enter	the	bedroom	as	an	allegory	for	all	the	cats	on	the	earth,	the	 felines	 that	 traverse	 our	 myths	 and	 religions,	 literature	 and	fables	(p.	6).		With	 this	 gesture	Derrida	makes	 it	 clear	 that	 his	 cat	 is	 ‘unsubstitutable’;	the	story	he	is	telling	is	irrevocably	tied	to	her	unique	subjectivity	as	‘this	irreplaceable	 living	 being	 that	 one	 day	 enters	 my	 space.’	 As	 such,	 he	claims,	 she	 ‘does	 not	 appear	 to	 represent,	 like	 an	 ambassador,	 the	immense	 symbolic	 responsibility	 with	 which	 our	 culture	 has	 always	charged	 the	 feline	 race’	 (p.9).	 Derrida	 declines	 to	 participate	 in	 what	Phillip	 Armstrong	 suggests	 has	 historically	 been	 the	 principal	 mode	 of	engaging	with	cultural	representations	of	animals;	that	is,	to	read	them	as	‘screens	for	the	projection	of	human	interests	and	meanings.’171		As	Susan	McHugh	explains:		 Everybody	knows	the	disappearing	animal	trick:	rabbit	goes	into	hat,	magician	waves	wand,	and	presto!	The	magician	displays	an	empty	hat.	Simplistic	 though	 it	 sounds,	 this	old	act	 illustrates	how	 literary	critics	 historically	 have	 rendered	 the	 animal	 a	 non-issue.	 Reading	animals	 as	metaphors,	 always	 as	 figures	of	 and	 for	 the	human,	 is	 a	
																																																								171	Philip	Armstrong,	What	Animals	Mean	in	the	Fiction	of	Modernity	(London ;	New	York:	Routledge,	2008),	p.	2.	
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process	that	 likewise	ends	with	the	human	alone	on	the	stage.	Now	you	see	the	animal	in	the	text,	now	you	don’t.172			Derrida’s	 emphasis	 on	 processes	 of	 looking,	 seeing,	 and,	 crucially,	 being	seen	 foreclose	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	magician’s	 trick	 being	 successful	 by	insisting	on	 the	visibility	of	his	 cat;	 she	 is	 allowed	 to	 look,	 too.	However	McHugh	makes	 it	 clear	 that	 the	 sleight	 of	 hand	 that	 renders	 the	 animal	culturally	 invisible	has	a	particular	 relationship	 to	 the	ways	 in	which	we	read	 and	 understand	 literary	 representations	 of	 animals.	 The	interpretative	work	that	is	called	for,	or	desired,	by	a	reader	negotiating	a	literary	 text	 too	often	 invites	 recourse	 to	 the	 figure	of	 the	human	as	 the	privileged	 ‘key’	 to	 the	 complexities	 of	 that	 text.	 It	 should	 be	 important,	then,	to	attend	to	the	ways	that	textual	animals	might,	as	Philip	Armstrong	suggests,	 ‘have	 significances,	 intentions	 and	 effects	 quite	 beyond	 the	designs	of	human	beings’		(p.2).	Rather	than	arguing	away	or	denying	the	drive	 toward	 textual	 interpretation,	 it	 would	 instead	 be	 useful	 to	productively	complicate	the	interpretative	work	undertaken	by	the	reader	of	literary	texts	by	seeking	to	move	this	away	from	privileged	ontological	modes	of	reading	and	understanding.				 Indeed,	I	would	like	to	suggest	that	insights	from	the	field	of	animal	studies	might	go	some	way	toward	addressing	some	of	the	stalemates	that	can	 be	 seen	 to	 send	 theories	 of	 trauma	 into	 a	 perpetual	 argumentative	loop.	Where	trauma	studies	becomes	paralysed	by	competing	versions	of	experience	 (mimetic/non-mimetic)	 and	 their	 possible	 modes	 of	interpretation	 (the	 extent	 to	which	 they	might	be	 considered	as	offering	truths),	 animal	 studies	 engages	with	 the	 ethical	 tension	 generated	when	attempts	are	made	to	appropriate	or	interpret	another	bodies’	experience	of	being	in	the	world	in	ways	that	offer	a	fresh	perspective	on	the	debates	examined	here.																																																											172	Susan	McHugh,	‘Animal	Farm’s	Lessons	for	Literary	(And)	Animal	Studies’,	Humanimalia,	1.1	(2009),	n.p.[accessed	10	October	2017].	
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	 It	 is	useful	at	 this	point	 to	 turn	 to	an	example	of	 the	way	work	 in	animal	 studies	 seeks	 to	 avoid	 binary	 thinking	 when	 it	 comes	 to	interpreting	 animal	 bodies	 by	 way	 of	 analysing	 Anat	 Pick’s	 engagement	with	the	animal	scientist	Temple	Grandin.	Grandin	has	written	extensively	about	her	autism	and	the	ways	it	manifests	in	her	cognitive	life,	principally	with	 regard	 to	 the	way	 her	 thought	 processes	 take	 place	 visually	 (or,	 in	pictures)	rather	 than	 linguistically.	She	maintains	 that	 this,	alongside	 the	intensely	positive	and	negative	affective	 responses	 she	experiences	 from	various	kinds	of	tactile	encounter,	gives	her	a	privileged	understanding	of	the	world	 as	 it	 is	 experienced	by	nonhuman	 animals.	As	 a	 result	 of	 this,	Grandin	 has	 worked	 on	 the	 design	 of	 animal	 holding	 and	 processing	facilities	in	the	US,	with	the	stated	aim	of	making	these	more	humane	and	less	 traumatising	 for	 the	 animals	 involved.	 In	 order	 to	 do	 this,	 she	 is	attentive	 to	 her	 own	 sensory	 responses	 when	 passing	 through	 the	machinery,	 and	 in	 effect	 imagines	 herself	 into,	 or	 interprets,	 the	mental	state	of	the	livestock	which	see	sees	as	analogous	to	her	own.	Cary	Wolfe	argues	that	in	this	case,	‘disability	becomes	the	positive,	indeed	necessary	condition	for	a	powerful	experience	by	Grandin	that	crosses	not	only	the	lines	 of	 species	 difference,	 but	 also	 of	 the	 organic	 and	 inorganic,	 the	biological	and	mechanical,	as	well’.	173				 Here	then,	we	have	an	example	of	an	interpreter	of	trauma	trying	to	empathise	with	a	traumatised	subject.	Grandin	does	this	in	order	to	make	certain	 claims	 about	 the	 central	 truths	 of	 that	 traumatic	 experience	 and	she	 does	 so	 with	 a	 stated	 ethical	 aim.	 She	 is	 certainly	 interested	 in	accessing	a	kind	of	 ‘fullness’	of	experience	as	 it	exists	 for	the	 livestock	 in	question,	 and	 she	 sees	 this	 traumatic	 encounter	 as,	 if	 not	 readable,	certainly	 available	 to	 interpretation.	 In	 response	 to	 Wolfe’s	 essay	 on	Grandin,	 however,	 Anat	 Pick	 notes	 that	 even	 aside	 from	 the	 fact	 that,	‘Grandin’s	ability	to	see	from	a	cow’s	point	of	view	allows	her	to	enter	into	their	midst	like	a	spy’,	so	that	‘her	insider’s	perspective	makes	killing	them																																																									173	Cary	Wolfe,	‘Learning	from	Temple	Grandin,	Or,	Animal	Studies,	Disability	Studies,	and	Who	Comes	After	the	Subject’,	New	Formations,	64.64	(2008),	110–23	(p.	117).	
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easier,’	 Grandin’s	 assumptions	 about	 her	 own	 ability	 to	 interpret	 animal	trauma	in	some	kind	of	truthful	way	actually	lead	her	to	miss	what	might	be	important	about	that	experience	to	the	animal	in	question.174	Pick	asks,	‘does	 thinking	 in	 pictures	 really	 get	 one	 closer	 to	 the	 being	 of	 a	 cow?’,	before	 going	 on	 to	 point	 out	 that	 ‘cows	 have	 elaborate	 social	 structures	and	complex	familial	attachments.	Their	lives	rather	than	their	minds	are	significant	 in	ways	that	Grandin	barely	addresses’	(p.66).	Pick’s	 intention	is	not	to	shut	down	the	possibility	of	empathetic	engagement	with	animal	life;	 rather	 the	opposite,	 she	 is	preoccupied	with	 theorising	 ‘a	 creaturely	fellowship’	between	humans	and	other	animals	(p.	68).	However,	she	does	draw	attention	to	the	kinds	of	choices	that	can	be	made	when	a	decision	to	try	and	interpret	or	empathise	with	another	subject’s	experience	is	taken,	and	 how	 these	might	 often	 fail	 to	 be	 opened	 up	 (particularly	when	 that	empathy	 is	operating	within	a	 strictly	humanist	 framework).	 It	 seems	 to	me	 that	 the	 case	 of	 Grandin	 illustrates	 the	 tension	 at	 work	 between	assuming	 that	 it	 might	 be	 possible	 to	 know	 or	 understand	 an	 animal’s	being-in-the-world	 (quite	 possibly	 you	 can’t),	 whilst	 at	 the	 same	 time	there	perhaps	being	an	ethical	 imperative	to	 imagine,	empathise	with,	or	interpret	animal	subjectivity	in	order	to	think	through	the	kinds	of	desires	or	needs	an	animal	might	have	in	various	situations.		Pick’s	critique	makes	it	clear	that	one	of	the	most	useful	ways	to	approach	such	a	task	would	be	to	 resist	 searching	 for	 singular,	 experiential	 ‘truths’	 and	 instead	 to	consider	what	 a	 plurality	 of	 such	 truths	might	 look	 like,	 and	 how	 these	might	intersect.				 Such	a	project	would	of	course	be	particularly	necessary	if,	as	is	the	case	in	the	Grandin	example,	the	animal	experience	under	consideration	is	a	traumatic	one.	That	is,	of	course,	to	assume	that	animals	are	allowed	to	be	 traumatised,	 and	 that	 a	 traumatic	 encounter	 is	 readable,	 or	 given,	rather	than	withheld	or	taken	up	as	part	of	a	larger	cultural	narrative	that	regulates	 the	experience	of	suffering.	To	really	engage	with	 the	 idea	 that	
																																																								174	Pick,	p.	66.	
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an	 animal	 might	 be	 subject	 to	 trauma	would	 be	 to	 have	 to	 rethink	 and	transform	a	huge	number	of	our	current	social	structures,	which	function	on	 the	basis	 that	experiences	of	 trauma	cannot	and	do	not	extend	 to	 the	animal	 subject.	 Indeed,	 a	 large	 number	 of	 contemporary	 theorists	 of	trauma	have	put	forward	a	similar	critique	of	trauma	studies	as	it	relates	to	 the	 human.	 Pieter	 Vermeulen	 argues	 that,	 ‘designating	 certain	 events	and	 experiences	 as	 traumatic,	 far	 from	 being	 a	mere	 academic	 exercise,	not	 only	 reflects	 but	 also	 shapes	 contemporary	 power	 relations.’175	Stef	Craps	 also	 makes	 this	 point	 specifically	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 the	 global	distribution	of	trauma	and	trauma	studies’	Eurocentric	bias.	He	argues:		 The	 founding	 texts	 of	 the	 field	 […]	marginalize	 or	 ignore	 traumatic	experiences	 of	 non-Western	 or	 minority	 cultures	 […]	 they	 tend	 to	take	 for	 granted	 the	 universal	 validity	 of	 definitions	 of	 trauma	 and	recovery	 that	 have	 developed	 out	 of	 the	 history	 of	 Western	modernity.	176		Craps	points	out	that	the	privileging	of	the	event-based	model	in	classical	trauma	theory	also	works	to	obscure	experiences	of	structural	trauma	that	similarly	require	critical	and	therapeutic	attention	(Beyond	Eurocentrism,	p.	 50).	 The	 global	 plight	 of	 animals	 could	 certainly	 be	 understood	 as	traumatic	 on	 this	 structural	 level	 just	 as	 it	 could	 also	 be	 in	 the	 singular,	specifically	 located	 moments	 of	 violence	 that	 pervade	 animal	 life.	However,	 the	 novels	 I	 examine	 in	 this	 chapter	 are	 certainly	 not	 directly	concerned	with	 the	everyday	 trauma	 faced	by	much	of	 the	global	animal	population.	 Rather,	 they	 are	 hospitable	 to	 a	 reading	 that	 would	 seek	 to	think	 through	 the	 questions	 of	 subjectivity	 and	 interpretation	 raised	 by	
																																																								175	Pieter	Vermeulen,	‘The	Biopolitics	of	Trauma’,	in	The	Future	of	Trauma	Theory:	Contemporary	
Literature	and	Cultural	Criticism,	ed.	by	Gert	Buelens,	Sam	Durrant,	and	Robert	Eaglestone	(London:	Routledge,	2014),	pp.	141–55	(p.	141).	176	Stef	Craps,	‘Beyond	Eurocentrism:	Trauma	Theory	in	the	Global	Age’,	in	The	Future	of	Trauma	
Theory:	Contemporary	Literature	and	Cultural	Criticism	(London:	Routledge,	2014),	pp.	45–61	(p.	46).	
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the	 examination	 of	 theories	 of	 trauma	 that	 has	 formed	 the	 basis	 of	 this	chapter.				 As	 such,	 my	 reading	 of	 the	 texts	 focuses	 specifically	 on	 the	opposition	of	inside	to	outside	that	emerges	out	of	trauma	theory’s	model	of	sovereign	subjectivity.	I	see	an	analysis	of	this	binary	opposition	as	able	to	offer	insight	into	the	problems	of	interpretation	that	I	have	laid	out	here	in	the	sense	that	it	speaks	to	the	ways	trauma	theory	produces	its	subjects	and	in	doing	so	regulates	the	kinds	of	meaning	that	are	available	to	those	subjects.	Caruth	attributes	the	repetition	of	the	traumatic	flashback	to	‘the	absolute	inability	of	the	mind	to	avoid	an	unpleasurable	event	that	has	not	been	 given	 psychic	 meaning	 in	 any	 way.’	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 traumatic	experience,	 she	 argues,	 this	 means	 that	 ‘the	 outside	 has	 gone	 inside	without	 any	 mediation’	 (Unclaimed,	 p.	 59).	 Her	 comments	 function	 by	drawing	 attention	 to	 a	 ‘lack’	 that	 is	 posited	 as	 responsible	 for	 the	psychological	 distress	 that	 commonly	 attends	 such	 flashbacks.	 She	hypothesises	 that	 this	 mediation	 is	 necessary	 for	 the	 interaction	 of	‘outside’	and	‘inside’,	suggesting	that	such	an	intervention	works	to	effect	some	kind	of	 transformation	 in	either	entity	 so	 that	 they	might	healthily	cross	over,	one	into	the	other.				 In	clinical	terms,	this	mediating	structure	might	take	on	a	body	and	be	understood	as	the	analyst,	offering	a	therapeutic	intervention	intended	to	work	through	the	psychological	distress	arising	from	what	Caruth’s	use	of	 the	 word	 ‘outside’	 makes	 clear	 is	 an	 external	 event.	 Yet	 Caruth’s	deployment	 of	 the	 inside/outside	 opposition	 also	 brings	 to	 mind	 a	different	figure	that	might	take	the	place	of	this	missing	mediator:	a	host	presiding	 over	 a	 threshold,	 in	 this	 case	 the	 psyche	 of	 the	 traumatised	subject.	Imagining	this	mediating	figure	as	a	host	allows	the	opposition	of	inside/outside	to	be	understood	as	produced,	rather	than	natural.	That	is,	it	would	reintroduce	the	question	of	subjective	agency	into	an	analysis	of	the	traumatic	experience	by	seeing	the	inside/outside	of	subjectivity	as	an	opposition	 brought	 into	 being	 through,	 amongst	 other	 things,	 the	
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historical,	 social,	 and	 cultural	 contexts	 and	 identifications	 with	 which	 a	host	 subject	 is	 in	 a	 constant	 case	 of	 encounter.	 As	 such,	 focusing	 on	 the	inside/outside	problem	is	a	useful	way	to	direct	attention	to	the	question	that	this	chapter	seeks	to	answer:	how	can	spaces	of	meaning	be	kept	open	for	 nonhuman	 bodies	 in	 trauma	 narratives?	 To	 what	 extents	 are	 such	narratives	hospitable	to	nonhuman	presence,	and	how	do	the	processes	of	meaning-production	that	accompany	nonhumans	in	these	texts	shape	the	limits	of	this	hospitality?		 ***	
		 In	 the	 three	 texts	 that	 I	 read	 in	 this	 section	of	my	 thesis,	 animals	appear	as	haunting	presences.	Certainly	the	texts	I	examine	here	probably	would	not	gain	easy	membership	to	the	‘canon’	of	trauma	fiction	I	touched	on	earlier.	 I	will,	 however,	 treat	 them	as	 trauma	 texts	 simply	because	of	the	key	role	ghosts	and	hauntings	play	in	each	narrative.	Whilst	Luckhurst	suggests	 that	 the	 ghost	 has	 become	 something	 of	 a	 cliché	 in	 trauma	narratives,	 he	 also	notes	 the	 sense	 in	which	 a	 ghostly	presence	 in	 a	 text	acts	as	an	invitation	to	interpretation:		 Ghosts	are	the	signals	of	atrocities,	marking	sites	of	untold	violence,	a	traumatic	past	whose	traces	remain	to	attest	to	a	lack	of	testimony.	A	 haunting	 does	 not	 initiate	 a	 story;	 it	 is	 the	 sign	 of	 a	 blockage	 of	story	(p.	93).		In	this	chapter	I	will	therefore	proceed	from	two	key	assumptions:	that	the	ghost	 acts	 as	 a	 signifier	 of	 textual	 trauma;	 and	 that	 the	presence	 of	 said	ghost	 is,	 as	 Luckhurst	 suggests,	 aligned	 with	 blockages	 or	 knots	 of	narrative	 that	 present	 interpretative	 dilemmas.	 By	 choosing	 to	 analyse	texts	 that	 deviate	 from	 the	 conventional	 model	 of	 fragmentation	 that	trauma	 theory	 sees	 as	 the	 most	 appropriate	 literary	 response	 to	 the	traumatic	 experience,	 and	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	 animal	 presences	 in	 these	texts,	 I	 hope	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 ‘reiteration	 of	 traumatic	 subjectivity	 in	
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different	kinds	of	register’	that	Luckhurst	sees	as	crucial	to	a	reimagining	of	cultural	trauma	theory.			 In	the	final	part	of	this	chapter	I	undertake	a	very	brief	reading	of	Evie	Wyld’s	All	the	Birds,	Singing,	arguing	that	the	novel’s	adherence	to	an	event-based	model	of	 trauma	 in	 its	depiction	of	PTSD	acts	 to	 shut	down	the	possibilities	the	uncanny	animal	at	its	centre	has	to	be	something	more	than	a	metaphor	for	its	human	narrator’s	trauma.	In	Chapter	Five	I	analyse	the	ways	that	The	Dogs	of	Littlefield	similarly	acts	to	 ‘exorcise’	the	animal	ghosts	 that	 haunt	 its	 pages,	 although	 in	 this	 novel	 such	 a	 rejection	 of	nonhuman	 presence	 exists	 as	 a	 critical	 commentary	 on	 discourses	 of	immunity	after	9/11.	Finally,	in	Chapter	Six	I	conduct	an	extended	reading	of	 Fiona	 McFarlane’s	 novel	 The	 Night	 Guest	 alongside	 Sara	 Ahmed’s	theoretical	notion	of	‘strange	encounters’.177	I	argue	that	McFarlane’s	text	is	hospitable	 to	what	Ahmed	calls	 ‘strange	bodies’,	whilst	also	remaining	attentive	 to	 the	 ways	 that	 the	 strangeness	 of	 these	 bodies	 is	 produced,	rather	than	given.	As	such,	the	novel	points	to	a	middle	way	between	the	polarised	imperatives	to	either	reify	or	reject	meaning	that	trauma	theory	brings	to	its	analysis	of	literary	texts.		 	
																																																								177	Sara	Ahmed,	Strange	Encounters :	Embodied	Others	in	Post-Coloniality	(London:	Routledge,	2000).	
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IV.	 The	Traumatic	Animal	in	All	the	Birds,	Singing	
		 Evie	 Wyld’s	 novel	 All	 the	 Birds,	 Singing	 follows	 the	 story	 of	 its	troubled	 narrator	 Jake	 both	 backwards	 and	 forwards	 in	 time;	 forwards	from	the	moment	she	finds	a	dead	sheep	on	her	isolated	farm	(the	second	in	a	month),	and	backwards	through	her	life	before	that	moment,	moving	inexorably	and	in	reverse	towards	a	terrible	act	that	haunts	the	novel	but	is	not	revealed	until	 its	 final	pages.	These	two	timelines	are	presented	to	us	 in	 alternate	 chapters,	 with	 the	 present	 day	 events	 occurring	 on	 an	unknown	 (presumably	 British)	 island,	 and	 those	 from	 the	 past	 taking	place	 in	Australia.	 Initially,	we	are	 led	to	suspect	that	the	violence	meted	out	to	Jake’s	sheep	is	directly	connected	to	events	in	her	past	life,	but	what	at	 first	 suggests	 a	 straightforward	 act	 of	 vengeance	 is	 shown	 to	 be	 far	more	complex.				 Predominantly,	 this	 is	 because	 the	 being	 Jake	 suspects	 to	 be	 the	perpetrator	 of	 violence	 against	 her	 sheep	 is	 a	 large,	 dark	 animal	 of	inconsistent	 form,	glimpsed	only	 for	moments	at	a	 time	and	 imbuing	her	with	a	sense	of	dread	and	horror.	The	elusive	nature	of	this	beast	acts	 in	the	same	way	as	the	novel’s	structure	does	in	that	its	meaning,	like	that	of	the	 narrative,	 is	 continuously	 in	 play,	 seemingly	 graspable	 at	 certain	moments	 but	 then	 ultimately	 revealed	 as	 only	 partial.	 As	 the	 novel	progresses,	 we	 are	 presented	 with	 several	 scenarios	 that	 might	 explain	Jake’s	self-imposed	isolation	and	her	episodes	of	anxiety.	We	learn	that	she	was	once	a	sex	worker,	was	held	captive	and	sexually	abused	by	a	former	client,	 and	 also	 became	 the	 target	 of	 threats	 from	 a	 colleague	 when	working	as	the	only	 female	sheep	shearer	 in	an	all-male	workforce.	Each	time	 episodes	 like	 this	 are	 related	 they	 seem	 to	 offer	 an	 explanation	 for	her	 distress	 in	 the	 present	 day,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 attacks	 on	 her	 sheep.	However,	 none	 of	 them	 ever	 yield	 narrative	 payoff.	 Instead,	 due	 to	 the	reverse	 chronology	 Wyld	 employs,	 they	 are	 shown	 to	 simply	 be	 causal	effects	of	the	happening	awaiting	us	at	the	end	of	the	novel,	the	imagined	terrible	nature	of	which	builds	with	each	false	alarm.		
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		 Finally,	 however,	 the	 end	 of	 the	 novel	 takes	 us	 to	 her	 beginning.	Rejected	and	hurt	by	a	male	friend,	Jake	puts	the	tip	of	her	joint	to	a	 leaf	and	 starts	 a	 huge	 and	 terrible	 bushfire	 that	 claims	 the	 life	 of	 one	 of	 her	school	 friends	 and	 puts	 another	 in	 hospital,	 devastating	 property	 and	killing	hundreds	of	animals.	After	accidentally	revealing	her	culpability	she	runs	away	from	home,	although	not	before	being	brutally	beaten	by	a	gang	of	local	people	that	includes	the	dead	girl’s	father.	This	points	to	one	of	the	more	 interesting	 and	 problematic	 effects	 of	Wyld’s	writing	 strategy:	 the	deferral	of	meaning	that	characterises	the	narrative	means	that	the	reader	may	not	pass	judgement	on	Jake	until	the	end	of	the	novel,	by	which	time,	having	spent	so	much	time	with	her,	it	is	less	easy	to	do	this			 In	 this	 way	 the	 novel	 stages	 Jake’s	 narration	 of	 her	 history	 as	 a	process	of	working-through	that	 leads	us	 therapeutically	back	toward	an	originary,	 event-based	 trauma.	 Here,	 Wyld’s	 obvious	 interest	 in	 how	deferral	might	usefully	structure	a	novel	narrated	by	a	traumatised	subject	also	 recalls	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘belatedness’	 that	 is	 central	 to	 trauma	 theory.	Caruth	suggests	 that	 the	 ‘inherent	 latency	of	 the	event’	 is	responsible	 for	the	‘peculiar	temporal	structure,	the	belatedness,	of	historical	experience:	since	the	traumatic	event	is	not	experienced	as	it	occurs,	it	is	fully	evident	only	in	connection	with	another	place,	and	in	another	time’	(Trauma,	p.8).	We	 see	 just	 such	an	effect	 in	Wyld’s	novel	whereby	 the	 trauma	of	 Jake’s	past	 both	 makes	 sense	 of	 and	 is	 brought	 into	 existence	 by	 her	 present	circumstances.	As	 such,	 the	 text	 shows	 its	 investment	 in	 the	experiential	structures	 of	 trauma	 that	 Caruth	 prioritises	 in	 her	 theory.	 Certainly	 the	‘Australia’	 timeline	 chapters	 that	 interrupt	 the	 present	 day	 narrative	progression	 call	 to	 mind	 the	 recurrent	 ‘involuntary	 and	 intrusive	experiences’	that	characterise	medical	definitions	of	post-traumatic	stress	disorder,	 or	 PTSD.178	Because	 the	 inverse	 timeline	 of	 Jake’s	 recollections	disrupts	 the	 accumulation	 of	 meaning	 that	 would	 occur	 in	 a	 standard	
																																																								178	Mardi	Jon	Horowitz,	Stress	Response	Syndromes	(New	York:	Aronson,	1976),	p.	55.	
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chronological	 narrative,	 the	 Australia	 chapters	 are	 read	 as	 interruptions	to,	rather	than	advancements	of,	the	plot.	As	such,	they	can	be	understood	as	 both	 spontaneous	 and	 unwelcome	 in	 the	 manner	 of	 traumatic	‘flashbacks.’	 	 Jake’s	self-imposed	isolation	on	the	sheep	farm	(she	refuses	invitations	 to	 socialise	 with	 other	 members	 of	 the	 remote	 community)	similarly	 suggests	 another	 common	 PTSD	 symptom;	 a	 ‘denial	 state’	characterised	 by	 ‘numbness	 or	 unresponsiveness	 to,	 or	 reduced	involvement	with,	the	outside	world’	(Horowitz,	p.55).				 Sightings	of	 the	creature	 that	 is	killing	 Jake’s	 sheep	are	 figured	as	interruptions	 and	 intrusions	 in	 the	 same	way	 as	 the	 Australia	 chapters.	The	animal	appears	and	disappears	unexpectedly,	and	evades	all	attempts	at	classification.	Largeness	is	perhaps	the	only	attribute	of	the	animal	that	Jake	 consistently	notices	every	 time	 it	 appears.	On	several	occasions	 she	describes	 it	 as	 ‘black’	 or	 ‘dark’	 but	 this	 seems	 less	 a	 factual	 description	than	an	effect	of	 the	aporia	 that	 the	animal	presents.	 Indeed,	 even	when	the	 creature’s	 terrifying	 corporeality	 overwhelms	 her,	 its	 body	 still	suggests	 instability	and	absence.	On	one	occasion	Jake	makes	an	attempt	to	 fire	 her	 gun	 at	 it	 and	 is	 unable	 to,	 explaining,	 ‘it	 disappeared	when	 I	tried	to	aim,	when	I	looked	too	hard	[…].’179	She	compares	it,	variously,	to	‘a	big	dog’	‘a	fox	or	deer,	but	looking	nothing	like	either	of	these	things’	‘a	cat,	because	it	moved	in	that	way,	loped	like	a	cat,’	whilst	also	noting	that	it	is	‘taller	and	wider	than	a	man’	(Wyld,	pp.	28,	112,	176,	208).	The	arrival	of	 the	 animal	 into	 the	 narrative	 also	 coincides	with	 an	 influx	 of	 strange	noises	 and	 supernatural	 disturbances.	 Jake	 is	 woken	 by	 a	 ‘crack	 and	 a	slam’	 and	 a	 sound	 ‘like	 hands	 slapping	 fast	 on	 a	 wall’	 she	 also	 hears	something	 clamouring	 around	 the	 house,	 running	 ‘fast	 around	 the	bedroom’	 and	 then	 carrying,	 ‘on	 up	 the	 stairs,	 up	 and	 up	 the	 stairs	 that	were	not	there	because	there	was	no	room	above	mine’	(pp.	22,	187).		
																																																								179	Evie	Wyld,	All	the	Birds,	Singing	(London:	Vintage	Books,	2014),	p.	208.	
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	 Thus	 the	 animal	 is	 established	 from	 the	 start	 of	 the	 novel	 as	 a	complex	 interpretative	 knot.	 It	 is	 apparent,	 for	 example,	 that	 there	 are	elements	of	the	creature’s	appearances	that	can	be	understood	as	ghostly	or	 supernatural.	 In	 this	 context	 its	 visitations	 suggest	 a	 haunting	 that	 is	simultaneously	a	provocation:	why	does	it	visit?	Why	does	it	kill?	We	are	also	invited	to	consider	the	possibility	that	the	animal	might	be	a	product	of	Jake’s	mental	state;	after	all,	she	is	clearly	suffering	from	post-traumatic	stress,	 could	 the	 creature	 be	 a	 kind	 of	 hallucination?	 Indeed,	 Jake	 is	 the	only	person	 to	 see	 the	 animal	 for	 the	majority	 of	 the	novel.	 	 Yet	 despite	these	 formulations,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 deny	 the	 coarse	 realness	 of	 the	creature,	 evident	 in	 the	way	 Jake	 relates	her	 impressions	of	 the	animal’s	body,	 the	 hair	 on	 its	 back	 ‘thick	 and	 wiry’,	 the	 shoulders	 ‘dense	 and	muscled.’	Difficult	to	disregard,	either,	the	violent	traces	the	animal	leaves	behind	–	sheep	torn	open,	buildings	broken	into	in	the	night.	Undoubtedly,	the	 messy	 problem	 the	 creature	 presents	 is	 one	 that	 generates	 intense	narrative	pleasure	for	us.	It	is	desirable,	indeed	imperative,	for	Jake	to	see	this	creature	properly,	so	that	she	might	have	time	to	examine	it	and	come	to	 a	 realisation	 about	 its	 meaning.	 Simultaneously,	 the	 prospect	 of	 Jake	coming	 into	 closer	 contact	 with	 the	 beast	 is	 terrifying-	 it’s	 clear	 that	 it	intends	violence,	for	reasons	we	do	not	yet	understand.				 Therefore,	whilst	the	animal	functions	as	a	kind	of	doubling	of	Jake	in	the	sense	that	the	slippery	site	of	its	body	invites	questions	(and	hints	at	answers)	 about	 what	 she	means	 and	 how	 her	 narrative	might	 be	made	whole,	 there	 is	 an	 important	 textual	 richness	 at	work	 here	 in	 the	 sense	that	the	creature	never	simply	functions	as	a	metaphor	for	Jake’s	unknown	past.	 Instead,	 this	 animal	 figure	 offers	 such	 an	 excess	 of	 possibilities	 for	interpretation	that	it	necessarily	remains	an	object	of	interest	for	us.	It	is	regrettable	 then	 that	 the	 closing	 pages	 of	 the	 novel	work	 to	 close	 down	this	 interpretative	 space.	 Jake’s	 final	 encounter	 with	 the	 creature	 takes	place	in	the	concluding	chapter	of	the	novel	and	directly	follows	the	final	Australia	 chapter	 in	 which	 the	 reader	 finally	 learns	 of	 Jake’s	 arson.	 An	immediate	effect	of	this	is	that	the	significance	of	the	animal	to	the	plot	is	
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substantially	altered;	it	no	longer	seems	causally	entwined	with	Jake’s	past	life	but	instead	can	be	understood	more	crudely	as	a	beastly	manifestation	of	her	guilt.	Necessarily,	another	corollary	of	this	 is	 that	the	creature	can	no	longer	be	conceptualised	primarily	in	terms	of	its	own	peculiar	history,	agency,	or	desires;	it	becomes,	rather,	an	extension,	or	even	explanation	of,	Jake’s	self.				 Jake	 is	 driving	 at	 night	 with	 her	 friend	 Lloyd	 when	 he	 suddenly	demands	that	she	stop	the	truck.	When	she	does	so	he	gets	out	and	heads	into	the	woods,	with	her	following.	It	is	at	this	moment	that	he	too	sees	the	creature,	telling	Jake	‘“it’s	huge	[…]	It’s	just	in	front	of	us”’	(p.278).	There	is	a	crunch	in	the	undergrowth;	something	moves	deeper	into	the	woods	and	Jake	looks	down	to	see	that	she	and	Lloyd	are	holding	hands.	Chapter	and	novel	 effectively	 end	 here,	 followed	 only	 by	 a	 brief	 reflective	 passage	where	 Jake	 looks	 back	 to	 her	 childhood	 as	 it	was	 before	 the	 fire.	 In	 the	closing	pages,	then,	the	corporeality	of	the	animal	 is	withdrawn	from	the	narrative.	Although	it	appears	that	Lloyd	has	seen	the	beast,	Jake	can	only	make	out	‘a	shadow	beneath	the	green	canopy’,	where	‘maybe’	something	moves	(p.227).	Despite	this,	the	meaning	of	the	creature	is	still	effectively	left	open	(Wyld	is	far	too	interesting	a	writer	to	end	with	a	crude	reveal)	and	 so	 the	 animal	 remains	 unidentified,	 its	 shape	 fluid,	 its	 nature	unknown.	 Notwithstanding,	 something	 about	 the	 richness	 of	 what	 the	creature	might	mean	 is	 lost,	not	only	because	 the	puzzle	of	 Jake’s	past	 is	solved,	 but	 also	 because	 in	 its	 final	 pages	 the	 novel	 reveals	 itself	 to	 be	more	interested	in	what	it	signifies	for	Jake	to	see	the	animal,	than	in	what	it	might	mean	for	the	animal	to	see	her.				 Because	 the	creature	appears	 throughout	 the	novel	on	 the	 fringes	of	 Jake’s	vision,	even	when	 it	does	not	manifest	 itself	 to	sight	she	senses	and	 is	 vigilant	 to	 its	 presence.	 As	 such,	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 throughout	 the	narrative	 that	 the	 animal	 is	watching	 Jake,	 that	 it	 has	 business	with	 her	and	returns	to	make	some	kind	of	demand.	In	being	reduced	to	noise	and	shadows	 in	 the	 final	 chapter,	 then,	 the	 creature	 no	 longer	 exists	 as	 a	
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complex	provocation,	 but	 instead	 reads	 as	 a	metaphor	 for	 Jake’s	 trauma	and	guilt.	 Its	body	quite	literally	disappears	into	the	shadows	and	leaves,	to	 quote	 McHugh	 once	 more,	 ‘the	 human	 alone	 on	 the	 stage’	 (Animal	
Farm’s	Lessons,	npn).			 In	 this	 way,	 the	 creature	 becomes	 part	 of	 a	 relatively	straightforward	 trauma	 narrative.	 It	 is	 a	 symptom,	 a	 repetition	 of	 the	traumatic	 event	 and	 as	 such	 its	 role	 is	 to	 ‘remain	 unavailable	 to	consciousness	 but	 intrude	 repeatedly	 on	 sight’	 (Caruth,	 Unclaimed	
Experience,	p.92).		In	what	can	be	understood	as	a	conventional	process	of	working-through,	Jake	is	finally	able	to	narrate	her	trauma,	the	therapeutic	reward	of	this	being	the	fact	that	she	is	no	longer	alone	but	is	able	to	share	her	experience	with	Lloyd,	as	demonstrated	by	his	newfound	ability	to	see	the	mysterious	animal	and	by	their	symbolic	gesture	of	hand-holding	that	concludes	the	chapter.	Therefore,	the	subjectivity	of	the	animal	is	further	diminished	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 now	 simply	 represents	 an	 event	 that	intrudes	on	Jake’s	sovereign	subjectivity.	This	opposition	of	hostile	outside	to	bounded	inside	is	replicated	spatially	in	the	novel	when	it	juxtaposes	a	violent	 exterior	 realm	 (the	 woods	 inhabited	 by	 the	 mysterious	 animal)	with	 the	 isolated	 farmhouse	 housing	 a	 traumatised	 subject,	 a	 bordered	space	threatened	with	infiltration	by	this	same	uncontrollable	outside.	It	is	apparent,	 therefore,	 that	 in	 structuring	 its	narrative	both	as	a	process	of	working-through	and	as	an	example	of	 intrusive,	event-based	trauma,	All	
the	 Birds,	 Singing	 is	 not	 able	 to	 keep	 space	 open	 for	 the	 creature	 that	haunts	its	pages.	This	suggests,	I	would	argue,	that	traditional,	event-based	models	of	trauma	narrative	are	fundamentally	inhospitable	to	nonhuman	presences,	a	claim	that	I	will	address	further	in	the	next	two	chapters.		 	
	 173	
Chapter	Five	
	
Ditching	the	Dogs:	Discourses	of	Immunity	in	The	
Dogs	of	Littlefield	
	
	
Introduction			 In	 her	 Sunday	 Times	 review,	 Christina	 Patterson	 called	 Suzanne	Berne’s	novel	The	Dogs	of	Littlefield	‘gentle’	and	‘moving’,	but	suggested	it	was	 a	 shame	 that	 the	 author	 ‘didn’t	 stick	 with	 people	 and	 ditch	 the	dogs.’180	Given	that	the	text	is	in	large	part,	about	dogs,	and	indeed,	about	people	 ditching	 dogs,	 Patterson’s	 recommendation	 seems	 to	 somewhat	miss	 the	 point	 of	 Berne’s	 novel,	which	 is	 a	 (thoughtful	 and	 provocative)	exploration	 of	 borders	 in	 one	 small	 American	 town,	 and	 of	 the	 different	ways	 outsiders	 come	 to	 be	 ‘ditched’.	 As	 Patterson’s	 bemusement	demonstrates,	 the	 novel’s	 dogs	 provide	 the	 most	 striking	 and	 unusual	example	of	narrative	non-belonging,	particularly	as	many	of	them	happen	to	be	ghosts.				 Indeed,	Patterson’s	review	ironically	replicates	the	central	conflict	of	the	novel,	summed	up	by	the	question:	how	might	it	be	possible	to	live	
without	 ‘ditching	 the	 dogs?’	 In	 this	 chapter	 I	 explore	 the	 ways	 that	 the	meaning	of	the	narrative’s	dogs	(both	living	and	ghostly)	is	closed	down	as	part	of	Berne’s	critical	commentary	on	therapeutic	discourses	of	trauma.	I	argue	that	the	text	shows	how	contemporary	approaches	to	healing	from	trauma	are	structured	by	discourses	of	immunity	that	once	more	establish	and	 police	 the	 borders	 of	 a	 sovereign	 subjectivity,	 a	 claim	 I	 develop	through	 a	 reading	 of	 Roberto	 Esposito’s	 work.	 In	 order	 for	 the	 novel’s																																																									180	Christina	Patterson,	‘The	Dogs	of	Littlefield	by	Suzanne	Berne’,	The	Sunday	Times,	8	December	2013		[accessed	17	October	2017].	
	 174	
central	character	Margaret	to	move	past	her	pervasive	feelings	of	loss,	she	is	 forced	 to	 transform	 the	 ghostly	 dogs	 that	 haunt	 her	 from	 loved	companions	to	traumatic	metaphor,	a	process	that	 is	satirised	 in	the	text	and	never	fully	achieves	completion.		 ***		 The	Dogs	of	Littlefield	is	set	in	a	fictional	Massachusetts	town	of	that	name,	 sixth	 on	 a	 Wall	 Street	 Journal	 list	 of	 	 ‘20	 Best	 Places	 to	 Live	 in	America’,	 and	 home	 to	 roughly	 one	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 nation’s	psychotherapists. 181 	Margaret	 Downing,	 plagued	 by	 an	 uncertain	 but	overwhelming	sense	of	loss,	lives	here	with	her	husband	Bill	and	daughter	Julia.	Their	new	neighbour	Dr	Clarice	Watkins	has	recently	arrived	in	town	to	 research	 the	 effects	 of	 global	 destabilization	 on	 ‘the	 world’s	 most	psychologically	 policed	 and	probably	well-medicated	population’	 (Berne,	p.	47).	Clarice	finds	the	town	filled	with	unease	after	an	unknown	person	has	 begun	 poisoning	 dogs,	 dogs	 that	 in	 death	 have	 begun	 to	 appear	 to	Margaret	 Downing	 in	 a	 ghostly	 pack,	 lurking	 in	 the	 bushes	 outside	 her	home,	their	‘enormous	baleful	eyes’	staring	up	at	the	windows	(p.132).				 Clarice	intends	to	focus	her	monograph	on	‘good	quality	of	life’	in	the	expectation	that	the	wealthy,	white,	middle	class	inhabitants	of	Littlefield	will	be	especially	balanced	particularly	as	they	are	all	in	therapy	and	so	‘investigating	their	fears	rationally,	with	the	care	and	absorption	of	scientists’	(p.	242).	Yet	as	she	makes	observations	during	the	course	of	her	research	she	comes	to	realise	that	the	people	of	Littlefield	are	instead	‘strangely	infatuated	with	the	idea	of	menace’	and	is	forced	to	conclude	that	she	has	in	fact	‘stumbled	on	to	the	most	unbalanced	people	of	all	[…]	afraid	of	everything’	(p.	242).	She	notes:		 One	 can	 view	 the	 village	 of	 Littlefield	 as	 a	 carefully	 constructed	refuge,	an	achievement	that,	 these	days,	seems	as	admirable	as	 it	 is	
																																																								181	Suzanne	Berne,	The	Dogs	of	Littlefield	(London:	Fig	Tree,	2013),	p.	4.	
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fragile	 […]	What	 is	surprising	to	 the	outsider	 is	 that	Littlefield	does	not	consider	 itself	 to	be	a	refuge.	The	citizens	here	believe	they	are	no	different	from	citizens	anywhere.	Although	they	stay	apprised	of	current	 events	 it	 appears	 they	 believe	 that	 what	 happens	 in	 their	village	is	equally	serious,	that	their	personal	burdens	are	equivalent	to	any	suffered	elsewhere…	(p.	152).		Clarice	 has	 her	 neighbour	 Margaret	 Downing	 in	 mind	 here;	 she	 will	provide	 a	 case	 study	 for	 the	 first	 chapter	 of	 the	 planned	 monograph.	Despite	 to	 all	 appearances	 enjoying	 a	 comfortable,	 stable	 and	 privileged	life,	Margaret	 is	plagued	by	an	anxiety	so	pervasive	that	Clarice	 imagines	she	 is	 ‘attending	 to	 something	 just	 beyond	 the	 range	 of	 human	 hearing,	something	 normally	 audible	 only	 to	 dogs,	 or	 bats’	 (p.50).	Whilst	 Clarice	finds	Margaret’s	 anxiety	 unsettling,	 she	 is	 simultaneously	 conscious	 that	her	mother	would	dismiss	Margaret	as	‘another	whiny	white	person’	(p.50)	Indeed,	 it	 is	 apparent	 as	 the	novel	 unfolds	 that	whilst	 the	 inhabitants	 of	Littlefield	might	not	 see	 their	privileged	 situation	 as	providing	 a	 ‘refuge’	from	personal	hardship,	they	certainly	conceive	of	it	as	a	bounded	space	of	comparative	 security	 when	 compared	 to	 the	 hostile	 and	 degenerative	outside	world.	The	townspeople	see	their	existence	as	being	vulnerable	to	this	mysterious	outside	and	imagine	their	community	is	constantly	on	the	verge	 of	 either	 collapse	 or	 invasion.	 A	 child	 sends	 the	 school	 into	 ‘full	lockdown’	by	carrying	a	plastic	pencil	sharpener	shaped	like	a	pistol	into	class,	parents	 fret	 as	 fighter	 jets	 fly	over	a	 football	 game	 (‘“they’re	going	somewhere”’)	and	unusually	heavy	snow	causes	the	children	of	the	town	to	fear	something	is	‘out	of	balance	in	the	universe’	(pp.	55,	44,	99).				 The	 predominance	 of	 such	 tropes	 in	 the	 novel	 aligns	 it	 with	 the	genre	 of	 literature	 known	 as	 ‘suburban	Gothic’,	 described	 by	 Bernice	M.	Murphy	as	 ‘a	sub-genre	of	the	wider	American	gothic	tradition	that	often	dramatises	anxieties	arising	from	the	mass	suburbanisation	of	the	United	States	 and	 usually	 features	 suburban	 settings,	 preoccupations	 and	
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protagonists.’182	Despite	 the	 jet	 planes	 overhead	 and	 niggling	 anxieties	about	 climate	 change,	 it	 is	 a	 menace	 from	 within	 (the	 spate	 of	 dog	poisonings)	that	threatens	to	tear	the	community	apart	and	sow	seeds	of	distrust	 between	 friends	 and	 neighbours.	 As	 such,	 the	 novel	 exhibits	another	 feature	of	 the	genre,	which	 is	 that	 ‘one	 is	almost	always	 in	more	danger	from	the	people	in	the	house	next	door,	or	one’s	own	family,	than	from	 external	 threats’	 (Murphy,	 p.	 2).	 However	 the	 interplay	 of	 outside	and	in,	or	more	specifically	of	 local	and	global	community,	 is	emphasised	throughout	The	Dogs	of	Littlefield	with	the	result	that	an	easy	separation	of	internal	 from	external	 threats	becomes	almost	 impossible.	Therefore	 the	privileged	site	of	anxiety	(and	horror)	 for	 the	community	 in	 this	novel	 is	not	 simply	 the	 realisation	 of	 incorporated	 danger	 that	 characterises	suburban	Gothic,	but	more	precisely	a	 fear	 that	 the	categories	of	 ‘in’	and	‘out’	 are	 not	 working	 in	 the	 ways	 they	 might	 be	 expected	 to.	 To	 put	 it	slightly	 differently,	 this	 anxiety	 involves	 an	 understanding	 that	 the	borders	 of	 community	 are	 permeable	 and	 an	 internal	 threat	 is	 always	already	bound	up	with	an	external	one,	and	vice	versa.					 As	such,	I	would	argue	that	it	is	more	helpful	to	read	Berne’s	novel	alongside	the	theory	of	Roberto	Esposito,	specifically	his	explication	of	the	immunitary	 paradigm	as	 it	 relates	 to	 community	 after	modernity,	which	deals	 explicitly	 with	 the	 problematics	 of	 negotiating	 borders.	 Esposito	shows	how	the	immune	mechanism	that	we	are	most	familiar	with	in	the	biomedical	context	of	vaccination	(‘the	inoculation	of	nonlethal	quantities	of	a	virus	stimulates	the	formation	of	antibodies	that	are	able	to	neutralize	pathogenic	 effects	 at	 an	 early	 stage’)	 is	 identifiably	 also	 deployed	 in	various	 other	 (legal,	 political,	 technological)	 contexts.183	In	 essence,	 this	mechanism,	‘reproduces	in	a	controlled	form	what	it	is	meant	to	protect	us	from’	 (p.8).	 Esposito	 turns	 to	 etymology	 to	 show	 that	 the	 Latin	 noun																																																									182	Bernice	M.	Murphy,	The	Suburban	Gothic	in	American	Popular	Culture	(Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2009),	p.	2.	183	Roberto	Esposito,	Immunitas :	The	Protection	and	Negations	of	Life	(Cambridge,	Eng. ;	Malden,	MA:	Polity	Press,	2011),	p.	7.	
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immunitas	 incorporates	 within	 itself	 that	 which	 it	 lacks,	 the	munus	 that	refers	 to	 office	 or	 tribute,	 and	which	 Esposito	 identifies	 as	 linked	 to	 the	reciprocal	obligation	and	gift-giving	that	define	the	earliest	understanding	of	communitas	(p.6).	As	such,	Esposito	argues	that	immunity	is	necessarily	a	 ‘privative	 category’	 that	 ‘only	 takes	 on	 relief	 as	 a	 negative	 mode	 of	community’	 (p.9)	 and	 in	 politico-juridical	 language	 it	 signifies	 ‘a	temporary	or	definitive	exemption	on	the	part	of	the	subject	with	regard	to	 concrete	 obligations	 or	 responsibilities	 that	 under	 normal	circumstances	would	bind	one	to	others.’	184	It	is	thus	possible	to	identify	two	 key	 characteristics	 of	 the	 immune	mechanism	 as	 Esposito	 posits	 it:	firstly,	it	involves	the	controlled	management	and	inclusion	of	a	perceived	threat;	secondly,	it	is	a	negative	mode	characterised	by	the	restriction	and	inhibition	 of	 relationalities	 that	would	 seek	 to	 exceed	 the	 boundaries	 of	the	privileged	organism.				 Therefore,	 the	 immune	 are	 excused	 from	processes	 of	 reciprocity	(and	 relationality)	 by	 being	 protected	 from	 ‘obligations	 or	 dangers	 that	concern	 everyone	 else.’185	As	 the	 immune	 community	 are	 exempt	 from	responsibility	 to	 those	outside	 that	community	 they	are	able	 to	establish	and	 police	 borders	 that	 open	 and	 close	 according	 to	 the	 desires	 of	 the	immune	 group,	 rather	 than	 in	 response	 to	 the	 pleas	 or	 demands	 of	 the	(contagious)	 external	 subject.	 In	 the	 Littlefield	 community	 (inhabited,	 as	Clarice’s	 proposed	 monograph	 will	 argue,	 by	 privileged	 American	subjects)	 the	 immune	mechanism	 functions	 in	 order	 to	 guarantee	 these	privileged	 subjects	 the	 safety	 they	 see	 as	 their	 right.	 As	 such,	 the	community	 is	 characterised	 by	 controlled	 forms	 of	 unsafety	 that	predominantly	 proceed	 by	 impeding	 the	 development	 of	 unruly	relationalities.	This	means	 that	 the	 townspeople	are	 continuously	on	 the	look	 out	 for	 citizens	 that	 don’t	 belong	 and,	 as	 such,	 should	 be	 refused																																																									184	Roberto	Esposito,	Bíos :	Biopolitics	and	Philosophy,	PostHumanities	Series ;	v.	4	(Minneapolis,	Minn:	University	of	Minnesota	Press ;	Bristol,	2008),	p.	47.	185	Timothy	Campbell,	‘Bios,	Immunity,	Life:	The	Thought	of	Roberto	Esposito’,	Diacritics,	36.2	(2008),	2–22	(p.	50).	
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hospitality.	 A	 proposed	 off-leash	 dog	 park	 that	 has	 sent	 the	 town	 into	meltdown	(and	is	the	supposed	catalyst	for	the	spate	of	dog	poisonings)	is	just	 such	an	example	of	 the	 immune	cycle	of	 freedom,	 transgression	and	control	 in	 action;	 this	 allowance	 of	 doggy	 freedom	 will	 be	 managed	negatively	 (as	a	 restriction	of	growth),	 just	as	Esposito	describes,	 in	 that	the	park	meadow	will	only	be	off-leash	between	eight	am	and	ten	am	on	weekdays,	and	for	two	hours	on	a	Saturday	and	Sunday	evening.	This	will	be	 a	 probationary	 period	 during	 which	 the	 dogs	 can	 prove	 themselves	worthy	 of	 such	 a	 privilege	 (Berne,	 p.4).	 However,	 those	members	 of	 the	community	 that	 see	 this	move	 as	 (unforgivably)	privileging	 the	 rights	 of	dogs	over	 those	of	humans	point	 to	 the	various	ways	 that	dogs	have	not	‘behaved	 like	 good	 citizens	 in	 the	past’	 in	order	 to	 call	 into	question	 the	wisdom	of	incorporating	an	unwelcome	virus	(dogs)	into	the	heart	of	the	communal	organism	(the	park)	(p.77).			 This	 management	 of	 subjectivity	 and	 inclusion	 (citizen	 or	 non-citizen)	can	be	seen	at	work	elsewhere	in	the	community	in	that	dogs	are	not	 the	 only	 ones	 under	 pressure	 to	 prove	 their	 credentials	 as	 ‘good	citizens.’	Although	it	is	Clarice’s	‘sleepy	and	benevolent-looking’	dog	Aggie	that	 is	 purportedly	 to	 blame	 for	 her	 three	 week	 search	 for	 rental	accommodation	in	the	town,	her	new	landlady	Hedy	Fischman	pronounces	‘with	relish’	that	the	townspeople	are	in	fact	simply	too	‘ray-shist’	to	rent	property	to	a	black	woman.	Indeed,	Clarice	finds	that	her	goal	of	blending	in	with	the	local	population	poses	something	of	a	challenge.	The	only	other	black	people	she	has	encountered	in	the	town	are	‘a	cashier	at	Walgreens	and	 a	 bagger	 at	Whole	 Foods’	 (p.48).	 Ahmed	Bhopali,	 a	 young	 Pakistani	law	student,	is	the	only	other	person	of	colour	to	feature	in	the	novel,	and	as	 such	 is	 considered	 a	 prime	 suspect	 in	 the	 dog	 poisonings.	 This	 is	because,	Hedy	declares,	‘you	cannot	discount	the	Middle	East’,	referring	to	Ahmed	as	the	‘young	Muslim	man’	she	has	seen	around	town	who	is	‘very	angry-looking	and	never	says	hello.	Looks	like	he’d	like	to	blow	something	up’	 (p.126).	When	Clarice	points	 out	 that	Ahmed	 is	Hindu,	 and	 someone	else	presses	Hedy	to	provide	a	motive	for	the	Middle	East’s	involvement	in	
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small-town	 dog	 poisoning,	 she	 vaguely	 mentions	 ‘religious	 differences’	(p.127).		Her	racism	is	demonstrably	shared	by	the	Littlefield	police	force,	who,	Ahmed	 tells	 Clarice,	 have	been	harassing	him	 for	months,	 ticketing	him	for	chaining	his	bicycle	to	a	parking	meter,	for	jay-walking,	for	sitting	in	the	park	after	dusk	(p.236).	A	dark-haired	man	with	facial	hair	has	been	spotted	painting	graffiti	on	an	office	wall,	and	the	police	have	proceeded	to	stop	anyone	matching	that	description,	including	Ahmed,	twelve	times.				 Whilst	Ahmed	is	not	one	of	the	novel’s	principal	characters,	the	fact	that	his	brownness	alone	(and	more	specifically,	the	racism	that	allows	the	Littlefield	 inhabitants	 to	 transpose	 South	 Asian	 for	Middle	 Eastern)	 is	 a	signifier	of	both	prospective	and	realized	guilt	for	the	townspeople	is	one	of	 the	key	ways	that	the	text	announces	 itself	as	post-9/11	fiction.	When	an	 interviewer	 mentioned	 to	 Berne	 that	 the	 novel	 appeared	 to	 her	 as	describing	 ‘a	 collective	 outbreak	 of	 hysteria-neuroses	 borne	 out	 of	 too	much	 comfort,	 something	 akin	 to	 that	 suffered	 by	 the	 drawing	 room-confined	 middle-class	 women	 in	 turn	 of	 the	 century	 Vienna	 treated	 by	Freud’,	 Berne	 replied	 that	whilst	 she	 had	 not	 considered	 a	 parallel	with	‘drawing-room’	 hysteria,	 she	 certainly	 felt	 that	 the	 label	 of	 ‘collective	hysteria’	 would	 be,	 ‘a	 rather	 apt	 description	 of	 the	 current	 American	political	system.’186	Berne	gestures	here	to	the	mechanism	of	immunity	as	it	exists	in	the	West	post-9/11,	where	the	compulsive	policing	of	borders	has	become	a	positive	expression	of	patriotic	nationalism.	187	Indeed,	9/11	is	the	event	that	both	Esposito	and	Jacques	Derrida	use	as	an	example	of	the	pathological	‘auto-immune’	response	that	is	able	to	develop	when	the	immune	mechanism	 fails.	188	Again,	 the	 term	 takes	 its	meaning	 from	 the																																																									186	‘Suzanne	Berne	behind	the	Picket	Fence’,	Bookanista,	2013	<http://bookanista.com/suzanne-berne/>	[accessed	17	October	2017].	187	George	Bush	used	the	language	of	immunity	and	defence	in	his	famous	‘War	on	Terror’	speech	in	2001,	when	he	announced:	‘Our	nation	has	been	put	on	notice:	We	are	not	immune	from	attack.	We	will	take	defensive	measures	against	terrorism	to	protect	Americans.’	188	For	Derrida,	unlike	Esposito,	the	structures	of	immunity	and	auto-immunity	are	indispensable	to	community	as	we	know	it.	He	sees	the	auto-immune	response	as	a	‘death-drive’	that	is	‘silently	at	work	in	every	community,	every	auto-co-immunity’	and	claims	‘no	community	<is	possible>	that	
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same	process	in	biology	whereby	the	bodily	immune	system	malfunctions	and	begins	to	produce	antibodies	that	attack	its	own	cells.	For	Derrida,	the	auto-immune	 response	 is	 ‘quasi-suicidal’	 in	 that	 ‘a	 living	 being	works	 to	destroy	 its	 own	 protection,	 to	 immunize	 itself	 against	 its	 “own”	immunity’189,	whilst	Esposito	defines	it	as	‘an	immunity	that	is	destined	to	destroy	itself	with	the	other’	(Campbell,	p.55).190	Whilst	Esposito	suggests	that	Derrida	gives	auto-immunity	a	‘tragic	characterization’	that	he	himself	would	 reject	 in	 favour	 of	 seeking	 aspects	 of	 the	 response	 that	 are	‘potentially	creative	and	productive’,	he	is	in	agreement	with	Derrida	that	the	 destructive	 auto-immune	 effect	 is	 linked	 to	 globalization	 and	 the	‘preventive	 immunization’	 that	 is	 generated	 when	 ‘more	 human	 beings	(but	 also	 ideas,	 languages,	 and	 technologies	 [le	 techniche])	 communicate	and	intersect’	(Campbell,	pp.	53-55).	As	such	‘local	enclaves’	like	the	town	of	Littlefield	‘can	be	explained	as	the	immunitary	rejection	of	that	general	contamination	 that	 is	 called	 globalization’,	 the	 phenomenon	 that	 Clarice	identifies	when	she	notes	that	the	townspeople	see	their	personal	burdens	as	‘equivalent	to	any	suffered	elsewhere’	(Campbell,	p.55;Berne,	p.152).				 In	Littlefield,	the	hysterical	auto-immune	response	that	comes	into	being	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 community’s	 over-immunisation	 (the	 policing	 of	citizens)	 is	most	visible	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 town	dogs.	The	restriction	and	inhibition	of	development	that	characterises	the	immune	response	as	seen	at	work	in	the	controlled	introduction	of	the	dog	park	turns	back	on	itself	in	its	most	negative	form	when	an	unknown	person	begins	poisoning	the	dogs	 (and	 they	 are,	 of	 course,	 not	 just	 dogs,	 but	 pets).	 The	 community																																																																																																																																																			would	not	cultivate	its	own	auto-immunity,	a	principle	of	sacrificial	self-destruction	ruining	the	principle	of	self-protection.’	In	the	case	of	9/11	he	points	to	the	fact	that	the	“terrorists”	are	not	absolute	others,	but	rather	‘were	often	recruited,	trained,	and	even	armed,	and	for	a	long	time,	in	various	Western	ways	by	a	Western	world	that	itself,	in	the	course	of	its	ancient	as	well	as	very	recent	history,	invented	the	world,	the	techniques,	and	the	“politics”	of	“terrorism.”	(Autoimmunity,	115.)	189	Derrida,	‘Autoimmunity’	in	Philosophy	in	a	Time	of	Terror,	94.	190	Jürgen	Habermas,	Jacques	Derrida,	and	Giovanna	Borradori,	Philosophy	in	a	Time	of	Terror :	
Dialogues	with	Jürgen	Habermas	and	Jacques	Derrida	(Chicago ;	London:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2003),	p.	94.	
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begins	to	disintegrate	as	 its	 inhabitants	are	no	longer	able	to	trust	 in	the	‘shared	 values’	 that	 allow	 consensus	 on	 the	 way	 that	 the	 controlled	inclusion	of	‘othered’	citizens	is	decided,	structured,	and	managed.	Instead,	an	unidentified	but	internal	agent	has	begun	attacking	the	organism	of	the	town	 from	 within,	 just	 as	 the	 immune	 mechanism	 does.	 Berne’s	description	 of	 the	 communities’	 auto-immune	 response	 to	 this,	 whilst	humorous,	also	clearly	mimics	the	kind	of	liberal	discourse	that	commonly	arises	as	a	response	to	acts	of	terrorism	post-9/11.		 People	no	longer	let	their	dogs	out	in	their	yards	alone.	Some	dog	owners	drove	to	other	towns	to	walk	their	dogs.	More	than	a	few	were	considering	moving	altogether.	Task	forces	had	been	organised.	A	Take	Back	the	Park	march	was	planned	for	when	the	weather	warmed.	‘Our	Dogs	and	What	Next?’	read	an	editorial	headline	in	last	week’s	Gazette.	What	have	been	unleashed	in	this	town	are	the	forces	
of	hatred	and	intolerance.	A	place	bitten	by	fear	is	never	the	same	
place	again.	.	.	(p.148,	italics	in	original).	
	This	being	the	case,	it	would	be	easy	to	embark	upon	a	reading	of	the	novel	that	 would	 see	 dogs	 in	 general	 (and	 particularly	 Margaret’s	 accusatory	ghost	dogs)	as	a	metaphor	for	the	uncontainable,	globalised	‘outside’	that	so	 terrifies	 the	 Littlefield	 inhabitants;	 indeed,	 Berne	 places	 the	 novel	specifically	 in	 this	 context	 when	 she	 mentions	 the	 ‘hysteria’	 of	 the	American	 political	 system	 in	 her	 interview.	 Such	 a	 reading	 is	 of	 course	possible,	not	to	mention	interesting,	and	it	is	certainly	a	part	of	the	novel’s	meaning,	but	ultimately	the	project	of	Berne’s	text	seems	to	be	to	call	into	question	 the	 possibility	 or	 ethics	 of	 processes	 of	 interpretation	 that	substitute	one	 thing	 for	another	 in	ways	 that	unproblematically	override	signified	with	signifier.	When	working	in	this	way,	such	a	metaphor	would	close	down	the	meaning	of	the	accusatory	ghost	dogs	that	haunt	Margaret	because	 they	 simply	 stand	 in	 for	 an	 invasive	 other,	 and	would	 similarly	close	 down	 the	 subjectivity	 of	 Ahmed	 Bhopali,	 whose	 brownness	would	
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simply	equal	a	 threat	 to	(white)	America.	As	one	of	 the	town	inhabitants	says	 to	 Clarice,	 ‘“Obviously	 the	 dogs	 are	 a	 symptom	 of	 a	more	 systemic	problem,	 but	 we	 all	 take	 it	 personally”’	 (pp.151-2).	 To	 put	 it	 a	 little	differently,	 assuming	 that	 the	 function	of	 dogs	 in	 the	novel	 stands	 in	 for	post	 9/11	 anxieties	 about	 the	 foreign	 ‘invader’	 (in	 the	 language	 of	
immunitas)	 is	 to	suggest	 that	 the	way	 the	community	and	 its	 inhabitants	are	bound	up	with	and	emotionally	invested	in	doggy	relationalities	is	not	readable	in	its	own	right.	Indeed,	reading	the	text	alongside	the	theories	of	Esposito	 and	 Derrida	 as	 I	 have	 begun	 to	 do	 here,	 immediately	makes	 it	clear	that	the	immune/auto-immune	response	is	clearly	mobilised	by	the	problematics	 of	 inter-species	 living	 and	 can	 be	 read	 coherently	 in	 these	terms	 without	 the	 substitution	 of	 an	 alternative,	 more	 authoritative	paradigm.	 Amongst	 other	 things,	 this	 would	 point	 to	 the	 real	 joke	 in	Berne’s	novel	–	that	dogs	are	enough	to	rupture	this	privileged	community	all	on	their	own.	This	is	not	to	say	that	I	believe	a	reading	of	this	novel	in	the	context	of	trauma	post-9/11	is	without	value.	Rather	the	opposite;	it	is	to	suggest	that	focusing	on	dogs	opens	up	a	reading	of	the	text	that	would	analyse	 the	 relationship	 between	 trauma	 and	 the	 immune/auto-immune	mechanism	in	order	to	uncover	the	ways	that	this	is	mobilised	against	and	with	both	human	and	non-human	subjectivity	post-9/11.		 Perhaps	 most	 obviously,	 the	 place	 of	 dogs	 in	 the	 novel	 draws	attention	 to	 the	 way	 that	 value	 is	 inconsistently	 distributed	 across	different	forms	of	life.	As	I	have	pointed	out,	such	distribution	is	of	course	controlled	 to	 some	 extent	 by	 the	 workings	 of	 the	 immune	 mechanism,	which	 would	 equate	 an	 unwelcome,	 or	 viral	 life	 to	 a	 threat	 that	necessitates	negative	management.	This	means	that	such	unwelcome	lives	can	 never	 fully	 express	 or	 grow	 into	 the	 possibilities	 of	 their	 disruptive	selves.	 So:	 dogs	 must	 be	 on	 leashes,	 and	 live	 in	 the	 community	 on	sufferance,	 always	 subject	 to	 termination	 if	 they	 turn	 against	 the	communal	 ‘organism’.	 As	 such	 tolerated	 (but	 also	 privileged,	 in	 many	ways)	 subjects,	 the	 Littlefield	 dogs	 are	 allocated	 value,	 but	 this	 value	 is	considered	 finite,	 and	assigning	 too	much	of	 it	 to	doggy	 lives	 is	a	 sign	of	
	 183	
pathology.	 Margaret,	 moved	 and	 obsessed	 by	 the	 dogs	 that	 haunt	 her,	constantly	 describes	 herself	 (and	 is	 described	 by	 others)	 as	 having	 an	unhealthy	 surplus	 of	 affect	 that	marks	 her	 as	 different.	 She	 is	 ‘a	 human	tuning	 fork’	 who	 muses	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 she	 may	 have	 some	 kind	 of	‘Sensory	 Integration	 Disorder’	 because	 everything	 bothers	 her,	 a	permanent	 imbalance	 that	 makes	 itself	 felt	 as	 ‘something	 unreasonable,	morbid,	a	persistent	boring	dread	(p.14).	It	is	Margaret	who	discovers	the	first	dog	poisoned,	 lying	dead	 in	 the	park,	 ‘white	 and	motionless,	 almost	too	big	to	be	believable’	(p.7).	The	dog’s	body	is	uncanny	from	the	start,	so	that	the	reader	is	perfectly	able	to	identify	the	spectral	canine	on	its	return	when	 it	 rears	 up	 against	 the	 car	 window	 as	 Margaret	 sits	 inside,	‘enormous	 and	 white’,	 nails	 clicking	 against	 the	 window	 and	 breath	fogging	the	glass	(p.	62).	Soon,	Margaret	is	being	followed	everywhere	by	watchful	hordes	of	canine	undead:		 Sometimes	she	saw	just	one,	but	there	were	hundreds	of	them	now,	gray	legions,	small	and	large,	some	of	them	mangy	and	thin,	patches	of	fur	hanging	loose,	hides	crawling	with	fleas	and	worms;	some	with	ropes	around	their	necks;	some	with	legs	crushed	and	trailing	behind	them;	some	still	 just	puppies,	 fat	bellies	dragging	along	 the	ground.	All	 of	 them	 with	 enormous	 baleful	 eyes.	 It	 was	 all	 the	 dogs	 of	Littlefield,	 she	 had	 started	 to	 think,	 every	 dog	 that	 had	 ever	 been	starved	 or	 beaten,	 run	 over,	 abandoned	 by	 the	 road,	 tied	 to	 a	 tree	and	stoned,	torn	apart	in	staged	dog	fights,	drowned	as	a	puppy	in	a	sack.	They’d	crept	back,	crossing	the	years	like	miles,	scenting	their	way	home	across	an	impossible	distance,	one	by	one,	to	gather	under	the	oak	trees	in	her	backyard,	in	the	softly	falling	snow,	to	stare	up	at	her	windows	and	wait	for	her	to	look	out	and	see	them.	(p.132).		All	 these	 dogs	 are	 victims	 of	 abuse	 and	 murder,	 their	 ghostly	 bodies	testifying	 to	 the	 brutality	 of	 both	 their	 lives	 and	 their	 afterlives.	 They	appear	to	Margaret	as	a	kind	of	rebuke,	and	it	seems	that	their	overarching	desire	 is	 for	visibility,	 they	 ‘wait	 for	her	to	 look	out	and	see	them.’	 In	 life	
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these	 dogs	 were	 killable	 (although	 not	 grievable)	 non-subjects,	 but	 in	becoming	visible	to	Margaret,	this	changes	a	little;	they	make	a	demand	on	her	 to	 look	 that	 also	 requires	 an	 acknowledgement	 of	 invisible	 kinds	 of	trauma.	They	have	the	power	to	hold	Margaret	in	their	gaze,	peering	at	her	with	 ‘enormous	 baleful	 eyes’	 in	 a	 way	 that	 calls	 her	 to	 account.	 This	 is	particularly	evident	during	an	episode	 in	which	Margaret	and	Bill	host	a	Christmas	meal	 that	 unites	most	 of	 the	novel’s	 central	 characters	 in	 one	room;	 Margaret,	 however,	 is	 unable	 to	 ignore	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 dogs	outside.	 She	 is	 disturbed	 by	 an	 awareness	 of	 the	 difference	 in	 condition	between	her	guests	and	the	animals	outdoors,	and	is:		 Sorry	 for	 inviting	 people	 to	 dinner	 while	 out	 in	 the	 cold	 whirling	darkness	thousands	of	dogs	slunk	just	beyond	her	lit	windows,	ears	laid	back,	hackles	raised,	circling	and	circling	her	house,	leaving	not	a	single	paw	print	in	the	snow	(p.139).		Her	expression	of	regret	is	articulated	in	a	powerful	image	that	expresses	the	spatial	separation	of	included	and	excluded	subjects	(the	bright,	warm,	room	sheltered	from	the	dark	snow	outside)	whilst	also	simultaneously	identifying	Margaret	as	the	agent	of	this	division;	she	has	invited	the	people	inside,	and	the	apology	she	makes	is	to	do	with	her	awareness	that	she	has	limited	and	managed	her	hospitality.				 Margaret	and	Bill’s	daughter	Julia	is	identified	as	suffering	from	the	same	surplus	of	affect	as	Margaret;	she	is	painfully	aware	of	her	responsibilities	to	the	animals	in	her	life,	and	this	is	most	evident	in	the	ways	she	seeks	to	arrange	that	these	animals	are	properly	mourned:		 Every	time	a	pet	died,	Julia	conducted	rituals	and	burial	ceremonies	with	somber	devotion,	the	animal	conveyed	to	its	grave	on	a	little	red	plush	 pillow	 Julia	 reserved	 for	 this	 purpose,	 covered	 by	 a	handkerchief.	 Happy	 memories	 were	 recounted,	 followed	 by	 the	Lord’s	Prayer	and	a	poem,	 then	the	 internment.	Later,	a	moment	of	
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silence	at	dinner,	a	candle	 lit	 in	honor	of	 the	dead.	She	even	buried	mice	and	toads	that	drowned	in	the	pool	(p.16).		Julia’s	grief	 is	evenly	distributed,	and	extends	from	her	own	pets	to	frogs	caught	in	the	water	filter	of	the	outdoor	pool.	When	she	discovers	a	dead	mayfly	in	the	kitchen	she	tells	her	father,	‘I	think	it’s	sad	when	something	dies,	no	matter	what	it	is’,	to	which	he	replies,	‘Sad	doesn’t	really	apply	to	bugs’	(p.253).	Julia	is	ignorant	of	the	value	judgments	that	regulate	which	lives	are	grievable,	and	her	affective	attachments	are	shown	to	be	not	only	foolish	 but	 dangerous;	 she	 is	 hospitalised	 after	 climbing	 on	 to	 a	 frozen	pond	in	order	to	rescue	a	small	white	puppy,	which	of	course	turns	out	not	to	be	there,	after	all.					 Neither	Margaret	nor	Julia,	however,	extends	their	surplus	of	affect	to	the	novel’s	most	disposable	lives:	coyotes.	These	animals	stalk	the	edges	of	the	novel	in	the	same	way	that	they	are	shown	to	do	in	the	community,	the	 woods	 of	 which	 are	 said	 to	 be	 ‘full	 of’	 them;	 ‘occasionally	 they	materialized	at	the	edges	of	people’s	backyards	during	evening	barbecues,	dark	 and	 bony	 and	 somehow	 accusing,	 hovering	 behind	 rhododendrons	and	swing	sets’	(p.25).	Margaret	 is	reassured	after	she	discovers	the	first	murdered	dog	by	thinking,	‘if	it	was	poison	at	all,	someone	had	been	trying	to	poison	 the	coyotes’	 (p.25).	These	wild	canids,	 then,	are	excluded	 from	her	circle	of	grief.				 As	 it	 turns	out,	she	 is	right;	 the	novel	 finally	reveals	 that	 the	dogs	have	been	killed	by	an	environmentalist	trying	to	‘complete	the	food	chain	and	restore	a	natural	order’	by	culling	the	coyotes	who	he	argues	have	‘no	natural	 predators	 in	 the	 New	 England	 suburbs’	 (p.262).	 The	 dogs	 have	simply	 been	 ‘collateral	 damage’,	 a	 phrase	 that	 incorporates	within	 itself	the	move	from	immune	mechanism	to	autoimmune	response;	the	proper	inclusion	 of	 death	 within	 life	 which	 is	 posited	 here	 as	 preserving	 the	‘natural’	 subjects	 of	 the	 community	 turns	 on	 itself	 to	 attack	 those	 same	proper	 subjects,	 the	 dogs	 that	 live	 and	 belong	 in	 human	 homes.	 Here,	
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Berne	points	to	the	way	that	the	immune/autoimmune	response	is	always	already	 imbricated	 in	 ideas	of	 care,	 and	gestures	 to	 the	broader	 cultural	implications	of	this	as	it	can	be	seen	at	work	in	practices	of	conservation.	The	 poisonous	 thanatopolitics	 of	 the	 environmentalist	 show	 that	 in	 this	case	the	project	of	conservation	is	able	to	unproblematically	adopt	killing	as	 a	means	of	 prolonging	or	 enriching	 life,	 thus	offering	 a	 quintessential	example	of	 immune	 logic	 in	action.	Further,	 the	poisoning	of	 the	coyotes	relies	on	an	assumption	about	 their	sameness	 that	sees	 these	animals	as	infinitely	 replaceable,	 and	 therefore	 killable.	When	 the	 one	 stands	 in	 for	the	many,	a	violent	metaphorical	logic	is	at	work.			 In	this	novel,	then,	care	is	unruly,	and	the	proper	functioning	of	the	immune	mechanism	relies	on	it	being	properly	managed	and	allocated.	In	Margaret’s	 case,	 her	 excess	 of	 care,	 manifested	 in	 the	 dogs	 she	 sees,	 is	ultimately	seen	as	a	sign	of	pathology.	This	is	where	Berne’s	novel	engages	closely	 with	 cultural	 discourses	 of	 trauma	 and	 the	 traumatised,	particularly	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 kinds	 of	 working-through	 or	 acts	 of	interpretation	 that	 are	 offered	 as	 potentially	 therapeutic	 in	 these	 cases.	Crucially,	 Littlefield’s	 psychological	 pedigree	 (home	 to	 roughly	 one	percent	 of	 the	 nation’s	 psychotherapists)	 is	 part	 of	 the	 novel’s	 dark	comedy.	 	 Clarice	 considers	 the	 inhabitants	 to	 be	 ‘the	 world’s	 most	psychologically	 policed	 and	 probably	 well-medicated	 population’,	 and	Margaret	 muses,	 ‘	 “you	 know,	 I	 bet	 if	 you	 ran	 out	 of	 the	 house	 yelling	“Help!”	doors	would	fly	open	and	people	would	rush	out	with	handfuls	of	Prozac’	 (pp.	47,	17).	 Inevitably,	 then,	Margaret’s	ghostly	canine	 followers	inspire	a	frenzy	of	attempts	at	diagnosis	from	those	around	her,	diagnoses	which	seek	to	close	down	and	displace	the	meaning	of	the	dogs	by	working	out	what	they	really	stand	for.	This	closing	down	is	presented	as	not	only	a	contrast	but	also	a	preventative	response	to	 the	affective	realisation	 that	Margaret	 uses	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 dogs	 on	 her	 own	 terms.	 In	 a	particularly	 striking	 few	passages,	Margaret	muses	on	 the	appearance	of	the	 dogs	 and	 is	 suddenly	 struck	 by	 the	 idea	 that	 although	 the	 dogs	 ‘had	
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only	seemed	about	her,	not	about	anything	else’	what	if	instead,	‘the	dogs	were	for	all	of	them?’	(p.	138)		 At	 last	she	understood.	At	 last	 it	had	come	to	her:	she	was	 just	 like	everyone	else	who	had	troubles	and	if	she	was	interested	in	her	own	troubles,	she	was	also	interested	in	theirs,	and	therefore	she	was	not	alone,	would	never	be	alone,	even	if	Bill	left	her,	even	if	she	spent	the	rest	 of	 her	 life	weeping	 in	 her	 bedroom	with	 the	 door	 closed.	 The	world	and	its	troubles	would	be	with	her	(p.	141).		Whilst	this	realisation	is	not	particularly	politically	profound	(as	we	have	already	seen,	Margaret’s	affect	is	still	limited	and	does	not	lead	to	any	kind	of	 larger	 action),	 it	 is	 still	 radical	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 way	 the	 Littlefield	community	 is	 normally	 seen	 to	 operate;	 that	 is,	 as	 being	 concerned	primarily	with	inwardness	and	the	strict	policing	of	risky	relationality	that	characterises	 the	 immune	 mechanism.	 By	 experiencing	 a	 sense	 of	connection	 to	 others	 that	 extends	 outside	 of	 Littlefield	 (to	 ‘the	 world’),	Margaret	 returns	 to	 the	 reciprocity	 of	 the	 communal	munus	 from	which	the	immune	subject	is	exempt.	Linked	as	this	realisation	is	to	the	presence	of	 the	 dogs,	 it	 becomes	 evident	 that	 for	 Margaret	 to	 be	 ‘cured’	 of	 their	haunting	is	for	her	to	necessarily	be	‘cured’	of	this	openness	to	the	outside	that	 undercuts	 and	 threatens	 the	 normal	 functioning	 of	 the	 communal	immune	 mechanism.	 The	 ghostly	 dogs,	 therefore,	 are	 an	 extremely	dangerous	kind	of	virus.				 In	 order	 for	 Margaret	 to	 be	 cured	 she	 must	 perform	 an	 act	 of	substitution,	 or	 interpretation,	 that	 will	 involve	 finding	 an	 alternative	meaning	 for	 the	 dogs	 she	 sees	 by	 looking	 inward.	 The	 erasure,	 or	more	appropriately,	exorcism	of	the	dogs	is	necessary	for	Margaret’s	cure,	and	is	understood	 by	 those	 around	 her	 to	 be	 part	 of	 and	 crucial	 to	 a	 healthy	process	 of	working	 through;	 to	 put	 it	 differently,	 if	 the	 dogs	 aren’t	 dogs	then	Margaret’s	 distress	 becomes	manageable.	 Bill,	 her	 husband,	 ‘thinks	the	dogs	are	a	symptom	of	distress.’	He	attributes	their	appearance	to	the	
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strain	 Margaret	 is	 under	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	 potential	 divorce,	 ‘it	 was	infecting	her,	doing	 something	 to	her	brain.	He’d	 read	about	 this	kind	of	projection	stuff	in	a	copy	of	Psychology	Today	in	Dr	Vogel’s	waiting	room.	Neurotic	obsession.	Common	for	people	going	through	a	bad	time’	(p.111).	The	narrator	offers	Bill’s	diagnosis	of	Margaret	to	the	reader	with	tongue	firmly	 in	 cheek,	 just	 as	 she	 does	 with	 all	 the	 townspeople	 and	 their	compulsion	 to	 diagnose	 their	 friends,	 neighbours	 and	 children	 with	various	psychological	disorders.	Indeed,	Margaret	explains	that	when	she	has	tried	to	talk	to	Bill	about	the	uncanny	dogs,	‘he	thought	he	knew	what	she	was	talking	about,	which	was	worse	than	not	being	understood	at	all’	(p.131).	Instead	of	wanting	the	dogs	gone,	Margaret	has	‘started	to	crave’	their	 presence,	 so	 that	 whilst	 seeing	 them	 feels	 like,	 ‘a	 tremendous	
irritation	[…]	like	the	air	is	filled	with	bees,	a	repulsive	feeling,	intolerable’,	she	finds	that	she	can	‘bear	it.’	Often	she	gets	up	in	the	middle	of	the	night	to	go	and	look	out	of	the	window;	 ‘I	know	you’re	there,	I	haven’t	forgotten	
about	you’	(pp.	132-3).				 This	changes,	however,	after	 Julia	climbs	on	 to	 the	 frozen	pond	 in	search	 of	 the	white	 puppy	 that	 vanishes	 as	 soon	 as	 she	 has	 taken	 a	 few	steps	on	to	the	ice.	After	this	event,	Margaret	explains	that	it	is	‘her	job	to	stay	home.	In	the	days	after	she	fell	through	the	ice	on	Silsbee	Pond,	Julia	had	 not	wanted	 to	 be	 alone’	 (p.172).	Margaret	 sees	 Julia’s	 accident	 as	 a	failure	of	care	on	her	part	and	she	understands	this	failure	as	linked	to	her	preoccupation	with	the	dogs;	she	has	formed	a	foolish	attachment	that	has	diverted	 her	 emotional	 energies	 in	 a	 way	 that	 has	 proved	 potentially	deadly.	Just	as	it	is	her	‘job’	to	look	after	Julia,	it	is	also	‘her	job	now	not	to	see	them’,	despite	the	fact	that,	 ‘they	were	there,	they	were	always	there’	(p.172).			 Just	 as	 Margaret	 has	 endangered	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 communal	immune	 mechanism	 by	 opening	 herself	 up	 to	 the	 spectral	 dogs,	 (thus	engendering	 an	 autoimmune	 response	where	 the	 dogs,	 in	 the	 person	 of	the	ghostly	puppy	on	the	pond,	threaten	the	life	of	her	own	daughter),	she	
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is	also	shown	to	have	done	so	by	 including	a	 lethal	doggy	subject	within	her	own	home.	This	 is	 the	 family	dog,	Binx,	 loved	by	 Julia	but	seen	most	often	with	Margaret,	 the	 ‘lunatic	 Binx:	 chewing	 up	 shoes	 and	 chair	 legs,	barking	at	every	squirrel	 that	ran	across	the	 lawn,	sending	rugs	 flying	as	he	 skittered	 from	 room	 to	 room’	 (p.16).	 This	 exuberant	 canine	 subject	breaches	 the	 terms	 on	 which	 dogs	 are	 tolerated	 in	 the	 Littlefield	community,	 and	 this	 unruly	 subject	 must	 be	 negatively	managed	 as	 the	immune	mechanism	demands.	Appearing	throughout	 the	 first	part	of	 the	novel	barking,	wailing,	howling	and	running,	Binx	is	abruptly	neutered	and	stops	barking,	growling,	and	even	his	favourite	pursuit-	trying	to	bite	the	postman.	 A	 dynamic	 presence	 up	 until	 this	 point,	 Binx,	 now	 lies	 ‘in	 the	middle	of	the	kitchen	floor	like	a	gigantic	ink	blot,	hardly	moving’	(p.216).	He	has	been	prescribed	anxiety	medication	(just	like	the	rest	of	the	town)	and	 is	 now	 ‘almost	 catatonic’	 (p.214).	 When	 Julia	 slips	 him	 a	 couple	 of	extra	anxiety	pills	before	a	walk	to	cheer	him	up,	he	manages	to	break	free	of	his	 leash	 in	the	park	and	attack	Matthew,	the	son	of	one	of	Margaret’s	good	friends.	For	Matthew,	stoned	and	frightened,	Binx	is	unidentifiable,	a	creature	 that	 ‘could	 not	 be	 categorized’	 but	 most	 closely	 resembles	 a	coyote:	‘Black	gums.	White	fangs.	Yellowish	eyes’	(p.232).			 After	 this,	 Binx	 is	 ‘destroyed.’	 As	 Matthew’s	 mother	 Naomi	 (a	psychotherapist,	of	course)	explains,	 ‘	“I	mean	I	 love	dogs,	I	have	one	too	[…]	But	that	thing	wasn’t	safe	around	children”’	(p.234).	The	destruction	of	Binx,	 become-coyote	 and	 become-killable,	 works	 to	 restore	 Margaret’s	pathological	 excess	 of	 affect;	 he	becomes	 a	 sacrificial	 subject	 that	 allows	the	functioning	of	the	immune	mechanism	(outsiders	stay	out)	to	return	to	normal	by	providing	an	explanation	for	Margaret’s	canine	fears.	As	Naomi	remarks:		 “One	 minute	 she’s	 looking	 at	 a	 bush,	 the	 next	 it’s	 a	 dog.	 Well,	 no	surprise,	given	the	monster	she	had	right	in	her	house.	That’s	what	I	told	 her.	 I	 said,	 Margaret,	 you	 are	 projecting,	 and	 it	 may	 even	 be	helpful,	a	defense	mechanism,	given	all	your	stress”	(p.	235).	
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	In	 the	same	way	 that	Derrida	points	 to	 the	workings	of	autoimmunity	 in	the	 fact	 that	 the	 ‘terrorists’	 that	 the	US	sought	 to	wage	war	against	after	9/11	were	not	in	fact	 ‘absolute	others’	but	 ‘were	often	recruited,	trained,	and	 even	 armed,	 and	 for	 a	 long	 time,	 in	 various	 Western	 ways	 by	 a	Western	 world	 that	 […]	 invented	 the	 word,	 the	 techniques,	 and	 the	“politics”	of	terrorism’,	so	Binx	similarly	becomes	the	‘monster’	within	the	safe	 space	 of	 the	 house,	 his	 attack	 precipitated	 by	 the	 medication	 that	should	 have	 managed	 and	 controlled	 him	 (Politics	 in	 a	 Time	 of	 Terror,	p.115).	By	allowing	Binx	to	be	killed,	Margaret	acts	to	counteract	the	care,	connection,	 and	 also	 grief	 she	 has	 felt	 toward	 the	 living-dead	 dogs	 that	have	 followed	 her	 for	 so	 long,	 and	 so	 auto-immunity	 is	 restored	 to	 the	‘healthy’	 state	of	 immunity.	 In	order	 to	complete	 this	process,	 she	has	 to	tell	 a	 different	 story	 about	 the	 dogs,	 one	 that	 is	 no	 longer	 hospitable	 to	their	 presence.	 Naomi	 has	 offered	 her	 version	 of	 this,	 (as	 has	 Julia,	who	decides	 that	 the	waterfall	 built	 as	 a	memorial	 for	 the	 children	Margaret	lost	 to	a	series	of	miscarriages	 is	 ‘what	her	mother	was	seeing	when	she	stared	 out	 of	 the	 kitchen	 windows’)	 and	 although	 Margaret’s	 is	 slightly	different	it	still	returns	the	meaning	of	the	dogs	back	to	Margaret	herself,	so	 that	 the	 affective	 opening-out	 that	 she	 had	 previously	 experienced	 is	closed	down	and	turned	inward.	She	understands	now	that	the	white	dog	she	saw	for	the	first	time	in	her	car	was	‘only	a	projection	of	her	own	fears	and	unmet	needs’	(p.274).	As	Bill	explains:		 It	was	all	her	worries	about	Julia,	that’s	what	she’d	been	seeing,	she	told	him,	when	she	thought	she	saw	those	dogs.	She	was	very	cogent	about	 it	 now,	 almost	 businesslike.	 She	 did	 not	 believe	 in	 ghosts.	 It	was	all	neurosis.	Not	sleeping,	not	eating,	the	difficulties	they’d	been	having,	 trying	 to	 suppress	 her	 fears	 –	 all	 of	 that	 had	 made	 her	unbalanced,	so	that	her	mind	had	shown	her	what	she	was	afraid	to	see.	 Just	 as	 Dr	 Vogel	 said:	 anxiety.	 It	 wasn’t	madness	 –	 she	wasn’t	going	mad,	thank	God	[…]	but	only	anxiety,	its	next-door	neighbour.	
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She	was	going	to	get	a	prescription.	There	was	a	certain	medication.	Naomi	knew	someone,	a	psychopharmologist	(p.	246).		Here	 we	 see	 an	 effect	 similar	 to	 that	 observed	 in	 All	 the	 Birds,	 Singing,	whereby	 the	 dogs	 (or	 puma-creature,	 in	 that	 case)	 simply	 stand	 in	 as	 a	figure	 for	 the	 individualised	 trauma	 of	 the	 protagonist.	 However	 both	novel	 and,	 we	 may	 imagine,	 Margaret,	 seem	 deeply	 sceptical	 of	 such	 a	closing	 down	 of	 meaning.	 Having	 chuckled	 appreciatively	 at	 the	therapeutic	 community	 throughout	 the	 novel,	 the	 reader	 can	 hardly	 be	expected	to	buy	into	Dr	Vogel’s	analysis	now.	The	indirect	discourse	Berne	uses	 also	 means	 that	 this	 neat	 resolution	 to	 Margaret’s	 psychological	difficulties	is	transmitted	to	the	reader	in	Bill’s	voice,	and	we	already	know	that	 he	 is	 deeply	 sceptical	 about	 the	 dogs,	 and	 that	 his	 perceived	understanding	of	Margaret’s	relationship	to	her	ghostly	canines	is	 ‘worse	than	not	being	understood	at	all.’	Not	only	is	the	diagnosis	too	convenient,	too	 neat,	 too	 unimaginative,	 to	 be	 taken	 seriously,	 but	 the	 idea	 that	 a	prescribed	medication	will	help	Margaret	is	somewhat	entertaining	in	the	light	of	Binx’s	recent	pill-fuelled	aggression.	Berne’s	novel	refuses	such	an	easy	act	of	 interpretation	 just	as	 it	 also	 refuses	 to	discard	 the	possibility	that	the	undead	dogs	are	just	dogs.	Further,	although	the	environmentalist	has	confessed	to	 laying	poison	in	the	park	for	the	coyotes,	 there	remains	‘the	question	of	Boris,	a	dog	deliberately	poisoned	on	a	weekday	afternoon	a	 few	 days	 before	 Thanksgiving,	 outside	 an	 ice-cream	 parlor	 on	 a	 busy	sidewalk’	 (p.264).	Boris’s	death	 is	not	assimilable	 into	 the	 town’s	chosen	narrative,	and	that	seems	to	be	because	the	act	is	ultimately	meaningless,	the	auto-immune	response	taken	to	its	extreme	as	the	pursuit	of	death	for	death’s	 sake.	As	Margaret	understands	 it,	 ‘someone	had	 liked	 the	 idea	of	poisoning	dogs	and	had	decided	to	try	it	[…]	simply	to	see	what	it	felt	like	to	kill	something	that	someone	else	loved’	(p.264).			 The	attempt	 to	reduce	 the	events	surrounding	 the	dog	poisonings	to	 the	 actions	 of	 one	 person,	 in	 order	 that	 they	 might	 go	 away,	 echoes	precisely	the	community’s	need	for	Margaret’s	dogs	to	be	the	projections	
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of	her	troubled	psyche	so	that	they	might	be	encouraged	to	go	away,	too.	Imbricated	 as	 these	 two	 moves	 are	 in	 the	 desires	 for	 wellbeing	 of	 a	community	obsessed	with	psychological	health,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	Berne’s	novel	 is	 engaging	with	what	 have	 been	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 ‘depoliticizing	tendencies’	of	Western	models	of	trauma	treatment	(Craps	and	Beulens,	p.	4).	 This	 would	 refer	 to	 the	 kinds	 of	 working-through	 that	 Freudian	psychoanalysis	would	posit	as	curative,	 just	as	 it	would	to	 the	paralysed,	fragmented	narrative	voice	of	Caruth’s	trauma	sufferer.	Craps	and	Beulens	point	out	that	psychological	healing	often	‘risks	becoming	privileged	over	material	 recovery:	 reparation	 or	 restitution	 and,	 more	 broadly,	 the	transformation	of	a	wounding	political,	social,	and	economic	system’,	and	Margaret’s	exorcism	of	her	canine	spectres,	the	success	of	which	depends	on	 her	 severing	 a	 newly	 formed	 attachment	 to	 the	 world	 beyond	Littlefield,	 shows	 this	 in	 action	 (p.4).	 As	 Clarice	 observes,	Margaret	 ‘was	weeping	about	everything.	But	did	it	matter?	To	notice	and	weep,	to	worry	about	everything	and	yet	do	nothing	in	particular’	(p.241).				 Furthermore,	 in	 asking	 a	 reader	 to	 look	 critically	 at	 this	 effect,	Berne	 engages	 with	 the	 individualizing	 tradition	 of	 the	 suburban	 genre	that	she	writes	within	and	against.		Catherine	Jurca’s	ironically	titled	study	
White	Diaspora	examines	the	tendency	of	twentieth	century	literature	set	in	American	suburbia	 ‘to	convert	 the	rights	and	privileges	of	 living	 there	into	 spiritual,	 cultural,	 and	 political	 problems	 of	 displacement,	 in	 which	being	white	and	middle	class	 is	 imagined	to	have	as	much	or	more	to	do	with	 subjugation	 as	 with	 social	 dominance.’ 191 	Jurca	 coins	 the	 term	‘sentimental	 dispossession’	 to	 refer	 to	 ‘the	 affective	 dislocation	 by	 which	white	middle-class	suburbanites	begin	to	see	themselves	as	spiritually	and	culturally	impoverished	by	prosperity’	(p.7).	It	is	immediately	possible	to	see	 Berne’s	 novel,	 and	 in	 particular	 Margaret’s	 unnameable	 grief,	 as	expressing	 just	 this	 condition.	 Crucially,	 however,	 Berne	 acknowledges	this	 as	 a	 hallmark	 of	 suburban	 American	 literature	 in	 order	 to	 try	 and																																																									191	Catherine	Jurca,	White	Diaspora :	The	Suburb	and	the	Twentieth-Century	American	Novel	(Princeton,	N.J.:	Princeton	University	Press,	2001),	p.	4.	
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move	 beyond	 it.	 Margaret’s	 problems,	 whilst	 easy	 to	 represent	superficially	 in	 these	 terms,	 also	 simultaneously	exceed	 them	 in	 that	her	spiritual	 impoverishment	 is	 engendered	 by	 the	 policing	 of	 affect	 and	relationality	 that	 goes	 hand	 in	 hand	 with	 the	 workings	 of	 the	 immune	mechanism,	 placing	 restrictions	 on	 her	 impulse	 toward	 a	 more	unconditional	kind	of	hospitality.	Further,	Berne	 is	certainly	not	a	writer	uncritical	of	or	even	sympathetic	to	the	kind	of	sentimental	dispossession	Jurca	describes.	Indeed,	she	faces	it	head	on	in	Clarice’s	own	diagnosis	of	Margaret’s	troubled	condition:		 	The	problems	of	Margaret	Downing	were	all	too	obvious:	the	ennui	of	a	loveless	marriage,	resulting	in	attempts	to	connect	with	external	sources	 of	 emotional	 intensity:	 elaborate	 seasonal	 decorations;	sentimental	 German	 music	 played	 endlessly	 on	 the	 piano;	 and,	 of	course,	the	banal	affair	with	a	sexist	male	novelist,	whose	emphasis	on	 sports	 culture	 epitomized	 the	 phallocentric	 world	 that	simultaneously	 rejected	 and	 enslaved	 her,	 leading	 to	 the	 inevitable	emphasis	on	youthful	 appearance	amid	 the	decline	of	middle	age	–	blonde	salon	highlights,	yoga	classes,	skin	coddled	daily	with	creams	and	moisturizers	 that	 cost	 as	much	 as	 the	 yearly	 income	of	 a	 bean	farmer	in	Rajasthan	–	all	adding	up	to	the	worst	kind	of	social	blight:	the	completely	self-absorbed	human	being	(p.240).		Here,	Berne	cheerfully	and	courageously	pokes	fun	at	the	plot	of	the	novel	as	 well	 as	 at	 suburban	 literature	 (not	 to	 mention	 academia)	 more	generally.	She	is	able	to	do	so	because	in	fact	the	plot	of	her	novel	is	made	up	of	much	more	than	this,	which	makes	the	suggestion	that	she	‘stick	with	people	and	ditch	the	dogs’	that	began	this	essay	all	the	more	strange.	The	dogs	 allow	 the	 reader	 to	move	 beyond	 seeing	Margaret	 Downing	 in	 the	terms	above	 to	 thinking	about	her	 inwardness	 in	more	 interesting	ways.	Indeed,	 although	 Clarice	 delivers	 this	 damning	 indictment	 of	 Margaret’s	lifestyle	 and	 character	 (and	 Margaret	 is,	 of	 course,	 self-absorbed),	 she	herself	is	dissatisfied	with	this	analysis,	to	the	point	that	she	is	not	able	to	
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complete	the	grant	proposal	for	the	anthropological	study	that	would	take	Margaret	as	its	key	subject.	Instead,	she	recalls	quoting	Kenneth	Burke	to	her	students;	‘	“a	way	of	seeing	is	also	a	way	of	not	seeing	[…]	To	focus	on	object	 A	 involves	 a	 neglect	 of	 object	 B’”,	 a	 quotation	 that	 very	 deftly	encapsulates	 the	 concerns	 of	 Berne’s	 novel.	 Her	 findings	 having	 proven	too	‘problematic’,	Clarice	departs	Littlefield	without	completing	her	grant	proposal,	 a	 decision	 Berne	 described	 in	 an	 interview	 as	 ‘a	 triumph	 of	moral	 intellect’	For	Berne,	Clarice	was	 ‘imposing	a	narrative	on	the	town	and	 its	 inhabitants	 by	 trying	 to	 use	 them	 to	 prove	 a	 theory’,	 just	 as	 the	therapists	 and	 townspeople	 do	 to	 each	 other,	 and	 to	 Margaret	 and	 her	dogs	(Bookanista,	n.p.).				 The	 conclusion	 of	 the	 novel,	 then,	 invites	 the	 reader	 to	 remain	critical	of	the	various	ways	that	the	imbrications	of	(living	and	nonliving)	canine	and	human	subjects	have	been	explained	or	theorised	by	the	town’s	inhabitants,	 and	 also	 finally	 refuses	 to	 integrate	 or	 explain	 Margaret’s	sense	of	 loss	 in	any	real	way.	Most	 importantly,	Berne	refuses	 to	discard	(or	exorcise)	the	dogs	as	real	bodies	that	matter	and	mean	and	her	novel	calls	 attention	 to	 the	dubious	ethics	of	 such	processes	of	 erasure.	As	 the	novel	closes,	Margaret	sits	 in	her	garden,	and	notices	something	 ‘moving	in	the	deep	blue	twilight.’		 ‘“Hello?”	she	called,	to	whatever	it	was’	(p.280).		 	
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Chapter	Six	
	
Beastly	Encounters:		Interpreting	Strange	Bodies	in	
Fiona	McFarlane’s	The	Night	Guest	
		
Introduction	
	 Ruth	 had	 always	 pictured	 the	 tiger	 just	 appearing	 in	 the	 lounge	room,	 the	 way	 a	 ghost	 might;	 he	 was	 a	 haunting	 and	 required	nothing	so	practical	as	a	door.	Now	she	saw	him	coming	by	road	and	through	 the	 high	 grasses	 of	 the	 drive;	 she	 saw	 him	 moving	 with	intemperate	speed	over	the	beach	and	ascending	the	dune;	she	saw	him	in	the	dark	garden,	making	for	the	open	door.192		This	 passage	 from	 Fiona	 McFarlane’s	 novel	 The	 Night	 Guest	 marks	 the	moment	at	which	Ruth	Field	starts	to	conceive	of	the	mysterious	tiger	that	has	 been	 visiting	 her	 at	 night	 as	 invasive;	 as	 entering	 from	 the	 outside,	rather	than	being	a	body	whose	uncanny	presence	is	proper	to	her	home.	As	 such,	 it	 is	 an	 important	 turning	point	 in	 the	 text’s	 staging	 of	 the	way	that	Ruth’s	openness	to	the	tiger	and	its	meaning	is	gradually	closed	down	by	 the	 intervention	 of	 her	 carer,	 Frida	 Young.	 In	 narrating	 this	 process	McFarlane’s	 novel	 engages	with	 some	 of	 the	ways	 that	 encounters	 with	both	 human	 and	 nonhuman	 bodies	 might	 be	 recognised	 as	 products	 of	their	particular	historical,	social,	and	cultural	settings,	whilst	at	the	same	time	necessarily	exceeding	these	contexts.		
		 In	 order	 to	 examine	 the	 questions	 of	 interpretative	 difficulty	 and	the	nonhuman	that	are	the	focus	of	this	chapter,	I	posit	Sara	Ahmed’s	work	on	strangers	as	a	valuable	means	of	rethinking	the	ways	that,	as	this	thesis	has	 suggested,	 trauma	 theory’s	 event-based	 model	 installs	 a	 boundary																																																									192	Fiona	McFarlane,	The	Night	Guest	(London:	Sceptre,	2014),	p.	147.	
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between	 inside	 and	 outside	 that	 results	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 passive	sovereign	 subject.	 Ahmed	 shows	 that	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 ‘stranger’	 is	similarly	 produced	 through	 the	management	 and	 installation	of	 borders,	so	 that	 it	 is	 ‘an	 effect	 of	 processes	 of	 inclusion	 and	 exclusion,	 or	incorporation	and	expulsion,	that	constitute	the	boundaries	of	bodies	and	communities,	including	communities	of	living	(dwelling	and	travel)	as	well	as	epistemic	communities’	(Strange	Encounters,	p.6).	For	Ahmed,	the	best	means	 of	 disrupting	 this	 endless	 operation	 of	 border	 policing	 is	 an	engagement	 with	 interpretative	 difficulty	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 the	 stranger	figure	 on	 whose	 behalf	 such	 boundaries	 are	 drawn.	 This	 involves	 the	important	 recognition	 that	 this	 figure	 is	 produced	 (and	 thus	 readable)	rather	 than	 characterised	 by	 aporetic	 alterity;	 the	 stranger	 comes	 into	being	 ‘not	 as	 that	which	we	 fail	 to	 recognise,	 but	 as	 that	which	we	have	already	recognised	as	“a	stranger”’	(p.	3).				Recognising	 the	 stranger,	 then,	 would	 involve	 moving	 to	 see	 the	inside/outside	 of	 (sovereign)	 subjectivity	 as	 brought	 into	 being	 through	historical,	social,	and	cultural	contexts	and	 identifications,	amongst	other	things,	with	which	this	 ‘host’	subject,	 fearing	 invasion	at	any	time,	 is	 in	a	constant	 state	of	encounter.	 In	order	 to	move	beyond	 this	 recognition	of	the	stranger	as	produced,	however,	and	to	be	able	to	approach	this	figure	more	 generously,	 Ahmed	 asks	 us	 to	 become	 interested	 in	 strange	encounters,	encounters	that	necessarily	involve	‘surprise	and	conflict’	and	which	are	understood	in	relation	to	the	contradictory	possibility	that	 ‘we	
may	not	be	able	to	read	the	bodies	of	others’	(p.p.	6,	8,	italics	in	original).				 I	see	Ahmed’s	arguments	here	as	offering	a	particularly	useful	way	through	 the	 problems	 of	 meaning-production	 that	 have	 occupied	 the	second	section	of	this	thesis,	especially	if	we	think	of	strangers,	or	strange	bodies,	as	being	any	kind	of	body	that	remains	excluded	from	the	sphere	of	sovereign	subjectivity.	In	this	sense,	her	theory	suggests	that	it	is	possible	to	 take	 an	 interpretative	 approach	 to	 strangeness	 that	 enacts	 a	 critical	process	 of	 working-through	 when	 it	 recognises	 strange	 bodies	 as	
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produced	 (and	 seeks	 to	 contextualise	 this)	 as	well	 as	 remaining	 open	 to	the	existence	of	an	unassimilable	excess	in	these	same	bodies	by	allowing	them	to	still	 surprise.	 	Reading	 the	 textual	nonhuman	 in	 this	way	avoids	the	dual	vanishing	that	occurs	when	its	body	is	either	worked-through	by	reducing	it	to	metaphor,	or	left	abandoned	because	it	 is	assumed	to	exist	aporetically	outside	narrative.			
	 The	Night	Guest	 lends	 itself	 particularly	well	 to	 such	 a	 theoretical	approach	because	 problems	of	meaning-production	 in	 relation	 to	 bodies	are	 foregrounded	 in	 the	 text.	 Set	 in	 modern	 day	 Australia,	 the	 novel	 is	narrated	 by	 Ruth	 Field,	 an	 elderly	 woman	 living	 alone	 who	 comes	 to	believe	that	a	mysterious	tiger	is	visiting	her	house	at	night.	Although	the	condition	is	never	named	explicitly,	it	is	clear	that	Ruth	has	dementia.	This	is	seemingly	exacerbated	by	the	arrival	of	Frida,	a	carer	claiming	to	have	been	sent	by	the	local	community	council	(a	claim	which	later	turns	out	to	be	 false).	 Frida	 gradually	 insinuates	 herself	 into	 Ruth’s	 home	 and	 her	presence	triggers	a	series	of	memories	for	Ruth	related	to	her	missionary	childhood	in	Fiji,	memories	which	weave	through	the	novel	in	a	way	that	collapses	 Ruth’s	 past	 and	 present.	 The	 uncanny	 tiger,	 whose	 presence	initially	delights	Ruth,	soon	becomes	a	source	of	 terror	 for	her	when	she	shares	his	existence	with	Frida.				 The	novel	presents	itself	as	a	trauma	narrative	in	its	preoccupation	with	 a	 colonial	 past	 that	 symptomatically	 haunts	 the	 present,	 and	 it	 is	these	legacies	of	colonialism	that	are	associated	with	the	closing	down	of	meaning	 in	 the	 text,	 specifically	 in	 relation	 to	Frida	and	 the	 tiger.	Whilst	Ruth	 mistakenly	 assumes	 Frida	 is	 Fijian,	 a	 (mis)recognition	 that	 allows	Frida	to	successfully		enter	her	life,	Frida	also	manipulates	the	meaning	of	the	 tiger	 by	 contextualising	 it	 through	 imperial	 narratives	 that	 situate	tigers	 as	 an	 	 ‘outside’	 threat	 to	 empire	 and	 its	 colonised	 subjects.	Ruth’s	dementia	 functions	as	 the	backdrop	to	these	conflicts,	with	Frida’s	abuse	of	 her	 presented	 as	 another	 form	 of	 colonisation	 in	 that	 it	 involves	 a	closing	down	of	Ruth’s	imaginative	world.	In	this	sense,	the	novel	engages	
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with	the	ways	meaning	and	interpretation	act	differently	according	to	the	power	 structures	 within	 which	 they	 operate,	 and	 in	 doing	 this	 links	cultural	forms	to	the	larger	political	and	historical	contexts	on	which	they	draw.	 As	 such,	 the	 text	 reminds	 us	 that,	 in	 Edward	 Said’s	 words,	 ‘the	power	to	narrate,	or	to	block	other	narratives	from	forming	and	emerging,	is	 very	 important	 to	 culture	 and	 imperialism,	 and	 constitutes	 one	 of	 the	main	 connections	between	 them.’193	Ultimately	however,	 I	want	 to	 argue	that	the	text	remains	invested	in	preserving	the	pluralities	of	meaning	that	circulate	around	strange	bodies	and	invasive	subjects,	as	demonstrated	by	the	 ways	 in	 which	 it	 implicates	 us	 as	 readers	 in	 the	 same	 drive	 to	interpretation	and	restriction	of	meaning	that	it	simultaneously	critiques.			 I	 begin	 my	 analysis	 of	 the	 Night	 Guest	 with	 a	 brief	 summary	 of	Ahmed’s	work	on	the	stranger	in	order	to	set	out	the	critical	context	of	this	chapter.	 I	 then	proceed	to	explore	 the	ways	 that	 interpretative	problems	are	 figured	 in	 the	 text	 by	 using	 a	 slightly	 unusual	 structuring	 device.	Following	 Ahmed’s	 emphasis	 on	 ‘encounters’,	 I	 focus	 on	 four	 different	instances	of	encounter	 that	occur	 in	 the	novel	 in	order	 to	 investigate	 the	ways	that	connections	between	embodiment	and	meaning-production	are	opened	up	and	then	closed	down	as	the	narrative	unfolds.		
I.		 Strange(r)	Encounters			 In	Strange	Encounters:	Embodied	Others	 in	Post-Coloniality,	Ahmed	sets	out	to	critically	examine	the	figure	of	the	stranger	across	a	number	of	political	 and	 theoretical	 contexts.	 She	 argues	 that	 the	 stranger,	 by	 being	constituted	as	 the	outside	of	 (Western)	bodies,	 communities	and	nation-states,	allows	these	things	to	come	into	sovereign	being.	She	further	insists	that	attention	be	paid	to	the	specific	ways	that	notions	of	the	stranger	are	mobilised	 at	 different	 times	 and	 in	 different	 places,	 pointing	 out	 that	contemporary	 discourses	 of	 globalisation	 and	 multiculturalism	 produce																																																									193	Edward	W.	Said,	Culture	&	Imperialism,	First	Vintage	Books	edition.	(London:	Vintage,	1994),	p.	xiii.	
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and	 reproduce	 not	 only	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 stranger,	 but	 the	 figure	 of	 the	‘stranger	 stranger’,	 in	 order	 ‘to	 differentiate	 between	 some	 others	 and	stranger	others’	(p.16).	Such	discourses	rely,	she	explains,	not	only	on	the	policing	 of	 borders	 but	 also	 on	 selective	 processes	 of	 welcoming.	 Her	central	 aim	 is	 to	 argue	 that	 strangers	 are	 brought	 into	 being	 by	 such	discourses	rather	than	existing	as	pre-constituted	subjects	available	to	be	read	and	recognised	as	other,	and	she	explains	that	in	order	to	deconstruct	these	processes	attention	must	be	paid	to	the	social,	political	and	historical	relationships	of	 force	 that	attend	specific	examples	of	what	she	calls	 this	operation	 of	 ‘stranger	 fetishism’.	 She	 borrows	 and	 adapts	 the	 notion	 of	stranger	 fetishism	 from	 Marx’s	 commodity	 fetishism,	 positing	 it	 as	 a	fetishism	of	 figures	 rather	 than	of	 objects,	where	 ‘what	 is	 at	 stake	 is	 the	‘cutting	off’	 of	 figures	 from	 the	 social	 and	material	 relations	which	over-determine	 their	 existence.’	 This	 allows	 such	 figures	 to	 appear	 as	 though	they	 ‘	 ‘have	 a	 life	 of	 their	 own’’,	 which	 is	 to	 say	 that	 they	 come	 to	 be	understood	 as	 fixed	 or	 natural	 subjects	 independent	 of	 these	 material	relations.			 Proceeding	 from	 this	 point,	 Ahmed’s	 text	 examines	 the	 ‘strange	encounters’	 through	which	 the	 figure	of	 the	 stranger	 is	produced	 ‘not	as	that	 which	 we	 fail	 to	 recognise,	 but	 as	 that	 which	 we	 have	 already	recognised	 as	 “a	 stranger”’	 (p.3).	 Specifically,	 she	 is	 concerned	 with	embodiment	 in	 this	 context,	 and	 with	 the	 way	 that	 ‘in	 the	 gesture	 of	recognising	 the	 one	 that	we	 do	 not	 know,	 the	 one	 that	 is	 different	 from	“us”,	we	flesh	out	the	beyond,	and	give	 it	a	 face	and	form’	(p.3).	Ahmed’s	task	 is	 to	examine	 this	process	of	 ‘fleshing	out’	 the	stranger,	 the	ways	 in	which	 a	 subject	 seeks	 to	 recognise	 the	 body	 of	 another	 ‘not	 only	 by	 re-reading	 the	body	of	 this	 other	who	 is	 faced,	 but	by	 telling	 the	difference	between	 this	 other,	 and	 other	 others	 (p.8).	 This	 process	 of	 reading	 the	other	 becomes	 necessary	 due	 to	 the	 defining	 characteristic	 of	 the	encounter	 as	 Ahmed	 theorises	 it;	 the	 element	 of	 ‘surprise’	 that	 is	introduced	 when	 the	 encounter	 is	 ‘premised	 on	 the	 absence	 of	 a	knowledge	that	would	allow	one	to	control	the	encounter,	or	to	predict	its	
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outcome’	 (p.8).	 The	 surprising	 encounter	 contains	 within	 it	 the	threatening	 possibility	 that	 ‘we	 may	 not	 be	 able	 to	 read	 the	 bodies	 of	
others’,	 and	 this	 instigates	 the	 ‘fleshing	out’	process	 in	which	 the	strange	body	comes	 to	be	defined	by	 ‘prior	histories	of	encounter	that	violate	and	
fix	others	in	regimes	of	difference’	(p.8,	emphasis	in	original).			 Ahmed	 argues	 for	 the	 introduction	 of	 ‘particularity’	 when	approaching	these	potentially	pernicious	histories	of	prior	encounter	that	are	 called	 upon	 to	 make	 strangers	 ‘readable’.	 Particularity	 in	 this	 sense	would	not	be	a	turn	inwards	to	pay	attention	to	the	body	or	speech	of	the	other,	but	would	instead	involve	a	move	outwards	to	think	of	the	‘modes	of	
encounter	 through	 which	 others	 are	 faced’	 (p.144).	 In	 order	 for	 this	 to	happen,	Ahmed	argues	that	the	encounter	needs	to	be	located	in	time	and	space	by	 asking	 ‘what	are	the	conditions	of	possibility	 for	us	meeting	here	
and	 now?’,	 with	 this	 question	 allowing	 difference	 between	 bodies	 to	 be	understood	 as	 ‘determined	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 encounter’	 by	 social	processes	that	are	not	only	at	work	in	the	present	but	that	have	been	and	will	 be	 active	 in	 other	 times	 and	 places	 (p.145).	 For	 Ahmed,	 there	 is	 an	ethical	possibility	at	stake	in	the	idea	that	to	focus	on	the	particularity	of	an	encounter	in	this	way	is	also	‘to	open	the	encounter	up,	to	fail	to	grasp	
it’.	 That	 is,	 surprise	 would	 be	 understood	 as	 sustaining	 rather	 than	frustrating	 the	relationship	of	 the	bodies	 involved	(p.145).	Her	preferred	terminology	 for	 this	kind	of	openness	 is	 the	 ‘close	encounter’,	which	she	argues	 is	 ‘always	 a	 strange	 encounter,	 where	 something	 fails	 to	 be	revealed’	(p.181).			 In	light	of	Ahmed’s	conclusions	here,	then,	I	want	to	argue	that	The	
Night	Guest	exposes	the	particular	kinds	of	affective	work	that	Ruth	does	in	order	to	produce	(and	read)	the	strangeness	of	the	tiger.	In	doing	so,	it	both	 draws	 attention	 to	 and	 elides	 the	 operations	 of	 stranger	 fetishism	that	 work	 by	 the	 ‘’cutting	 off’	 of	 figures	 from	 the	 social	 and	 material	relations	 which	 over-determine	 their	 existence’	 (Ahmed,	 p.5).	 As	 such,	Ruth’s	initial	meeting	with	the	tiger	introduces	the	reader	to	what	is	in	fact	
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the	 novel’s	 main	 project	 –	 the	 uncovering	 and	 making	 visible	 of	 the	relationships	 that	 are	 concealed	 when	 strange(r)ness	 comes	 to	 be	understood	 as	 ‘an	 ontological	 condition’	 (Ahmed,	 pg.5).	 Here	 the	 novel	shows	how	the	production	of	strangeness	might	occur	on	a	material	level	by	 bringing	 different	 bodies	 into	 conversation	 with	 each	 other	 in	 order	that	the	strange	might	be	read	against	the	familiar;	or	more	accurately,	so	that	 the	 strange	 might	 be	 produced	 against	 the	 familiar.	 However	 the	novel	also	emphasises	Ruth’s	willingness	to	remain	confused	by,	or	fail	to	‘grasp’	 the	 tiger’s	 body,	 situating	 her	 encounter	 with	 the	 tiger	 as	 a	generous	 kind	 of	 reading	 of	 its	 strangeness,	 one	 interested	 in	 the	particularity	of	a	body	that	still	never	ceases	to	surprise.			
II.	 Ruth:	Tiger	
	Ruth	Field	 lives	alone	 in	an	 isolated	house	by	 the	 sea,	 and	a	 tiger	wakes	her	at	four	in	the	morning.	Her	awareness	of	the	animal	is	auditory	rather	than	visual;	she	doesn’t	see	it	(and	won’t	until	the	close	of	the	novel)	but	instead	 forms	 an	 impression	 of	 its	 activities	 from	 various	 distinctive	sounds.		Something	 large	 was	 rubbing	 against	 Ruth’s	 couch	 and	 television	and,	 she	 suspected,	 the	 wheat-coloured	 recliner	 disguised	 as	 a	wingback	chair.	Other	sounds	followed:	the	panting	of	a	large	animal;	a	 vibrancy	 of	 breath	 that	 suggested	 enormity	 and	 intent;	 definite	mammalian	noises,	definitely	feline,	as	if	her	cats	had	grown	in	size	and	 were	 sniffing	 for	 food	 with	 huge	 noses.	 But	 the	 sleeping	 cats	were	weighing	down	the	sheets	at	the	end	of	Ruth’s	bed,	and	this	was	something	else	(Berne,	pp.1-2).		After	comparing	the	tiger’s	breathing	and	sniffing	to	that	of	her	own	cats,	Ruth	then	goes	on	to	liken	the	noises	it	makes	to	those	of	another	tiger	she	once	saw	eating	at	a	German	zoo,	which	had	 ‘sounded	just	 like	this:	 loud	and	 wet,	 with	 a	 low,	 guttural	 breathing	 hum	 punctuated	 by	 little	
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cautionary	 yelps,	 as	 if	 it	 might	 roar	 at	 any	 moment	 except	 that	 it	 was	occupied	 by	 food.’	 However	 this	 visiting	 tiger	 differs	 in	 some	 important	sense	 from	 that	 other,	 remembered	 tiger,	 in	 that	 as	 it	 busies	 itself	 with	whatever	 ‘large	 bloody	 thing’	 it	 is	 intent	 on	 eating	 the	 noise	 it	makes	 is	‘empty	and	meatless.’	When	Ruth	calls	her	son	Jeffrey	in	New	Zealand,	he	wearily	 responds,	 ‘“it’s	 either	 a	 cat,	 or	 a	 dream”’’	 and	 indeed,	when	 she	goes	to	investigate	the	lounge	room	is	‘benign’	despite	‘a	vegetable	smell	in	the	long	hallway,	and	an	inland	feel	to	the	air’	(pp.	2-3).			 From	 the	 first	 moment	 of	 its	 arrival,	 then,	 the	 tiger	 presents	 a	problem	for	the	reader.	Ruth	makes	sense	of	the	tiger’s	body	by	recalling	other	bodies	that	remind	her	of	this	new	strange	one,	each	one	replaced	by	another	that	does	not	quite	fit.	Domestic	cat,	echo	of	a	 long-ago	zoo	visit,	‘meatless’	ghost	and	dream	all	at	once,	the	tiger’s	body	is	both	elusive	and	recognisable;	it	exceeds	the	known	but	holds	out	the	promise	of	becoming	knowable.	 Ruth	brings	 the	 tiger	 into	 being	by	 acknowledging	 the	 bodies	that	it	 is	not,	 in	order	to	grasp	for	the	body-that-it-might-be.	As	such,	the	text	offers	us	a	tiger	composed	from	fragments,	fragments	that	come	from	and	are	rooted	in	Ruth’s	lived	experience.	In	Ahmed’s	terms,	Ruth	tries	to	read	 the	 tiger’s	 body	 by	 ‘telling	 the	 difference	 between	 this	 other,	 and	other	others’,	 laying	bare	the	mechanisms	by	which	strange	bodies	come	to	 be	 produced	 (Strange	 Encounters,	 p.8).	 This	 textual	 moment	 also	productively	 complicates	 the	 processes	 of	 border	 drawing	 that	 Ahmed	sees	as	always	present	in	encounters	with	strangeness.	Indeed,	it	presents	one	 possible	 response	 to	 a	 question	 she	 suggests	 should	 demand	 our	attention:	‘how	does	being-at-home	already	encounter	strangeness?	(p.88)		 Ahmed	spends	quite	some	time	in	Strange	Encounters	thinking	about	and	 theorising	 the	 idea	 of	 home	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 the	 fetishisation	 of	 the	stranger.	 She	 contends	 that	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 stranger	 comes	 into	 being	through	 ‘the	 marking	 out	 of	 inhabitable	 spaces,	 bodies	 and	 terrains	 of	knowledge’,	 and	 she	 is	 interested	 in	dismantling	 the	opposition	between	‘home’	and	‘away’	in	order	instead	to	pay	attention	to	the	particularity	of	
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how	 home	 is	 constructed	 and	 theorised	 at	 different	 moments	 (p.	 79).	Ahmed	 acknowledges	 that	 in	 being	 critical	 of	 this	 ‘assumed’	 opposition	between	 the	 strange	 and	 the	 familiar	 she	 follows	 Freud’s	 work	 on	 the	uncanny.	 Crucially,	 however,	 she	 departs	 significantly	 from	 Freud	 by	rejecting	the	model	of	repression	that	subtends	his	own	work	in	this	area.	For	 Freud,	 the	 unheimlich	 applies	 to	 ‘everything	 that	 was	 intended	 to	remain	 secret,	 hidden	 away,	 and	 has	 come	 into	 the	 open’,	 by	 which	 he	means	 anything	 that	was	 at	 one	 time	 familiar	 to	 the	 psyche,	 an	 element	‘that	 has	 been	 repressed	 and	 now	 returns.’ 194 	Ahmed’s	 task	 on	 the	contrary	 is	 to	 understand	 strangeness	 (and	 particularly	 strangeness	 at	home)	as	produced	rather	than	repressed,	so	that	the	strange(r)	appears	familiar	 not	 because	 it	 was	 once	 hidden	 within	 the	 psyche	 but	 instead	because	 it	 appears	 ‘as	 an	 effect	 of	 recognition	 and	 as	 a	 category	 of	knowledge’	 so	 that	 ‘when	we	 “look	 out”	 for	 strangers	 we	 already	 know	what	 we	 are	 looking	 for’	 (p.184).	 The	 corollary	 of	 thinking	 about	strangeness-at-home	 in	 this	way	 is	 that	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 turn	 a	 critical	gaze	back	toward	the	home	as	offering	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	the	strange	 to	 appear	 as	 such,	 rather	 than	 extending	 this	 gaze	 outwards	 to	seek	 the	origins	of	 this	 strangeness	 in	a	hostile	outside.	This	means	 that	rather	than	strange(r)ness	within	the	home	being	understood	as	invading	or	 visiting,	 the	 host	 subject	 would	 be	 asked	 to	 think	 about	 their	 own	relation	 to	 this	 strangeness,	 that	 is,	 about	 the	 ways	 they	 might	 be	implicated	 in	both	 the	emergence	of	strangeness	 in	 this	space	and	 in	 the	ways	 they	 might	 choose	 to	 designate,	 or	 ‘read’	 it	 as	 such.	 One	 possible	result	 of	 this,	 Ahmed	 contends,	 is	 recognition	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 violence	might	be	‘structured	by,	and	legitimated	through,	the	formation	of	home	and	
community’	 rather	 than	 being	 understood	 as	 ‘coming	 from	 outside	 the	protective	walls	of	family,	community	or	nation’	(p.36,	italics	in	original).	If	we	 follow	 Ahmed	 here,	 I	 believe	 we	 are	 able	 to	 see	 that	 when	 Caruth	theorises	 the	 traumatic	 flashback	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 ‘the	outside	has	 gone	 inside	 without	 any	mediation’,	 she	 is	 reliant	 on	 an	 opposition																																																									194	Sigmund	Freud,	David	McLintock,	and	Hugh	Haughton,	The	Uncanny	(New	York:	Penguin	Books,	2003),	pp.	132,	147.	
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that	actively	produces	strange(r)ness	 in	order	 to	 imagine	 the	 ‘outside’	of	trauma.	The	Night	Guest	provides	a	useful	corrective	to	such	formulations.	Although	the	tiger’s	recurrent	visits	certainly	interrupt	Ruth’s	existence	in	the	manner	of	a	traumatic	haunting	or	possession,	the	text	initially	never	suggests	that	the	tiger	(with	the	strange(r)ness	it	embodies)	arrives	from	outside	to	infiltrate	the	bounded	space	of	the	home.		
	 To	 think	 about	 strange(r)ness	 as	 produced	 is	 necessarily	 also	 to	think	about	the	ways	in	which	a	‘host’	subject	(or,	as	I	prefer	to	think	of	it	more	 neutrally	 here,	 a	 subject-at-home)	might	 play	 a	 part	 in	 producing	who	or	what	might	arrive,	and/or	when	and	how	they	might	do	so.	Ahmed	draws	attention	to	 the	way	that	Derrida’s	 theory	of	hospitality	precludes	engagement	 with	 such	 a	 politics	 of	 production	 by	 prioritising	 what	 she	refers	 to	 as	 a	 politics	 of	 ‘forgetting’.	 In	 order	 to	 explain	 this	 claim	 she	focuses	 on	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 arrivant	 that	 Derrida	 first	 introduces	 in	
Aporias.	For	Derrida,	arrivant	can	refer	both	to	‘the	neutrality	of	that	which	arrives’,	and	to	‘the	singularity	of	who	arrives’	and	this	arrivant	‘surprises	the	host	–	who	is	not	yet	a	host	or	an	inviting	power	–	enough	to	call	into	question,	 to	 the	 point	 of	 annihilating	 or	 rendering	 indeterminate,	 all	 the	distinctive	signs	of	a	prior	 identity.’195	Ahmed	argues	that	 in	 its	assertion	that	 the	 identity	 of	 both	 host	 and	 arrivant	 are	 obviated	 in	 this	 way,	Derridean	hospitality	is	‘premised	on	the	very	failure	to	recognise	the	one	who	arrives.’	In	order	to	‘disrupt	the	identity	of	place	and	property	[…]	he	or	she	must	not	be	 identifiable	as	coming	 from	a	particular	place,	and	as	having	 simply	 crossed	 a	 border,	 arriving	 here	 from	 there.’	 Although	Ahmed	 values	 Derrida’s	 commitment	 to	 imagining	 an	 opening	 or	‘openness’	to	‘that	which	is	yet	to	be	assimilated’,	she	argues	that	there	is	work	to	be	done	imagining	and	working	through	the	relationship	between	this	 openness	 and	 ‘the	 forms	 of	 assimilation	 that	 already	 function	 to	
differentiate	others	(p.151).	She	explains:																																																										195	Jacques	Derrida	and	Thomas	Dutoit,	Aporias :	Dying--Awaiting	(One	Another	at)	The	‘limits	of	
Truth’	(mourir--S’attendre	Aux	‘limites	de	La	Vérité’)	(Stanford,	Calif:	Stanford	University	Press,	1993),	pp.	33,	34.	
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Such	 a	 hospitality	 is	 based	 on	 the	 forgetting	 of	 the	 names	 that	 are	used,	 however,	 inadequately,	 to	 locate	 subjects	 in	 a	 topography	 of	time	 and	 place.	 In	 contrast,	 what	 is	 required	 is	 a	 hospitality	 that	
remembers	the	encounters	that	are	already	implicated	in	such	names	(including	 the	 name	 of	 ‘the	 stranger’),	 and	 how	 they	 affect	 the	movement	 and	 ‘arrival’	 of	 others,	 in	 a	 way	 which	 opens	 out	 the	possibility	 of	 these	 names	 being	 moved	 from.	 This	 hospitality,	premised	 on	 the	 surprise	 of	 an	 opening	 or	 gift,	 would	 begin	 by	admitting	 to	how	 the	assimilation	of	 others,	 and	 the	differentiation	between	others,	might	already	affect	who	or	what	may	arrive,	 then	or	now,	here	or	there	(p.151).		In	Ruth’s	encounter	with	the	tiger,	we	find	an	example	of	what	this	kind	of	‘remembering’	hospitality	might	look	like	in	practice.	Ruth	remembers	the	‘other’	 bodies	 (cat,	 zoo	 tiger,	 uncanny	 ghost)	 that	 she	 has	 already	assimilated	into	categories	of	knowledge,	and	then	differentiates	between	these	in	order	to	make	her	visiting	tiger	knowable	(that	is	to	say,	in	order	to	 allow	 the	 tiger	 to	 arrive).	 McFarlane	 makes	 visible	 this	 process	 of	remembering	 and	 the	 production	 of	 strangeness	 that	 accompanies	 it.	 As	Ahmed	might	 put	 it,	 she	 ‘admits’	 that	 such	 a	 process	 is	 operative	 in	 the	encounter	between	Ruth	and	tiger.	 	At	the	same	time,	however,	the	novel	holds	 open	 the	 possibility	 that	 Ruth	 and	 the	 tiger’s	 encounter	might	 be	premised	on	‘the	surprise	of	an	opening	or	gift’.	This	is	achieved	primarily	by	figuring	Ruth’s	relationship	to	the	tiger	in	terms	of	desire.	When	Ruth	ventures	 out	 into	 her	 hallway	 to	 try	 and	 lay	 eyes	 on	 the	 tiger,	 who	 is	nowhere	to	be	found,	she	is	aware	of:		 Another	 sensation,	 a	 new	 one,	 to	which	 she	 attended	with	 greater	care:	 a	 sense	 of	 extravagant	 consequence.	 Something	 important,	Ruth	felt,	was	happening	to	her,	and	she	couldn’t	be	sure	what	it	was:	the	tiger,	or	the	feeling	of	importance	[…]	She	felt	something	coming	to	meet	 her	 –	 something	 large,	 and	 not	 a	 real	 thing	 of	 course,	 she	
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wasn’t	 that	 far	 gone	 –	 but	 a	 shape,	 or	 anyway	 a	 temperature.	 It	produced	a	funny	bubble	in	her	chest	(p.4).			The	 text	makes	 it	 clear	 that	 the	 tiger	means	 in	 some	 important	way	 for	Ruth,	 the	sense	of	 ‘extravagant	consequence’	 that	she	feels	 is	understood	in	 terms	of	an	encounter	 (‘something	coming	 to	meet	her’)	 that	 is	also	a	movement	 forward,	 or	 an	 opening	 out.	 The	 feeling	 reminds	 Ruth	 ‘of	something	vital	–	not	of	youth	exactly,	but	of	the	urgency	of	youth’	and	she	is	‘reluctant	to	give	it	up’	(p.6).	This	attachment	performs	important	work	in	the	text	by	positioning	Ruth	in	a	generous	relation	to	the	tiger,	one	that	is	desiring	and	open	to	surprise.			 Therefore,	whilst	Ruth	does	try	to	read	the	tiger’s	body	by	bringing	it	 into	 dialogue	 with	 other	 bodies,	 she	 also	 does	 not	 react	 to	 its	strangeness	by	using	these	‘prior	histories	of	encounter’	to	close	down	his	meaning.	 Instead,	 the	 encounter	 with	 the	 tiger	 proceeds	 on	 Ruth’s	 part	with	a	kind	of	openness	to	missing	his	body.		In	this	case,	the	desire	–	the	‘extravagant	 consequence’	 she	 feels	 in	 relation	 to	 his	 presence	 –	 is	 not	fixed	to	a	definite	subject	but	is	instead	experienced	affectively	as	a	shape,	a	temperature,	a	sense	of	largeness.	This	openness	extends	even	further	to	a	 willingness	 to	 entertain	 the	 notion	 of	 her	 own	 subjectivity	 being	subsumed	 by	 the	 tiger’s.	 	 She	 is	 ‘delighted’	 to	 imagine	 newspaper	headlines	reading	 ‘‘Australian	Woman	Eaten	by	Tiger	 in	Own	House’’,	or,	‘more	 likely’,	 ‘‘Tiger	 Puts	 Pensioner	 on	 the	 Menu.’’	 As	 such,	 Ruth’s	encounter	 with	 the	 tiger	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 one	 of	 Ahmed’s	 ‘close	encounters’	in	the	sense	that	the	material	and	psychical	slipperiness	of	the	tiger’s	body,	the	fact	that	it	does	not	reveal	itself	in	any	fixed	way,	enriches	and	opens	up	the	relationship	between	their	two	bodies.				 By	 situating	 the	unknowability	of	 the	 tiger	 in	 terms	of	desire	 and	excitement,	 then,	 the	 text	 shows	 that	 the	 generosity	 at	 work	 in	 Ruth’s	encounter	with	the	tiger	is	not	simply	an	ethical	practice	of	responding	to	otherness,	 but	 also	 holds	 out	 the	 possibility	 that	 there	 might	 be	 joy	 or	
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pleasure	 to	 be	 found	 in	 such	 a	 generous,	 or	 ‘close’	 encounter	 with	strangeness.	McFarlane	sees	the	pleasure	and	 joy	to	be	found	in	surprise	as	one	of	the	potential	rewards	awaiting	a	generous	reader,	a	reader	both	hospitable	 to	 strangeness	 within	 a	 text	 and	 attentive	 to	 their	 own	implication	in	the	reading,	or	production	of,	that	strangeness.	However,	in	the	 second	 of	 the	 encounters	 that	 structure	 the	 narrative	 of	 The	 Night	
Guest,	Ruth’s	 first	 introduction	 to	Frida,	we	are	offered	a	meeting	 that	 is	the	 inverse	of	 the	hospitable	one	 that	has	 just	 taken	place	between	Ruth	and	the	tiger.	
	
III.	 Ruth:	Frida	
		 Frida	 Young	 arrives	 the	 morning	 after	 Ruth’s	 first	 nocturnal	encounter	 with	 the	 tiger.	 Ruth	 is	 sitting	 at	 her	 dining	 room	 window,	looking	out	at	the	sea	that	lies	below	her	garden	and	the	steep	sand	dunes	that	border	it.			 And	in	every	way	this	was	ordinary,	except	that	a	large	woman	was	approaching,	 looking	as	 if	 she	had	been	blown	 in	 from	the	sea.	She	toiled	 up	 the	 dune	 directly	 behind	 the	 house,	 dragging	 a	 suitcase	that,	after	some	struggle,	she	abandoned	among	the	grasses.	It	slid	a	little	way	down	the	hill.	Once	she	had	made	her	determined	way	to	the	 top	 of	 the	 dune,	 the	 woman	 moved	 with	 steadfast	 purpose	through	the	garden.	She	filled	up	a	little	more	of	the	sky	with	every	step.	[…]	Perhaps	she	had	been	shipwrecked,	or	marooned	(pp.7-8).		Whereas	 the	 text	carefully	situates	 the	 tiger	 (or	 rather,	Ruth’s	encounter	with	 the	 tiger)	as	being	produced	by	and	originating	within	 the	 space	of	the	 home,	 Frida’s	 encounter	 with	 Ruth	 conversely	 takes	 place	 via	 the	movement	 from	 outside	 to	 in	 that	 characterises	 discourses	 of	 ‘stranger	danger’	 (Ahmed,	pp.	32-7).	The	 first	 sentence	here	does	a	 lot	of	work	 to	establish	this.	Firstly,	Frida	is	confirmed	as	an	exception	to	the	 ‘ordinary’	landscape	 that	 serves	 as	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 bounded	 space	 of	 Ruth’s	
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home.	Secondly,	the	epithet	‘large	woman’,	particularly	when	followed	by	the	 observation	 that	 Frida	 ‘filled	 up	 a	 little	 more	 of	 the	 sky	 with	 every	step’,	 presents	 Frida	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 kind	 of	 unusual,	 indefinable	 bodily	excess.	 Thirdly,	 not	 only	 does	 Frida	 arrive	 from	 the	 outside	 in,	 Ruth	further	imagines	that	she	has	been	‘blown	in	from	the	sea’,	making	it	clear	that	 rather	 than	 a	 being	 a	 visiting	 neighbour,	 or	 local,	 Frida	 is	 instead	identified	as	coming	from	somewhere	much	further	away:	indeed,	from	a	different	element.	Frida	is	thus	immediately	understood	(by	both	Ruth	and	reader)	 as	 a	 ‘strange’	 body,	 already	 out	 of	 place.	 Or	 to	 put	 it	 a	 little	differently,	 Frida	 is	 not	 the	 kind	 of	 stranger	 that	 Ruth	 might	 expect	 to	arrive.	McFarlane	continues	to	develop	Ruth’s	sense	of	Frida’s	strangeness	as	the	paragraph	continues.	By	reporting	that	Frida	is	dragging	a	suitcase	laboriously	up	the	dunes,	the	text	plays	with	what	might	be	understood	as	common	 (or,	 less	 charitably,	 lazy)	 signifiers	 of	 ‘strangeness’.	 Frida	 is	figured	 as	 a	 perpetual	 traveller	whereas	 in	 fact	 the	 case	 turns	 out	 to	 be	filled	not	with	her	possessions	but	with	 ‘enormous	bottles	of	eucalyptus-scented	 disinfectant’	 (p.34).	 Finally,	 Ruth’s	 reading	 of	 Frida’s	 arrival	culminates	 in	 her	 imagining	 that	 Frida	may	 have	 been	 ‘shipwrecked’	 or	‘marooned’.	The	anachronistic	 language	works	here	 to	multiply	 the	ways	that	 Frida	might	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 ‘not	 belonging’	 by	 suggesting	 that	 she	may	be	out	of	time,	as	well	as	out	of	place.			 Here,	 then,	 McFarlane	 exposes	 the	 process	 of	 reading	 by	 which	Ruth	makes	 sense	 of	 Frida’s	 body,	 just	 as	 she	 does	 in	 the	 case	 of	Ruth’s	encounter	 with	 the	 tiger.	 Although	 the	 two	moments	 are	 similar,	 in	 the	sense	 that	McFarlane’s	 task	 is	 to	 sort	 through	 and	 reveal	 Ruth’s	 various	impressions	of	each	body,	they	in	fact	operate	rather	differently.	The	text	lays	bare	the	ways	in	which	Ruth	reads	(and	materialises)	the	tiger’s	body	through	a	process	of	comparison	and	rejection	in	relation	to	other	bodies.	However,	she	also	makes	it	clear	that	the	tiger	ultimately	eludes	any	kind	of	 fixity,	an	elision	 that	 fills	Ruth	with	 joy	and	 to	which	she	responds	by	remaining	open	and	generous	to	his	strangeness.	Ruth	acknowledges	and	is	 attentive	 to	 her	 own	 complicity	 in	 the	 production	 of	 the	 tiger	 as	 a	
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strange	body:	she	knows	that	her	attempts	to	read	him	assimilate	him	into	her	 own	 experiences	 of	 similar	 bodies.	 In	 contrast	 to	 this	 welcoming	manner	of	interpretation,	the	signifiers	of	strangeness	that	Ruth	draws	on	when	relating	her	impressions	of	Frida’s	arrival	are	self-evidently	generic,	rather	than	based	in	Ruth’s	own	memories	and	experiences.	The	effect	 is	that	Ruth	 does	 not	 acknowledge	 her	 own	 implication	 in	 the	 strangeness	that	she	attributes	to	Frida.	As	such,	rather	than	engaging	with	the	context	of,	 or	motivation	 for,	her	 reading	of	Frida’s	 approaching	body	–	why	 the	largeness,	 the	movement	out	of	 the	sea,	 the	 imagined	shipwreck?	–	Ruth	simply	‘recognises’	Frida	as	a	stranger	by	means	of	positioning	these	sense	impressions	as	natural	rather	than	produced.				 For	Ahmed,	such	a	process	of	recognition	also	becomes	the	means	by	which	‘inhabitable	or	bounded	spaces	are	produced.’196	The	recognition	of	 strange(r)ness	 is	 one	 of	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 for	 a	 subject	 to	understand	themselves	not	only	as	being	at	home	(defined	broadly	here	in	terms	 of	 community,	 nation,	 family	 etc.)	 but	 as	 being	 in	 the	 position	 of	host.	Further,	being	a	host	subject	necessarily	means	having	the	power	to	welcome	or	refuse	that	which	is	 figured	as	strange	without	recourse	to	a	‘remembering’	hospitality.		This	removes	the	need	to	remain	aware	of	the	processes	by	which	both	strangers	and	bounded	spaces	are	imagined	into	being.	In	this	sense	we	return	to	the	familiar	idea	of	a	sovereign	subject-at-home	that	is	always	potentially	at	risk	from	a	hostile	outside	(conceived	of	as	the	strange);	an	outside	that	threatens	to	disrupt	the	ways	in	which	this	subject	 is	 imagined	 as	being	 fully	present	 to	 themselves.	As	 such,	Ruth’s	house,	made	 strange	 in	 the	 night	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 tiger	within,	 is	returned	to	her	as	host	once	more	when	she	recognises	Frida	as	a	figure	of	otherness.	 This	 recognition	 becomes	 possible,	 then,	 because	 Frida	 is	understood	 as	 emerging	 from	 an	 outside	 opposed	 to	 the	 Ruth’s	 homely	space;	the	house	and	land	that	she	surveys	from	her	chair	at	the	window.			
																																																								196	Ahmed,	Strange	Encounters,	p.	22.	
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	 The	lack	of	generosity	that	characterises	Ruth’s	reading	of	Frida	is	closed	 down	 even	 further	when	 the	 text	 connects	 their	 encounter	more	specifically	 to	 the	social	and	historical	 context	of	Ruth’s	own	 life,	 further	engaging	 the	 questions	 about	 reading	 and	 difference	 that	 lie	 at	 it	 heart.	The	narrator	reports	that	Frida’s	‘breadth	and	the	warmth	of	her	skin	and	the	 dark	 sheen	 of	 her	 obviously	 straightened	 hair	 looked	 Fijian	 to	Ruth’	and	 that	 this	 is	enough	 to	make	her	 feel	 ‘optimistic	about	 the	encounter’	(p.8).	At	this	point	all	we	know	about	Ruth’s	connection	to	Fiji	is	that	she	lived	there	as	a	child,	but	it	soon	becomes	evident	that	this	was	(as	might	be	expected)	a	missionary	childhood.	Indeed,	Ruth’s	memories	of	this	time	start	 to	become	 increasingly	 important	 to	her	present	existence.	What	 is	immediately	clear,	however,	is	that	Ruth’s	profiling	of	Frida	is	highlighted	as	such	in	the	text.	It	is	shown	to	be	an	interpretation	or	reading	of	Frida’s	body	 that	 relies	 on	 and	 is	 produced	 by	 Ruth’s	 past	 colonial	 encounters,	rather	than	a	reliable	description	of	Frida’s	physical	appearance.	This	is	an	effect	of	 the	 indirect	discourse	used	 in	 the	novel,	 focalised	 through	Ruth.	The	 text	 informs	 the	 reader	 not	 that	 Frida	 is	 Fijian	 but	 that	 she	 looks	Fijian,	 and,	 importantly,	 that	 she	 looks	 this	 way	 ‘to	 Ruth’.	 As	 such,	 the	possibility	of	Frida’s	being	Fijian	is	both	opened	up	and	obscured	because	the	authority	of	omniscient	third	person	narration	leads	us	to	assume	that	the	idea	that	she	looks	Fijian	is	factual,	while	the	insistence	that	this	view	is	focal	(Ruth’s	interior	voice)	reveals	that	it	is	in	fact	perspectival.	In	this	sense,	the	text	shows	how	supposedly	factual	notions	about	strangerness	(in	this	case	racial	profiling)	are	in	fact	discursively	produced.	Therefore,	although	this	is	not	the	same	kind	of	generous	encounter	that	takes	place	between	Ruth	and	the	tiger,	it	does	expose	the	inner	workings	of	a	meeting	that	 is	 contrastingly	ungenerous	because	 it	 involves	 the	assumption	 that	Frida’s	body	is	readable,	categorisable,	and	consumable.			 	However,	 whilst	 the	 text	 exposes	 the	 broader	 contexts	 that	subtend	Ruth’s	reading	of	Frida	(her	colonial	childhood	in	Fiji),	we	also	see	that	Ruth	is	deliberately	inattentive	to	(although,	crucially,	not	ignorant	of)	these.	 Therefore	 it	 becomes	 apparent	 that	 McFarlane	 is	 not	 interested	
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here	in	exploring	another	kind	of	generous	encounter,	but	focuses	instead	on	offering	a	fictional	critique	of	the	process	of	reading	strangeness.	This	task	is	complex,	so	I	will	take	some	time	here	to	explain	how	it	is	achieved	in	the	text.				 When	Frida	finally	arrives	at	Ruth’s	 front	door	after	toiling	up	the	dune	 that	 bounds	 the	 garden,	 Ruth	 asks,	 “’Do	 I	 know	 you?”	 Despite	 the	coldness	this	phrase	might	normally	imply,	we	are	told	that	she	means	this	‘sincerely.’		 Possibly	 she	 did	 know	 her.	 Possibly	 this	 woman	 had	 once	 been	 a	young	 girl	 sitting	 on	 Ruth’s	 mother’s	 knee.	 Perhaps	 this	 woman’s	mother	had	been	ill	in	just	the	right	small	way	that	would	bring	her	to	Ruth’s	 father’s	clinic.	 […]	Maybe	 this	woman	came	out	of	 the	old	days	with	a	message	or	a	greeting.	But	she	was	probably	too	young	to	 have	 been	 one	 of	 those	 children	 –	 Ruth	 guessed	 early	 forties,	smooth-faced	and	careful	of	her	appearance	(p.9).		Here,	 then,	Ruth	 tries	 to	make	sense	of	Frida	by	 seeking	 to	 locate	her	 in	time	and	space.	It	is	apparent,	however,	that	this	process	of	location	is	not	neutral.	Rather,	it	relies	on	returning	to	the	broader	social	processes	that	are	 operational	 elsewhere	 and	 in	 other	 times	 –	 in	 this	 instance,	 Ruth’s	memories	of	her	colonial	childhood	spent	at	her	father’s	medical	clinic	in	Fiji.	 Although	Ruth	 seems	 to	 reject	 the	 possibility	 that	 Frida	was	 a	 child	she	 knew	 at	 this	 time	 (albeit	 without	 any	 real	 decisiveness)	 she	 still	remains	 attached	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 Frida	 is	 Fijian	 (just	 not	 one	 of	 ‘those’	children	from	the	clinic.)	Thus,	Ruth	negotiates	her	understanding	of	both	her	 own	 and	 Frida’s	 identity	 by	 returning	 to	 her	 own	 lived	 experiences,	just	as	she	does	with	the	tiger.	The	crucial	difference,	however,	is	that	Ruth	imposes	 a	 certain	 (racial	 and	 ethnic)	 identity	 on	 Frida,	 closing	 down	possibilities	for	different	kinds	of	meaning	(or	reading)	as	they	apply	not	only	to	the	encounter	between	the	two	women	but	more	broadly	to	Frida	herself.		
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		 However,	McFarlane	also	 invites	us	to	doubt	Ruth’s	 interpretation	of	events	so	that	in	the	passage	above	each	sentence	begins	with	an	adverb	of	 uncertainty	 (‘possibly’;	 ‘possibly’;	 ‘perhaps’;	 ‘maybe’).	 These	 call	attention	 to	 Ruth’s	 hesitation	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 the	 encounter.	 She	 is	tentatively	 employed	 in	 seeking	 out	 ways	 to	 read	 and	 interpret	 Frida’s	presence.	 As	 such,	 the	 text	 shows	 that	 Frida	 ultimately	 remains	unreadable,	with	 the	unease	 this	generates	 for	Ruth	contributing	at	 least	in	part	to	her	willingness	to	reify	Frida’s	body	by	naming	her	as	Fijian.	Our	focus	 is	 therefore	 shifted	 from	 the	properties	of	 Frida’s	 body	–	 from	 the	ways	 that	 a	 reader	 might	 seek	 to	 fix	 her	 identity	 as	 somehow	 ‘real’,	 or	given	–	to	what	Ahmed	calls	the	‘particularity’	of	modes	of	encounter.	This	involves	focusing	instead	on	‘the	meetings	and	encounters	that	produce	or	flesh	 out	 others’,	 in	 order	 to	 expose	 ways	 that	 ‘others’	 come	 to	 be	differentiated	from	‘other	others’	(p.144).	In	The	Night	Guest	such	a	change	of	 focus	takes	place	when	our	attention	 is	directed	toward	the	ways	that	Ruth’s	personal	history	is	brought	to	bear	upon	her	meeting	with	Frida	as	a	sense-making	tool.	The	mode	of	encounter	that	occurs	between	Ruth	and	Frida	 is	 rooted	 in	 Ruth’s	 reading	 of	 Frida	 as	 an	 ‘other’,	 rather	 than	 an	‘other	 other.’	 In	 other	 words,	 Ruth	 decides	 to	 make	 the	 strange(r)	readable,	 if	 not	 safe,	 through	 a	 process	 we	 should	 not	 think	 of	 as	recognition	 but	 as	 a	 form	 of	 production	 that	 is	 active	 across	 time	 and	space.	 This	 process	 ‘fleshes	 out’	 Frida	 through	 acts	 of	 recollection	 and	reimagining.				 Furthermore,	 the	 text	 also	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	 way	 that	 the	encounter	 between	 Ruth	 and	 Frida	 extends	 outwards	 to	 involve	 other	subjects.	 	Crucially,	 these	other	 subjects	also	contribute	 to	and	effect	 the	conditions	of	 possibility	 for	 the	unfolding	of	 the	Ruth-Frida	 relationship,	and	 this	 is	demonstrated	most	clearly	 in	a	phone	conversation	 that	Ruth	has	with	her	son	Jeffrey.	The	movements	of	desire	at	work	in	the	tripartite	encounter	 that	 takes	place	when	Ruth	 tells	him	about	Frida’s	arrival	 can	clearly	 be	 understood	 as	 colonial	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 flow	 backward	
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(nostalgically)	 toward	 a	 reduction	 in	 meaning,	 a	 closing	 down	 of	 the	possibilities	Frida’s	body	has	to	surprise.			 ***			 Jeffrey,	 who	 lives	 in	 New	 Zealand,	 phones	 moments	 after	 Frida’s	arrival.	 Ruth	 explains	 to	 Jeffrey	 that	 a	 ‘government	 carer’	 has	 arrived,	supposedly	 to	 look	after	her,	and	he	 insists	on	speaking	 to	Frida.	After	a	brief	conversation,	he	seems	satisfied	that	all	is	well,	telling	Ruth	it	could	be	 “wonderful	 […]	 exactly	 what	 we	 need.”	 Ruth,	 still	 unsure	 about	 the	situation,	 tells	him	 that	Frida	 is	 Fijian,	 ‘mainly	 for	her	own	 reassurance.’	His	reply	is	brief,	and	dismissive:	“‘there	you	are,	some	familiarity’”	(p.12).	If	 Ruth’s	 reading	 of	 Frida,	 and	 her	 communication	 of	 this	 to	 Jeffrey	 (‘for	her	 own	 reassurance’)	 emerges	 in	 part	 from	 a	 need	 to	 make	 Frida	readable,	 then	 Jeffrey’s	 unquestioningly	 positive	 response	 vindicates	Ruth’s	decision	to	fix	Frida’s	identity	in	this	way.	Not	only	this,	he	chooses	to	refer	to	Frida	specifically	as	an	opportunity	for	‘familiarity’	in	a	speech	act	that	produces	Frida	as	familiar	rather	than	strange,	whilst	also	hinting	at	the	legacy	of	colonial	appropriation	of	native	peoples	for	labour.	That	is,	Jeffrey	assumes	in	his	reaction	to	Ruth	on	the	telephone	that	the	identity	‘Fijian’	is	knowable	(or,	for	my	purposes	here,	readable)	to	the	point	that	‘Fijian’	means	‘familiar.’			 This	 telephone	 conversation	 between	 Ruth	 and	 Jeffrey	 opens	 up	and	draws	attention	 to	one	of	 the	key	questions	 in	The	Night	Guest:	how	does	Frida	manage	to	insert	herself	into	Ruth’s	life	so	easily,	and,	in	doing	so,	 cause	 so	 much	 violence?	 As	 the	 novel	 progresses,	 Ruth	 becomes	increasingly	dependent	on	Frida,	who	moves	(uninvited)	into	Ruth’s	home,	encourages	 Ruth	 to	 sell	 her	 car	 (without	 which	 she	 is	 isolated	 in	 her	remote	house)	and	begins	to	make	requests	for	money.	All	of	this	happens	without	 interference	 or	 protest	 from	 family	 and	 friends.	As	 a	major	plot	device	 it	 seems	 to	 demand	 an	 explanation	 that	 is	 not	 straightforwardly	offered,	in	line	with	the	interpretive	strangeness	of	the	text,	and	engaging	
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with	 the	 ‘particularity’	 of	 this	 mode	 of	 encounter	 is	 a	 useful	 means	 of	tackling	 this	 strangeness.	 Crucially,	 McFarlane	 suggests	 here	 (and	 will	continue	to	do	so	throughout	the	text)	that	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	Frida	entering	Ruth’s	life	in	the	way	she	does	are	dependent	on	legacies	of	colonialism	 that	 understand	 the	 ‘stranger’	 as,	 in	 Ahmed’s	 words,	‘knowable,	 seeable,	 and	 hence	 be-able’	 (p.133,	 italics	 in	 original).	 The	conversation	between	Ruth	and	Jeffrey	works	as	a	kind	of	nodal	point	 in	the	text	in	that	it	presents	one	of	the	first	moments	at	which	the	reader	is	able	 to	see,	 if	not	understand,	 some	of	 the	 lines	of	convergence	whereby	the	strange(r)	is	both	produced	and	read	as	familiar.				 In	 writing	 Jeffrey’s	 reaction	 here,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 the	 novel’s	invocation	of	Ruth’s	affection	for	Fiji	and	its	inhabitants,	McFarlane	seems	to	be	drawing	on	histories	of	Fiji’s	colonisation	that	stress	 the	occupying	British	officials’	regard	for	the	Fijians	as	a	supposedly	‘exemplary	colonial	people.’197	This	was	 in	part	a	result	of	Fijian	willingness	to	enlist	 in	 large	numbers	during	World	War	Two,	leading	the	British	colonisers	to	see	the	Fijian	 people	 as	 ‘patriotic,	 devoted	 to	 duty	 and	 ready	 to	 lay	 down	 their	lives	 for	the	Empire.’198	Crucially,	 this	perception	of	 indigenous	Fijians	as	subjects	loyal	to	the	occupying	empire	was	reliant	on	and	produced	by	an	imagined	 opposition	 to	 the	 Indian	 population	 of	 Fiji,	 most	 of	 whom	initially	 made	 the	 journey	 to	 Fiji	 between	 1879	 and	 1916	 to	 work	 as	indentured	 labourers	 in	 the	 island’s	 sugar	 industry,	 and	 were	subsequently	blamed	by	the	British	for	causing	trouble	in	the	colony	after	agitating	for	equality	with	 indigenous	Fijians	(Denoon,	p.304).	199	Despite	the	fact	that	the	Indo-Fijian	community	grew	rapidly	in	the	early	twentieth	century,	 so	 that	 in	 the	 1940s	 it	 surpassed	 the	 indigenous	 Fijian	population200,	British	colonial	policy	held	that	‘the	rights	and	privileges	of																																																									197	Donald	Denoon,	Philippa	Mein	Smith,	and	Marivic	Wyndham,	A	History	of	Australia,	New	Zealand,	
and	the	Pacific	(Oxford:	Blackwell,	2000),	p.	323.	198	Donald	Denoon,	The	Cambridge	History	of	the	Pacific	Islanders	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2004),	p.	304.	199	Brij	V.	Lal,	‘Understanding	the	Indian	Indenture	Experience’,	South	Asia:	Journal	of	South	Asian	
Studies,	21	(1998),	215–37	(p.	220)		200	Jon	Fraenkel,	‘The	Origins	of	Military	Autonomy	in	Fiji:	A	Tale	of	Three	Coups’,	Australian	Journal	
of	International	Affairs,	67.3	(2013),	327–341	(p.	327).		
	 215	
indigenous	Fijians	with	respect	to	their	customs,	heritage,	and	 land	were	virtually	inalienable	and	should	be	paramount	over	any	other	claims.’201In	practice,	 this	 meant	 that	 the	 colonial	 regime	 under	 the	 first	 resident	Governor,	Sir	Arthur	Gordon,	introduced	a	system	of	indirect	rule	through	Fijian	 chiefs	 based	 in	 the	 eastern	 regions	of	 the	 country,	 chiefs	who	had	‘well-established	relations	with	settlers	and	missionaries’	(Lawson,	p.800).	The	 colonial	 administration	 then	 sought	 to	 indoctrinate	 what	 Stephanie	Lawson	calls	the	‘myth	of	cultural	homogeneity’(p.800).	They	constructed	and	reinforced	the	notion	of	a	uniform	Fijian	culture	built	on	the	model	of	the	chiefly	systems	of	the	eastern	regions,	allowing	them	to	prioritise	the	land	 rights	 of	 those	 who	 could	 now	 commonly	 be	 referred	 to	 as	‘indigenous	Fijians’	over	those	of	Indo-Fijians.	This	is	despite	the	fact	that,	as	Dominik	Schieder	explains:		 It	 was	 not	 until	 the	 British	 annexation	 and	 the	 attempts	 of	 people	like	 Gordon	 to	 unify	 the	 indigenous	 population	 for	 political	 and	administrative	 purposes	 that	 a	 common	 ethnic	 Fijian	 identity,	including	a	 common	 language,	was	born.	This	was	achieved	mainly	by	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 neo-traditional	 socio-political	 order,	based	 on	 a	 local	 eastern	 variation	 of	 Fijian	 chieftainship,	 but	transplanted	and	imposed	over	the	entire	archipelago.202		This	 colonial	 ‘myth	 of	 cultural	 homogeneity’	 has	 been	operative	 socially,	culturally	and	politically	in	Fiji	for	many	years	and	its	legacy	is	apparent	in	the	 history	 of	 political	 clashes	 between	 indigenous	 Fijians	 and	 Indo-Fijians,	most	obviously	made	visible	by	the	series	of	coups	that	have	taken	place	on	the	island	since	1987.				 The	 colonial	 history	 of	 Fiji,	 then,	 is	 one	 that	 clearly	 demonstrates	the	ways	in	which	national	identity	is	produced	by,	in	Ahmed’s	terms,	‘the																																																									201	Stephanie	Lawson,	‘The	Myth	of	Cultural	Homogeneity	and	Its	Implications	for	Chiefly	Power	and	Politics	in	Fiji’,	Comparative	Studies	in	Society	and	History,	32.4	(1990),	795–821	(p.	800)		202	Dominik	Schieder,	‘“Fiji	Has	a	Coup	Culture”:	Discussing	Fiji’s	Ongoing	Political	Instability’,	
Paideuma,	58	(2012),	45–68	(p.	58).	
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proximity	of	strangers	within	the	nation	space’	(p.100).	This	is	in	contrast	to	the	notion	that	such	an	identity	defines	itself	in	opposition	to	a	stranger	on	 the	outside,	or,	 to	put	 it	 another	way,	 a	 stranger	 to	whom	hospitality	may	be	extended	or	denied.	Rather,	the	nationalism	of	 indigenous	Fijians	(and	 the	 accompanying	 primacy	 of	 rights	 that	 they	 enjoy	 over	 the	 Indo-Fijian	community)	is	reliant	on	creating	relations	of	strangeness	within	the	national	‘home’,	so	that	borders	are	defined	and	drawn	within	Fiji,	rather	than	around	 its	edges.	 In	 choosing	Fiji	 as	 the	 location	 for	Ruth’s	 colonial	childhood	(and	her	memories	and	fixations	in	the	present)	the	text	draws	attention	to	the	ways	that	 the	production	of	bodies	as,	variously,	strange	or	familiar	(or	‘at	home’	or	‘visiting’)	is	operative	across	time	and	space,	so	that	the	encounter	between	Ruth	and	Frida	opens	out	into	and	is	mediated	by	other	encounters,	in	other	places,	at	other	times.				 Jeffrey’s	 speech	act	offers	a	clear	example	of	 stranger	 fetishism	 in	practice.	Frida	becomes	a	‘figure’	cut	off	from	her	social	relationships,	one	that	 stands	 in	 for	 a	 group	 of	 people	 (Fijians)	who	 have	 also	 necessarily	been	 fetishized	 in	 order	 that	 Jeffrey	 is	 able	 to	 imagine	 them	 as	homogenous,	 with	 the	 one	 (Frida)	 standing	 in	 for	 the	 many.	 Crucially,	however,	 these	 occluded	 social	 relationships	 (i.e.	 Ruth’s	 introduction	 to	and	reading	of	Frida)	haunt	the	fetishized	meetings	between	characters,	so	we	are	able	to	remain	critical	of	attempts	to	reduce	or	fix	the	meanings	of	both	 these	 relationships	 and	 the	 bodies	 that	 are	 implicated	 in	 them.	Further,	by	placing	Jeffrey’s	reference	to	Fiji’s	‘familiarity’	in	the	context	of	(a	 very	 small	 part	 of)	 Fijian	 colonial	 history	 here,	 we	 see	 that	 Frida’s	acceptance	 into	 Ruth’s	 home	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	 production	 of	 the	‘stranger	 stranger’	 against	 the	 ‘stranger’	 which	 Ahmed	 argues	 is	 the	condition	of	possibility	 for	 the	stranger	being	 ‘taken	 in’.	Historically,	 this	process	 can	 be	 seen	 at	 work	 in	 the	 British	 colonial	 administration’s	decision	 to	oppose	 the	 indigenous	Fijian	 community	 (as	 the	 stranger)	 to	the	 Indo-Fijian	community	(as	stranger	strangers),	and	I	want	 to	suggest	that	 it	 is	 in	this	context	 that	 Jeffrey’s	comments	should	be	understood	as	
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reproducing	this	operation	in	order	to	read	Frida	as	familiar,	or	knowable,	in	the	present.				 Such	 an	 action	 is	 reliant	 on	 the	 process	 of	 stranger	 fetishism	(severing	 a	 person	 from	 its	web	 of	 social	 relations)	 that	 I	 find	 useful	 to	think	 of	 here	 as	 the	 practised	 and	 intentional	 reduction	 of	 meaning	 of	certain	bodies.	In	the	context	of	Fiji,	the	indigenous	Fijian	community	were	put	through	a	process	of	cultural	flattening	the	direct	goal	of	which	was	a	reduction	in	the	possibilities	that	they	had	to	mean	differently.		After	this,	a	formerly	diverse	cultural	group	could	be	imagined	as	united	in	opposition	to	an	Indo-Fijian	community	understood	as	similarly	standardised.		As	for	Frida,	 Jeffrey	 chooses	 to	 understand	her	 body	 in	 a	 similarly	 reductionist	mode	 in	 the	sense	that	he	sees	her	as	able	 to	stand	 in	 for	a	homogenous	group	(Fijians)	whom	he	believes	to	be	knowable,	because	familiar.	He	is	reliant	 on	 a	 sense-making	 process	 that	 imposes	 meaning	 onto	 certain	bodies	 –	 which	 also	 involves	 ignoring	 the	 different	 ways	 these	 bodies	might	 already	 be	 understood	 to	 mean	 –	 in	 order	 to	 produce	 them	 as	(various	degrees	of)	 strange.	As	 such	 I	 see	 this	as	a	neo-colonial	 reading	practice.			 This	reading	of	Ruth’s	telephone	conversation	with	Jeffrey	offers	an	explanation	 for	 the	 way	 that	 Frida	 is	 able	 to	 enter	 and	 eventually	 have	some	element	of	control	over	Ruth’s	home	(and	Ruth	herself).	 	 I	want	 to	suggest	 that	 McFarlane	 is	 offering	 a	 kind	 of	 provocation	 to	 the	 reader,	something	along	 these	 lines:	 look	what	happens	when	you	think	you	know	
how	 to	 read.	 The	 text	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	 way	 that	 the	 process	 of	‘recognising’	 strangers	 might	 go	 wrong,	 and	 with	 it	 the	 production	 and	regulation	of	 inhabitable/bounded	spaces	Recognising	the	stranger,	 then,	might	 also	 involve	 recognising	 the	 stranger	 as	 familiar	 in	 their	strangeness,	 and	 thus	 distinct	 from	 and	 also	 generative	 of	 the	 stranger	stranger.	 Crucially,	 however	 this	 relies	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 categories	 of	recognition	 (or	 types	 of	 reading)	 being	 used	 to	 produce	 these	 different	kinds	 of	 stranger	 are	 working	 for	 the	 host	 (the	 one	 who	 names	 the	
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stranger)	in	the	way	that	they	are	supposed	to.	The	Night	Guest	 is	able	to	further	 critique	 these	 kinds	 of	 over-confident	 readings	 by	 introducing	Ruth’s	dementia	into	the	texts	as	a	means	of	exploring	what	happens	when	such	processes	fail.			 Ruth’s	 illness	 is	 first	 introduced	 in	 small	 and	unremarkable	ways,	perhaps	 signalling	 only	 a	 benign	 self-neglect.	 For	 example,	 when	 Frida	arrives	for	the	first	time,	Ruth	is	having	pumpkin	seeds	for	breakfast	and	is	accustomed	 to	 dressing	 in	 her	 sons’	 old	 t-shirts,	 although	 later	 she	 is	horrified	to	realise	 that	she	has	 forgotten	to	wash	her	hair	–	perhaps	 for	weeks.	 However,	 as	 Frida	 becomes	 more	 omnipresent,	 Ruth	 grows	confused	and	begins	to	doubt	herself.	This	comes	to	an	initial	climax	when	Ruth	discovers	Frida	is	staying	in	the	house	in	one	of	the	spare	bedrooms.	When	 confronted,	 Frida	 insists	 that	 she	 and	 Ruth	 have	 discussed	 the	arrangement,	 and	 although	Ruth	 begins	 to	 argue,	 (“‘that	 isn’t	 true	 Frida,	what	 you’re	 saying	 to	 me	 now,	 it’s	 not	 true.	 I’d	 remember.’“)	 she	nevertheless	 experiences	 ‘a	 feeling	 of	 unravelling,	 all	 the	 same;	 an	unwound	 thread.’203 	Ruth’s	 health	 then	 begins	 to	 deteriorate	 after	 a	physically	abusive	incident	during	which	Frida	locks	her	out	of	the	house.	After	this	point	her	confusion	increases	and	although	her	narrative	voice	is	still	strong	and	lively,	in	conversation	with	other	characters	her	responses	are	erratic	and	often	childlike.	Throughout	this	series	of	events,	 the	tiger	remains	 a	 constant	 presence,	 mainly	 making	 himself	 known	 to	 Ruth	through	changes	 in	 the	night-time	atmosphere	of	 the	house,	which	 takes	on	the	aspect	of	a	jungle	where	‘palms	rattled	their	spears,	insects	rubbed	their	wings	in	the	dripping	trees’	(p.50).			 In	 part,	 the	 introduction	 of	 dementia	 into	 the	 text	 is	straightforwardly	disruptive,	 acting	as	 a	device	 for	McFarlane	 to	 explore	what	 it	 might	 mean	 for	 the	 ‘proper’	 recognition	 of	 strangers	 and	strangeness	to	stop	working,	or	go	wrong.	Yet	such	a	reading	of	dementia	in	 the	 text	 requires	 us	 (or	 at	 least	 gives	 us	 permission)	 to	 understand																																																									203	McFarlane,	p.	114.	
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Ruth’s	 encounters	 with	 the	 tiger	 and	 Frida	 in	 the	 context	 of	 cognitive	difficulty,	albeit	in	very	different	ways.	In	the	case	of	the	tiger,	the	ethically	valuable	 cognitive	 slipperiness	of	 the	big	 cat’s	body	might	be	 reduced	 to	hallucination	or	misrecognition	(Ruth’s	domestic	cats	are,	after	all,	a	huge	part	of	her	life	at	home).	As	regards	Frida,	Ruth’s	eagerness	to	attribute	a	Fijian	 identity	 to	 her	 might	 also	 be	 explained	 as	 symptomatic	 of	 the	workings	 of	 a	 less	 reliable,	 older	 mind,	 a	 mind	 for	 which	 childhood	memories	 and	 experiences	 are	 fresher,	 more	 easily	 accessible,	 perhaps	even	 more	 desirable	 than	 those	 of	 the	 present	 day.	 However,	 whilst	McFarlane	is	clearly	attentive	to	and	interested	in	the	potential	that	the	act	of	 recognising	 (and	 so	 producing)	 strangeness	 has	 to	 break	 down,	 or	glitch,	 in	 interesting	 and	productive	ways,	 to	 see	dementia	 as	 the	device	that	illuminates	or	gives	order	to	this	idea	in	the	text	would	be	to	miss	the	truth	 of	 its	 emergence.	 In	 the	 text	 Ruth’s	 dementia	 is	 not	 some	 kind	 of	naturally	occurring	process	but	is	rather	produced	by	her	encounters	with	other	bodies.	The	question	the	text	asks	is	not	whether	Ruth	does	or	does	not	have	dementia	(whether	what	she	sees	or	experiences	is	or	is	not	‘real’	in	 any	 sense)	 –	 indeed,	 that	 question	 is	 irrelevant	 here,	 as	 well	 as	uninteresting.	 Rather,	 in	 raising	 the	 possibility	 but	 not	 determining	 that	Ruth	 has	 dementia,	 McFarlane	 puts	 us	 in	 a	 position	 where	 we	 must	continuously	pay	attention	to	and	become	aware	of	the	limits	of	our	own	generosity.	That	 is	 to	 say,	we	are	constantly	 forced	 to	 confront	 the	ways	that	we	ourselves	produce	and	then	identify	strangeness.			 Therefore,	 on	 one	 level	 the	 text	 leaves	 space	 for	 us	 to	 remain	vigilant	 to	and	critical	of	 the	ways	 that	bodies	 (specifically	Frida	and	 the	tiger)	 are	 produced	 as	 strange	 (or	 not)	 via	 their	 interactions	with	 other	bodies,	bodies	that	might	be	understood	as	hosts	(in	the	case	of	Ruth	and	Jeffrey).	Yet	the	text	also	enacts	a	relationship	with	us	that	means	we	are	forced	to	turn	this	critical	gaze	back	on	ourselves	and	reckon	with	our	own	implication	in	the	production	of	strangeness,	this	time	by	paying	attention	to	 the	ways	 that	we	may	seek	 to	reduce	down,	or	even	disregard,	Ruth’s	impressions	of	 the	world.	 In	 this	 sense	we	may	 feel,	 as	Frida	does	when	
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Ruth	 invites	her	childhood	 love	Richard	to	stay	with	her,	 that	we	have	 ‘a	secret’:	 by	 which	 I	 mean	 that	 we	 may	 wish	 to	 reach	 beyond	 Ruth’s	narration	 to	 make	 critical	 judgements	 about	 the	 accuracy	 of	 her	observations	and	thoughts.	For	Frida,	Ruth	knows,	the	secret	is	that	Ruth	and	 Richard	 are	 ‘innocents’,	 that	 they	 are	 ‘old,	 older	 than	 old,	 and	 that	while	they	might	still	be	capable	of	a	sweet,	 funny	romance,	any	physical	possibility	was	 extinguished	 for	 them	both’	 (p.64).	 Frida’s	 notion	 of	 this	‘secret’,	 then,	 relies	 once	 more	 on	 an	 interpretation	 of	 the	 different	possibilities	Ruth’s	body	has	to	mean,	with	sexuality	dismissed	as	not	one	of	 those	 possible	 meanings.	 As	 it	 happens,	 Ruth	 and	 Richard	 do	 have	 a	sexual	 encounter,	 one	 that	 is	pleasurable	 for	both	parties,	who	are	 ‘both	prepared	 to	 be	 practical’	 (p.123).	 Whether	 or	 not	 a	 reader	 may	 have	shared	Frida’s	preconceptions	on	this	matter,	 the	 fact	 that	Ruth	 focalizes	the	encounter	means	that	Ruth’s	(and	Richard’s)	sexuality	 is	present	and	marked	 in	 the	 text.	 Therefore	 it	 must	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 as	 part	 of	Ruth’s	embodied	experience.					 Furthermore,	whilst	 it	 is	apparent	relatively	early	on	 that	Frida	 is	manipulating	 Ruth,	 as	 Ruth	 becomes	 more	 distressed	 and	 clouded	 the	lines	between	what	 can	be	 attributed	 to	her	now	obvious	 confusion	 and	Frida’s	manipulations	become	blurred.	When	Ruth	eludes	Frida	and	takes	a	trip	to	town	she	needs	help	to	use	the	bus	(she	can’t	manage	to	find	the	right	coins)	and	when	she	tries	to	make	a	purchase	in	the	local	butcher	her	purse	is	empty,	the	cards	missing	from	their	slots.	It	would	be	easy	for	us	to	choose	to	join	the	ranks	of	the	people	she	negotiates	in	town	–	the	man	on	the	bus	who	gives	her	a	‘sceptical’	look,	the	young	boy	she	talks	to	who	seems	‘startled’,	even	‘a	bit	afraid’	(p.194).	When	she	calls	Richard’s	house	and	thinks	she	hears	Frida	 laugh	(‘a	golden,	bouncing	swell,	a	brass	ring,	and	unmistakable’)	 it	 could	be	easy	 to	assume,	despite	 the	evidence	 that	Frida	is	becoming	more	involved	in	Ruth’s	life,	that	she	is	paranoid,	or	at	least	confused.	Easy,	again,	to	do	the	same	when	Frida	returns	home	with	pink	lilies	that	Ruth	accuses	her	of	bringing	from	Richard’s	house,	because	he	has	written	to	her	about	his	garden,	‘full	of	day	lilies,	all	of	them	pink’,	
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but	 which	 she	 insists	 she	 has	 picked	 from	 her	 mother’s	 home	 (p.132).	Easiest	of	all	would	be	to	dismiss	the	tiger,	as	a	kind	of	early	warning	sign,	or	simply	a	dream.	Indeed	Ruth	herself	begins	to	feel	differently	about	the	tiger	as	her	relationship	with	Frida	evolves	and	becomes	more	disturbing.	Once	a	source	of	joy	and	possibility	for	her,	she	now	groups	him	together	with	particular	moments	of	upset	and	confusion	that	she	sees	as	signifying	mental	deterioration.	At	one	point	she	 imagines	expressing	her	concerns	to	Richard:		 ‘Please,	Richard,’	she	might	have	said,	‘how	can	I	tell	if	I’m	losing	my	mind?	 Are	 there	 definite	 signs?	 Please,	 is	 there	 some	 kind	 of	 test?	What	would	you	say	to	an	old	woman	who	heard	a	tiger	in	her	house	at	 night,	 who	 forgot	 to	 wash	 her	 hair,	 who	 didn’t	 notice	 her	government	carer	had	moved	in?	(p.117)		Where	 previously	 Ruth	 saw	 cohabitation	 with	 the	 tiger	 as	 full	 of	possibility,	 and	 sought	 to	 make	 room	 for	 him	 and	 his	 multiple	significances,	 she	 now	 finds	 herself	 forced	 into	 a	 position	 where	discerning	the	‘truth’	or	reality	of	a	phenomenon	is	not	only	understood	to	be	 possible	 (not	 to	 say	 desirable)	 but	 also	 	 an	 indispensable	 process	providing	 the	 necessary	 basis	 for	 the	maintenance	 of	 a	 kind	 of	 coherent	subjectivity.	Whereas	previously	Ruth	was	content	to	leave	the	nature	and	meaning	of	the	tiger	unresolved	–	indeed,	found	joy	in	his	haunting	of	her	life	–	now	she	wants	him	to	be	read	so	that	she	can	be	read,	too.		She	wants	others	to	be	able	to	quantify	and	interpret	her	own	experience	of	being	in	the	world,	and	then	instruct	her	on	its	significance:	this	means	identifying	‘signs’	and	perhaps	taking	a	‘test.’	If	Ruth	is	beginning	to	doubt,	or	perhaps	more	accurately,	betray	her	 tiger,	 then	why	should	we	remain	 faithful	 to	him?			 There	is	a	particular	moment	in	the	text,	however,	which	acts	as,	if	not	necessarily	a	rebuke,	certainly	a	reminder	to	us	of	our	responsibility	to	read	 generously.	 Our	 temptation	 to	 second-guess	 Ruth	 by	 working	 out	
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what	 is	 and	 is	 not	 ‘really’	 happening	 to	 her	 implicates	 us	 in	 the	 same	system	of	stranger	fetishism	that	the	novel	obliquely	critiques.	As	such,	we	are	 able	 to	 affectively	 experience	 our	 own	 position	 of	 power	 when	 it	comes	to	reading	strange	bodies	–	in	this	case,	an	ageing	body	fighting	for	agency.	 Therefore	 the	 experience	 of	making	 sense	 of	 Ruth	 as	 a	 fictional	character	parallels	the	way	Ruth	makes	sense	of	her	perceptions	of	Frida,	and	 has	 everything	 to	 do	 with	 a	 failure	 to	 recognise	 that	 ‘truth’	 is	 not	natural,	 or	 given,	 but	 is	 instead	 produced	 by	 and	 dependent	 on	 power	relations	 (of	which	 reading	 is	one).	Attention	 is	drawn	 to	 the	way	we	as	readers	 are	 implicated	 in	 this	 process	 through	 a	 conversation	 that	 takes	place	after	Frida	has	 returned	with	pink	 lilies	 that	Ruth	believes	 to	have	come	from	Richard’s	garden:		 Ruth	held	tighter	to	the	lilies.	‘They’re	from	Richard,’	she	said.	‘Poor	dear	crazy.	Give	them	here.’	‘I’m	not	crazy.’	‘Confused,	then.	As	usual,	poor	Ruthie’s	just	a	bit	confused.’	‘No,’	said	Ruth,	but	she	recognised	the	word	confused	as	approaching	what	she	was,	after	her	sticky	bright	dream.	‘All	right,’	said	Frida.	‘Let’s	see.	How	old	are	you?’	‘Seventy-five.’	‘What	colour	are	my	eyes?’	‘Brown.’	‘And	what’s	the	capital	of	Fiji?’	‘Suva.’	‘No	it	isn’t.’	‘It	is,’	Ruth	said.	‘I	lived	there.	I	should	know.’	‘You	don’t	know,’	said	Frida.	 ‘You	only	think	you	do.	That’s	what	I’m	talking	about	–	confused!’	(pp.	173-3)		Up	 to	 this	point,	Frida’s	manipulations	of	Ruth	have	been	subtle	and	 the	use	 of	 indirect	 discourse	 produces	 an	 effect	whereby	 the	 reader	 is	 both	within	 and	 outside	 Ruth’s	 consciousness;	 we	 see	 the	world	 through	 her	
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eyes	 but	 are	 also	 able	 to	maintain	 a	 critical	 distance	 from	 her	 narrative	voice.	 As	 such,	 although	 the	 text	 cultivates	 suspicion	 toward	 Frida	 and	alertness	 to	 her	 potential	 motives	 for	 exploiting	 Ruth	 (for	 example,	 she	talks	 to	 Ruth	 at	 length	 about	 money	 troubles	 caused	 by	 her	 unreliable	‘brother’	George,	who	is	later	revealed	to	be	her	husband)	definite	proof	of	Frida’s	ill	intentions	has	until	now	remained	absent	from	the	text.		This	has	so	 far	allowed	us	 to	doubt,	or	 remain	wary	of,	Ruth’s	 impressions	of	 the	situation.	 This	 conversation,	 however,	 marks	 a	 rupture	 in	 the	 text,	 a	moment	 of	 shock	 in	 which	 Frida’s	 abusive	 treatment	 of	 Ruth	 becomes	violently	explicit,	and	a	moment	at	which	we	are	also	forced	to	recognise	the	 similarities	 between	 Frida’s	 treatment	 of	 Ruth	 here	 and	 our	 own	reading	practices.				 By	 moderating	 her	 language	 to	 call	 Ruth	 ‘confused’	 rather	 than	‘crazy’,	Frida’s	performs	an	empty	tolerance	that	reveals	the	way	in	which	this	language	substitution	simply	transfers	violence,	rather	than	mitigates	it.	As	such	it	directs	our	attention	to	the	ways	in	which	we	may	have	made	similar	judgements	in	relation	to	Ruth’s	narrative	perspective.		Even	more	disturbingly,	 however,	 Frida	 does	 not	 stop	 at	 the	 use	 of	 this	 accusatory	language	(the	repetition	of	which	is	clearly	having	a	successful	impact	on	Ruth’s	own	sense	of	herself	–	she	recognises	 it	as	 ‘approaching	what	she	was’)	but	 instead	 transforms	 this	 reading	of	Ruth	 (crazy,	 confused)	 from	accusation	into	truth.	When	Ruth	correctly	identifies	Suva	as	the	capital	of	Fiji,	 Frida	 flat	 out	 refuses	 to	 accept	 this	 answer.	 	 As	 she	 explains,	 Ruth	doesn’t	know,	she	only	thinks	that	she	knows.	Here,	for	the	first	time,	the	text	explicitly	directs	attention	toward	a	threat	that	has	lurked	in	its	pages	from	the	start:	reading	strategies	that	aim	to	identify	and	reveal	forms	of	‘truth’,	 not	 only	 within	 texts,	 but	 also	 specifically	 in	 terms	 of	 different	kinds	of	bodies,	enact	violence	on	these	texts,	and	these	bodies.		Who	are	you,	we	might	want	to	demand	of	Frida,	to	say	what	is	or	is	not	true?	Who	are	you,	the	text	reminds	us,	to	do	the	same?			
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	 This	 conversation	 between	 Ruth	 and	 Frida	 makes	 it	 clear	 that	‘truth’	in	this	text	is	fluid	and	dependent	on	shifting	power	relations.	The	fact	 that	 Ruth	 is	 correct	 when	 she	 names	 Suva	 as	 the	 capital	 of	 Fiji	 is	irrelevant	at	this	moment	because	Frida	is	the	arbiter	of	truth	and	chooses	to	reject	Ruth’s	answer.	Concurrently,	we	are	also	placed	in	the	position	of	making	 similar	 decisions	 about	 the	 ‘accuracy’	 or	 ‘truthfulness’	 of	 Ruth’s	descriptions	of	the	world	and	as	such	are	led	to	the	realisation	that	we	are	a	determiner	of	Ruth	just	as	Frida	is.	At	the	same	time,	however,	it	is	still	possible	 to	distinguish	our	 consumption	of	 the	 textual	Ruth	 from	Frida’s	deliberate	gaslighting	of	her.				 In	 the	 next	 section	 of	 this	 chapter,	 then,	 I	wish	 to	 build	 upon	 the	arguments	I	have	made	so	far	regarding	the	relationship	between	strange	bodies,	 interpretative	 work,	 and	 violence.	 Examining	 two	 encounters	between	 Frida	 and	 the	 tiger,	 I	 argue	 that	 in	 writing	 Frida’s	 attempted	‘exorcism’	of	the	tiger	the	text	explores	the	material	effects	of	how	bodies	may	be	changed	or	harmed	through	the	workings	of	stranger	fetishism.	I	argue	that	the	novel	firmly	situates	these	harmful	effects	as	the	product	of	the	 same	 colonial	 processes	 of	 meaning-reduction	 that	 are	 evident	 in	Jeffrey’s	 interpretation	 of	 Frida.	 In	 order	 to	 show	how	 this	works	 in	 the	text,	 I	turn	once	more	to	an	analysis	of	the	 ‘particularity’	of	the	modes	of	encounter	 that	 occur	 between	 Frida,	 Ruth,	 and	 the	 tiger.	 Specifically	 I	show	 how	 Frida’s	 attempts	 to	 close	 down	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 tiger	 are	successful	because	they	engage	imperial	representations	of	both	tigers	and	Fiji	in	order	to	introduce	a	symbolic	dependency	into	her	relationship	with	Ruth.	 In	 order	 to	 be	 installed	 as	 Ruth’s	 protector	 (and	 secure	 her	 space	within	 Ruth’s	 home)	 Frida	 characterises	 the	 tiger	 as	 a	 hostile	 ‘outsider’	through	a	deployment	of	these	colonial	representative	strategies.		
	
IV.	 Frida:	Tiger	
	 ‘I	don’t	know	Ruthie.’	Frida	headed	back	to	the	kitchen	with	her	mop.	‘Stranger	 things	under	 the	 sun.’	 She	 shook	her	head,	 looking	out	 at	
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the	sea	as	she	walked,	so	that	Ruth	saw	she	was	taking	the	possibility	of	 the	 tiger	 seriously;	 that	 the	 wide	 spread	 of	 her	 thoughts	 was	growing	wider	still	(p.149).		When	Ruth	tells	Frida	that	she	has	heard	a	tiger	visiting	the	house	at	night,	she	 is	 at	 first	met	with	 ‘jovial	 scorn’	 and	 told	 that	 there	are	 ‘no	 tigers	 in	Australia’	(pp.144,	145).	Soon	however,	it	is	Frida	who	has	‘settled	into	the	possibility	 of	 the	 tiger’,	 which	 she	 insists	 is	 probably	 ‘man-eating’	 or,	indeed,	 ‘woman-eating’.	 This	 turnaround	 unsettles	 Ruth.	 Faced	with	 this	new	 version	 of	 the	 tiger,	 which	 is	 frightening	 not	 because	 he	 might	 be	interested	 in	eating	her	 (she	has	of	 course	entertained,	and	enjoyed	 that	possibility	before)	but	because	he	is	Frida’s	version	–	she	feels	compelled	to	refute	his	existence,	again	and	again.	Indeed,	this	happens	four	times	on	one	 page	 alone.	 Despite	 Ruth’s	 insistence	 that	 she	 must	 have	 made	 a	mistake,	 Frida	 spends	 the	night	 on	 the	 sofa	 in	 the	 living	 room.	Although	Ruth	 is	 partly	 annoyed	 by	 the	 idea	 that	 Frida	 is	 teasing	 her,	 she	 sees	‘without	wanting	to,	evidence	of	Frida’s	seriousness:	her	crushed	hair,	the	displaced	 sofa	 cushions,	 the	 cups	 of	 tea’	 (p.153).	 Frida’s	 interest	 in	 the	tiger	 then	 culminates	 in	 two	 violent	 incidents	 where	 she	 supposedly	confronts	him	whilst	Ruth	remains	locked	in	her	bedroom.	After	the	first	of	 these	 Frida	 is	 left	with	 three	 scratches	 on	 her	 arm,	 and	 although	 she	insists	she	has	‘scared	him	right	off’,	she	commences	building	‘tiger	traps’	around	 the	 outside	 of	 the	 house,	 the	 largest	 of	 these	 being	 a	 large	 hole	halfway	down	the	dune	below	Ruth’s	garden.	The	second	time	Frida	fights	the	tiger,	she	tells	Ruth	he	is	dead.	She	has	killed	him	by	cutting	open	his	stomach	 and	 slitting	 his	 throat,	 dumping	 his	 body	 out	 to	 sea	 in	 a	wheelbarrow.			 Frida’s	 decision	 to	 take	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	 tiger	 seriously	completely	 changes	 his	 meaning	 for	 Ruth,	 because	 Frida	 now	 gets	 to	decide	who	and	what	he	 is.	Ruth	realises	 ‘the	 tiger	was	Frida’s	now;	and	not	 just	 this	 tiger,	 but	 the	 entire	 species’	 (p.163).	 Her	words	 here	 draw	attention	to	the	way	that	‘Frida’s	tiger’	is	generic	rather	than	individual.	He	
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stands	 in	 for	 tigers	 as	 a	 species,	 a	 body	 representative	 of	 other	 bodies	rather	than	the	singular	and	complex	creaturely	(non)being	that	Ruth	met	in	their	first	encounter.	I	argued	earlier	in	this	chapter	that	her	reading	of	his	body	against	other,	different	bodies	constituted	an	example	of	the	kind	of	 ‘remembering’	hospitality	that	Ahmed	suggests	would	be	honest	about	the	 ways	 that	 a	 host	 subject	 is	 always	 already	 implicated	 in	 the	recognition,	 or	 non-recognition,	 of	 whoever	 or	 whatever	 visitor	 might	arrive.	Frida,	instead,	embarks	on	a	project	of	reducing	the	meaning	of	the	tiger	by	making	use	of	imperial	stereotypes	of	the	species,	not	in	order	to	read	and	understand	the	 individual	tiger	against	and	in	relation	to	these,	but	in	order	to	assimilate	him	to	them.	In	doing	so,	Frida	assigns	different	meanings	to	the	tiger	then	mobilises	these	in	order	to	draw	and	maintain	an	inside/outside	opposition.	This	involves	imagining	a	coherent	and	fixed	inner	space	of	subjectivity	(Ruth’s	home,	and	Ruth	and	Frida	within	it)	as	opposed	 to	 a	 traumatic,	 invasive	 outside	 (the	 tiger).	 In	 this	 way,	 Frida	seeks	to	displace	the	more	real	source	of	trauma	in	the	text	(her	abuse	of	Ruth)	through	exploiting	the	boundary-drawing	mechanisms	that	Ahmed	has	shown	are	endemic	to	the	production	of	strange(r)ness.				 When	Ahmed	talks	about	what	she	calls	 ‘spaces	of	belonging’,	 she	identifies	 the	nation	 as	 an	 exemplary	model	 for	 such	 a	 space	 (p.99).	 For	Ahmed	 the	 nation	 is	 produced	 through	 proximity	 to	 and	 distance	 from	strangeness	 –that	 is,	 proximity	 and	 distance	 from	 subjects	 that	 are	understood	as	belonging	 (or	not)	 in	 the	nation	 space,	 and	 the	many	and	various	 degrees	 to	 which	 this	 non/belonging	 might	 be	 understood	 as	taking	 place.	 In	 order	 for	 the	 nation	 to	 be	 imagined	 or	 produced	successfully,	 Ahmed	 argues,	 a	 process	 of	 ‘self-identification’	 must	 take	place	 whereby	 ‘the	 nation	 comes	 to	 be	 realised	 as	 belonging	 to	 the	individual	 (the	 construction	 of	 the	 ‘we’	 as	 utterable	 by	 the	 individual.’	Ahmed	 explains	 that	 the	 tools	 of	 production	 allowing	 the	 nation	 to	 be	conceived	 as	 a	 space	 of	 (individual	 and	 communal)	 belonging	 owe	 their	operation	both	to	material	interventions	that	specifically	seek	to	draw	and	enforce	national	 borders,	 like	 ‘the	material	 deployment	 of	 force,	 and	 the	
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forms	 of	 governmentality	 which	 control	 […]	 the	 boundaries	 between	nation	states,	and	the	movements	of	citizens	and	aliens	within	the	state’,	as	well	 as	 the	 assemblages	 that	 structure	 the	 cultural	 imaginary.	 These	comprise	‘the	repertoire	of	images	which	allows	the	concept	of	the	nation	to	come	into	being	in	the	first	place’	(p.98).				 In	The	Night	Guest,	Frida	uses	both	of	these	tools	of	production.	She	first	engages	with	a	colonial	‘repertoire	of	images’	in	order	to	characterise	the	tiger	as	a	man-eater,	and	then	uses	physical	force	to	stage	a	battle	with	him	 in	Ruth’s	home.	By	doing	 this,	 she	 is	able	 to	draw	both	a	 literal	 and	imagined	 boundary	 between	 herself	 and	 Ruth	 (inside)	 and	 the	 tiger	(outside).		The	ultimate	goal	of	this	is	for	Ruth	to	identify	the	space	of	her	home	as	necessarily	 inhabited	by	a	 ‘we.’	Frida	wants	Ruth	to	understand	her	home	as	a	space	of	belonging	the	coherency	of	which	is	contingent	on	Ruth’s	 dependence	 on	 and	 investment	 in	 Frida	 as	 the	 enforcer	 of	 these	newly	 drawn	 boundaries.	 	 As	 such,	 the	 complex	 set	 of	 relationships	between	Ruth,	 Frida	 and	 the	 tiger	 offer	 a	 reflection	 on	national	 identity,	nation	 spaces	 and	 hospitality	 in	 the	 context	 of	 traumatic	 events	 that,	although	specifically	located,	also	open	out	other	places,	other	times,	and	other	relationships.	This	draws	attention	to	the	way	that	the	production	of	spaces	of	belonging	is	never	simply	benign	but	involves	actively	producing	(and	 excluding)	 strange(r)ness	 in	 order	 to	 secure	 the	 fantasy	 of	 the	national	 subject	 as	host.	Or,	 in	other	words,	 the	 fantasy	of	 a	 subject	 that	reads,	but	is	not	themselves	read.	Most	importantly,	however,	Frida’s	use	of	these	tools	of	production	relies	on	the	curtailment	of	what	I	described	earlier	 as	 the	 desire,	 or	 joy,	 that	 Ruth	 experiences	 in	 relation	 to	 his	presence.			 Firstly,	 Frida	 makes	 use	 of	 tiger	 tropes	 that	 have	 their	 historical	origins	 in	 the	 colonial	 hunting	 campaigns	 of	 the	 British	 Raj	 in	 order	 to	situate	 the	 tiger	 as	 particularly	 Indian.	 When	 Ruth	 mentions	 the	 tiger,	Frida	 immediately	 draws	 a	 connection	 between	 the	 animal’s	 arrival	 and	Ruth’s	 childhood	 in	 Fiji,	 which	 she	 calls	 ‘that	 jungle	 you	 grew	 up	 in’	
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(p.144).	Ruth	protests	(’I	didn’t	grow	up	in	a	jungle	[…]	And	there	are	no	tigers	in	Fiji’)	instead	insisting	that	tigers	are	accustomed	to	cold	weather	and	 ‘live	in	India	and	China.	Maybe	Russia.’	 In	response,	Frida	cryptically	asserts	 that	 there	 are	 ‘Indians	 in	 Fiji	 […]	 everyone	 knows	 that,	 from	 the	news.’	Despite	Ruth’s	dismissal	of	 this	(‘just	because	there	are	 Indians	 in	Fiji	doesn’t	mean	there	are	Indian	tigers.	 I	 thought	everyone	knew	that.’)	Frida	and	Ruth’s	conversation	draws	a	link	between	tigers,	India	and	Fiji.	Specifically,	Frida	connects	 India	and	Fiji	 in	 the	context	of	 ‘the	news’,	 i.e.	the	recurrent	coups	that	have	dogged	Fijian	politics	since	1987	and	have	been	presented	in	the	media	as	the	result	of	on-going	conflict	between	so-called	indigenous	Fijians	and	the	Indo-Fijian	population.204		 Frida	 is	 also	 insistent	on	 characterising	 the	 tiger	 as	 a	 ‘man-eater’,	(‘you’re	 lucky	 you	 haven’t	 been	 gobbled	 up	 in	 your	 bed’;	 ‘Tiger	 on	 the	loose,	 chances	 are	 it’s	 a	man-eater’)	 and	 again	 perseveres	 in	 suggesting	this	aspect	of	the	tiger’s	nature	is	related	to	its	particular	Indianness.	She	tells	 Ruth,	 with	 apparent	 relish,	 ‘“I	 saw	 a	 TV	 show	 once	 […]	 yeah,	 a	documentary	 about	man-eating	 tigers	 in	 India.	 You	know	what	 they	 say,	once	a	tiger	gets	a	taste	of	human	flesh,	that’s	all	it	wants	to	eat’’’	(p.147).	The	 characterisation	 of	 the	 tiger	 as	 a	 ‘man-eater’,	 as	 well	 as	 the	particularly	 sensationalist	 description	 of	 the	 animal’s	 supposedly	insatiable	proclivity	for	human	flesh,	is	one	hallmark	of	a	particular	kind	of	hunting	 discourse	 that	was	 prevalent	 in	 nineteenth	 century	 India	 under	the	 British	 Raj.	 European	 hunters	 sought	 to	 emphasise	 the	 dangers	 of	man-eaters	 to	 the	 rural	 population	 as	 well	 as	 their	 own	 particular	indispensable	skill	in	managing	and	killing	these	beasts.	This	served	both	as	 a	warning	 to	 Indian	 insurgents	 characterised	as	 ‘tigers’	 by	 the	British	and	as	a	means	of	winning	over	 ‘the	hearts	of	wary	and	non-cooperative	colonial	 subjects’	 through	 a	 performance	 of	 what	 John	 Miller,	 following	Anand	 S.	 Pandian,	 calls	 ‘imperial	 benevolence	 in	 the	 face	 of	 animal	
																																																								204	Mark	Tran,	‘Fiji’s	History	of	Coups’,	The	Guardian,	5	December	2006,	section	World	news	<accessed	22	March	2017].	
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aggression’	 (p.41).205	Anand.	 S.	 Pandian	 has	 coined	 the	 term	 ‘predatory	care’	to	refer	to	this	colonial	project,	a	term	that	helpfully	brings	together	the	 dual	 operations	 of	 cautionary	 force	 and	 benign	 protection	 that	 the	pursuit	and	killing	of	man-eating	tigers	sought	to	make	visible.	It	might	be	argued	that	the	British	administration’s	prioritisation	of	indigenous	Fijian	rights	at	the	expense	of	those	of	Indo-Fijians	provides	another	example	of	this	 kind	 of	 imperial	 ‘predatory	 care’,	with	 the	 bodies	 being	 policed	 and	managed	in	this	context	those	of	the	indentured	Indian	population,	serving	as	a	warning	to	indigenous	Fijians	of	the	violence	at	hand	if	they	cease	to	be	 ‘good’	 subjects	 as	well	 as	 an	 affirmation	 of	 the	British	 officials’	 ‘deep	love’	for	the	Fijian	people	(Denoon,	p.304).			 Frida’s	treatment	of	Ruth	can	similarly	be	understood	as	‘predatory	care’,	not	only	in	the	sense	that	she	commits	to	killing	the	tiger	in	what	she	presents	 to	 Ruth	 as	 an	 act	 of	 protection,	 but	 also	 in	 the	 way	 that	throughout	the	novel	she	demonstrates	her	agency	over	both	Ruth’s	body	and	her	home	through	applications	of	force	that	are	often	framed	as	acts	of	necessary	care.	McFarlane	brings	these	three	very	different	kinds	of	power	relationships	into	dialogue	in	order	to	draw	attention	to	the	tiger’s	body	as	a	 site	 of	 unease,	 or	 interruption,	 that	 requires	 a	 colonial	 kind	 of	management,	 a	 management	 based	 on	 the	 juxtaposition	 of	 an	unpredictable	and	violent	strange(r)ness	against	a	stable,	protected	home	space.		 Under	 the	 Raj	 and	 then	 continuing	 after	 Indian	 independence,	tigers	 were	 killed	 in	 such	 large	 numbers	 that	 by	 the	 1930’s	 they	 were	listed	as	endangered.	During	the	Raj,	tiger	shikar	had	been	‘on	the	itinerary	of	 every	 visiting	 dignitary	who	was	 at	 all	 interested	 in	 hunting’	 and	 the	tiger	population	in	India	went	from	about	100,000	individuals	in	1600,	to	less	than	2500	by	the	1970s.206	The	British	authorities	partly	justified	this	excess	of	killing	as	a	necessary	response	to	the	purported	danger	the	tiger																																																									205	Anand	S.	Pandian,	‘Predatory	Care:	The	Imperial	Hunt	in	Mughal	and	British	India’,	Journal	of	
Historical	Sociology,	14.1	(2001),	79	(p.	81).		206	Kailash	Sankhala,	Tiger! :	The	Story	of	the	Indian	Tiger.	(London:	Collins,	1978),	p.	133;	Susie	Green,	Tiger	(London:	Reaktion,	2006),	p.	21.	
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posed	 to	 humans,	 whilst	 also	 viewing	 the	 killing	 of	 such	 powerful	carnivores	 as	 an	 affirmation	 of	 masculine	 heroism.	 As	 such,	 tigers	inhabited	 a	 strange	 dual	 status	 as	 both	 ‘magnificent	 beast’	 and	‘vermin.’207Kailash	 Sankhala,	 the	 first	 executive	 director	 of	 the	 famous	Project	 Tiger	 conservation	 initiative	 which	 launched	 in	 1972,	 notes	 the	establishment	 in	 1874	 of	 the	 British	 Government’s	 tiger	 eradication	programme,	 and	 John	M.	Mackenzie	 claims	 that	 the	 East	 India	 Company	established	 a	 rewards	 system	 for	 the	 killing	 of	 tigers	 in	 the	 eighteenth	century,	 continuing	 into	 the	 twentieth,	with	 the	bounty	paid	out	on	 tiger	carcasses	 ‘exceptionally	 high,	 reflecting	 perceptions	 of	 the	 creature’s	destructive	powers’	(p.	182).			 The	 distinction	 between	 ‘magnificent	 beast’	 and	 ‘vermin’	 was	inscribed	 into	 the	 cultural	 consciousness	 most	 powerfully	 through	 the	prevalence	 in	 hunting	 literature	 of	 the	 time	 (itself	 a	 vast	 and	 popular	market)	of	stories	about	man-eating	tigers	–	Mackenzie	points	out	that	the	hunting	 books	 ‘are	 full	 of	 stories	 of	 beasts	 with	 over	 a	 hundred	 human	victims	to	their	credit’	(p.180).	Although	the	tiger	was	generally	a	vilified	animal	 due	 to	 the	 ‘combination	 of	 cruelty,	 furtiveness	 and	 treacherous	elegance’	assumed	to	be	its	essential	characteristics,	many	hunters	made	a	distinction	 between	 tigers	 that	 subsisted	 on	 ‘wild’	 prey	 and	 those	 that	hunted	 and	 killed	 both	 humans	 and	 their	 livestock	 (Mackenzie,	p.180;Pandian,	p.84).	The	former	were	deemed	worthy	of	conservation	as	tiger	numbers	began	to	fall	(mainly	due	to	fears	that	large	and	impressive	tiger	 trophies	were	not	 as	 easy	 to	 come	by208),	whilst	European	hunters	who	 sought	 to	 make	 a	 name	 for	 themselves	 as	 specialised	 man-eater	killers	 industriously	hunted	down	the	 latter.	Perhaps	the	most	 famous	of	these	 was	 Jim	 Corbett,	 a	 hunter	 turned	 conservationist	 who,	 whilst	lobbying	 for	 protection	 for	 the	 Bengal	 tiger	 population	 (his	 influence	contributed	 to	 the	 opening	 of	 the	 Hailey	 National	 Park,	 renamed	 the	Corbett	 National	 Park	 in	 1957)	 also	 authored	 the	 hugely	 popular	Man																																																									207	John	M.	(John	MacDonald)	MacKenzie,	The	Empire	of	Nature :	Hunting,	Conservation,	and	British	
Imperialism	(Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press,	1988),	p.	180.	208	Pandian,	p.	84.	
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Eaters	 of	 Kumaon	 (1944),	 in	 which	 volume	 he	 describes	 his	 adventures	hunting	down	and	killing	man-eating	tigers	in	various	rural	villages,	most	notably	the	‘Champawat	Man-Eater’	which	he	claims	killed	200	humans	in	Nepal	 and	 234	 in	 Kumaon.	209	Corbett	 apparently	 saw	 no	 contradiction	between	his	conservation	work	(he	describes	the	tiger	as	‘a	large-hearted	gentleman	with	boundless	courage’210)	and	the	great	number	of	tigers	he	hunted	and	killed	over	the	years,	and	neither	did	his	audience.	Indeed	his	book	captured	perfectly	the	prevailing	cultural	understanding	of	the	tiger	as	magnificent/vermin,	so	much	so	that	 it	was	used	as	a	school	 textbook	(Corbett,	xv;	Sankhala,	p.134).			 Necessarily,	 then,	Corbett’s	descriptions	of	 the	kinds	of	 tigers	 that	supposedly	 became	 man-eaters	 were	 hugely	 influential	 and	 seen	 as	authoritative.	Aside	 from	 lurid	 accounts	of	 the	horrors	of	death	by	man-eater	(‘man-eaters,	 if	not	disturbed,	eat	everything	–	including	the	blood-soaked	 clothes’),	 Corbett	 describes	 man-eaters	 as	 always	 physically	impaired	 in	 some	 way,	 whether	 by	 old	 age	 or	 injury.	 Man-eating	 takes	place,	 he	 claims,	 ‘when	 a	 tiger	 is	 suffering	 from	 one	 or	 more	 painful	wounds,	 or	 when	 its	 teeth	 are	 missing	 or	 defective	 and	 its	 claws	 worn	down,	 and	 it	 is	 unable	 to	 catch	 the	 animals	 it	 has	 been	 accustomed	 to	eating’;	 this	 leads,	 tigers,	 he	 explains,	 to	 kill	 human	 beings	 out	 of	‘necessity’	(p.x,	xv).		 The	fact	that	Frida	has	seen	(or	says	he	has)	a	documentary	about	‘man-eating’	 Indian	 tigers	demonstrates	 the	contemporary	persistence	of	these	 common	 tropes	 of	 nineteenth	 century	 hunting	 literature,	 with	 the	documentary’s	suggestion	that	once	tigers	taste	‘human	flesh’	they	will	eat	nothing	 else	 again	 pointing	 to	 the	 continuance	 of	 a	 tradition	 of	representing	tigers	as,	in	Miller’s	words,	‘the	most	recalcitrant	of	animals,	inviting	 destruction	 by	 the	 unremitting	 violence	 of	 their	 otherness	 and	their	 complete	 exteriority	 to	 human	 harmony’	 (p.37).	 In	 other	 words,	Frida	 is	engaging	with	 this	 representational	 tradition	 in	order	 to	suggest																																																									209	Jim	Corbett	and	Maurice	Hallett,	Man-Eaters	of	Kumaon	(London:	Oxford	University	Press,	1944),	p.	1.	210	Corbett	and	Hallett,	p.	xv.	
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to	 Ruth	 not	 only	 that	 the	 tiger	 is	 not	 only	 dangerous	 but	 that	 he	 must	certainly	be	destroyed	–	Ruth,	she	claims,	is	lucky	she	hasn’t	‘been	gobbled	up’	 in	 her	 bed	 (p.146).	 Ruth	 demonstrates	 her	 awareness	 of	 and	conversance	with	 this	 same	set	of	 images	 in	her	 reply	 to	Frida,	 recalling	that	she	has	seen	‘a	documentary	of	her	own,	possibly	the	same	one’	which	suggested	danger	was	posed	only	by	‘’the	old	tigers	with	broken	teeth’’	as	Jim	Corbett	claimed	years	earlier	(p.147).	Ruth’s	disagreement	with	Frida	is	 not	 the	 point	 here.	 Instead	 McFarlane	 points	 to	 the	 pervasiveness	 of	such	 imagery	 in	 the	 cultural	 imaginary,	 the	 way	 that	 The	 Man-Eater,	seeing	Ruth	 only	 as	 ‘’a	meat	 tray	 in	 a	 raffle’’	 begins	 to	 cast	 a	 shadow	of	representation	over	 that	other	 less	 fully	 formed,	 elusive,	 surprising	 tiger	that	 she	 has	 known	 up	 until	 now.	 Ruth	 starts	 to	 see	 her	 tiger	 as	 what	Dinesh	Wadiwel	calls	a	‘rogue’	animal,	an	animal	‘that	no	longer	fears	the	human;	 indeed,	may	 actively	 hunt	 and	 attack	 the	 human’,	 its	 capacity	 to	threaten	a	human-like	violence,	 ‘to	reason,	to	plan,	to	strategise,	to	track,	to	 stalk’	 being	 tied	 to	 its	 terror.	211	As	 Frida	warns	 Ruth:	 ‘’Tigers	 can	 be	patient.	They	know	all	about	lying	in	wait’’	(p.161).		 In	 nineteenth-century	 India,	 the	 process	 of	 myth-making	 that	surrounded	 man-eating	 tigers,	 the	 epitome	 of	 the	 rogue	 animal,	 also	served	 something	 of	 a	 practical	 purpose.	 Aside	 from	 the	 fact	 that	deploying	such	literary	images	of	these	animals	served	to,	as	Susie	Green	points	 out,	 cast	 anyone	 who	 hunted	 them	 as	 an	 ‘heroic	 saviour’,	 it	 also	fulfilled	 an	 important	 role	 for	 the	 colonial	 administration	 in	 causing	villagers	who	felt	under	threat	from	such	tigers	to	begin	to	turn	to	British	officials	 for	 protection	 rather	 than	 the	 professional	 shikaris	 (Indian	hunters)	who	had	performed	this	function	in	the	past	(Mackenzie,	p.180).	As	Mackenzie	 points	 out,	 hunting	during	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century	Raj	had	an	important	symbolic	dimension,	representing	‘an	increased	concern	with	 the	 external	 appearance	of	 authority’	 in	 order	 to	 conceal	what	was	felt	to	be	the	‘inner	weakness’	at	the	heart	of	the	empire.	 	As	such,	native	villagers	 were	 presented	 in	 hunting	 narratives	 as	 utterly	 incapacitated																																																									211	Dinesh	Joseph	Wadiwel,	The	War	against	Animals,	Critical	Animal	Studies,	volume	3	(Leiden ;	Boston:	Brill,	2015),	p.	269.	
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with	 regard	 to	 the	maraudings	of	man-eaters,	 their	 terror	 ‘only	 resolved	by	the	masculine	intervention	of	the	white	hunter’	(Pandian,	p.87).			 Corbett	 describes	 his	 encounters	 with	 village	 inhabitants	 in	 just	such	terms;	in	the	case	of	the	Champawat	Man-Eater	he	claims	that	all	fifty	members	of	the	persecuted	village	were	living	 ‘in	a	state	of	abject	terror’	and	only	began	to	feel	safe	enough	to	venture	out	of	their	homes	after	he	and	his	men	arrived,	made	a	fire	in	the	courtyard,	and	sat	down	to	a	cup	of	tea	(p.2).	Corbett’s	inescapable	conviction,	he	says,	after	spending	time	in	‘that	 stricken	 land’	 was	 that	 ‘there	 is	 no	more	 terrible	 thing	 to	 live	 and	have	one’s	being	under	the	shadow	of	a	man-eater’	(p.13).	This	figuration	of	the	tiger	as	‘an	oppressive	figure	terrorizing	the	rural	populace	with	the	spectre	 of	 arbitrary	 violence’	 is	 one	 that	 Pandian	 argues	 is	 common	 to	colonial	hunting	narratives,	and	speaks	to	Wadiwel’s	observation	that	the	terror	 of	 the	 rogue	 animal	 lies	 in	 its	 ‘levying	 a	 violence	 that	 might	 be	interpreted	 as	 itself	 instrumental’	 (i.e.	 human-like)	 (p.269).	 The	 more	important	sense	of	the	word	arbitrary	here,	then,	I	would	argue,	is	not	that	it	 points	 toward	 the	man-eater’s	 attacks	 as	 purposeless	 or	 random,	 but	rather	 that	 it	 speaks	 to	 the	 sense	 in	 which	 the	 animal	 exercised	 an	absolute	right	to	take	human	life	at	will;	in	other	words,	it	was	understood	as,	in	Wadiwel’s	terms,	‘sovereign’	(p.270).			 In	 pursuing	 and	 killing	 man-eaters,	 then,	 hunters	 enacted	 a	substitution	 –	 the	 reign	 of	 the	 tiger	 was	 over,	 and	 instead	 the	 hunter	became	 ‘kingly	 potentate,	 personification	 of	 sovereign	 force’,	 extending	the	 governing	 powers	 of	 the	 British	 administration	 further	 into	 the	countryside	(Pandian,	p.88).	This	was	despite	the	fact	that	the	accuracy	of	many	 accounts	 of	 the	 damage	 done	 by	man-eaters	 is	 certainly	 in	 doubt.	Tigers	were	useful	scapegoats	 for	human	crimes,	and	companies	offering	‘shikar’	to	Europeans	were	keen	to	market	themselves	–	in	one	case	silver	bangles	purportedly	 found	in	the	stomach	of	a	dead	tiger	were	shown	to	the	client	that	had	made	the	kill,	giving	him	a	sense	of	‘heroic	achievement’	(Sankhala,	 p.135).	 The	 importance,	 then,	 lay	 rather	 in	 the	 second	substitution	of	power	that	was	made	when	villagers	began	to	turn	to	the	
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British	 to	 kill	 man-eaters,	 rather	 than	 the	 Indian	 shikaris.	 Mackenzie	argues	 that	 Europeans	 turned	 the	 shooting	 of	 tigers	 into	 ‘a	 symbolic	system	 of	 dependence’	 in	 which	 they	 played	 a	 ‘protective	 function.’	 In	other	 words	 the	 performance	 of	 dependence	 (the	 ‘repertoire	 of	 images’	that	 saw	 the	 Raj’s	 hunters	 cast	 as	 defenders	 of	 vulnerable	 village	inhabitants)	was	more	important	than	its	actuality.		 Frida’s	 two	 ‘battles’	 with	 the	 tiger,	 and	 her	 characterisation	 of	 it	before	 that,	can	also	be	understood	as	kinds	of	performance	that	seek	to	introduce	 symbolic	 dependency	 into	 her	 relationship	 with	 Ruth.	 This	means	that	they	cast	Ruth	as	defenceless	victim	and	Frida	as	her	powerful	and	 committed	 protector	 in	 a	 colonial	 operation	 that	mimics	 that	 of	 the	British	Raj.	 Furthermore,	 the	 text	mobilises	 the	 historical	 context	 I	 have	discussed	above	in	order	to	draw	attention	to	the	temporally	and	spatially	removed	 encounters	 with	 strangeness	 that	 flow	 out	 from	 and	 structure	Ruth	and	Frida’s	 relationship	with	 the	 tiger.	That	 is,	 it	 lays	bare	some	of	the	 conditions	of	possibility	 that	 allow	Frida	 to	 successfully	 establish	 this	dependent	relationship.			 Frida	first	seems	to	introduce	the	prospect	(and	indeed,	certainty)	of	 her	 victory	 over	 the	 tiger	 through	 the	 vexed	 removal	 and	 cleaning	 of	Ruth’s	 living	 room	 rug,	 which	 she	 initially	 names	 as	 the	 source	 of	 the	‘animal	smell’	Ruth	attributes	to	the	tiger’s	visit.	The	distinction	between	rug	 and	 tiger	 collapses	 as	 the	 conversation	 continues	 (‘A	 kind’ve	 hairy	smell,	 is	that	it?’),	so	that	the	rug	takes	on	associations	of	animal	hide,	or	pelt	–	a	prized	commodity	during	the	nineteenth	century	when	the	British	would	 go	 to	 ‘ludicrous	 efforts’	 to	 acquire	 tiger	 skins	 (Mackenzie,	 p.182).	These	 overtones	 become	 more	 explicit	 when	 Ruth	 describes	 Frida	carrying	 the	 rug	 outside,	 ‘corpselike,	 over	 her	 right	 shoulder’,	 beating	 it	with	 so	much	 force	 that	 ‘dust	 and	 hair’	 rise	 in	 clouds	 (p.148).	 After	 this	Ruth	and	Frida	wash	the	rug	together,	Ruth	enjoying	the	‘short,	rough	feel	of	the	bristles	under	her	fingernails’	and	describing	the	way	in	which	‘for	the	 rest	 of	 the	 day	 it	 fidgeted	 in	 the	 wind	 as	 if	 something	 trapped	underneath	 were	 making	 half-hearted	 attempts	 to	 escape’	 (p.150).	 The	
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imagery	 used	 to	 describe	 the	 rug	 evokes	 connotations	 both	 of	 a	vanquished	 animal	 foe	 (the	 corpselike	 rug,	 ‘beaten’,	 just	 as	 man-eating	tigers	 were	 beaten	 toward	 the	 awaiting	 hunter 212 )	 and	 also	 the	preparation	 of	 the	 tiger	 skin	 for	 sale	 as	 a	 trophy.	Miller	 argues	 that	 the	value	of	the	colonial	hunting	trophy	was	not	simply	financial,	but	lay	more	explicitly	in	its	‘emblematic	power’	calling	attention	to	the	‘military,	rather	than	 commercial,	 associations	 of	 hunting’;	 that	 is,	 of	 a	 victory	 won	 by	force,	holding	a	powerful	‘symbolic	charge.’213	The	episode	with	the	rug	is	symbolically	 charged	 in	 just	 this	 way,	 casting	 Frida	 as	 hunter	 (and	successful	victor)	before	she	even	faces	the	tiger,	as	well	as	speaking	to	the	way	 that	 her	 authority	 is	 tied	 to	 the	 policing	 of	 and	 control	 over	 the	domestic	 sphere	 that	 is	 also	 often	 assumed	 as	 having	 a	 relationship	 to	different	kinds	of	care.			 This	 continues	 later	 through	 another	 domestic	 activity:	 cooking.	Explaining	that	they	require	‘’red	meat	for	strength’’,	Frida	serves	steak	for	herself	 and	 Ruth,	 an	 unusual	 extravagance	 that	 once	 again	 holds	 a	symbolic	 aspect.	 Meat-eating	 was	 described	 as	 essential	 to	 the	 diet	 of	imperial	 hunters,	 who	 were	 ‘highly	 carnivorous’,	 with	 meat	 being	understood,	 ,	 as	 providing	 the	 necessary	 energy	 for	 their	 ‘position	 of	command	 and	 leadership’	 (Miller,	 p.48;Mackenzie,	 p.305).	 Once	 again,	Frida	establishes	herself	as	hunter	and	symbolic	protector;	after	the	meal	she	tells	Ruth,	‘’between	you	and	me	[…]	your	Frida	is	a	match	for	any	old	tiger’’,	 calling	 attention	 not	 only	 to	 her	 own	 strength	 and	 capability,	 but	also	 the	 fact	 that	 these	attributes	are	 to	be	deployed	 for	 (and	belong	 to)	only	Ruth	–	(‘your	Frida’).	In	this	sense,	Frida	enacts	a	false	declaration	of	servitude	that	is	in	fact	an	assertion	of	power.		 When	Frida	finally	encounters	the	tiger	she	makes	Ruth	stay	inside,	returning	after	a	disturbance	to	show	Ruth	her	left	forearm,	‘where	three	long	 scratches	already	brimmed	with	blood’	 (p.158).	 She	 insists	 that	 she	encountered	the	tiger	but	scared	him	so	badly	that	he	ran	off	‘’with	his	tail																																																									212	MacKenzie,	p.	181.	213	Miller,	p.	48.	
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between	 his	 legs’’,	 her	 wounded	 arm	 simultaneously	 testifying	 to	 his	potential	for	violence	as	well	as	her	victory	over	him.	Just	as	in	the	case	of	the	marauding	man-eaters,	at	issue	is	not	the	reality	of	the	tiger	or	even	of	the	 potential	 threat	 he	 poses,	 but	 Frida’s	 appropriation	 of	 the	 role	 of	Ruth’s	 defender	 through	 a	 symbolic	 performance	 of	 protection.	 Indeed,	when	Ruth	 asks	 to	 see	 her	 arm,	 Frida	 tells	 her	 not	 to	worry,	 that	 it	 has	seen	 worse	 than	 “a	 few	 fingernails”,	 the	 apparent	 admission	 that	 the	wounds	are	self-inflicted	seemingly	unimportant.	Instead,	what	matters	is	that	when	 Frida	 asks	 Ruth	 ‘’what	 on	 earth	would	 you	 do	without	me?’’,	Ruth	has	‘’no	idea’’(p.160).	McFarlane	gestures	here	to	the	way	that	Ruth’s	dependency	on	Frida	has	an	affective	dimension	rather	than	being	simply	attributable	to	Frida’s	ability	to	defend	her	through	force.	Once	more,	this	relationship	resembles	the	‘predatory	care’	of	the	imperial	project	with	its	twin	 goals	 of	management	 by	 force	 and	 benevolence,	with	 the	 symbolic	dependency	 cultivated	 by	 the	 management	 and	 killing	 of	 man-eaters	functioning	 on	 both	 a	 relational	 and	 a	 militarised	 level. 214 Indeed,	McFarlane	comes	close	to	echoing	Pandian’s	term	when	she	explains	that	writing	The	Night	Guest	was	a	way	of	exploring	‘the	murkiness	of	different	kinds	of	terrible	care	and	caring	terror.’215		 For	 much	 of	 the	 novel,	 the	 (benign)	 authority	 that	 Ruth	 sees	 as	governing	 and	overseeing	her	 emotional	 life	 is	 the	British	Queen,	whose	visit	 to	Fiji	 in	1953	 is	 the	subject	of	many	of	Ruth’s	reminiscences	 in	 the	present.	 She	 recalls	 a	 ball	 held	 in	 the	 Queen’s	 honour	 at	which	 she	was	kissed	by	a	young	doctor	(the	long-term	subject	of	her	desire).	Ever	since,	Ruth	explains,	 ‘she	had	felt	an	unshakeable	gratitude	towards	the	Queen,	whose	dark	royal	head	had	been	visible,	now	and	then,	among	the	people	in	 the	ballroom’	 (p.73).	Ruth’s	understanding	of	 the	Queen’s	presence	as																																																									
214	McFarlane	makes	 it	clear	 that	 in	Frida’s	case	her	care	 for	Ruth	 is	real	enough,	despite	 the	 fact	that	this	is	contradicted	by	her	at	times	abusive	behaviour.	Ruth	suspects	Frida	of	‘telling	the	truth’	when	she	insists	that	she	wants	Ruth	to	be	happy,	and	after	Ruth’s	death	a	family	friend	who	met	Frida	tells	Ruth’s	son	that	although	she	had	concerns	about	Frida	she	still	‘’got	the	impression	that	she	really	loved	your	mum.’’214		215	‘Tigers,	Suspense	and	Ageing:	An	Interview	with	Fiona	McFarlane’,	The	Wheeler	Centre		[accessed	26	March	2017].	
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somehow	both	sanctioning	and	enabling	her	moment	of	intimacy	gestures	to	the	sense	 in	which	colonial	authority	depended	not	only	on	governing	by	 force,	 but	 also,	 in	 Ann	 Laura	 Stoler’s	words,	 on	 ‘shaping	 appropriate	and	 reasoned	 affect.’216	When	 Frida	 begins	 to	 take	 an	 interest	 in	 Ruth’s	tiger,	 however,	 she	 takes	 over	 this	 role	 as	 sovereign	 arbiter	 of	 Ruth’s	emotional	life,	imagined	by	Ruth	as	‘the	Queen	of	Sheba’	standing	‘robed	in	magisterial	light’	(p.143).	Ruth	has	surrendered	herself	to	Frida’s	‘terrible	care’,	 a	 new	 protective	 authority	 taking	 over	 the	 duty	 of	 ‘educating	 the	proper	distribution	of	sentiments	and	desires’	(Stoler,	p.2).		***		 By	way	of	moving	to	conclude	this	argument,	I	want	to	return	to	the	affect	of	pleasure,	or	joy,	that	I	suggested	was	a	key	component	of	Ruth’s	relationship	to	the	tiger	on	their	first	meeting.	In	figuring	the	elusiveness	of	the	tiger’s	body	as	a	generative	source	of	enjoyment	for	Ruth,	McFarlane	presents	 their	 encounter	 as,	 in	 Ahmed’s	 terms,	 a	 generous	 one.	 Ruth	 is	shown	 to	 be	 a	 desiring	 subject,	 with	 that	 flow	 of	 desire	 geared	 toward	openness,	 a	 hospitality	 toward	 the	 tiger’s	 body	 that	 finds	 joy	 in	 the	possibilities	he	still	has	 to	surprise,	 that	 is	 to	say,	 joy	 in	relation	 to	what	Ahmed	calls	the	‘structural	possibility’	that	his	body	may	not	be	able	to	be	read.	 When	 Frida	 takes	 over	 the	 tiger,	 (and	 not	 just	 this	 tiger,	 but	 the	‘entire	species’)	her	efforts	are	geared	toward	manipulating	and	reducing	his	meaning	 by	making	 use	 of	 the	 existing	 colonial	 representations	 that	work	to	make	tigers	both	frightening	and	ultimately	killable.	As	such,	her	labours	 are	 concentrated	 on	 curtailing	 and	 redirecting	 Ruth’s	 desire	 by	shaping	 Ruth’s	 affective	 relations	 with	 the	 tiger.	 Frida’s	 performative	battles	with	the	tiger	work	toward	this	goal	not	only	by	 fixing	the	tiger’s	identity	 as	 a	 ‘man-eater’	 but	 also	 by	 enacting	 a	 complex	 negotiation	 of	boundaries	whereby	she	banishes	the	tiger	to	the	‘outside’	of	Ruth’s	home,	in	 the	 process	 installing	 herself	 as	 belonging	 within	 that	 space	 as	 its																																																									216	Ann	Laura	Stoler,	Haunted	by	Empire :	Geographies	of	Intimacy	in	North	American	History	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2006),	p.	2. 
	 238	
beloved	defender,	 or	 indeed,	 host.	That	 is,	 Frida	 cements	her	 status	 as	 a	safe,	or	knowable	stranger,	by	actively	producing	the	tiger	as	the	‘stranger	stranger’;	 the	one	who	must	be	 expelled	 in	 order	 for	her	 to	be	 ‘taken	 in	(Ahmed,	p.133).		 Frida’s	project	is	to	undo	this	productive	and	essentially	open	set	of	relations	 Ruth	 holds	 toward	 the	 tiger	 so	 that	 he	 can	 be	 understood	 as	having	his	proper	place	outside	of	 the	walls	of	Ruth’s	home.	She	rebukes	Ruth	for	leaving	the	back	door	open	at	night	to	allow	the	cats	to	come	and	go,	insisting	‘’that’ll	be	how	this	tiger	of	yours	got	in’’,	a	claim	that	causes	Ruth	to	completely	re-evaluate	her	understanding	of	the	tiger	so	that	she	imagines	him	as	an	invader,	rather	than	a	body	whose	presence	is	proper	to	 her	 home.	 We	 return	 now,	 to	 the	 passage	 with	 which	 I	 began	 this	chapter,	 having	 seen	 how	 Ruth	 arrives	 at	 this	 point	 through	 Frida’s	manipulation	of	the	tiger’s	meaning:	Ruth	 had	 always	 pictured	 the	 tiger	 just	 appearing	 in	 the	 lounge	room,	 the	 way	 a	 ghost	 might;	 he	 was	 a	 haunting	 and	 required	nothing	so	practical	as	a	door.	Now	she	saw	him	coming	by	road	and	through	 the	 high	 grasses	 of	 the	 drive;	 she	 saw	 him	 moving	 with	intemperate	speed	over	the	beach	and	ascending	the	dune;	she	saw	him	in	the	dark	garden,	making	for	the	open	door	(p.145).	After	this,	Ruth	no	longer	feels	safe	outside.	She	worries	that	‘Frida’s	tiger’	(she	has	lost	him,	now)	‘might	be	nearby’	and	that	‘he	might	come	as	night	fell	and	find	her.	Frida	might	make	him	come;	she	might	make	him	a	real	tiger,	 with	 real	 teeth’	 (p.179).	 Whereas	 previously	 Ruth’s	 overriding	emotions	toward	the	tiger	were	those	of	curiosity	and	expectation,	Frida’s	ownership	 of	 the	 tiger’s	 meaning	 results	 in	 a	 curtailment	 of	 these	movements	of	desire,	so	that	they	are	experienced	by	Ruth	as	violence,	or	at	 least	 the	threat	of	 it.	 	Ruth’s	understanding	that	Frida	now	has	agency	over	 the	 tiger,	 to	 the	 point	 that	 she	 may	 ‘make	 him	 come’,	 is	 also	 an	awareness	 of	 the	 crucial	 role	 this	 new	 tiger	 has	 in	 keeping	 her	 inside,	where	she	is	safe	from	those	‘real	teeth.’	In	this	sense,	then,	Frida’s	version	
	 239	
of	the	tiger	is	tasked	with	preventing	Ruth	from	leaving	the	house	as	well	as	emphasising	the	border	between	inside	and	out.	His	supposedly	hostile	presence	gives	Frida	 leave	 to	extend	her	authority	over	Ruth.	She	begins	locking	her	inside	the	house	when	she	goes	out	–	‘’I	can’t	leave	you	here	all	alone	with	 the	 door	 open	 and	 a	 tiger	 on	 the	 loose,	 can	 I?’’	 (p.164)	Once	more	force	and	coercion	operate	under	the	sign	of	care.			 The	 establishment	 of	 this	 inside/outside	boundary	 –	Ruth	on	one	side,	 tiger	on	 the	other	 –	has	 two	main	 effects.	 Firstly,	 it	 allows	Frida	 to	construct	herself	as	the	stranger	to	be	‘taken	in’	by	producing	the	tiger	as	the	figure	of	the	‘stranger	stranger’,	the	one	who	must	be	expelled	as	part	of	this	act	of	taking	in	(Ahmed,	p.133).	This	expulsion	is	symbolic	but	also	literal.	Frida’s	battle	with	the	tiger	drives	him	from	the	house	whilst	Ruth	remains	 locked	 inside	 her	 bedroom,	 hearing	 only	 the	 noises	 of	 an	altercation.			 The	 second	 notable	 effect	 of	 Frida’s	 ‘exorcism’	 and	 the	inside/outside	opposition	 it	 creates	 is	 that	 the	main	 source	of	 trauma	 in	the	 text	 (Frida’s	 physical,	 mental	 and	 emotional	 abuse	 of	 Ruth)	 is	displaced	onto	the	tiger.	Whilst	Ruth’s	first	encounter	with	the	tiger	enacts	what	Ahmed	calls	a	‘remembering’	hospitality,	her	subsequent	encounters	with	 Frida,	 and	 Frida’s	 with	 her	 (as	 well	 as,	 I	 have	 suggested,	 those	between	us	and	the	text)	move	away	from	this	toward	a	pernicious	kind	of	relation	 that	 is	 focused	 instead	 on	 defining	 itself	 against	 strangeness.	 In	the	case	of	the	tiger,	Frida	tells	a	story	of	violence	and	trauma	that	closely	resembles	Caruth’s	model	 in	 its	 reliance	on	an	outside/inside	opposition	that	 sets	 a	 hostile	 outside	 (the	 tiger)	 against	 a	 vulnerable	 and	 bounded	inside	 (Ruth).	 Furthermore,	 she	 casts	 herself	 as	 the	 ‘mediator’	 able	 to	challenge	 and	 manage	 this	 outside	 threat,	 so	 that	 Ruth’s	 agency	 (and	desire)	is	subsumed	into	a	symbolic	system	of	dependency	(‘’I’m	very	well	cared	for’’,	Ruth	tells	a	family	friend	–	‘’Not	only	that,	I’m	defended’’).	What	gets	missed	in	Frida’s	version	of	events,	however,	is	the	way	that	the	origin	of	 trauma	 in	 this	 text	 lies	 not	 in	 the	 threatened	 breaching	 of	 interior	subjectivity	 that	 Caruth	 posits	 as	 definitive	 of	 the	 traumatic	 experience,	
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but	rather	the	opposite:	trauma	makes	itself	felt	in	the	forced	separation	of	outside	 from	 in,	 the	 production	 of	 strange(r)ness	 at	 the	 site	 of	 the	 tiger	that	 allows	 Frida	 to	 use	 his	 presence	 as	 a	means	 of	 taking	 control	 over	Ruth	and	her	home.		
V.	 Ruth:	Tiger	
		 Ruth	does	finally	get	to	see	her	tiger,	after	months	of	only	hearing	and	smelling	him.	Indeed,	she	gets	to	see	him	even	though	he	is	supposed	to	be	dead.	Frida’s	staged	expulsion	of	the	tiger	does	its	job;	after	writing	herself	a	note	reminding	her	to	TRUST	FRIDA,	Ruth	accompanies	Frida	to	the	bank	 to	make	 a	 large	withdrawal.	 	As	 it	 turns	out,	 however,	 Frida	 is	also	subject	to	a	betrayal.	Her	boyfriend	George	has	taken	the	money	and	abandoned	her.	A	devastated	Frida	takes	Ruth	out	into	the	garden,	lays	her	down,	 and,	 after	 maybe	 or	 maybe	 not	 giving	 her	 an	 overdose	 of	medication,	 tells	 her	 to	 rest	 there	before	making	her	way	back	 inside	 to	phone	her	son.	This	will	give	Frida	‘’some	time’’:	for	what	she	isn’t	sure.				 The	 rest	 of	 the	 chapter	 takes	 the	 form	 of	 a	 long	 stream-of-consciousness	 narration	 from	 Ruth,	 moving	 through	 and	 combining	memories,	sense	impressions	and	analysis	of	her	own	body,	which	appears	to	be	changing	in	some	profound	way.		At	some	point	she	looks	down	the	beach	and	sees	the	tiger	standing	in	the	water,	 ‘his	throat	wasn’t	cut,	and	he	wore	his	own	seared	skin’’	(p.266).	Ruth	presents	his	body	in	terms	of	overwhelming	colour,	noise	and	movement:	he	 is	 ‘the	colour	of	 the	gone	sun’,	and	sings	‘in	a	low,	familiar	voice’.	When	he	moves	the	flowers	shake	and	 the	 grass	 blows.	 She	 notices	 that	 he	 is	 ‘totally	 unharmed’,	 and	 this	means	that	‘someone	had	lied	about	this	tiger.	A	woman	as	large	as	he	was,	and	as	real	as	he	was,	had	 lied’	 (p.267).	Although	the	 ‘lie’	Ruth	mentions	here	might	seem	to	refer	to	Frida’s	insistence	that	the	tiger	has	been	killed	(‘’his	 guts	 came	 spilling	 out	 […]	 there	 was	 a	 lot	 of	 blood’’)	 the	 sense	 is	unclear;	she	could	just	as	easily	be	understood	as	suggesting	that	the	‘lie’	
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Frida	has	told	is	about	knowing	anything	about	this	tiger:	anything	at	all.	The	truth,	Ruth	realises,	is	that	there	is	‘no	reason	to	be	afraid	of	this	calm	tiger’	 and	 the	 chapter	 ends	 with	 her	 leaning	 her	 head	 into	 his	 chest,	listening	to	his	 ‘great	heart’	tick.	The	moment	feels	loving,	kind	–	it	reads	like	a	reconciliation.	The	problem	of	the	tiger	is	not	solved.	The	novel	ends.				 In	writing	 this	moment	between	Ruth	and	 the	 tiger,	 an	encounter	that	clearly	tells	the	story	of	Ruth’s	death,	McFarlane	opens	up	the	tiger’s	body	to	new	kinds	of	meaning	in	introducing	a	spiritual	dimension	to	his	presence.	He	remains	a	knot	of	interpretative	difficulty,	and	the	encounter	that	takes	place	between	him	and	Ruth	retains	the	quality	of	surprise	that	Ahmed	 sees	 as	 crucial	 to	 strange,	 generous	 encounters.	 However,	McFarlane	is	just	as	interested	in	owning	up	to	the	ways	that	what	Ahmed	calls	‘prior	histories	of	encounter’	might	be	used	as	tools	for	reading,	and	beyond	that,	as	ways	to	‘violate	and	fix	others	in	regimes	of	difference’	as	she	is	in	exploring	what	unreadability	might	mean	(p.8).	I	believe	that	her	text	exposes	some	of	the	workings	of	stranger	fetishism	by	opening	up	to	scrutiny	 the	 social,	 cultural,	 political,	 and	 historical	 relationships	 that	 it	conceals,	and	drawing	attention	 to	 the	broader	networks	of	 relation	 that	are	 operative	 in	 encounters	 with	 strangeness.	 This	 chapter	 has	 tried	 to	identify	and	analyse	some	of	these	relations	as	they	appear	in	the	text,	as	well	 as	 seeking	 to	 show	 the	 ways	 that	 McFarlane	 draws	 together	encounters	with	 strangeness	 that	 at	 first	blush	might	 seem	spatially	 and	temporally	 distinct.	 In	 doing	 so,	 her	 text	 acknowledges	 that	 historical	encounters	 may	 provide	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility,	 as	 well	 as	 the	(potentially	pernicious)	reading	strategies,	 for	encounters	 in	 the	present.	Whilst	her	characters	may	not	be	hospitable	 to	strange(r)ness,	her	novel	certainly	is.		 		 	
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Concluding	Remarks	
	In	 this	 thesis	 I	 have	 argued	 for	 an	 engagement	 with	 contemporary	 loss	narratives	that	seeks	to	keep	space	open	for	nonhuman	presences	and	to	theorise	 them	 beside	 the	 human	 rather	 than	 as	 metaphorical	representations	of	it.		The	idea	of	considering	the	nonhuman	alongside	the	human	has	been	 important	to	me	here,	and	as	the	chapters	 in	this	 thesis	show,	much	of	my	analysis	has	been	concerned	with	the	ways	that	 these	two	 figures	 interact	 with	 and	 transform	 each	 other.	 As	 such	 I	 have	 not	suggested	 that	 the	 purview	 of	 stories	 about	 loss	 should	 simply	 be	expanded	 to	 ‘include’	 the	 nonhuman,	 but	 instead	 have	 tried	 to	 explore	some	 of	 the	 ways	 that	 this	 figure	 is	 always	 already	 implicated	 in	 those	narratives.	 Indeed,	 this	 thesis	 has	 shown	 that	 nonhuman	 presences	 are	often	 indispensable	 to	 the	ways	 that	 humans	 represent	 and	 define	 their	experiences	of	loss.	Beyond	the	way	that	this	might	work	metaphorically,	I	have	argued	that	nonhumans	play	an	active	part	in	the	way	narratives	of	loss	 unfold.	 As	 such,	 over	 and	 against	 the	 closing	 down	 of	meaning	 that	occurs	 when	 nonhuman	 presences	 stand	 in	 for	 human	 desires	 and	experiences,	I	have	called	attention	to	their	agency	in	such	narratives.		Such	an	argument	has	in	part	been	made	possible	because	the	texts	that	I	have	chosen	to	address	in	this	thesis	already	consider	the	representation	of	 the	 nonhuman	 in	 narrative	 form	 to	 be	 interesting	 and	 worthwhile	problem.	 As	 such	 I	 hope	 that	 it	 has	 showcased	 the	 richness	 of	contemporary	 textual	 engagement	with	 the	nonhuman,	because	 it	 seems	to	me	that	our	contemporary	moment	is	increasingly	producing	texts	that	are	 not	 only	 interested	 in	 the	 nonhuman	 in	 this	 way,	 but	 also	 see	 its	presence	as	indispensable	to	the	stories	they	want	to	tell.	This	is	perhaps	especially	 evident	 in	 the	 first	 section	 of	 this	 thesis,	 where	 the	 threat	 of	global	 ecological	 crisis	 (and	 indeed	 its	 current	 unfolding)	 sees	 humans	drawn	 into	relations	with	nonhuman	animals,	objects,	and	 things	 in	new	and	urgent	ways.		
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	In	exploring	some	of	the	reasons	for	this	increasing	engagement	with	the	nonhuman	in	contemporary	texts,	this	thesis	has	aimed	to	engage	with	the	‘particularity	 of	 encounters’	 that	Ahmed	 sees	 as	 crucial	 to	 an	 analysis	 of	how	otherness	 is	produced.	This	has	meant	placing	 the	 texts	 I	have	read	here	in	contexts	that	extend	across	time	and	space	in	order	to	explore	the	ways	 that	 the	 refigurations	 of	 subjectivity	 and	 relationality	 that	 attend	experiences	 of	 loss	 do	 not	 occur	 in	 isolation.	 Rather,	 they	 arise	 from	specific	 historical,	 social,	 political,	 and	 cultural	 identifications	 and	encounters,	and	 if	 these	contexts	are	missed	 then	we	also	miss	 the	ways	that	we	are	historically	brought	into	being	as	subjects	by	the	abjection	of	whatever	and	whomever	is	considered	to	be	nonhuman.	In	this	thesis	such	an	analysis	of	particularity	has	raised	questions	of	citizenship,	victimhood,	nationhood,	colonialism,	and	whiteness,	amongst	others.	It	is	my	hope	that	in	 doing	 so	 it	 has	 done	 some	 justice	 to	 the	 reality	 that	 the	 stories	 told	about	 loss	 and	 the	 nonhuman	 both	 implicate	 and	 do	 violence	 to	 their	subjects.			In	concluding	this	thesis,	however,	I	would	like	to	reflect	more	specifically	on	 the	 ways	 that	 both	 the	 contemporary	 and	 its	 contexts	 have	 been	figured	in	my	arguments.	Whilst	contemporary	texts	are	often	defined	as	those	 coming	 after	 World	 War	 Two,	 or	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 twentieth	century,	the	term	is	malleable	and	in	need	of	constant	redefinition.	Indeed,	the	texts	 that	 I	choose	to	 focus	on	 in	 this	 thesis	are	all	much	newer	than	that:	 of	 them	 all	 only	The	Hunter	 is	 a	 twentieth-century	 novel	 (and	 only	just	makes	it	into	that	category,	with	a	publication	date	of	1999).		For	my	purposes	here,	the	contemporariness	of	these	texts	has	primarily	come	to	be	 signified	 through	 the	ways	 that	 they	 privilege	 questions	 of	 ecological	crisis	 and	 border	 policing	 with	 reference	 to	 recent	 global	 events.		However,	 it	 is	also	apparent	 that	 these	 texts	have	more	 in	common	 than	the	kinds	of	contemporary	crises	they	choose	to	examine.	Specifically,	they	all	 show	 an	 interest	 in	 the	 workings	 of	 a	 settler	 consciousness	 as	 this	relates	to	questions	of	loss,	trauma,	and	the	nonhuman.	Not	only	does	the	
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action	and	narrative	of	 the	texts	discussed	here	all	 take	place	 in	national	spaces	 that	 share	 histories	 (and	 present	 moments)	 of	 privileging	whiteness	 through	violence	 (specifically	Australia,	 the	USA,	 and	 the	UK),	but	 the	 authors	 themselves	 are	 also	 white	 subjects	 of	 these	 nations.	 As	such,	my	thesis	approaches	the	ethical	questions	of	visibility	and	inclusion	that	accompany	its	discussion	of	loss	and	the	nonhuman	through	texts	that	engage	 in	 various	 ways	 with	 violent	 settler	 histories.	 In	 this	 sense	 my	argument	 can’t	 be	 seen	 as	 representative	 of	 the	 engagement	 of	 a	 broad	variety	of	contemporary	 texts	with	 loss,	 (this	 thesis	contains	no	work	by	indigenous	writers,	for	example)	but	instead	works	to	show	how	a	group	of	 authors	 that	 benefit	 from	 the	 uneven	 power	 structures	 of	 settler	societies	navigate	 legacies	of	colonialism	when	they	write	about	 loss	and	subjectivity.			Necessarily,	 the	 explicitness	 of	 such	 an	 engagement	 varies	 between	 the	texts	 I	 have	 examined	 here.	 In	 Chapter	 One,	 I	 began	 by	 arguing	 that	Catherine’s	fascination	with	the	automaton	and	its	hull	in	The	Chemistry	of	Tears	 led	 her	 to	 a	 troubling	 awareness	 of	 her	 own	 imbrication	 in	oppressive	 structures,	 an	 uncomfortable	 but	 necessary	 realisation	 only	made	 possible	 when	 she	 cultivated	 an	 affective	 openness	 to	 slippery	nonhuman	 subjectivities.	 	 Whilst	 the	 text	 focused	 most	 closely	 on	 the	relationship	between	grief	and	environmental	 consciousness,	 I	 examined	the	 contextual	 ‘particularity’	 of	 Catherine’s	 encounters	 with	 different	subjects	in	order	to	highlight	the	ways	that	ecological	crisis	was	linked	in	the	 text	 to	 structural	 systems	 of	 oppression	 (particularly	 white	supremacy)	that	distribute	humanness	only	to	privileged	subjects.			Chapters	Two	and	Three	also	took	ecological	crisis	as	their	theme,	with	a	more	specific	 focus	on	extinction.	The	workings	of	de-extinction	projects	again	 raised	complicated	questions	about	human	responsibility	and	guilt	in	 the	 context	 of	 anthropogenic	 extinction,	 affective	 responses	 that	 I	suggested	 could	 be	 productively	 linked	 through	 a	 reading	 of	 Freud	 to	human-animal	 psychical	 dependency.	 In	 Chapter	 Three	 I	 focused	
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specifically	 on	 Australian	 history	 and	 questions	 of	 national	 identity	 and	the	 national	 past.	 I	 analysed	 performative	 white	 (specifically	 feminine)	precarity	in	the	texts,	and	argued	that	both	novels	suggested	this	might	be	mobilised	as	a	means	of	advocating	responsibility	for	acts	of	colonial	and	ecological	violence.			In	 Chapters	 Four,	 Five,	 and	 Six	 I	 changed	 focus	 slightly	 to	 consider	nonhuman	 presences	 in	 narratives	 of	 trauma,	 proceeding	with	 a	 critical	analysis	of	various	forms	of	trauma	theory	during	which	I	argued	for	the	disruption	 of	 classical	 trauma	 theory’s	 tendencies	 to	 reify	 the	 humanist,	sovereign	subject.	A	reading	of	The	Dogs	of	Littlefield	drew	out	some	of	the	ways	 that	 these	 humanist	 structures	 of	 thought	 were	 also	 structures	 of	whiteness	that	separated	out	 ‘good’	and	 ‘bad’	subjects	through	processes	of	 racialization	 and	border	policing,	 an	 analysis	 grounded	by	 the	novel’s	thematic	 preoccupation	 with	 liberal	 racism	 in	 the	 USA	 post-9/11.	 In	Chapter	Six	I	engaged	with	the	relation	between	settler	consciousness	and	land	 ownership	 through	 analysing	 borders,	 empire,	 and	 the	 limits	 of	hospitality	in	The	Night	Guest.	 In	this	final	chapter	I	also	moved	to	reflect	critically	on	the	ways	that	a	reader	themselves	might	become	implicated	in	ungenerous	 reading	 practices;	 ones	 governed	 by	 the	 same	 diagnoses	 of	‘otherness’	that	subtend	colonialism.		Future	work	done	in	this	area	could	usefully	 build	 on	 and	 develop	 some	 of	 the	 relationships	 between	 loss,	colonialism,	and	subjectivity	 that	 I	have	reflected	on	here,	particularly	 in	relation	to	texts	that	both	depict	and	critique	whiteness.	It	would	also	be	interesting	to	consider	in	more	detail	the	particular	and	varied	affects	that	emerge	when	the	settler	consciousness	that	links	the	texts	examined	here	comes	 up	 against	 its	 own	 implication	 in	 both	 structural	 and	 directed	violence.			Finally,	however,	I	hope	that	by	engaging	in	this	thesis	with	the	problem	of	how	 to	 generously	 interpret	 nonhuman	 bodies,	 I	 have	 shown	 that	 one	possible	means	of	keeping	space	open	for	their	presence	is	to	embrace	the	narrative	 pleasure	 found	 in	 surprise.	 I	 see	 this	 as	 one	 of	 the	 most	
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important	conclusions	of	my	thesis,	as	well	as	another	area	of	interest	for	future	research	on	loss	and	subjectivity.	As	my	analysis	of	The	Night	Guest	suggests,	 remaining	 open	 to	 the	 possibilities	 that	 both	 human	 and	nonhuman	bodies	have	to	surprise	can	be	a	source	of	joy,	as	well	as	a	way	of	 recognising	 the	 agency	 of	 these	 bodies.	 Engaging	 with	 the	 affect	 of	surprise,	then,	as	Ruth’s	hospitable	encounters	with	the	tiger	show,	might	also	mean	 leaning	 into	 feelings	of	discomfort	and	 fear	as	well	 as	ones	of	delight	and	astonishment.	 It	 is	my	sense	that	such	an	engagement	would	be	 a	 productive	 and	 generous	 way	 of	 approaching	 textual	 otherness,	 as	well	as	a	means	of	recognising	our	own	implication	in	its	production	and	consumption.				 	
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